IMPACT OF THE US STAND ON HUMAN RIGHTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01362A000200100001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 11, 1977
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs .
The attached memorandum, "Impact of the US Stand
on. Human eights," is in response to your request,
conveyed to us by IN-1s. Tuchman.
STANSFIELD TURNER
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Attachment:
RP-M- 77- 10107
Date 57-//-
F0 r?4 USE PREVIOUS
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11 May 1977
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Initial international skepticism about the seriousness of the
Carter administration's commitment to the fostering of human rights
has been dispelled by presidential statements and US initiatives in
bilateral relations and international forums. Considerable confu-
sion and suspicion over US motives persist, however, and despite
recent statements by Secretary Vance and other officials there still
is apprehension over the lengths to which the US may be prepared to
go in pursuit of human rights objectives. This memorandum surveys
reaction to the US stand. A regional listing of significant develop-
ments is provided at annex.
The US stand on human rights has prompted a number of
governments to move toward bettering their human rights
performance. This has occurred principally where the re-
gime has been anxious to preserve cooperative relations
with the US, has not felt publicly challenged or specifi-
cally prodded by Washington, and is relatively confident
about its internal security situation.
Even in these cases, however, there has been a notable
reluctance to accept the US stand at face value. Public
expressions of understanding about US concerns have been
This memorandum was prepared by the office of Regional
and Political Analysis. Inquiries may be directed to
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matched by private assessments of Washington's emphasis on
human rights as a ploy designed to pressure other countries
into comporting themselves in accordance with US policies
generally.
Attribution of such ulterior motivation, the connec-
tion of human rights to other issues, and a marked propen-
sity to interpret US pronouncements and actions in
egocentric terms have been characteristic reactions of
countries with the most cause for unease over the US stand.
Repressive practices have intensified in some cases, and
bilateral relations.have suffered in a number of instances.
There is strong public endorsement of the principles
that underlie the US stand in some countries, but in many
cases it is coupled with considerable worry over the poten-
tial for adverse international political consequences.
Applause for Washington's espousal of human rights principles,
therefore, is not always accompanied by approval of specific
US initiatives. A broad range of political relationships
important to the US thus has been complicated by the addi-
tion of what many foreign observers view as a new element
of uncertainty in international affairs.
The Communist World
The Soviets, perplexed and concerned over Washington's
human rights initiatives, tend to view the US stand as aimed
primarily at them. Even sophisticated Soviet observers re-
portedly suspect US actions are part of a campaign to under-
mine their political system. The Soviets reportedly have
been concerned over the potential implications of heightened
activity by intellectual dissidents if they attempt to com-
bine with existent popular dissatisfaction over food short-
ages and managerial deficiencies. Worry about the economy
is likely to continue to figure in Moscow's tendency to
magnify the threat posed by dissidents and to react strongly
to foreign encouragement of domestic criticism.
The Soviets have protested vehemently about unaccep-
table interference in their internal affairs, and there
have been numerous warnings that bilateral relations could
suffer as a result of the US stand. Soviet propaganda on
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human rights has shifted from a generally defensive to a
somewhat more accusatory posture since late April, but
Moscow has generally limited itself to reactions deemed
sufficient to make its points without jeopardizing its ties
with the US.
Flints at the possible spillover of Soviet displeasure
into SALT, for example, continue to be accompanied by ex-
plicit signals that SALT is a separate issue where progress
can be achieved. Nevertheless, at least for tactical reasons,
the Soviets are likely to continue to point to the US human
rights stand as a major impediment to progress on the whole
range of bilateral issues.
Moscow is anxious to disabuse the US of the notion
that public urgings on human rights will help Soviet dis-
sidents and to convince the dissidents that pleading their
cause to the West will be counterproductive. Soviet author-
ities significantly increased pressure on the dissidents
early this year, and attempts to intimidate them through
arrests and threats almost certainly will continue. Some
of them reportedly are encouraged by US initiatives despite
the fact that they anticipate further intensification of
repressive measures in the immediate future. But there
also are indications of disheartenment among the dissidents,
and some of them have called for a return to "quite diplo-
macy." Approval of US human rights activism among Soviet
citizens interested in bringing about changes in their
society tends to be strongest among those who feel most
alienated from the system.
