MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD FROM L. K. WHITE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01284A001800050069-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 69
• Publication Date: August 12, 1968
• Content Type: MFR

Approved Fo~lease
~Q~01 001800050069-8
12 August 1968
Morning Meeting of 12 August 1968
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Lehman drew attention to MAC V's weekly wrap-up, which sug-
gests that most of the enemy main force units are in positions to launch
military action.
The Director was highly complimentary of the material contained
in the briefing book provided for his session at the ranch on Saturday.
D/ONE advised that the Estimate on Soviet emplacement of weapons
of mass destruction on the sea bed is scheduled for this week's USIB
meeting.
Bross discussed Friday's PFIAB session.
DD/S&T reported that there was an SR-71 flight over North
ADD/P drew attention to indications that the Communists may be
planning an attack against Nakhon Phanom airbase in Thailand.
DDCI suggested and the Director concurred that USIB be briefed
Thursday on the study of enemy forewarning of air attacks.
DDCI drew attention to the planned study group on
and indicated a scenario whereby the NIRB will make an input to the
study group provided the study group's report is reviewed by the Direc-
tor before submission to the Secretary of Defense. The Director con-
curred in this arrangement.
Approved For Release 2
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The Director drew attention to the recent series of articles by
George Wilson in the Washington Post and asked the DD/I and the
DD/S&T to look into the articles to determine the source of Wilson's
information.
Approved For Releas
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 ? .Approve or Release 200~dQ#14$~p80'
' ~ ~ t~ August 1968 ,
waahtnaton Poat Btaft writer "'
TH,E UNITED STATES this week Shows`' Since MIRV 'still atllst undergo bw~o years
off a new weapon which will shave an in?~,'of testing before dt is ready for deployment?
~calcu4able effect on the world's a1'ms race. {the President who follows Mr. Johnson also
It could damp it down-wand thus fulSill will have the option of scrapping MIRY. to a
President Johnson's hopes-or escalate vtlslow. the arms race. ~
nd thus confirm bhe fears of many ~ But vJhat anany scientists Sear including'
~; By Geor?e C. Filson .
a
scientists. ;some on the President's Science Advisory.
The weapon is called MIRY, an acronym, Commnttee, is that MIRV will be "destabiliz-,j
for . znultiple~ndependently-targetable?re-en-. ang." Once MIRY completed those tests the ~
try vehicle. It is several nuclear genies in Soviets knave avast precede deployment, the,
one bottle in the form .of several .H~bosnbs ,old uncertainty which has spawned billions
atop one missile. ~ i of dollars of useless weapons would move in.
E The deadly package of H;bombs is slated' Soviet observation satellites photograph'
to be carried by the Minuteman 3 ICBM;,our ICBMs all bheitime. Bwt-once MIRY
~~ and bhe Poseidon missile. The Minuteman; tests were finished,--blow oou~ld bl-e Soviets
3 will be put in underground silos while thei?tell whether bile warhead on our ICBMs
Poseidon will replace the Polaris missile one were MIRV or just one H~bomlb? The tempts-?
~ our nuclear submarines. , tion, in this svtuation, would be far the;
~~, MIRV, if deployed, would mean many; 6ov~iets to'deploy more nuclear weapons as'
f times more nuclear warheads in the world.I a hedge. .
Each Minuteman 3 would have three H-~ coo ,
;,bombs do its -nose and each Poseidon as=~. WITHOUT MIRV, U.S. and~Soviet Union
many as ten. Russian missiles, because bhey reconnaissance sateliites~ could police a mis-
are more powerful than ours, could carry,, side freeze argreement. On~site inspeatioa
even snore MIR.Vs. The United States be=; at last co~tild be remove~i~ as the sbttmbling?
