SOVIET CAPABILITY FOR WAGING ELECTROMAGNECTIC WARFARE
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T
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8
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 9, 2001
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SOVIET CAPABILITY FOR WAGING ELECTROMAGNETIC WARFARE
NSA & DOS Declassification/Release Instructions on File.
I would like to discuss the Soviet capability for waging electromagnetic
warfare. Let us first define what we mean by electromagnetic warfare. Electro-
magnetic warfare, sometimes called electronic warfare is the contest, through
use, jamming, interference, and related measures, for the control and use of
parts or all of the radio spectrum or the denial of use to others.
In the first general postwar international radio conferences held in
Moscow and Atlantic City in 1946-47 the Rusikians were most cooperative and
agreed to proposals that a new program for world wide use of radio frequencies
should be established based on an engineering approach. In the 1948 and succeeding
conferences the Soviet attitude changed completely and all their activity was
directed towards "hamstringing" the establishment of a new list. They fought
any proposal for developing an international frequency plan based on sound
engineering and stated that the only correct approach was to hold to the 1939 Bern
List under which the U.S.S.R. held some sort of priority to every communications
channel in the frequency spectrum from the lowest frequency to 30 megacycles.
This list of course would give them an advantageous legal position for using any
of these frequencies to the detriment of other countries. Thus, Russia could
resort to a form of international radio "blackmail" by refraining from the use of
certain frequencies in return for which the country concerned would grant
concessions to the U.S.S.R. in other fields. Additionally by refusing to honor
their agreement to participate in the formulation of a new list they refrain from
supplying technical information on present and planned future use of radio to
other countries while at the same time getting such information. To reinforce
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their position the Russians appear to have established and are operating stations,
particularly in the broadcasting field, in excess of the number required for
adequately fulfilling their legitimate needs, thus denying the use of the
frequencies by other countries.
A more active phase of the electromagnetic warfare that the U.S.S.R. has
been waging is that of jamming. The jamming has taken two forms, so called
"polite" jamming in which an Orbit transmitter utilizes a frequency already in
use by another country's transmitter thereby making it difficult to hear the
non-orbit broadcast; and deliberate jamming where an orbit transmission with
jamming modulation applied to its carrier is targeted on a western information
broadcast. This latter form of jamming is one of great concern and the balance
of this presentation will be largely devoted to a discussion of it.
Organized jamming of VOA-BBC programs began in 1948 and, by April 1949,
developed into a concentrated, extensive and effective program of jamming all,
or nearly all, Russian-language broadcasts. The Soviets not only jam at will
Russian-language broadcasts but those in the satellite languages as well. A
curtain of jamming exists from the Sarelo-Finnish S.S.R. in the north through
Western Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Rumania, and
Bulgaria. Broadcasts to the Far East are also jammed. Recently BIAS (Radio
In the American Sector) broadcasts to Germany have been jammed and current
information indicates that powerful transmitters being constructed in the Sov
Zone of Germany will be able to further nullify BIAS and other broadcasts. In
January of this year the U.S.S.R. jammed the internal broadcast system of Denmark
when a program that the Russians considered objectionable was broadcast for Danish
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Polar
chart
of
circuits
Propa-.
ation
g
of Big
nals
internal consytmption. In all cases, Jamming takes place quickly and effectively
whether the broadcasts are scheduled or non-scheduled.
I hope to emphasize the fact that today the Russians have the capability
for completely disrupting our long range radio circuits. This means, that if the
Russians so choose, they can completely isolate the continental U.S. from its
overseas facilities from a radio communication point of view. This, therefore,
is a potent weapon for use in either psychological warfare or in an active military
situation, since today approximately 75% of our military and 40% of our commercial
traffic to Europe is by radio and 100% of military and 81% of commercial traffic
to the far east is via radio.
In order to better understand how electromagnetic warfare or Jamming is
carried out, we have prepared a pictorial representation of the transmistion
characteristics of radio waves. At the left is a transmitter in the U.S. sending
messages to a receiving station located in Berlin. We have also shown two
jamming stations; one located deep inside the U.S.S.R. and the other in the vicinity
of the receiving station in Berlin. If you will consider first the transmitting
station located in the U.S. you will notice two types of waves being sent out
by this station. These are the ground wave which follows the surface of the
earth and, depending on the frequency and power used, has a reliable range of
about two to three hundred miles, and the sky wave which travels upward and is
reflected back to earth by an ionize4&ayer in the ionosphere. This path will
i
permit reliable transmissions of several thousand miles. In the example we have
used, you will note that the transmission to Berlin is entirely by the sky
wave path.
