Participation in Geneva Surprise Attack Discussions

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80R01441R000100010023-8
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 20, 1998
Sequence Number: 
23
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 13, 1959
Content Type: 
MF
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80R01441R000100010023-8.pdf215.05 KB
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25X1X4 Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO1441 R000100010023-8 Next 14 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO1441 R000100010023-8 Approved For Relea 2000/08/30: (WIM86JW441 R00SM0010023-8 r COPY UNITED STATES EXPERTS TO THE TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS ON THE PROBLEM'OF SURPRISE ATTACK Geneva, Switzerland - November 10, 1958 December 15, 1958 MI RAN M FOR: Dr. Jerome Wiesner SUBJECT: Missile Working Group Comments on Surprise Attack Exercise Provided herein are the general comments of the U. S. Missile Working Group concerning the problems encountered and suggested courses of future action prior to reinstigating Surprise Attack Discussions. This memorandum is divided into two parts: Part I treats the substantive problems; and Part II'reviews administrative difficulties. PART I - Substantive Comments 1. A timely communication system is the essential ingredient to an effective ballistic missile warning system. The feasibility, reliability and overall effectiveness of a suitable communication system have been a continuing point of controversy throughout this exercise. In order to support a statement that "It is technically feasible to. provide ballistiic missile early wing", an extensive and practical application of the various communication techniques must be engaged prior to future surprise attack discussions,. 2. Although the-technical characteristics of aerial search and verification techniques were readily available, there was considerable question concerning the degree of reliance that could be placed in such systems for various types of ballistic missile launching sites. It is recom- mended mat actual aerial search and verification techniques be exercised against missile and other ground facilities in order to determine their validity in an overall inspection system. 3. Intelligence on Soviet ballistic missile deployment - concepts vas inadequate to reconcile the mobile vs. fixed site problem; therefore causing considerable difficulty in devising a suitable inspection system sufficiently comprehensive to Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIAO-RRDPROORO1441 R000100010023-8 WS ONLY Approved For Rele 2000/08/30: CIA-RDP80RO1441 ROOM90010023-8 I 1111 US S On y cover both type facilities. Every effort should be made to obtain a more definitive anaver on this problem. 4. Although discussion of limitations and disarmament was precluded from the present exercise, these problems as associated with the missile inspection system, should be studies in con- siderable detail prior to a future meeting. Specifically, should an adequate cc ation system not be feasible for a ballistic missile inspection system, the consideration of limitations and associated diear mmnt may be the only answer. Also closely related therewith is the possibility of applying certain inhibitors to ballistic missile launch site activities which could be. monitored by resident observers and which would reduce the danger of surprise attack. The effect of other national problems on the ballistic missile problem has not been adequately considered. For example, the degree to Mich U. S. national security would be effected. by implementation of a ballistic missile Inspection, system in toto or in part; the effect of a nuclear ban on the bal- listic missile problem; and the effect of implementing certain proposed zones of inspection. Political acceptability of many of these proposals, as veil as the economic impact, also have not been sufficiently studied. PART IS: General and Administrative Problems The cos enta in this section are intended to provide constructive criticism of value to future exercises of this nature. For. convenience, the ooamefits are divided between Washington and Geneva: A. Washington 1. A great deal of "passing" interest in the missile subject vas apparent and resulted in an excess of general "systems talk" not directly related to the problem. 2. The be cal missile work was performed essentially with technical advice and ass stance am sew a rs of the group. An additional technical missile man vould have been a. valuable adjunct in meeting the tight time schedules; however, the small size of the missile group tended to reduce extraneous discussions and permitted meeting prescribed deadlines. US b"1tES ONLY Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80.RO1441 R000100010023-8 J Apprpved For Releasea2000/08/30: CIA-RDP80RO1441 R00 0010023-8 US EYES ONLY -3- 3. A lack of a clear-cut orgxizational chart indicating vertical as well as horizontal responsibilities reduced the effectiveness of operations. Informal liaison on a self-initiated basis greatly overcame this deficiency, but complete interchange of ideas on associated problems was not achieved. 4. Lack of adequate security clearances on the part of many individuals indirectly associated with the basic missile problem tended to create a lack of confidence and hampered a complete discussion of some key points. B. Geneva 5. The first Five Poorer Missile Group meeting did not occur until 25 November. Although our Allies may have felt they did not have the opportunity to participate as exten- sively as desired in the missile exercise, the tight time schedules for completing the missile paper kept nationalistic quibbling to a minimum. None of the other Western Power members of the Missile Group had had any direct missile experience; however, they evidenced good judgment and worked constructively.tovard meeting assigned deadlines. The Five Poorer Missile Group worked effectively and congenially. 6. The security barriers between the U. S. Group and our Allies, arid particularly the French and Italians, proved somewhat avkw rd inasmuch as they recognized ve were not being completely candid about the U. S. missile program and about our knowledge of the Soviet missile program. The problem was dodged., apparently successfully, by utilizing Aviation Week as a source for =my relevant technical details. The experience gained by dealing with our Western Allies was valuable as a prelude to determining what could be included, in our table paper as well as subsequent discussions with the }stern Povers should same ever occur. .7. Technical, facilities in Geneva are somewhat limited.. Should we have engaged in actual working sessions with the Soviets, a good hand computer, graph paper, logarithm tables and technical reference books would probably have been required. S SNG for Approved For Release 2000/08/30: CIA-RDP80Re1 US EYES G 25X1A9a 25X1A9a 25X1A9a