UNITED STATES DELEGATION to the CONFERENCE OF THE TEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT Geneva, Switzerland March 15, 1960
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80R01441R000100030006-5
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 13, 2005
Sequence Number:
6
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 7, 1960
Content Type:
REPORT
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Date: Aril 7. 1960
Time: Dinner, 6:00 p.,me
Place: Hotel des Bergues
UNITED STATES DELEGATION
to the
CONFERENCE OF THE TEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DI&'"IENT
Geneva, Switzerland March 15, 1960
Partic ants:
Copies to;
Ambassador Fredrick H. Eaton - US Delegation
Mr, Alexander Akalovsky - US Delegation
Deputy Foreign Minister Valerin Zorin - USSR Delegation
Mr, Yuri Vinogradov - USSR Delegation
U...3o1c ation
3(50)
Anericar1 %bassii:.y:
Paris, Rome! Ottawa, ioscow,
London, iJ
'Most of the conversation before and during dinner consisted of
exchanges of pleasantries., but toward the end of the dinner Zorin raised
the question of the recess., asking Eaton whether the period between
April 29 and June 6 was to be considered as agreed. He said that the
Summit might,last up to ten days and that about ten days would be required
to digest its conclusions,, Z'dhen Eaton told him any day the first wick in June
'ould be acceptable as reconvening date, Zorin checked the calendar and
said that perhaps it would be better to reconvene on the 7th, which would
be on a Tuesday so as to have Monday open for possible private discussions
oxi questions of procedure, Eaton said this would be acceptable to him and
raised the question of how this might be handled with regard to the press*
After a brief, discussion, it was agreed that the only official, announcement
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would be at the end of the last meeting before the recess, but that each
delegation would informally inform the press of the planned recess,. Eaton
said that he was happy that procedural questions at the beginning of the
Conference had been resolved quickly and to everyonets satisfaction and
that he did not intend to make an issue of procedural questions,, since
substance was what counted. Zorin replied that he also believed that
procedural issues should not hamper our work, but stated that in this
connection he wanted to mention a point which had arisen with regard to
the language suggested by Ormsby-Gore for a communique about the publication
of verbatim records, He said that he did not believe that it would be wise
to have a reference in the communique to the effect that publication of
verbatim records would be subject to unanimous agreement in each case,, be-
cause this could give rise to speculation as to possible objections on the
part of some Conference participants. It was clear that any agreement
reached by the Conference would stand so long as there was no objection by
anyone. He also said that he did not feel that it would be wise to specify
the time of release of documents for the preceding month because there may
be cases, such as in May, whore it would be preferable to release the docu-
ments at a time other than at the end of the mongh? Eaton replied that he
was not familiar with the language suggested by Ormsby-Gore and that he was
not aware of the problems involved, but that,, subject to his Governmentts
views, he personally felt that there would be no objection to NIr, Zorints
suggestion.
Eaton then said that he intended to keep private conversations, such
as this one, in strict confidence and that if he made any statements which
he intended to make public afterwards, he would advise Zorin of such in-
tention. However, he would advise his Government and his Vestr:rn partners
of any possible private discussions he might have with `Lorin. He expressed
the hope that Zarin would reciprocate in this respect? Zorin inferred that
he would do so, because otherwise there would be no point in having private
discussions,.
Zorin then asked Eaton about his view's as to the future work of t
Conference and ghat could be do o prepare someth~.n s ,r the it ,M{ He
said it would be a shame if the Conference were to come tortYe oummit,
emptylianded, Eaton replied that, after todayts statement by Zorin in the
plenary meeting, he was at a loss as to what the Conference could do between
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now and the Summit. He said that he felt that the positions of the two
sides should be brought much more closely together than they were now if
anything constructive was to be produced; obviously this would require
much more time than there was left until the Summit, He hoped, however,
that both the USSR and the US could find an area which,would be in their
interest from the standpoint of their respective security and that they
would produce something constructive, perhaps as a result of discussions
such as this one.. He said that the US approached these negotiations an
the belief that the Soviet Union was interested in a degree of disarma-
ment -- what degree and for what reason, we could not tell -- and that
he hoped that the Soviet Union realized that the United States also was
interested in a degree of disarmament. Therefore, the two sides should
try to find common ground on certain specific areas which could lay the
ground for future progress toward out ultimate goal.
Zarin replied that he agreed that the time remaining until the
Summit was very short and, citing; the example of the Nuclear Tests
Conference,, stated that it would be impossible to work out an agreement
on any specific measure because that would require throrough discussion
of many technical details. He did feel, however, that it would be much
easier to agree in this period left before the Summit on a set of principles
which, if endorsed by the Summit,, could serve as directive for our future
work after the Summit, He also felt that Heads of State could not agree
on any specific measure because agaftn such agreement would require detailed
discussions; what they could do was to agree on a set of general principles
with a view to having them developed and spelled out in detail by the
Conference*
Eaton stated that if Zorin had in mind a list of what he would call
end.produets, such as "Ban the Bomb," "Liquidate. the Bases," "Abolish All
Nuclear Establishments," etc,, that would not be acceptable because we
could not agree to any of these things without a prior discussion and
agreement on the means for verification of such measures, Zorin replied
that he had raised this point privately with other Western delegates and
that no one could produce a valid argument against this approach; only
Mr. Moch, who seemed to object to this approach even more strongly than
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his other Western colleagues, said that the principles would commit the
Western powers to a set of measures.. Yet even this argument held no
water because the question was not of signing a document or commitment;
but what was involved was simply astatement of principles elaborated on
the basis of the general formula contained in the UN Resolution, In other
words., this general formula would be developed and elaborated so as to give
a rough sketch of the total picture of general and complete disarmament. As
to any possibility of discussing individual., specific measures at this time,
Mr, Zorin said that he had no instruction to engage in such discussion at
this stage of negotiations and that the Soviet Union would not be prepared
to do so until and unless this rough sketch of the general program Was
agreed on, However., if such a set of principles were agreed upon by the
Conference and endorsed by the Summit., the Soviet Union would be prepared
to set down and spell out the first stages in more detail than the last
one., because "frankly speaking" it was difficult to foresee when the last
stage would take place, Eaton reiterated that it depended upon what Zorin
had in mind when he spoke of general plans; if he was thinking of a list of
"end products," that would be unacceptable; but if he had in mind a very
brc,d general language expressing the desirability of bringing about a
disarmed world where freedom from fear of war would reign, etc., that
per}raps could be worked out, but again this was his personal opinion and
subject to instructions from his Government, He then suggested that perhaps
all subjects for discussion had been exhausted and that both Mr. Zorin and
he should think about what had been said and see each other again in a few
days, Mr, Zarin, agreed, but in parting stated that he wanted to make it
very clear that if and when the Soviet delegation introduced something in
the Conference this would not mean that every single word or comma would
have to remain unchanged and would not be subject to modification,
AA.kalovsky:It
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