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Now in order for the signals transmitted from the U.S. to be received
successfully in Berlin, the strength of these signals in Berlin must be greater
than any other signals existing there on the same frequency. If such is not
the case then interference will be experienced and if this interference is great
enough then the desired signal will be unintelligible and jamming will have
occurred. Let us look for a moment at the Soviet capability, from a propagation
point of view, to cause such interference or jamming to our European receiving
stations. Remember that geographically the U.S.S.R. is closer to our receiving
locations than we are. Accordingly the Russians can utilize a jammer located
adjacent to our receiving station and jam by ground wave or if this is not feasible
that jammer can be located a distance away and jamming accomplished by utilizing
the sky wave path. It is of importance to remember that for a fixed transmitter
power output the closest transmitter to a given location will develop the
greatest signal strength at that location.
Let us now consider the frequency range over which jamming of Voice of America
Freq.
cover-land British Broadcasting Co. has occurred. The red block on this chart shows
age of
Jong
that range, 200 kilocycles to 21 megacycles. We have also plotted on this chart
those portions of the frequency spectrum utilized for both military and commercial
long range communication and navigation circuits. It is obvious that these circuits
utilize frequency ranges within the bands where the U.S.S.R. has already demonstrated
they can conduct efficient jamming.
Let us now consider what is needed to conduct effective jamming operations
and how well the Russians can today fulfill these requirements. The essential
elements are: transmitting stations, monitoring stations, communications facilities
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SURD 14438000100030004-5
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between the various stations, and trained personnel. First, we must recognize
that any radio transmitter that can be tuned to the desired frequency is a
potential jamming transmitter. If you have listened to the early morning
news broadcasts where direct overseas pickups are used, you have at times heard
jamming. In this case when code signals or voice transmissions interfered with
your listening it was unintentional but nevertheless caused difficulty. More
sophisticated types of jamming are being utilized by the Soviets which they can
accomplish by merely connecting a noise generator to an already installed
transmitter. In Russia radio and wire line facilities rather than just wire line
Map of I as in this country are utilized to provide internal communications. On this map
Sov.
basic
tel stns
Diver-
sion of
trans.
these stations there are also many more that are utilized for broadcast, marine,
aviation, military circuits, etc., and that at many of these stations there are
several transmitters. Any of these hundreds of transmitters can be utilized
as jammers. A listening program was established by the State Department in an
attempt to determine if any of the Russian high frequency broadcast transmitters
were being utilized as jammers since defector interrogations had disclosed that
this was being done in the satellite areas. The information thus obtained has been
plotted on this chart. The red lines indicate the major periods of VOA Russian
language transmissions. You will note that prior to origination of these
programs the number of Russian high frequency broadcast programs on the air
decreases and does not increase substantially until the conclusion of the VOA
25X1 DOa
NSA program.
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the normal broadcast. It has been estimated that between 500 and 1000 transmitters
are today being utilized for jamming of western orbit language broadcasts. A
feature of transmitters, that improves the efficiency of jamming operations, is the
ability to change frequency rapidly. This characteristic is increasingly
difficult to achieve as the power output of the transmitter increases.
Transmitters Oanufactured in the U.S. with outputs of 50 kilowatts require up
to 15 minutes to retune to a new frequency. In contrast to this, a 100 kilowatt
transmitter manufactured by Brown-Boveri in Switzerland can accomplish a frequency
change in less than one minute. It is known that Czechoslovakia purchased two of
these units in 1950 designed for operation together with a power output of 200 kw.
In addition to having transmitters available, a successful Jamming operation
requires a well integrated monitoring-control network. This network must monitor
continuously the transmitter to be jammed as well as the taming transmitter.
From observation of the reaction of Russian jammers to changes in frequency of VOA
stations it is known that such a network exists. Tests made with VOA
25X1X4
NSA
fiIFs _'1Onsd cooperatintr have failed to uncover any radio transmissions which could
be associated with such a network. It is assumed that such transmissions are
carried out by land line circuits. It is known however, that the Russians
NSA have monitoring networks devoted to other services which, if the need arose, could
25X1 DOa
be used for jamming operations.
NSA
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The remaining item on our list is the matter of trained personnel. It is
obvious that from 1949, when jamming of VQA started, until today a great number
of personnel could have been trained.
We have spoke great deal about jamming and now suppose we listen to
some of it. You will hear a recording of a transmission being jammed, the
transmitting stations changing frequency to get away from the jamming, and the
Russian Jammer very rapidly coming up on the new frequency. (Play tape)
In conclusion, I would like to restate what we consider the present Russian
capability and intent for waging electromagnetic warfare:
1. Through the position they take at International Radio Conferences
they seek to disrupt orderly planning on a sound engineering basis of
world radio usage, while at the same time maintaining some sort of
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legal claim to every useful channel up to 30 megacycles. Accordingly,
They are in a position to carry out international radio "blackmail" or
engaged in "polite" jamming.
2. The jamming mechanism is of such a magnitude that they can interfere
with many of the western nations internal broadcasting systems.
3. The high order of development of their jamming networks is such
as to permit them to interfere with and completely disrupt our
long range, military and civilian, communication and navigation
circuits as well as broadcasting.
4. They will utilize any of the foregoing techniques whenever they
consider it expedient.
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