ATTACHED DRAFT OF AN INTELLIGENCE ENCLOSURE FOR A REPORT UPDATING NSC 68/4 (UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01284A000100400014-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2013
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: July 14, 1951
• Content Type: MEMO

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FORM Nn
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mm,,
14 September 1951
DATE
TO:
SA/DCI (Mr. Jackson)
BUILDING
ROOM NO.
Administration
REMARKS:
This is the paper on which we have
total concurrence from all the IAC
agencies. I am going to recommend
to the Director that it be sent in
this form to NSC without further IAC
consideration. May I have yo
concurrence?
STAT
FROM:
Col. C. B. Hansen
BUILDING
ROOM NO.
E
Administration
220
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KEK0RANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence DATE: lL September 1953.
FOR IAC APPROVAL OP`. Attached Draft of an Intelligence Enclosure for a Report
Updating NSC 68/1; (United States Objectives and Programs
for National Security)
Sur+eary of Attached Enclosure:
Paragraph 1. Intensification of intelligence is primarily a problem of
obtaining qualified personnel.
2. Expansion is contemplated in Related Activities; armed forces
should provide a portion of this personnel.
3. Policies of NSC 86/1 are being studied in an effort to help fix
more specifically interdepartmental responsibilities for the
safekeeping and welfare of defectors.
!t. Need for further emphasis on requirements, coordination, and
periodic assessment of intelligence resources.
5. Need for further examination of requirements and priorities in
collection, especially from clandestine sources.
6. Systematic analysis of Soviet economy should help in appraisal
of capabilities and in search for vulnerabilities.
7. Progress has been made in the collection of intelligence by
scientific means--but much remains to be done.
8. Progress has been made in coordination but there is still room
for improvement.
9. IAC increasingly helpful in correlation among intelligence
agencies.
10. Watch Committee systematically reviews current indications.
11. a. Increased difficulties anticipated in clandestine collection;
will require more people and more money.
b. In the opinion of IAC representatives, presently directed
personnel cuts will make it difficult for the armed forces
intelligence services to maintain *yen minimum programs.,
12. a. Sharpened intensity of U.9.-Soviet relationships sours need
for more and better intelligence. Ind product, however,
will never fully satisfy policy.-makers and planners,
b. Imperative that intelligence services obtain the personnel
and logistical support required for fulfillment of their
expanded tasks.
Action Taken:
1. Reviewed and concurred in by: DDCI, SA/DCI, DI)/P (00, 050, OPC),
DD/A, ONE, OCD, ORR, ACT, 081, OIC9 and OGC.
2. Reviewed and concurred in by the IAC agencies.
Recommendation:
1. Recommend attached revision of NSC 68/4 be dispatched to KSC
without further IAC consideration.
C. B. Hansen
Colonel, USAF
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FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
1. The peculiar nature of intelligence operations makes it
difficult to project national intelligence planning in terms
comparable to those employed in a program aimed at the attainment
of manpower or production goals. While intelligence must
intensify its activities if it would audit the Soviet world's
growth in strength and estimate its intentions, expansion in
itself offers no guarantee of improved intelligence. Improvement
in the intelligence product is dependent not only upon increased
collection of reliable foreign intelligence but upon the skill
with which it is evaluated and assembled in the form of estimates.
Thus the root problem of intelligence is obtaining personnel
skilled in collection and evaluation.
2. Existing plans contemplate expansion within the next two
years to three times the current strength of personnel engaged in
clandestine intelligence and Related Activities. Expanded domestic
and overseas facilities for training are presently in process of
construction. A sizeable portion of that strength should consist
of personnel from the armed forces.
3. Policies approved in NSC 86/1 for the encouragement and
asylum of defectors from the Soviet Union and its orbit are being
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13 September 1951
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studied in order that interdepartmental responsibilities for the
safekeeping, resettlement, and rehabilitation of defectors may be
further refined. This study is being, conducted with a view toward
recommending to MSC such action as may be appropriate.
