U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01441R000100090047-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2002
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: December 26, 1957
• Content Type: MF

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON
December 26, 1957
IIMRANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURYTY COUNCIL
SUBJECT: U. S. Policy on Control of Armaments
RE ER CES: A. NSC Action No. 1419
B. NSC Action No. 1513 and Annex thereto
C. NBC Action No. 1553 and Annex thereto
D. NBC 5707/8
E. NBC Actions Nos. 1676 and 1722
The enclosed report on the subject, prepared by the Special
Assistant to the President for Disarmament, is transmitted herewith for
preliminary consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting
on Monday, January 6, 1958.
Also enclosed for the information of the Council are
Annexes A, B and C (consisting of maps referred to in the enclosed
report); and Annex D, "Proposals for Partial Measures of Disarmament",
made by Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States in the
Sub-Committee of the UN Disarmament Commission.
JAMS S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary
cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Co?mission
The Special Assistant to the President
for Disarmament
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
*NSC Review Completed *
State Department review completed
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REVISION OF U. S. POLICY ON DISARMAMENT
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Need for Review of U. S. Disarmament Position
1. Present basic policy states that the-United States should "actively
seek an international system for the regulation and reduction of armed forces
and armaments". (NSC Action No. 1419, June 30) 1955; NSC 5707/8, June 3, 1957)
It is clear that the major developments since the last U. S. compre-
2.
hensive review of detailed positions on disarmament require an essential revi-
sion of such detailed positions in order to form a reasonable foundation for
actively seeking a sound and safeguarded agreement with the USSR on disarmament.
3. The U. S. net evaluation studies conducted by the General Thomas Com-
mittee; the Security Resources Panel Report (Gaither Group); and the
joint intelligence estimates; all point to the high degree of devastation which
would result from a modern general war and thus confirm the soundness of the
basic U. S. policy to actively seek a sound safeguarded agreement.
4. One feature of the August 29th Western proposals* widely criticized at
the recent United Nations General Assembly sessions by Free World nations as
well as by the Soviet Bloc countries, has been the "inseparability clause".
This clause is contained in Section XI of the August 29th proposals. It states;
"This working paper is offered for negotiation on the understanding that its
provisions are inseparable."
5. The U. S. Ambassador in Moscow recently has reported: "I continue to
believe that the Soviets genuinely seek a first step agreement on disarmament
and believe it is this they have chiefly in mind in pressing for high-level
talks" (November 23, 1957). However, he considers that the Soviets from their
standpoint regard the August 29th proposals as so heavily weighted in the
West's favor that the United States should not realistically expect the Soviet
Union to accept them, nor should the United States consider the Soviet rejec-
tion of them to be a fair test of whether or not the Soviet is genuinely seek-
ing an agreement. (Cable of Ambassador Thompson, September 3, 1957)
6. The most recent U. S. intelligence estimate on Soviet capabilities
and policies (NIE 11-4-57, November 12, 1957) states that "The USSR clearly
regards the present Western disarmament proposals as heavily loaded in favor
of the West."
7. The only feasible way to ascertain whether or not the Soviet Union
will enter into an inspected and safeguarded agreement which is reasonable
and which would be mutually desirable because of a resultant redu on in
the dangers of war, is to make an offer of such an agreement.
* See Annex D hereto.
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8. Making such an offer is also the only reliable manner in which the
maw cohesion and support of the peoples of the free nations and of the uncommitted
states can be maintained by the United States. This cohesion and support of
the peoples of the free nations is vital to the security of the United States.
Separate Test Suspension
9. The United States has consistently held to the position that inspec-
tion is necessary for each step in each provision of any disarmament agreement.
Thus when the Soviet Union proposed the suspension of nuclear testing, the
United States insisted upon the requirement of inspection. In the informal
bilateral discussions, carried on with full knowledge of the other Western
partners at London, the Soviet Union on June 7, 1957, agreed to inspection
stations inside the USSR to monitor the suspension of nuclear testing.