The Soviets have been concerned that the revolution's
60th anniversary in November could be tarnished if the
West vigorously presses the issue of "Basket III" (human
rights) implementation at the Belgrade CSCE meeting that
begins in June. Efforts to stifle dissident activity be-
fore and during the CSCE sessions are coinciding with the
dissidents' own realization that it is a propitious time
internationally to promote their various causes. As of now
the Soviets have managed to suppress the most publicized mani-
festations of the human rights movement. They are likely
to employ a variety of tactics--including selective emigra-
tion and expulsion--to confine the movement within the cir-
cumscribed limits that obtained before the recent upsurge
of Western support.
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A serious worry for Moscow is that agitation over
human rights could exacerbate existing or anticipated
control problems in Eastern Europe, especially in Poland,
and to a lesser extent in East Germany. Like the Soviets,
the East European regimes have been puzzled by the US
stand and somewhat off balance as a result. Party officials
reportedly met recently to discuss the long term impact of
US initiatives and concluded that a continuing international
focus on human rights could erode the loyalties of important
segments of their populations, especially intellectuals and
young people.
There is no evidence so far that the US stand on human
rights has had a significant impact on the East European
regimes' tactics for dealing with dissidents. Even before
recent US initiatives there was disagreement within and
among the East European regimes on how to handle the serious
wave of dissident activity that has developed over the last
several years--activity that may become bolder as the CSCE
meeting approaches. Those with the least serious dissident
problem (i.e., Hungary) or which believe a hard line would
be counterproductive in their particular circumstances
(i.e., Poland) reportedly have been defending their moderate
approach. Thus far, the Soviets appear to be tolerating some
diversity in handling dissent.
The East Europeans have shown concern over the possi-
bility that US human rights initiatives could provoke Soviet
movement away from detente, and over the adverse implications
such a development would have for them both economically and
politically. The East European press has been highly cri-
tical of the US stand and has couterattacked with condemna-
tions of alleged injustices in the US and US disregard for
"economic and social" rights.
China is the only Communist country that seems to have
derived some satisfaction from the US stand. Peking clearly
has taken heart from recent difficulties in US-Soviet rela-
tions, and the Chinese see Washington's attitude on human
rights as possibly signaling a toughening US stance toward
Moscow generally. The Chinese are ostensibly unconcerned
about their own vulnerability on the human rights issue,
but Peking probably has some private misgivings on this
score. This may explain the failure of Chinese media to
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highlight the human rights controversy despite Peking's
penchant for emphasizing US-Soviet differences.
The Industrial Democracies
There is broad approval in principle of the US human
rights stand in Western Europe, Canada, and Japan. But
leaders of these countries tend to define international
issues on which the US takes a comprehensive global approach
in more parochial terms. Thus, the Europeans see the human
rights issue mainly in terms of East-West relations, while
the Japanese are primarily concerned with how the US stand
will affect US policy and Japanese interests in Asia.
The Europeans are concerned that US human rights ini-
tiatives risk causing a deterioration in East-West relations
that would have a more damaging impact on Western Europe
than on the US. As a result, government leaders have dis-
played a decided preference for pursuing human rights ob-
jectives with quiet diplomacy and behind-the-scenes approaches.
Britain's Prime Minister Callaghan may have indicated
to the Soviets that Foreign Secretary Owen's strong speech
on human rights did not herald a major change in UK policy.
French officials are reportedly worried about preserving
what remains of the Franco-Soviet "special relationship,"
and they are eager to maintain a friendly atmosphere for
Brezhnev's coming visit to Paris. In Germany, Chancellor
Schmidt has declared that Bonn will seek to.advance the
cause of human rights in its own low-key way. Among the
smaller West European nations, willingness to be outspoken
on the human rights issue seems to vary inversely with
physical proximity to the Soviet Union.
Latin America
US human rights initiatives have aroused considerable
resentment in several Central and South American countries
ruled by military regimes that have felt directly challenged.
They have denounced US statements and actions as unwarranted
and unacceptable interference in strictly internal affairs.
