Participation in Geneva Surprise Attack Discussions

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01441R000100010023-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 1998
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: January 13, 1959
• Content Type: MF

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UNITED STATES EXPERTS
TO THE
TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS ON THE PROBLEM'OF SURPRISE ATTACK
Geneva, Switzerland - November 10, 1958
December 15, 1958
MI RAN M FOR: Dr. Jerome Wiesner
SUBJECT: Missile Working Group Comments on
Surprise Attack Exercise
Provided herein are the general comments of the U. S.
Missile Working Group concerning the problems encountered
and suggested courses of future action prior to reinstigating
Surprise Attack Discussions. This memorandum is divided into
two parts: Part I treats the substantive problems; and
Part II'reviews administrative difficulties.
PART I - Substantive Comments
1. A timely communication system is the essential
ingredient to an effective ballistic missile warning system.
The feasibility, reliability and overall effectiveness of
a suitable communication system have been a continuing point
of controversy throughout this exercise. In order to support
a statement that "It is technically feasible to. provide
ballistiic missile early wing", an extensive and practical
application of the various communication techniques must be
engaged prior to future surprise attack discussions,.
2. Although the-technical characteristics of aerial
search and verification techniques were readily available,
there was considerable question concerning the degree of
reliance that could be placed in such systems for various
types of ballistic missile launching sites. It is recom-
mended mat actual aerial search and verification techniques
be exercised against missile and other ground facilities in
order to determine their validity in an overall inspection
system.
3. Intelligence on Soviet ballistic missile deployment -
concepts vas inadequate to reconcile the mobile vs. fixed site
problem; therefore causing considerable difficulty in devising
a suitable inspection system sufficiently comprehensive to
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cover both type facilities. Every effort should be made to
obtain a more definitive anaver on this problem.
4. Although discussion of limitations and disarmament was
precluded from the present exercise, these problems as associated
with the missile inspection system, should be studies in con-
siderable detail prior to a future meeting. Specifically,
should an adequate cc ation system not be feasible for
a ballistic missile inspection system, the consideration of
limitations and associated diear mmnt may be the only answer.
Also closely related therewith is the possibility of applying
certain inhibitors to ballistic missile launch site activities
which could be. monitored by resident observers and which
would reduce the danger of surprise attack.
The effect of other national problems on the ballistic
missile problem has not been adequately considered. For example,
the degree to Mich U. S. national security would be effected.
by implementation of a ballistic missile Inspection, system
in toto or in part; the effect of a nuclear ban on the bal-
listic missile problem; and the effect of implementing certain
proposed zones of inspection. Political acceptability of
many of these proposals, as veil as the economic impact, also
have not been sufficiently studied.
PART IS: General and Administrative Problems
The cos enta in this section are intended to provide
constructive criticism of value to future exercises of this
nature. For. convenience, the ooamefits are divided between
Washington and Geneva:
A. Washington
1. A great deal of "passing" interest in the missile
subject vas apparent and resulted in an excess of general
"systems talk" not directly related to the problem.
2. The be cal missile work was performed
essentially with technical
advice and ass stance am sew a rs of the group.
An additional technical missile man vould have been a. valuable
adjunct in meeting the tight time schedules; however, the
small size of the missile group tended to reduce extraneous
discussions and permitted meeting prescribed deadlines.
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3. A lack of a clear-cut orgxizational chart indicating
vertical as well as horizontal responsibilities reduced
the effectiveness of operations. Informal liaison on a
self-initiated basis greatly overcame this deficiency, but
complete interchange of ideas on associated problems was
not achieved.
4. Lack of adequate security clearances on the part of
many individuals indirectly associated with the basic missile
problem tended to create a lack of confidence and hampered
a complete discussion of some key points.
B. Geneva
5. The first Five Poorer Missile Group meeting did not
occur until 25 November. Although our Allies may have felt
they did not have the opportunity to participate as exten-
sively as desired in the missile exercise, the tight time
schedules for completing the missile paper kept nationalistic
quibbling to a minimum. None of the other Western Power
members of the Missile Group had had any direct missile
experience; however, they evidenced good judgment and worked
constructively.tovard meeting assigned deadlines. The Five
Poorer Missile Group worked effectively and congenially.
6. The security barriers between the U. S. Group and our Allies,
arid particularly the French and Italians, proved somewhat
avkw rd inasmuch as they recognized ve were not being
completely candid about the U. S. missile program and about
our knowledge of the Soviet missile program. The problem was
dodged., apparently successfully, by utilizing Aviation Week
as a source for =my relevant technical details. The experience
gained by dealing with our Western Allies was valuable as a
prelude to determining what could be included, in our table
paper as well as subsequent discussions with the }stern
Povers should same ever occur.
.7. Technical, facilities in Geneva are somewhat limited..
Should we have engaged in actual working sessions with the
Soviets, a good hand computer, graph paper, logarithm tables
and technical reference books would probably have been required.
S SNG for
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