10. The United States has also consistently maintained that a first step
should be carefully measured and should guard against a disadvantageous result
in the event of violation by the Soviet Union. Thus the United States insisted
that a first agreement for test suspension should be of limited duration so
that laboratories could be maintained in the event of a breach of the agree-
ment. The Soviet Union finally responded in the informal bilateral discus-
sions conducted in London with a counter-proposal of an initial period of two
or three years of nuclear test suspension.
11. Leading U. S. atomic scientists state that they could hold their lab-
vier, and scientists together for a two-year period if it was explained as
being in the national interest, and they could during this period conduct
highly desirable nuclear research without conducting test explosions.
12. The latest U. S. intelligence estimate on Soviet policies states that
while the Soviet would prefer a disarmament agreement without significant in-
spection features, "they would be willing to accept limited inspection arrange-
ments to detect violation of a nuclear test ban, and a minimal number of fixed
observation posts in connection with any agreed arms reductions" (NIE 11-4-57,
November 1,2, 1957).
13. At the UN General Assembly session on November 19, 1957, the key vote
in the test suspension issue was taken on an Indian resolution which provided
for an inspected suspension of tests of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.
The vote was 24 in favor, 34 against, and 20 abstentions. The make-up of this
34 voting with the United States was 27 nations in the NATO and Latin America
groups, plus Australia, Nationalist China, Pakistan, Spain, the Philippines,
Israel, and New Zealand. New Zealand with its new Government has since changed
its position and now favors a test suspension. Six Latin American countries
did not follow the U. S. lead--but even more significant was the fact that 24
Asian-African countries did not support the United States. As indicated above,
no African countries supported the United States on this vote, and only 4
Asian countries (Nationalist China, the Philippines, Pakistan, and Israel).
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14. It is widely recognized that Asia and Africa are principal competi-
tive battlegrounds and may probably swing the decisive weight between the
Soviet Bloc and the Free World. The two leaders of two most influential
Asian nations--India and Japan--have repeatedly and strongly spoken out in
favor of a separate test suspension. Nehru, on December 10, 1957, said:
"I feel that suspension of atomic explosives is a valid first step (in dis-
armament). It is a dramatic step. It would not change the power of any
country but would give it a tremendous lead. It would come as a tremendous
relief to hundreds of millions all over the world."
15. The prompt negotiation of an inspected two-year test suspension, be-
cause of the time. necessary to work out the inspection agreement and obtain
Senate approval, could not at best be made effective as a ratified treaty
prior to September 1, 1956, and therefore the next series of U. S. tests would
be completed before the suspension became effective. When this next series of
tests is completed, a very comprehensive family of weapons in large supply will
be available to the United States.
16. A temporary suspension of nuclear weapons tests would bring into being
a United Nations supervisory organization which could be the forerunner c. an
organization to regulate and control armaments and armed forces in the decades
ahead.
17. A temporary suspension of nuclear tests would establish a climate
conducive to sound successful negotiations on successive steps of armaments
regulation and control.
18. A temporary nuclear test suspension would: (a) inhibit the develop-
ment of more powerful new types of weapons at a time when the United States
would have a relative superiority in nuclear weapons; (b) deter the spread of
the production of nuclear weapons to other less responsible countries;
(c) break the 12-year stalemate in the disarmament negotiations and establish
a climate conducive to sound successful negotiations on further steps of arma-
ments regulation and control; (d) carry with it an inspection system which
would begin the opening up of the Soviet Union and other Communist areas to
international regular observation and would assist in the evolution of the
Soviet system toward a more liberal and peaceful form.
Inspection Zones
19. Another consideration resulting from the recent London and New York
disarmament discussions is that there is reason to believe that the Soviet
might separate out from its proposals and negotiate a reasonable European in-
spection zone. The USSR would prefer to have a de-nuclearized zone in Central
Europe (Bulganin letter of December 10, 1957) but would also consider a Euro-
pean inspection zone as a first step.