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Argentina and Uruguay rejected all US military assis-
tance after Washington linked aid cuts to human rights
violations in those countries. Brazil, already angered by
US pressure to modify its nuclear deal with West Germany,
condemned the State Department's preparation of a report on
its human rights practices as an affront to its sovereignty
and renounced the 1952 military assistance agreement.
Guatemala and El Salvador have also rejected military assis-
tance conditioned on US judgment of their human rights situ-
ations.
The Latins are angered by what they regard as US fail-
ure to understand and make allowances for their political
and internal security problems. The Southern Cone military
regimes, especially, are convinced that their countries'
experiences with political disintegration, insurgency, and
terrorism fully warrant tough internal security measures.
The Argentines, for example, insist that they will not devi-
ate from the practices they deem indispensable in their
continuing war with leftist terrorists no matter what outside
criticism they incur.
The Latins are also resentful over the fact that they
were not considered important enough to US interests to be
treated specially (like South Korea). They have questioned
US qualifications for making international moral judgments
and have voiced suspicion that the US has ulterior motives
for its human rights stand. The latter view is particularly
strong in Brazil, where the human rights issue is viewed as
an adjunct to US pressure on nuclear matters.
The Southern Cone regimes have been commiserating with
each other, and they reportedly are considering joint moves
to convince the US that it has seriously underestimated the
costs of alienating them. The Latins undoubtedly would pre-
fer to forgo polemics and halt any deterioration in their
relations with Washington. But the military regimes are de-
termined not to take any action that could be construed as
caving in to US pressure.
Latin reaction to the US stand has not, of course,
been entirely negative. Venezuela and Costa Rica, two of
Latin America's few remaining democracies, have strongly
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endorsed US initiatives, and expressions of support for
the US stand have also been received from Mexico and
Bolivia. Prisoner releases in Paraguay and Peru were
directly responsive to US concerns.
The US stand has been met with a noticeable lack of
enthusiasm in most of East Asia, where with the exception
of Japan all states are ruled by authoritarian regimes that
impose significant restrictions on human rights. The na-
tions with the closest political, economic, and security
ties to the US--those that feel most vulnerable to US
pressure--seem to have the most negative attitudes.
South Korea's sensitivity on the issue is reflected
in a trend begun last November selectively to ease pres-
sures on dissidents and reduce overt police surveillance.
The press is enjoying greater latitude in its handling of
foreign news, prison conditions for key political figures
have improved, and the government has forgone punishment
for a number of protestors. A spate of arrests in mid-
April probably was meant as a warning to those inclined
to increase anti-government activity during the indepen-
dence day period, and most of the dissidents already have
been released.
The Marcos government in the Philippines is quite con-
cerned over the potential implications of the US emphasis
on human rights. Manila's vulnerability on the issue is
one reason Marcos would like to receive rent payments for
US bases rather than payment in the form of military assis-
tance subject to annual congressional scrutiny.
Indonesia intially seemed anxious not to let the human
rights issue disrupt relations with the US, especially the
continuance of military aid. Government officials publicly
expressed understanding of US initiatives, and Jakarta an-
nounced an accelerated timetable for the release of political
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prisoners. Privately, however, the Indonesians inter-
preted US emphasis on human rights as one ploy in a series
designed to force their country to support US policies gen-
erally, and they expressed resentment over interference in
their internal affairs. There recently has been a percep-
tible stiffening in Indonesia's attitude, accompanied by
hints that Jakarta has alternative sources of military
hardware. ,
The government of Taiwan is trying to avoid giving
the US cause to focus on human rights practices there,
but the mainland Chinese political establishment remains
determined to suppress ethnic Taiwanese opposition. Tai-
wan will undoubtedly be tempted to try to turn the issue
to its own advantage by calling attention to the human
rights situation in the People's Republic of China. .
Almost every African government is vulnerable to
criticism on the human rights issue, in part because Afri-
can standards of conduct differ markedly from "interna-
tionally accepted" conceptions of human rights. The most
negative African responses to the US stand have come from
Uganda, South Africa, and Ethiopia.
