MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD FROM L. K. WHITE

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80R01284A001800040055-4
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 24, 2005
Sequence Number: 
55
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 26, 1968
Content Type: 
MFR
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP80R01284A001800040055-4.pdf253.55 KB
Body: 
Approved For [ease 2 128,D1800040055-4 26 March 1968 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Morning Meeting of 26 March 1968 In 25 Godfrey advised that three enemy battalions besieged an American artillery unit west of Kontum and were finally beaten back after some initial success. D/ONE reported that an ONE officer has produced a paper on the Soviet military build-up along the Sino-Soviet border. The Director suggested that the paper be distributed to the intelligence community. DD/S reported that the trial of the two CAT pilots opened yes- terday in Taipei and that the defense got a postponement until 22 April. 25 Carver noted that an ORD proposal for protecting the Khe Sanh perimeter has been well received. The Director drew attention to the item in today's New York Times on the resignation of Sidney Roche, a civilian adviser in the U. S. mission in Saigon. Warner noted that the final phase of the NRO hearing went well yesterday. Bross reported that General Maxwell Taylor has requested a joint CIA./DIA briefing on the enemy order of battle in South Vietnam. The Director concurred in DD/I's suggestion that the briefing be scheduled for next Monday. Approved For Release 200 .184A001800040055-4 Approved For ease 0128401800040055-4 Bross advised that the panel of the PSAC which is reviewing Vietnam matters has requested a briefing on the enemy order of battle. The Director asked Bross to inform Steininger that at this juncture CIA is not able to oblige the panel's request. ADD/P reported he has been advised that Warner Brothers has produced a film entitled, "The Double Man, " which is antipathetic to CIA. The Director urged DD/I and Godfrey to examine means of im- proving the cartographic aspects of the various intelligence publications. ACTION: 1. The Director asked the DD/I to prepare a response to a letter which he has received from a Gustavus Adolphus College philosophy professor who has invited an Agency representative to address his stu- dents on the question of whether intelligence activity is in line with Christian principles. The Director also asked the DD/I to examine what the Agency's response should be to a request to host students from Princeton University's Project Update. 25 25 25 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80R01284A001800040055-4 SEC ES ONLY U.S:N SAIGON QUITS IN PROTEST He Charges U.S. Programs in Vietnam Are Failing By BERNARD WEINRAUB Special to The New York Times SAIGON, South Vietnam, arch 25 - A former official on Gen. William C. Westmore- nd's staff who has worked for the United States mission for ore than a year is leaving South Vietnam to protest "fail- ures" of the American effort here. The official, Sidney J. Roche, issued a report to the mission saying that United States pro- grams were being frustrated by massive corruption, an "inef- fectual" South Vietnamese Army, badly managed aid poli- cies and "unsound" American military efforts. He particularly cited his unhappiness with de- velopments since the Viet- , cong's unar New Year offen- sive. "I had hoped that the Tet offensive would produce some changes. in policies," Mr: Roche said today. "However, it ap- pears that we are going to fol- low the same old road and pur- sue the same old policies." In 1964 and 1965, Mr. Roche served on General Westmore- land's staff as plans officer in charge of defense planning in Southeast Asia. After that tour, he retired as a lieutenant colo- nel with 27 years' military experience. He returned to Vietnam in December, 1966, to serve with U.S.Aide the United States mission. He has served as a civilian ad- viser to the Fifth Division of the South Vietnamese Army and held several prominent po- sitions in the mission's plan- ning and pacification programs for the provinces around Sai- gon. In one of these positions, Mr. Roche served as liaison be- tween Robert Komer, who heads the pacification program, and John Vann, the highest ranking civilian adviser in the III Corps area, which includes Saigon. Mr. Roche said that he de- cided to resign shortly after Mr. Komer's recent return from a series of conferences in Washington. Hoped for Better Things "We were all hoping that when Komer went to Washing- ton and Wheeler came here for his visit, things would change," the hefty 51-year-old former Army officer said. He was re- ferring to the recent visit of Gen. Earle C. Wheeler, Chair- man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. business is the same - pacifi- cation is still the name of the "But Komer came back and ad a staff meeting and said ears and it won't work now." "We've got to be honest with One of the points he stresses few days and said, `You've hit 'the nail on the head."' I here will come to the same con- clusions,'' Mr. Roche said. "Peo- a blueprint of what high-level officials say privately is wrong with numerous programs here. "Anyone who gets involved Sion. "What he's saying is, aft- er all, what other people have said before." Says Many Agree Mr. Roche's report reads like not cutting it over here the way things are going" "We have got to sit down and face certain realities here," he said in an interview. "The limited response that we've been maintaining