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20. The latest intelligence estimate on Soviet policies states that the
Soviet leaders are "acutely concerned over the potential threat of a revived
and nationalistic Germany backed by the United States." The USSR has tended
to concentrate on such disarmament proposals as the ban on use of nuclear
weapons, liquidation of foreign bases, and troop withdrawals in Europe. Ac-
cording to the intelligence estimate: "Their (Soviet) interest in inducing
a U. S. troop withdrawal from Europe would probably lead them to go even fur-
ther (than inspection for a test ban) in allowing mutual inspection in Europe."
(NIE 11-4-57, November 12, 1957)
21. General Norstad has recommended to the NATO Council that it would
"enhance the security" of NATO to establish a European inspection zone against
surprise attack. Norstad said that the "minimum area" he had in mind was Ger-
many, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.
22. The present Western position (August 29, 1957) states that provided
there is agreement by the USSR to either a North America-Soviet Union zone or
an Arctic Circle zone that the United States, with the concurrence of its al-
lies, would agree to.a Europea: inspection zone including all of Europe to the
Ural Mountains (60 degrees East- longitude) and in the south to latitude 4o de-
grees North. If the Soviet reject this zone (which they have), the policy pro-
vides that under the some proviso as above a more limited zone of inspection in
Europe would be "discuesed", but only if a significant part of the Soviet Union,
as well as the other countries of Eastern Europe, was included.
23. The Soviet has rejected the August 29th European zone proposals. How-
ever, they did evince interest in earlier infornil U. S. suggestions based on a
50 E-30? E zone running from a line east of Paris to a line just west of
Leningrad-Odessa. In response to this informal U. S. probing, the Soviet on
April 30, 1957, responded with a proposal for a zone running from 0 degree
(Greenwich) to 25? E (Lvov-Brest-Wilna).
24. The Soviet likewise has rejected the August 29th Arctic Zone and the
North American-USSR zone. In response to informal earlier probing by the United
States during the London talks, the Soviet on April 30th responded with the sug-
gestion of an Eastern-Siberia-Western United States zone running from 108? E to
90? W.
25. The Western European UN Subcommittee members (UK and France), in line
with the May 25, 1957 Presidential decision* that the European zone should be
left to the initiative of Western European nations, did take the initiative in
advancing in the NATO Council the concept of a 5?-350 European zone. The NATO
Council then left to the Western UN Subcommittee members (U. S., UK, France,
Canada) the manner in which this zone should be advanced. During the 1+-Western
Power meetings at the end of July with the Secretary heading the U. S. Delega-
tion, it was decided not to advance 50-35P European zone but to advance for
"discussion" and only under cr aations of complete inseparability a small but
undefined European 7+ofG .
woo c ion o. 722.
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Outer-Space Objects
26. Particularly in view of the recently apparent Soviet strides in
satellite-missile technology, it is in the U. S. interest now to make separable
from the rest of the package and to agree to the August 29th proposal for the
establishment of a technical committee to study the design of an inspection
system which would assure the use of outer-space objects for peaceful purposes.
27. The Soviet during the London discussions did not react to the U. S.
missile proposal except to indicate that their proposal to eliminate nuclear
weapons included all "rockets".
Armaments Regulation Organization
28. The setting up of an Armaments Regulation Organization under the aegis
of the UN Security Council would be in the U. S. interest. Agreement on such
an organization by itself would have certain value in breaking the atmosphere
of stalemate and thereby improving the chances for agreement on subject;, on
which the two sides are not now far apart. Such an organization also c?=ald
begin to make the control studies that would be basic to agreements on any
additional steps of disarmament.
29. The Soviet have repeatedly indicated their support for some kind of
international control organization under the UN Security Council.
Other August 29th Proposals
30. The remaining proposals in the August 29th paper are separable and
can be practically implemented in successive steps if agreed upon.