Idi Amin's dramatically hostile reaction stemmed part-
ly from President Carter's statement about human rights
violations in Uganda. The South African reaction was dis-
creet and cautious at first, but has become outspokenly
critical as the US stand has increasingly been seen as de-
manding that whites change their way of life. The radical
Ethiopian dictator Lt. Colonel Mengistu has cited a human
rights-related cutback in US aid as one reason for his
recent anti-US actions, but the anti-US trend in Ethiopian
policy predates US emphasis on human rights. It is rooted
in a strong commitment to domestic socialism and a desire
to win favor with the Soviets.
Several black African countries have applauded the
US stand largely because they believe it implies US support
for majority rule in southern Africa. Some have also quiet-
ly welcomed US criticism of the situation in Uganda. US
initiatives have been warmly received in Nigeria, Cameroon,
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and Gambia. Senegal, the Central African Empire, Zambia,
and--in a recent shift--Ghana have also endorsed the US
stand. Togo recently released some political prisoners
partly out of a desire to improve relations with the US,
but another group of persons was arrested for political.
reasons shortly thereafter.
Middle East
The Arab states tend to define human rights strictly
in terms of concern over Israel's settlement policy in
occupied territories, the fate of Arab prisoners in Israeli
jails, and recognition of the "legitimate rights of the Pal
estinian people." They will react positively to the US
stand so long as its principal effect in the :diddle East is
the focusing of US attention on such issues, rather than on
human rights practices (especially the treatment of minor-
ities) in Arab countries.
The Israelis, of course, are concerned over the pos-
sible implications of increased US interest in their treat-
ment of Arabs in the occupied territories. On the other
hand, the Israelis apparently believe the US will be inclin-
ed to support initiatives they may take to focus interna-
tional attention on Soviet harassment of Jews who have asked
to leave the USSR.
Prospects
The impact that US human rights initiatives will have
over the next several months will depend in large part on
how the US chooses to press the issue. Repeated protesta-
tions as to the universality of US concerns are in any case
unlikely to dissuade most of the vulnerable governments from
continuing to interpret even general US actions or pronounce-
ments as being directed particularly at them.
The Soviets will be continuing their efforts to con-
vince West European leaders that degeneration of the CSCE
meeting into an acrimonious exchange of charges on implemen-
tation of the Helsinki final act would be a severe setback
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for detente. There are indications that some Europeans
are already worried on this score and do not want the
Soviets to be "put in the dock" at Belgrade. The Soviets
may, in fact, believe that the asymmetry of US and West
European perspectives on human rights can be exploited to
create controversy and tension within the Atlantic Alliance.
In any case, the Soviets undoubtedly have compiled
lists of countercomplaints on Helsinki non-compliance,
socio-economic inequities and alleged injustices in US
society, and discrepancies between US actions and the ad-
ministration's stand on human rights. Soviet propaganda
organs have made it clear that Moscow is prepared to respond
in kind if its human rights practices come under attack at
Belgrade.
Other countries that have reacted most negatively to
US human rights initiatives seem to be hoping for a "cooling
off" period that would permit a resumption of less antagon-
istic bilateral relations and allow them to develop strate-
gies for coping with the new situation. This is especially
the case in Latin America, where recent congressional testi-
mony by State Department officials and Secretary Vance's
Law Day Speech have been interpreted as signaling that the
US is in the process of moderating its tactics for pursuing
human rights objectives. Disappointment of such expecta-
tions would give added impetus to discussions among the
Southern Cone countries about convincing the US that they
are vitally important to its interest.
Criticism of alleged US disinterest in the world
wide advancement of social and economic justice is likely
to increase if the less developed countries conclude that
the US plans to link human rights to international economic
issues by seeking to further its human rights objectives
in international financial institutions whose charters call
for loan decisions to be made strictly on the basis of eco-
nomic considerations. The "North-South" dialogue, moreover,
could become considerably more contentious generally if
controversy over human rights were to severely damage US
relations with nations (like Brazil) that have played signi-
ficant moderating roles in the articulation of LDC demands.
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SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO THE US STAND ON HUMAN RIGHTS
SOVIET UNION
2 Soviet national television broadcasts an hour-long "anti-
Zionist" film designed to curb Jewish emigration by de-
nigrating the emigrants' motivation.
2 Moscow CSCE monitoring group leaders Yury Orlov and Aleksandr
Ginzburg are smeared by an article in Literary Gazette, sig-
nalling possible action against them.
