DCI Briefing of National Security Council on 29 January 1953

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000100010006-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 29, 1953
• Content Type: MFR

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Security Information
29 January 1953
St7BLTECT: DCI Briefing of National Security Council on 29 January 1953
1. Item 1 of the first meeting of the National Security Council,
under the Chairmanship of President Eisenhower, was a briefing of the
world situation by the Director of Central Intelligence.
2. General Smith's briefing was presented in three phases: a
brief introduction, the Soviet Atomic Energy Program, and an estimate
of The World Situation Through 1951. (REF: The National Intelligence
Digest, Section .
3. In his introduction, DCI approached his subject by saying
that in the time alloted, he was entering upon an ambitious undertaking
by attempting to give a round-up of the world situation; therefore, he
had decided to give to the new national policy-making body a short survey
of what the heads of the United States intelligence agencies, sitting-in
abnTrittee, had given as their best estimate -- and in some cases best
guesses - of what might be expected in the over-all world situation
within the next two years.
4. He introduced the second phase of his briefing by saying that
he would like to be quite frank and state that he had often heard from
these heads of intelligence that in many cases the result that we had
gained from intelligence was not being properly used by the heads of
our government. As an example, he mentioned former President Truman's
statement to the press on 26 January 1953, in which it was intimated that
there had been no actual proof of a Soviet atomic explosion. DCI stated
that on five separate occassions he had delivered the best considered
estimate, gained from many expensive sources, to President Truman. He
then gave a brief survey of the Soviet atomic energy development, clearly
differentiating what we knew and what we had estimated about that program.
5. In his third phase, DCI dealt primarily with briefs, or in some
cases, verbatim selected paragraphs, as contained in the Estimate of the
world Situation Through 1951L (National Intelligence Digest Section I).
In aition, he either Z =i bed or quoted from a few of the cards which
had been prepared for the briefing by OCI.
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6. Imediately after DCI had finished (time: 43 minutes) the
President asked if there was anything in this that would keep us from
giving it to the Foreign Committees of both Houses of Congress. The
President said that it was an excellent run-down of the world situation
and that he thought that it would do a great deal of good if we could
give it to these Committees. As an after thought, the President stated
that, judging from the manner in which it was presented, an article could
be written from it.
7. General Smith stated that there was nothing in the briefing that
could not be given to the Committees, and as a matter of fact, he knew
when he gave it that most people in the room had read it already in one
form or another.
8. At this point, Secretary Wilson remarked that the President had
mentioned "an article" and inferred that he would be against sending a
written report to the congressional members - to which the President
immediately responded that he did not mean to have "an articlett written
and sent to them, but that it was in such good form that one cou cube
written. He further clarified his statement by saying that if could be
"squashed down" and given to the Joint Foreign Committees in an oral
form when he meets with the Committees sometime next week. General
Bradley stated that he did not think the Atomic Energy material should
be included - to which all agreed.
9. Referring to General Smith's briefing, Mr. Stasson remarked that
he did not think that the remarks of our aiding the Italian elections
should go in either - which was also agreed upon. At this point, the
President asked General Smith just how much of "things like this" had
Congressman been given. General Smith replied practically none'. -- 7
10. The President stated that he could not help but remember that
General Smith had emphasized that one of the Communist aims was to split
the West, and in his (the President's) opinion, this was not a question
of bringing disagreement between the US and Mexico but that by neglecting
to give selected members of Congress what we could we were promoting the
same danger within our own government. He said that one reason why the
Executive Department approached matters like this differently was because
we had information like this to opperate on.
11. The President then turned and told General Bradley that it would
also be a good idea for him to give a short briefing on Korea. (It was
not clear to me whether the President meant just for this special briefing
,to Congressman or whether the President was directing General Bradley to
do this each week at each NSC meeting. This point might have been clarified
later in the meeting - which I did not attend.
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12. A Presidential assistant as a fhe President if the President
was referring "to the meeting on 6 February" set for the briefing of the
Foreign Committees. The President said that it was the next meeting,
when he was going to Congress. (This too perhaps was clarified before
the meeting adjourned) Someone asked the President whether he desired
that this briefing be given before a bipartisan group, to which he replied
he had told the leaders of Congress that he would leave such matters
entirely up to them but left the impression that he personally did not
see a thing wrong by making it a bipartisan group.
13. As an after thought the President, turning to DCI, said there
was one other thing which "you people" must do, and that is to underscore
and emphasis anything that you think "we here really should know."
1L. Secretary Dulles stated that when this was given to Congress he
thought it would be beneficial to have a map of Latin America.
ls. I left the meeting at this point, when the President called for
the next item on the agenda.
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