Memorandum of Conversation

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01441R000100100025-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: March 19, 1958
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2Q M , , AA&
0R01441 R000100100025-6
COPY
Memorandum of Conversation March 19, 1958
Participants: Mr. Valentin Ivanov, First Secretary
Soviet Embassy
Mr. Robert E. Matteson
At Mr. Ivanov's invitation, I met him for lunch at the LaFayette
Hotel at 12:30 P.M., Wednesday, March 19, 1958. The luncheon lasted
until 2:30 P. M. and the conversation covered a wide variety of subjects.
About 90% of the conversation involved questions which I asked Ivanov.
During the conversation, Ivanov was very frank and extremely congenial
more so, I think, than any other Soviet official I have met. At the same
time, as inight be expected, he did not have the precise knowledge of
disarmament which Soviet experts have.
The following were the points of interest:
1. In response to my comment that Ambassador Menshikov seemed
to have had a successful meeting with the delegation of Ohio Republican
women yesterday, Ivanov laughed and said they were women and so were
easily impressed. He remarked that he was surprised by how uninformed
they were about national and international affairs, especially since
they were in politics. He added that he supposed this was also true
of people in his country.
2. He volunteered that Ambassador Menshikov had not done very
well on the Sunday TV "Youth Wants to Know" program. He said this
was so in spite of the fact that. the Embassy staff had prepared for
him one page answers to anticipated questions. He remarked that news-
paper men are much better informed than either the Ohio women or the
panel of youth and that Menshikov had had a very tough "off-.the-record"
session recently with a group of newspaper men and also had had a
tough time at the recent National Press Club luncheon.
3. Ivanov asked me what I was--doing and I said remaining on the
White House staff although disarmament was now in the State Department.
4. I told him I had read Khrushchevts pre-election speech and
wondered whether Khrushchev meant that the Soviet, was about to announce
a unilateral cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons. He said
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80ROl441 R000100100025-6
 Approved For Relgasp 0 0 I - 80R01 00100100025-6
Z -
no - not at all. I then repeated the language Khrushchev had used
which made it sound as if he had changed or was about to change his
position. He said he would have to check that and I said I would
call him on the phone. He said please do.
5. Ivanov said that Khrushchev had never indicated that the
Soviet would unilaterally stop testing. He said that since the US
was ahead in the nuclear field, the Soviet could not unilaterally
stop either testing or the production of nuclear weapons.
6. I remarked that Khrushchev seemed more impressed than ever
with the destructive power of nuclear weapons - that. he said their
use could lead to the destruction of nearly all living organisms.
Ivanov said that this was so - but that, he didn't mean that all human
beings would be killed. Life would still go on. On the other hand,
the development of the destructive power of nuclear weapons was so
great that no one would want a nuclear war.
7. He said - in response to my question - there is no longer
possible any such thing as a local war of the Korean or Indo-Chinese
type. Nuclear weapons were now conventional weapons in modern armies
and the use of nuclear weapons locally would set off a chain reaction.
He said the Korean war could have become a general war if MacArthur
had used atomic weapons on (Red) China.
8. Ivanov said the thing to fear and watch out for is that an ac-
cident or an incident might occur which would lead to general nuclear
war. I asked him whether the Soviet - in that case - was serious about
sending volunteers into the Suez area at the time of the Suez crisis.
He said yes - to stop the British and French. But -. he quickly added
that Bulganin1s idea of having the US and Soviet join forces in the
Suez to stop aggression was even a better method.
9. I asked him what the Soviet would think of other joint en-
deavors - such as joint development of the peaceful uses of outer
space, joint controlled thermonuclear research, joint development of
underdeveloped areas, joint participation in regional security pacts.
To each of these he said with enthusiasm that this was what the Soviet
would like to see.
10. I asked him how he reconciled KhrushchevXs statement that
Soviet policy was not to interfere in other countries' internal affairs
with the Soviet action in Hungary. He answered that if you were an
ordinary Soviet citizen, your view of Hungary was that until the end
of World War II it was a fascist enemy controlled by Admiral Horthy.