3 Ginzburg is detained, but no formal charges are levied.
4 Associated Press Moscow correspondent George Krimsky is told
to leave the country within a week. Krimsky is charged with
currency improprieties, but his dissident contacts are the
real reason for his expulsion.
5 Two members of the Ukrainian branch of the CSCE monitoring
group are detained. Homes of other members are searched.
10 Orlov is arrested, but no specific charges are filed.
12 Pravda editorial castigates "impermissible" Western inter-
ference in Soviet internal affairs, and makes clear Moscow's
belief that fundamental doctrinal principles upon which it
cannot compromise are at stake in the controversy over human
rights.
14 Valentin Turchin, chairman of the Soviet chapter of Amnesty
International, is harassed by the KGB and given an official
warning to curtail his activities.
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17 Andrey Sakharov receives a letter from President Carter
at the US Embassy in Moscow. The Soviets promptly protest.
20 Pravda commentary is implicitly critical of President Carter
and Secretary Vance for their statements on human rights.
22 Pravda charges Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty with fund-
inggdissident activity, raising by several notches endemic
propagatida against the radios.
24 Anticipating President Carter's meeting with Vladimir
Bukovsky, Tass smears Bukovsky as "criminal scum" and suggests
that "US au orities" not consort with him. More biting com-
mentary follows the March 1 meeting at the White House.
1 Moscow CSCE group holds its first meeting since the arrests
of Orlov and Ginzburg and declares its determination to
carry on.
4 An "expose" by Izvestia charges that US diplomats and Soviet
dissidents are involve~c in espionage. .Among those named on
the Soviet side are Jewish activists Anatoly Shcharansky,
Vladimir Slepak, and Aleksandr Lerner.
Leningrad dissident Vladimir Borisov is released after three
months in a psychiatric hospital.
14 Shcharansky is arrested. He is not specifically charged, but
is privately described by a senior investigator as an "impor-
tant state criminal."
Mikhail Shtern, a Urkrainian Jewish doctor serving an eight-
year sentence after a blatantly rigged trial, is released for
"health reasons." Shtern and his wife subsequently are given
permission to emigrate.
18 Pravda article attacking "imperalist slander campaign" on
t Tuman rights issue is characteristic of themes projected
almost daily by various Soviet media.
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19 Two Leningrad artists are sentenced to long prison terms
for daubing anti-Soviet graffiti on public buildings last
year.
Tass flatly ties President Carter's statements on human rights
to attempts to "interfere in the internal affairs" of other
countries.
21 In a major policy address to the Soviet trade union congress
in Moscow, General Secretary Brezhnev comments extensively
on the human rights issue. Charging that false publicity
in the West creates the image of an internal opposition in
the USSR, Brezhnev declares that subversive foreign support
for individuals who violate Soviet laws will not be tolerated,
and that without "at least a minimum of mutual propriety"
the normal development of US-Soviet relations is "unthinkable."
23 Izvestia takes President Carter to task for expressing hopes
of-improved bilateral relations while "Bukovsky is received
in the White House" and "American political standards are
impudently foistered on others." Article warns that the
atmosphere for the forthcoming Moscow SALT talks has been
made "more complicated."
31 Foreign Minister Gromyko, in a press conference following
close of SALT talks, declares that the human rights issue
"poisons the political climate" and makes resolution of
other problems more difficult.
APRIL
4 A CSCE monitoring branch is set up in Yerevan, capital of
the Soviet republic of Armenia. The group joins regional
chapters in the Ukraine, Lithuania, and Georgia.
17-20 The fifth anniversary session of the so-called Sunday seminar
is held without incident in Moscow, with the participation of
scholars from the US and Canada. The seminars were initiated
by Soviet Jewish scientists and scholars dismissed from prom-
inent positions after applying for emigration.
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APRIL
18-22 Soviet media attempt to deflect criticism of Moscow's
record on implementation of the Helsinki final act by
playing back US press criticism of Washington's decision
to deny visas to Soviet trade union officials.
25 A Soviet appeals court rejects review of a five year
sentence imposed on a Belgian national convicted of
distributing anti-Soviet pamphlets in Leningrad.
Helsinki accord clauses relating to freedom of informa-
tion had been cited unsuccessfully as a defense.