II. POLICY OBJECTIVES
31. Actively to seek a safeguarded disarmament agreement, beginning with a
partial agreement and subsequently extending the initial step or steps into a
more comprehensive agreement. In negotiation of the foregoing, the United States
should seek either individually or in combination measures which would:
a. Break the present deadlock, gain experience in inspection and reg-
ulation, and at the same time be careful not to impair the security of the
United States in the event that further progress in developing wider dis-
armament agreements was not forthcoming.
b. Reduce the danger of great surprise attack and thereby give con-
tinuing vitality to the nuclear deterrent.
c. Inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons into the hands of "fourth
countries".
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d. Reduce the probability of weapons systems, particularly missile
systems, from developing in a way as to increase the danger of major nuclear
conflict being initiated either by accident or by actions of other than the
responsible n:vtional officials, particularly with regard to the growing
problem of dispersion of authority to take action which would initiate
world war.
e. Enhance the political position of the United States with regard to
its allies and the uncommitted nations*
f. Facilitate within the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc countries
the rise of "non-Stalinist" elements and ultimately the evolution of the So-
viet Bloc countries into more liberal and democratic societies, including
the true independence of the satellite countries.
III. POLEGUIDANCE
32. The United States, aftor consultation with the NATO states and other
free countries as appropriate, should propose the following separable measures
as a basis for an initial agreement:
a. (1) Immediately following ratification of the agreement, the in-
stallation of approximately eight to twelve test monitoring inspection
stations with appropriate agreed scientific instruments, in the USSR,
a like number in the United States, and suitable numbers of such sta-
tions in the Pacific Ocean areas, and at other necessary locations, as
agreed by competent scientists and as specified in the agreement. (See
attached. map, Annex A.) The inspectors to have the right to make prompt
on-the-spot observations at any point indicated by their instruments as
being aprobabie-site of a nuclear test explosion in violation of the
agreement.
(2) Subject to the satisfactory agreement on the inspection sta-
tions and on prompt installation of the inspection system, and further
subject to the right to end the test suspension before expiration-of
the 24-month period upon notice of a violation of the agreement upon
any important particular; a 24-month suspension of nuclear testing be-
ginning on September 1, 1958, or as soon thereafter as the agreement
is effective. This agreement would take effect as soon as ratified by
the United States, the USSR, the UI, and any other state, such as Aus-
tralia, whose territory might require inspection. This agreement would
be open to adherence of additional states.
be Establishment of an initial inspection zone against surprise attack
in Western USSR and Central Europe. (See attached map, Annex B.) This zone
would be from approximately 3? East longitude to 28? East longitude and from
45? North latitude to the Arctic Circle zone described in c.
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c. Establishment of an inspection zone in Eastern Siberia, the Arctic,
Northwestern United States, and Western Canada. (See attached map, Annex C.)
This zone would include all of Siberia east of 1080 East longitude and the
additional Soviet Arctic Circle territory including the Murmansk area. The
West would submit to inspection the Arctic Circle area of Norway, Greenland,
Canada, and Alaska, and in addition a sufficient proportion of Northwestern
United States and Western Canada so as to approximate the same number of
square miles as the Soviet area and to include the same percentage of U. S.
and USSR area.
(NOTE: The zones referred to in paragraphs b and c would
have aerial and limited ground inspection of the
type proposed in the Four-Power proposal of Aug-
ust 29, 1957.)
d.. The establishment of a technical committee to study the inspection
requirements of a system to assure that outer-space objects would be used
and maintained only for peaceful purposes. This committee would limit its
study to the technical problems.
e. The establishment of an Armaments Regulation Organization under
the aegis of the Security Council of the United Nations to supervise any
of the foregoing measures that are agreed, as well as to prepare for the
supervision of future additional agreed measures.
f. An undertaking by all signatory states to make an early and sus-
tained effort, during the initial 24+ months of the test suspension, to
reach agreement upon, and begin to implement additional steps of, disarm-
ament and arms control, including all of the other measures contained in
the August 29, 1957, Western proposals.
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