Approved For Release 2000/ 101441 R000100100025-6
 Approved For Release- 0 /08/.84: CIA-RDP801:W 44180 00100025-6
HP said that this being so - the Soviet could not tolerate a counter-
revolution which would re-establish on the Soviet border a fascist
state. He indicated that there was some difference of view about
Hungary in the Soviet - that a small group of students, for example,
did not share the above viewpoint.
11. I asked him if the Soviet, in his opinion, had ever committed
aggression. He at first said no and when I mentioned Finland, he said
that some might consider this aggression but that. the Finnish war actu-
ally was the introduction to World War II - that Finland was being set
up as an offensive base by Germany, that in reality the Soviet move was
defensive.
12. I asked him how he thought the ordinary Soviet official or
citizen viewed the outside world. He said that during the Stalin
period, they regarded the outside world with extreme suspicion, but
that with more contact, this was changing. He said, however, that the
ordinary person had fear of encirclement by US bases and nuclear weapons
and wondered how a US citizen would feel if the situation were reversed.
He also said that occasionally there were statements by certain groups
in the US which led people in the Soviet to believe that if certain,
groups came into power in the US, these bases would be used as the jump
off for a preventive war.
13. Realizing I would open myself to a doctrinal lecture, I asked
him about Khrushchevts concept of freedom, i. e. , 'the liberation of the
people from the horrors of unemployment and misery, from racial, national,
and social oppression. " I asked how he translated this into real poli-
tical and economic freedom. I referred to Khrushchevts statement in the
New York Times today in which he was reported as aaying the Communist
Party controlled the nominations. Ivanov, at first, said this wasntt a
correct report. Then he said that it was true that there was a Communist
Party slate but that the people had the right to reject the slate and
even to write in new nominations. He said Communist Party members were
6 million people out of over 200 million and how could a minority dictate
to the rest unless the rest agreed with the minority. I said that Stalin
was known to have made good use of the police. He said that it was true
Stalin had made mistakes. He said that under the present leadership
things were different - that there were real discussions at all levels
and real differences of opinion expressed. He referred to the decentral-
ization of industry as being a move that resulted from discussions at all
levels by many different bodies. I asked him if it weren't true that
Soviet. people wanted very much to have their own private plot of land,
their own cows and pigs, - even their own factory. He said this was
true within limits and that it. was permitted within limits - that if a
Approved For Release 2000`_??" ~'-RQ08(IR01441 R000100100025-6
 Approved For Release.,2WO/08/30 4 CIA-RDP80ROl441ZPQ100100025-6
man were to. own a factory, it would go beyond the constitution of the
state and would be considered exploitation. He said, on the other hand,
if enough people wanted to own a. factory, there would be another
revolution and the present system. would be overthrown. He said it
was to get rid of the past factory-owners and land-owners that the
1917 .revolution was fought.
14. I asked him about himself - if he was. married, what his
father did, his wife's father, etc. He said he was married and had.
children - that his wife preferred to work even though he had enough
money to support her. I asked him if he didn't prefer to have his
wife with the children rather than working. He said no - that it was
better for the children to be in a collective kindergarten and school -
that he believed in the collective life. He said he had worked in a
"supply" factory during the war - then took the exams for the.. Foreign
Trade School because he had friends there. After finishing the three
year course, he joined Menshikov who was Minister of Trade (or in the
Ministry of Trade) in 1947. It was in the Foreign Trade School that
he learned English. Later - I think he said. 1950 - he transferred to
the Foreign Service and served at the United Nations. He has been on
this current assignment since the middle of last year. He said his
father was a. "car driver" and had died in 1.956 (?) of a brain hemor-
rhage. His mother still lived in Moscow - which was Ivanovts. birth-
place. His father knew Bulganin - and "Bulganin isntt very " It
seemed as if he were going to say "smart" - but then changed to say:
"Bulganin is smart but he is liked by people because of his person-
ality like President Eisenhower. 11 His grandfather was a. peasant and
his great grandfather was a serf. His wife's father is a railroad
conductor.