Iieves, nt ds well a~hAad of bhe Soviet Union; block to arms~ontrol agreements with ~ the
~~ ,
; stumiblin,g-block right where Lt was. Hawks:
a
ave een respon ing o eac_ o er s w ap-, _,
h
on advances. So Russia-albhougn off to sure destruct2on of the aggressor. ~
`a late stares-will probably go to MIRV un? But MIRV, if i~t became accurate enough
;less the United Statr's calls ofif~its develop- through new guidance techniques; cowed.
ment. ~ ruin this deterrence which has kept the;
' .The public flight test of Minuteman 3 and..world ouh of nuclear war. A nation with'
Poseidon-s~4a~ted for Thursday and Friday a1 MIRV might ftigure it could knock out the,
C K d 'bh bh 1 'b']it of enemy's offense completely in a first strike.i
e ,
~ THE PFINTAGON contemds MIRV makes
an effective antiballistic-missile defense im-~ i'n bhe United States and Soviet Union woukL'
1 possible. The package of warheads would) argue that they, could not safely rely. on'
break apart on the way to bhe target city: satellites and obher mec~hanica4 means to
4? so the defense . would have too .many in?~ Police' an arms agreement.
~~ com2ng, H.bombs ~o handle. ~ I SCill another fear some scientists have
~, The deadly shower of H~i?om~bs would use about MIRV-one voiced by Nobel prize-;
~;,up the city's antimissile-missiles. Then a~ winning ,physicist Hans,Bethe-is that.the
second wave of 'nuclear-tigped missiles weapon will bring back the nervous days
;could fly into bhe city untim,peded. Or tar-, ~ ?counter?force" and "first strke."
',getin~g oSfdcers. could decide to get more, ? Counter~orce is bhe strategy of knocking
f bang for the buck .by sending each of the, out the other nation's weapons before they
MMIRVs aboard one missile to a differenti can be fired against you. Both the United
xnity, ~ ~ States and bhe Soviet Union have deployed.
'~ The United States and the Soviet Union( their nuclear weapons so that enowgvk of
them would survive a surprise strike, to as-
b d' t h th
'
i y
ape erne y vn a usua poss
a delay will focus world attention! on~ A rnatrion without MIRV might fd~gure; in!.
MIRV: President Johnson, i~t will be obvious, time of crisis, bhat.bhis indeed might happen.'
indeed has a blue chip; which cou~id~beplayed That nablom therefore would bg tempted.to~
fat arms talks with bhe Soviet.. " ~ ibre~firat., ]. `- =y{.
TL. TT...: L...7 G~.L...L.... .......7.-1 ..n11 ..,iSC 41, .. .7n1 All 11113 makes thi$ ~IeCll'8? tes~J ~~t ~'Yle~
velopment Of MIRV in exchange for a cor? ~?pe +~ ~S1g[uuaani: ~e-`"!;~"'aY~Cr.au aa~aa:1C,~;
fensive aissiles. Such a tradeoff would ~
lto "stabilizing" bhe arms ,relationship be?'
~bween the,tnvo superpowersy _ ... , ,1"'.~
Approved For?Rel~ase 2005/11/23 :CIA-RDP80R01284A001800050069-8~
 ? The Washington Post
Approved For'Ralease 2005/111$3A~gR012801800050069-8
~n .~ ~~i-14i~~i~~ ~`i~~~
RY George C. ~Vilson
1': ash:nRton Post Staff Writer _
U.S. satellite pictures indi- those bombers would get
tale the Soviet Union is con? through the defense.
ducting reappraisal of its "The question now before
bomber and missile defenses. I Soviet strategists," said an
The photographic evidence ~ American specialist, "is where
shows that the Soviets have 'do ,we go from here?"
slowed, if not called oi'f, the Historically, the Soviet
construction of an anti-missile Union has spent more money
defense around iVToscow. on defensive weapons than on
The satellite pictures also ~ offensive ones. The ratio is
have satisfied U.S. intelligence ~ about 3 to 1 compared to 1 to
officials that the Tallinn de-' 1 for the U.S., according to
fence across the northeast ap.I ~ those who made a longterm
proaches to Russia is against; ;study of the subject.'
I American bombers, not mis ~ It would, therefore, be quite
~siles. ~ a wrench for the Soviets to
But even this Tallinn de- ~ change this ]one-time empha-
fence, U.S. specialists believe, cis to' the ofl;ense. But the
is now being challenged in proven penetration ability -of
Russia as hardly worth it, airplanes and the projected
based on the experience of: pehetr