Questions relating to Arctic Inspection.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01441R000100100005-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 30, 2000
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: June 20, 1958
• Content Type: MEMO

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ME4ORANDUM OF COhVERSlT er Of Lr~ copies, Series
June 20, 1958
SUBJECT: Questions relating to Arctic Inspection.
ARTICIPAN'TS: Mr. F. M. Tovell, First Secretary
British Embassy
Mr. Vincent Baker, S/AE
COPIES TO RM/R USRO, Paris
S/AE Amembassy, Ottawa
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Mr. Tovell called to leave for consideration the attached paper on
technical points to be considered in our studies of an Arctic inspection
system. He referred to the paper as an elaboration of the questions
given by Mr. Rae to Mr. Farley on May 22 (also attached) and said it
represented in broad outline the questions under consideration within
the Canadian government in anticipation of possible talks with the
United States on the subject.
S/AE:VBakerscr
State Dept. declassification instructions on file
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Y June 20, 1958.
The Canadian authorities have been giving some
thought to some of the general problems connected with a
system of safeguards in the northern regions. The more
important considerations would seem to be:
(a) Scale of effort on the grounds numbers and locations
of observation posts, scale of manning, radar and
communications requirements, and degree of mobility
desirable.
(b) Scale of air effort required: numbers and types of
aircraft, equipment to be carried (radar and infrared),
and frequency of flights.
(c) Administrative effort required: international staff
to produce and administer inspection regulations and
restrictions, procedures for preparing flight
regulations and flight plans, administration of
communications orders, and collection, analysis and
dissemination of inspection reports.
(d) Restrictions on inspection teams: liaison officers,
speed and flight limitations on aircraft, clearance
of flight plans, restrictions on use of airfields,; and
on equipment in aircraft.
(e) Effect of weather, incidence of cloud and low
illumination in winter on efficiency of aerial
inspection and difficulty of continuous photographic
reconnaissance in Arctic (mean cloudiness and nercentage
of overcast, fog and blowing snow)
(f) Necessity for providing adequate communications in
auroral area where radio oaths are espect4 1 y subject
to disruption by magnetic storms.
Studies made so far suggest as a preliminary
conclusion that the best safeguard against surprise attack
from the point of view both of discouraging preparations
and of providing an additional margin of warning would be
presence of international observers on the airfields and at
missile launching sites of the states involved. To be of
real value such observers would require the support of a
rapid and completely reliable communications system
efficiently designed, supplied and operated. In addition
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to ground posts at airfields and launching sites either
airborne or land-based radar tracking systems appear
necessary to monitor notified flights and to report any
unauthorized movement. This requirement implies a system
for reporting and clearance of aircraft flight plans affecting
zone of surveillance. A further requirement would be
regular aerial photographic reconnaissance of zone to
ensure no undeclared military establishments were being
prepared or operated and to detect any unjustified buildup
of the elements necessary for a major assault. Evidently
such a system would recxuire a central administrative and
operational authority involving a substantial international
staff.
These preliminary conclusions imply a considerable
apparatus would be needed outside the actual zone of
surveillance in order to provide an effective system even
though the system were to apply only to aircraft, missiles,
etc. moving into, within or across the zones To the extent
that the system would be restricted in its operations
outside the zone of surveillance it would appear
correspondingly to be diminished in effectiveness. If, for
example, there were to be no ground observers at airfields
and launching sites outside the zone or if their communications
were inferior the value of system would appear to be
sharply reduced. If there were no procedures for
filing flight plans for flights into, within or across the
zone, it would be difficult to envisage a basis for a monitoring
system.
The Canadian authorities would be grateful to
learn whether the United States authorities concerned have
conducted "cost and effectiveness" surveys for systems
involving varying degrees of ground support outside the
zone of surveillance. It is the impression in Ottawa that
at beat a limited plan based on the polar regions would
provide only partial safeguards. Indeed the ground control
element outside the zone of surveillance may become
increasingly important with the passage of time as long-
range missiles become operational.
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On the basis of the studies of appropriate
United States authorities as to how control in the Arctic
might be implemented, and because of Canada's deep
interest in this matter, the Embassy has been asked to
enquire from the Department of State how their studies
on this aspect of disarmament now stand. The sort of
question to which broad answers would be appreciated
would be the followings
(a) What sort of practical activities within the
Arctic does the United States contemplate by
way of inspection on the ground and in the air?
(b) What kind of base facilities, if any, does the
United States visualize for international teams
in Canada but outside the Arctic area?
(c) What kind of additional installations in the
Canadian north does the United States consider
may be required by way of electronic devices
or communications?
(d) Does the United States envisage notifications
to an international inspection system of flight
plans of intended flights to or within the
Arctic and if so by what means?
THE CANADIAN EA4BASSY,
Washington, D. C.
May 22, 1958.
State4D,Wash., DC
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