4. To improve the overall value of their intelligence
product, the national intelligence agencies must focus added
emphasis upon three essential parts of their program:
First, they must make certain that substantive objectives in
field activity, research, and estimates are properly related to
the political and military problems confronting members of the
National Security Council.
Second, the activities of the intelligence agencies of the
government must be so synchronized that the resources of each
provide maximum support for the attainment of these objectives.
Third, they must constantly re-assess and strengthen their
capabilities and resources.
5. It is especially important that collection facilities of
the national intelligence agencies be improved. Efforts are being
made to establish accurate priorities of essential elements of
information. This requirement is especially important in the
field of clandestine collection where extraordinary difficulties
are encountered.
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,6. Establishment of a coordinated program for systematic
analysis of the Soviet and satellite economies should provide a
better appraisal of the capabilities and long-range intentions of
the USSR. It should likewise suggest possible avenues of U. S.
counteraction by exposing the vulnerabilities of the USSR and its
7. Progress has been made in the collection of intelligence
by scientific means (as distinct from the collection of scientific
intelligence itself), but much remains to be accomplished in this
field, especially in view of the difficulties encountered in
"conventional" clandestine activities.
8. In the coordination of foreign intelligence among national
intelligence agencies, the Director of Central Intelligence is
required by law to correlate the intelligence produced by each in
order to ensure that no gaps are left uncovered between agencies.
At the same time by recommendation to the NSC he can initiate
action to prevent duplication of effort or overlapping of one
agency upon the field of action or functions of another. The
Central Intelligence Agency is likewise charged with responsibility
for services of common concern which can most advantageously be
performed centrally. While progress has been made in this process
of coordination, there is still need for improvement.
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9. The Intelligence Advisory Committee with representation
from each of the departmental intelligence agencies has been
increasingly helpful in facilitating consultation and the exchange
of opinion among intelligence chiefs. The IAC provides a means
whereby the chief of intelligence of each agency of government can
comment upon, concur in, or object to recommendations, proposals,
or conclusions regarding problems of national intelligence concern.
10. To provide rapid dissemination of information on signifi-
cant military or political events, there has been created an
interdepartmental Watch Committee whose responsibility it is to
review systematically all incoming reports and to be alert for
indications of critical moves. Facilities for prompt transmission
and for evaluation of these indications are constantly being
improved.
11. a. More and more critical information within the USSR
and its satellites must be sought by clandestine means,
either directly or scientifically. -The ordinary difficulties
of "conventional" clandestine collection are hugely magnified
within the Soviet orbit where virtually the entire population
is covered with a vast counterespionage net and where state
surveillance severely restricts opportunities for penetration.
Not only do the enormous difficulties of such clandestine
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activities strain available resources of qualified personnel
but they may be expected to multiply in costliness and thus
require increasingly. greater expenditures.
b. In overt intelligence programs output varies almost
directly with the allocation of personnel and facilities.
.Present limitations operate to the effect that a minimum
program to meet fixed commitments can be met only with the
greatest difficulty with no margin for satisfying increasing
demands resulting from the deteriorating world situation.
In the opinion of the I.A.C. representatives of the Armed
Forces, presently directed personnel cuts will make it
impossible to maintain even this minimum program. The
Department of State indicates difficulty in obtaining
budgetary provision for adequate personnel expansion.
12. a. In summary, the sharpened intensity of U.S.-Soviet
relationships emphasizes the immediate need for intensifica-
tion of intelligence and Related Activities. Additional
funds and personnel will ccntinue to be required, not only
for expansion of the intelligence services but for the
improvement in the quality of their product, which neither
now or in the foreseeable future is likely to be all that
the planners and policy-makers desire.
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b. At the same time, the intelligence services, currently
taxed with expanded requirements, must adequately prepare for
vast expansion in the event of the spread of hostilities. If
the intelligence services are to prepare for these wartime
operations while undertaking commitments that currently strain
their present capabilities, it is imperative that they obtain
sufficient personnel and the logistical support required for
the execution of these tasks.
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