Tass commentary implicitly warns that any efforts to put
tie USSR and its allies in the dock at the CSCE meeting
will backfire against the West. The commentary carries
the message that Moscow will be prepared to respond in
kind if its human rights practices come under attack at
Belgrade.
29-30 Soviet press accounts of a protest made to the US Embassy
regarding Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty threaten
unspecified retaliatory measures against the radios.
6-7 Soviet media links "so-called fighters for human rights"
to the CIA. The CSCE monitoring group founded by Yury
Orlov is specifically mentioned.
10 Tass attacks the London economic summit participants for
i~ aving brought up the issue of human rights during the
session.
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SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO THE US STAND ON HUMAN RIGHTS
EAST EUROPE
6 The manifesto of the Czechoslovak human rights cause--
Charter 77--is published in West Europe. It calls on the
Prague regime to observe human rights provisions of domes-
tic laws and international agreements.
13-14 Four Czechoslovak dissidents--three of them Chartists--are
arrested for "maintaining contacts with hostile forces."
30 Two Charter 77 spokesmen are officially informed that their
activities are "contrary to Czechoslovakia's law."
3 Polish leader Gierek proposes a pardon for workers still
jailed as a result of June 1976 riots.
13 Romanian novelist Paul Goma and seven other dissidents con-
demn the lack of respect for human rights in their country
and appeal for support from the Helsinki signatories.
17 Romanian leader Ceausescu attacks Goma and other dissidents
as "traitors."
2-3 Warsaw Pact central committee secretaries responsible for
ideology meet in Sofia and discuss control of dissident
activities in their countries.
3 Czechoslovak dissident Pavel Kohout delivers a letter for
President Carter to the US Embassy.
8-10 Ninety Yugoslav dissidents express support for Charter 77.
12-15 Czechoslovak dissidents release two documents intended to
regain momentum for their cause; one tries to establish
common cause with workers, the other appeals to the Euro-
communist parties for greater support.
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MARCH
16 A thousand persons reportedly attend the funeral of
Czechoslovak dissident leader Jan Patocka.
24 The Yugoslav Constitutional Court rejects a plea by
dissidents for an end of travel restrictions.
27 A new Polish dissident organization--the Movement for
the Defense of Human and Civil Rights--is inaugurated.
Its goals are broader than those of the already active
Workers Defense League. The regime inanediately responds
with strong criticism.
APRIL
7
27
Coma is detained by Romanian authorities.
Two leading Polish dissidents are officially told they
are under suspicion of maintaining illicit contact with
Radio Free Europe and an emigre journal.
A Czechoslovak court upholds dissident Zdenek Mlynar's
dismissal from his job for participating in the Charter
77 cause.
27-30 Senior East European and Soviet party officials reportedly
meet in Prague to discuss the long-term impact of the US
stand on human rights.
A Czechoslovak dissident spokesman releases the tenth
follow-up document to the Charter 77 manifesto.
9 Romanians release Goma.
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SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO THE US STAND ON HUMAN RIGHTS
22 West German Chancellor Schmidt declares his country will
foster human rights "in ways we consider suitable."
23 French President Giscard refuses to meet with Soviet dis-
sident Andre Amalrik.
3 British Foreign Secretary Owen delivers a strong speech on
human rights, but notes that Great Britain will have to
balance morality with reality.
8 Following their Madrid summit Eurocommunist leaders from
Italy, France, and Spain issue a tepid communique endorsing
"full application" of the Helsinki Accords without specifically
mentioning the Soviet Union or any East European country.
5 A joint declaration of the European Parliament, the EC
Council, and the EC Commission strongly reaffirms the
signatories' commitment to the enhancement of fundamental
rights'and individual freedoms.
18 EC foreign ministers meeting in London discuss preparations
for the CSCE session in Belgrade. They urge that the Nest's
approach on the human rights issue be restrained in order
not to jeopardize detente.
20 Socialist International President Willy Brandt calls for
cautious pursuit of human rights objectives in a speech
to Socialist Party leaders from twenty-three countries meet-
ing in Amsterdam to discuss East-West relations.
25 A Papal adviser says that the Vatican has developed a three-
stage action plan to guide Church officials in countries
where human rights are not respected.