is well and good if it is sufficient to do the job. It hasn't been so far." He said that a sharp increase by American forces, as well as increased bombing of supply routes in North Vietnam to- gether with the port of Hai- phong, could be a solution." "The purpose of war, any war, is to impose your will upon an enemy and not settle for a military standoff," he said. Mr. Roche's "termination of. service" report, widely distrib- uted in the United States mis- sion, has been received with anger and some embarrassment in high official quarters. "It's one man's opinion," said one person close to the mis- For R se 20051' in Saigon fits, Charging `Failure' goes on, the traditional ap- proach has always been to en- dure, if not accept, the tendency of Vietnamese officials to dip into the public till. The Vietcong, making good use of propaganda, point out South Vietnamese corruption and emphasize to the people the perfidy of their leaders, Mr. Roche says. They also point out that Unit- ed States officials are little bet- ter because they support the South Vietnamese and, there- fore, must support their corrupt practices, he continues. "It is a propaganda line that is becoming increasingly hard to counter, especially when so little defense is possible," he goes on. Says It Prolongs War Aside from the monetary loss to the American taxpayer, he says, "which no doubt is a stag- gering amount, the harm to the United States and the war ef- fort is enormous and its effects are prolonging the war." Of the South Vietnamese Army, called the A.R.V.N., Mr. Roche writes: "The Army of the Republic of Vietnam may very well be the worst army in all of Asia. It is organized along the lines em- ployed by modern armies 30 years ago. "It is top-heavy with needless headquarters and administra- tive elements. Its weapons, in the main, are outdated and no match for modern Chinese and Russian weapons now in the hands of the Vietcong and North Vietnamese regulars. "Its leadership is ineffectual, poorly trained and head over heels in graft and corruption. The army is quite content to sit in camps, take their share of the graft and corruption and let the United States Army do the fighting and take the casualties. "During the recent Tet offen- sive, instances were reported of refusal by A.R.V.N. command- ers to venture out of forts to the assistance of towns and villages under siege by Vietcong troops. All of these problems remain after more than seven years of military assistance by the Unit- ed States." Says Police Neglect Duty On other subjects, Mr. Roche says that the Vietnamese na- tional police has "largely abro- gated" its duty to destroy the Communist party apparatus. "It is imperative that the na- tional police organization be trained in the vital task of de- fending the nation from internal subversion," his report says. Mr. Roche writes of United States aid: "United States aid programs in Vietnam have been wasteful. Programs have been overfunded with no clear cut idea of the goal to be obtained. Programs are badly managed, with confu- sion as to who really manages what. "Supervision has been non- existent and many struggle with the idea that somehow we will win by the sheer weight of our expenditures. Waste has been the keynote with many United States employes apparently la- distant and vague source which has an unlimited bounty to dis- pose of, all free." Mr. Roche suggests the possi- bility that the entire aid pro- gram be taken over by the mili- tary. "An agency either unable or unwilling to police itself should be policed by others," he writes. Sees Error in Direction Of the pacification program, Mr. Roche writes: "The Revolutionary Develop- ment, or pacification, program, which has such worthwhile ob- jectives as improving the liv- ing conditions of the Viet- namese peasants by building hamlet schools, roads, dispen- saries, and providing security from Vietcong attacks is poor- ly supervised.- "This is not surprising when one realizes that the Central Intelligence Agency, whose charter by Congress is to pro- vide foreign intelligence to the United States and to organize overseas intelligence nets, is the principal supervisor. "It is small wonder that the principal effort by the C.I.A would be the organization of intelligence nets rather than the supervision of a very worth- while program." Mr. Roche writes of United States military operations: "American men are dying this very day because of faulty tac- tics devised and ordered from Washington, tactics which limit choice of targets, prescribe types of weapons and define military objectives. Wants Tactics in Field "The right of Washington to dictate the strategy cannot be questioned. However, the tac- tics to achieve the objective of the strategy should be left to field commanders." Sitting in his crate-filled apartment this afternoon, Mr. Roche, who is scheduled to leave for the United States on Wednesday, said quietly: "It's not a question whether we did the right thing four or five years ago. It's a question of trying to extricate ourselves and save Southeast Asia for our side." "We're not going to do it un- less we face realities and make some changes," he said ."We have 20,000 dead so far and, God forbid, we're going to have another 20,000 dead if we con- tinue as we are." Mr. Roche, who is leaving two months before his 18- month contract expires is re- turning to his home in Colum- bus, Ga., where his wife and four children live. He said he had no immediate future plans. "I just want to go fishing for a long, long time," he said. sion that all of the supplies ands equipment come from some fr -4