15. Ivanov then asked about Secretary Dulles. He wondered how
long Dulles would stay on. I said I didntt know but I assumed he
would stay on as long as President Eisenhower. He asked whether bi-
lateral conversations with the Soviet were possible. I said I be-
lieved they were as possible now as they were before - that , as our
UN people had said, conversations might be carried on under the umbrella
of the Security Council or even the Disarmament Commission. He said he
understood the Disarmament Commission was called for March 26th. I
said I hadn't heard that. He. wondered whether it was necessary to have
disarmament discussed in the UN. I said that the UN was the agreed
worldwide. organization and that, as the Soviets had indicated, disarmament
was of vital interest to each nation. Therefore, it seemed logical that
it be discussed in the UN. Regarding the 25-nation Disarmament Com-
mission, I said that it had been voted by the. vast majority an d there
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 ,:! }-fit 18 R01441 R000100100025-6
 Approved For Release?2.Q,p0/08/10-: CIA-RDP80RO144 100100025-6
fore it was also logical that it might be called. He asked about a
Summit meeting. I said that the Secretary had already said that, the US
position was it favored one if adequately prepared for. He granted
that it would do no good to have one unless prepared for. He said the
Soviet didn't want one for propaganda reasons but to reach agreement.
He said the preparation could be by Ambassadors and by Foreign Ministers.
16. He asked about the subjects for agreement. I said that each
side seemed to have its lists of what should be on the agenda and that
there seemed to be certain items - such as surprise attack zones -
that were similar. I asked about control of outer space. He said not
without elimination of US bases, I asked if it wouldntt be possible
that surprise attack zones might take care of the base question. He
said no - that what was required - if outer space were to be negotiated -
was the equivalent on. our side which was the bases. He said this did
not mean that the bases should be wiped out - but merely turned over to
the country in which they were located and US personnel removed. He
said under such an arrangement, the. military pacts would still exist but
that it would be hoped that non-aggression treaties could be worked out.
17. I told Ivanov that the great difficulty with. Soviet proposals
was that given the lack of mutual trust, we didn't consider their pro-
posals to. include adequate inspection to verify the, commitment. I asked
why it was that the Soviet had been so unwilling to open up to the neces-
sary inspection. I said I knew that the usual answer had been that we.
were seeking intelligence about new targets. He acknowledged that this
had been the answer but went on to say that one must understand the
Russian mentality to appreciate their reluctance to open up, not only to
inspection, but to tourists. He. said the Soviet had had great suspicion
of foreigners and because of past, history mistrusted what they were up
to. In addition, the Soviet Union had been. fully occupied in developing
the country - and didn't have enough resources to provide hotels, etc.
for tourists. Likewise, the Soviet. never believed in tourism as a large
source of revenue. However, this was now changing because of the greatly
increased tensions caused by the arms race and it was felt that everything
possible should be done. to permit touriats to come in and get to know
Russians better. So far as inspection is concerned, he said we accept
surprise attack zones; we accept inspection for tests; we accept inspection
for control of outer space and bases. Regarding inspection for tests, I
asked what. was meant. He said their scientists admit that certain tests
in the. ground and high in. the stratosphere can be hidden and that the
Soviet was willing to have instrumented ground posts. He asked whether
our position on. separating out tests had changed. He referred to the
Hightower and Reston stories that, seemed to indicate it had changed. I
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80ROl441 R000100100025-6
 Approved For Releas .2100/08f3O : CIA-RDP80R014415OZ0100100025-6
said our position had not changed so far as I knew but that. I had. seen
the stories he referred to.
18. I asked him about Khrushchev's remarks in his speech about the
status of women. Ivanov said women are considered the equal of men -
that they have equal rights and are expected to do equal work. He said
with a laugh that he knew some women who were physically stronger than
he. I said I hoped for his sake that one. of them wasn't his wife. He
laughed and said that the West tends to spoil women - and act as if they
were not supposed to work. He also thought that the Western schools
wasted too much time on teaching subjects that could be picked up outside
of school - like geography, history, literature, etc. On the other hand,
the school years in the Soviet were devoted to learning languages, science,
and engineering which were more difficult to learn without instruction.
As we left, he reminded me that I was going to call him about the
question of the Khrushchev speech. (Note.: I did - half an hour after
I left him but the answer was he wasn't there but would call me. As
of now, he hasn't.)
Robert E. Matteson
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R0l441 R000100100025-6