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SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO THE US STAND ON HUMAN RIGHTS
27 Three members of Paraguayan communist party are released
after spending almost 20 years each in prison.
28 Political rights are restored to eight persons in Uruguay.
FEBRUARY
7 A US Embassy inspection of Ache Indian camp in Paraguay
uncovers no evidence to prove or disprove allegations of
official abuse.
10 Eleven women and their 17 children are released from a
Paraguayan detention facility for political prisoners.
28 Argentina and Uruguay reject US military assistance tied
to their human rights performance.
A state of siege is imposed in El Salvador following de-
monstrations protesting fradulent presidential elections.
3 Brazil rejects all US military assistance for fiscal year
1977.
5 In a meeting with National Guard commanders, Nicaraguan
President Somoza warns against human rights violations
by National Guard troops, and declares that such conduct
will be punished.
11 Brazilian President Geisel renounces the military assis-
tance agreement with the US that was signed in 1952. The
decision follows publication of the State Department's
report on human rights.
The Guatemalan government notifies the US that it declines
in advance any US military assistance conditioned on US
judgment of Guatemala's human rights practices.
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11 Venezuelan President Perez praises President Carter's
human rights initiatives in a major address to his coun-
try's congress.
Sixty-four additional Paraguayan political prisoners are
released.
12 Chilean President Pinochet dissolves remaining political.
parties and strengthens sanctions against all partisan
political activity.
15 In a press conference Colombian President Lopez supports
the promotion of human rights through an international
entity and declares Colombia's opposition to interference
in the internal affairs of sovereign states.
17 El Salvador rejects US military assistance.
APRIL
1 President Geisel suspends the Brazilian legislature for
two weeks in response to its veto of a government amend-
ment to reform the judiciary.
Nicaragua describes the US decision to link its military
aid to human rights conditions as "interference in the
internal affairs of Nicaragua."
11 Mexico announces that it has stopped legal proceedings
against 424 persons charged with political crimes and
declares that there are no more political prisoners in
Mexico.
During a meeting with members of the general staff of the
National Guard, Nicaraguan President Somoza says he will
not renounce US military aid.
15 The Paraguayan government refuses to grant formal safe con-
duct out of the country to three communist party members
released in January, who have been in asylum in the Peruvian
Embassy since 25 February. The government claims they are
not wanted for arrest and therefore are free to go.
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15 Brazilian President Geisel issues a series of decrees
aimed at reducing the influence of civilian politicians
in the government.
25 Peru extends the emergency suspension of civil guarantees
another 30 days; these measures went into effect after
street demonstrations last July.
26 Peruvian President Morales Bermudez announces amnesty for
314 persons, including several political prisoners.
28 The Archbishop of Asuncion comments favorably on Paraguay's
human rights progress. He has previously been highly criti.-
cal of the government on the issue.
MAY
The pro-government press in Nicaragua praises Secretary
Vance's Law Day Speech.
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SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO THE US STAND ON HUMAN RIGHTS
APRIL
9 The official Vietnamese newspaper accuses the US of hypro-
crisy on the human rights issue.
11 President Suharto reportedly tells Time magazine that
Indonesia would rather not receive foreign aid if it has
strings attached.
14-20 The South Korean government detains about two dozen persons
associated with the "Charter for Democracy and National
Salvation" issued by dissidents in Alarch. The arrests are
probably meant as a warning to those inclined to increase
anti-government activity during the 19 April independence
day period.
18 The Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philip-
pines issues a sequel to its previously published pamphlet
on political prisoners. It claims that torture continues
to be practiced despite government denials.
19 Mr. and Mrs. Marcos assure Assistant Secretary of State
Holbrooke that the Philippines will move on human rights.
in order to improve relations with the US.
2 Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik says he hopes the US will
use foreign assistance to promote the basic human right to
food and clothing, and not preoccupy itself with the "legal
side" of the human rights issue.
2-4 Most of the South Korean dissidents detained in March are
released.
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SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO THE US STAND ON HUMAN RIGHTS
AFRICA
FEBRUARY
14 Nigeria welcomes the US emphasis on human rights.
15-28 Ugandan President Amin orders the approximately 240
US citizens in Uganda to a meeting in Kampala with a
list of their possessions and forbids them to leave
the country. Amin sends a strongly anti-US message
to President Carter.
MARCH
1-15 Amin backs away from his anti-US line and postpones
the meeting with US citizens indefinitely.
4 A high-level spokesman for Cameroon President Ahidjo's
government expresses strong support for the US stand
on human rights to Ambassador Spiro.
21 Gambian President Jawara's closest foreign policy
advisor tells the US charge that President Carter
should be applauded for the forthright stand he has
taken on human rights. Jawara himself speaks out
publicly on the situation in Uganda.
22 Spokesmen for the Senegalese government react to
the US stand on human rights in a low-key but largely
positive fashion.
25 Zambian President Kuanda endorses the US stance on
human rights.
27 The Ethiopian government expresses official displeasure
at a cutback in US grant materiel aid linked to its
human rights performance.
31 Ghana expresses unhappiness with the State Department's
report on its human rights practices but does not make
it a major public issue.
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10 President Mobutu of Zaire expresses annoyance and
concern about the US emphasis on human rights. He
says that continued US harping on the issue will
alienate Washington's friends and have little effect
on its adversaries--whom he views as the main offenders.
10 Togolese President Eyadema releases about 25 political
prisoners in part to open the way for closer Togolese-
US relations.
16-18 The South African government begins to respond to US
criticism of its apartheid system after a period of
discreet and cautious silence. Foreign Minister "Pik"
Botha declares that arm twisting and threats from the
US will not make white South Africans change their way
of life.
19 Percy Qoboza, editor of the black-oriented South
African newspaper, The World, writes that the majority
of black South Africans agree with Ambassador young's
remark about the illegitimacy of the South African
government.
20 23 Togolese are arrested for political reasons.
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MAY
4 Some of those recently arrested in Togo are released.
5 Ghana comes out publicly in support of the US stand
on human rights.
6 South African Foreign Minister Botha indicates that
it may "not be convenient" for Ambassador Young to
visit South Africa later this month.
9 The Ghanaian foreign minister tells a US diplomat that
US refusal to sign the international cocoa agreement
is "a violation of human rights." Ghana is the
world's largest cocoa producer.
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SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPINMNTS RELATED TO THE US STAND ON HUM.&N RIGHTS
20 The Shah tells US officials in Iran that criticism of
his country's human rights practices is unwarranted,
unfair, and lacking in recognition of Iran's soci-
economic advances.
27 Iran announces royal pardons for over one hundred
prisoners convicted in civilian courts; few if any
political prisoners are involved.
17 The Shah pardons 653 prisoners who were tried by
military courts. Ninety-one are identified as
"anti-security" prisoners convicted of crimes
against state security. The release brings to 215
the total of such prisoners freed in 1977.
20 Eleven Iranian dissidents are sentenced to terms
ranging from three years to life imprisonment for
activities against the security of the state in a
trial notable for its openness to reporters and
foreign observers.
Opposition elements in Tunisia proceed with plans to
hold a "National Conference on Public Liberties,"
while the government moves to undercut the effort.
Both sides attempt to use the human rights issue for
their own political purposes.
2 Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi expresses his recogni-
tion of US seriousness on human rights to the US
Ambassador.
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:vnAORA.N'DU:vI FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM . Sayre Stevens
Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT . Memorandum on "Impact of the US Stand on Human
Rights" Prepared at Request of NSC Staff
1. Action Requested: You transmit the attached ORPA report
directly to Dr. Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs.
2. Background: Ms. Tuchman telephoned Special
Assistant to the DDCI, on 3 May to request a tiTap-up o significant
responses to President Carter's Human Rights policy since the
Inaugural. She indicated that Mr. Brzezinski wished to use such
a paper to brief the President upon his return from Europe. The
paper was requested for Thursday, 12 May.
Brzezinski's interest was apparently stimulated by the DCI's
"Watching Brief' on "Significant Developments Related to the US
Stand on Human Rights," delivered to Ms. Tuchman on 29 April.
The memorandum which ORPA has prepared is mainly a compilation of
information that has been used in previous briefings.
Sayre Stevens
Attachment:
RP-M- 77- 10107
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