INDIAN AMBASSADOR HAS INTERVIEW WITH STALIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80R01443R000100040002-6
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
18
Document Creation Date:
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date:
May 19, 2005
Sequence Number:
2
Case Number:
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP80R01443R000100040002-6.pdf | 524.52 KB |
Body:
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INDIAN AMBASSADOR HAS INTERVIEW WITH STALIN
There is an apparent relationship between India's
recent efforts to achieve peace in Korea, its attempts
to gain Communist China's admission to the United
Nations, its critical attitude toward President
Eisenhower's Seventh Fleet announcement and the inter-
view granted by Stalin to Indian Ambassador Kumar.
P. S. Menon on 17 February.
No information regarding the nature of the inter-
view is available. In two audiences given to Menon's
predecessor, Radhakrishnan, in 1950 and 1952, Stalin
displayed an interest only in inconsequential matters.
This suggests that the latest interview, like the earlier
ones, was intended to win Indian support merely by
granting its Ambassador an unusual honor rather than
by appealing to it with specific arguments.
State Department review completed
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K. P. S. Menon is a career civil servant who was
educated at Oxford, and who has the reputation of a
middle-of-the-road man. He is believed to be pro-
Western and completely loyal to Nehru.
He is not related to Krisha~ Menon, who sponsored
the Indian UN resolution for a Korean settlement, and
who is suspected of being susceptible to the Soviet
line.
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INTERNAL T IRANIAN SECURITY
Continuing deterioration of Iranian situation, confusion
in Tehran highlighted by:
1. The oil problem. Mossadeq told Ambassador
Henderson that on 21 February he would:
a) tell Majlis there is no hope of oil settlement.
b) recommend sale of oil to anyone including
Orbit.
2. Mossadeq's charge~Q amt
~t British don't want a settlement, are trying to
overthrow him, using fanatical religious groups,
+Communist-front organizations, and the tribes.
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3. Tribal unrest:
a) numerous reports of unrest.
b) intrigues appear aimed primarily at strength-
ening tribes' position against government
rather than overthrow of government.
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d) No indication of unified tribal plot. Concerted
tribal effort might result in breakdown of in-
ternal law and order.
(1}Soviet contacts among tribes, especially
Kurds, long reported, evidence slim.
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e) Imminent failure of oil negotiations and
continuing internal decline will not necessarily
arouse tribes to action.
~.3 "~~
4. Mossadeq threatened to throw up his hands and re-
sign:
a) He has threatened to do this before.
b) His death or removal might furnish occasion
far unified tribal action, especially if successor
gavernment is leftist, revolt is foreign-backed.
5. Shah has said he would abdicate, Reportedly in same 1
breath he might take control of government in emer-
gency. Latter unlikely in view of his record of
indecision and weakness.
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6. The Iranian situation is highly dangerous. For the
moment events have brought all of the elements
back into a temporary focus, which may be pre-
liminary to ti. f final disintegration. This is not the
first time in the past two years when Iran's collapse
seemed imminent, but the situation now appears
more explosive than at any time in immediate
past.
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LATIN AMERICA
LA considers self "forgotten continent"
Compare recent aid Europe and LA.
They feel US takes for granted
LA will give raw materials at our indicated
prices as we want them. They buy manufac-
tared goods at ever increasing prices.
Peran and Company out to show US we are wrong
and that LA can get free of "economic servitude"
to USA.
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LA economic and political condition mast
Certain exceptions are
Mexico - Peru - Uruguay - Venezuela
But these are affected by the others
These trends highly dangerous to U8 -
(~.ow Communists take advantage of Radical
-_~? _
Dictatorships
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-3-
LATIN AMERICA (Contd)
(Bas1C reasons i'or situation)
Basic revolution taking place - .L~taM ~a~
Radical - nationalists based'on left-wing
elements taking over.
Inexperienced in government - gutted economy
Examples are:
Peron - Argentina Ibanez -Chile
Arbenz - Guatemala Paz -Bolivia
Only army keeps same elements from power in
Peru - Venezuela
Consequence of these Trends
(1) Economic Nationalism /
(2) Regionalism ~ ~ 7~.L~"'~~-~-4~.
(3) Neutralism
(~+) Growth of Communist influence
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(1) Economic Nationalism
LA tries remedy of hasty self-sufficiency
programs like Argentina
They also try import and marketing controls
This affects LA-US trade (3.5 billion each way)
Also affects US supply vital raw materials
Figures are:
LA supplies 20~o Free World petroleum
34~
tungsten
US copper imports (nearly 50~
US requirements)
Nationalization Bolivian tin threatens US supply
Nationalization Chilean copper is only threat sti11
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-5-
(I1) Regionalism
Based largely on Yankeephobia -led by Argentina
Peron attempting eeonamic bloc with
Paz of Bolivia and Ibanez of Chile
Peron labor attaches try persuade others
to abandon ORIT (ICFTU) and loin
Peronista ATLAS (anti-US)
Peron endangers hemisphere
solidarity (Rio pact etc.) with regionalism
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(III) Neutralism
Keep out of US-Soviet involvement
Enthusiasm for Korea waned,
only Colombia sent troops
.~i ~ilaterel military assistance pacts:
US approached 9 countries with following results;
Completed
Cuba
Peru
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
Pe-~~ Ref used
llominican Republic Mexico
Brazil
Uruguay
LA (20 votes) support of US in UN sometimes
precarious
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( IV) Communism
Thrives on economic nationalism, regionalism
and neutralism
Not numerically strong, generally operates
through fronts
Only Guatemala is really dangerous
"Dissident" co~aies have Peron's ears
Strategic materials go to Orbit
15,000 tons Chilean copper in year ending
May 52 (1 year Czech requirements)
More LA delegates attend commie conferences
30 delegates to Moscow Economic Conference Aug 52
90 delegates to Peiping Peace Conference Oct 52
200 delegates to Vienna Peace Gonf'erence Dec 52
Argentina talks trade with USSR (Stalin interview)
Soviet Missions Satellite Missions
Argentina Argentina
Mexico Brazil
Uruguay Ecuador
Mexico
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-$-
Special Situation
Argentina
Peron gutted economy but has built personal. power
and leadership toward "third position" bloc.
Since 4 November Peron puts out friendly feelers
But basic position change unlikely
Brazil
Despite fundamentally sound economy
Brazil faces crisis due to excess purchasing,,
unfavorable trade balance.
Curable but needs watching
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GUATEMALA
Political situation outgrowth 194la,
revolution against pro-American Ubico
"dictatorship." First Arevalo then Arbenz
established leftist dictatorship to TMfree"
country from military dictatorships social
baclcgrounds, economic colonialism, under
basic anti-Yankee slogan. Commies infiltrated
government and political parties now dominate
organized labor despite anti-Communist attitude
individual laborers. They have effective
alliance with President Arbenz though control
only !~ out of s6 votes- in Congress. Mar~r
others of 56 crypto Communists.
Both pro-government papers use party line.
Director ma3or radio station pro-Commie.
Director National Election Board and Social
Security institute Commies.
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Arn;y basically anti-Commie but loyal to
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CONCLUSIONS
US surprised at UK, French short-sightedness
in Middle East, North Africa
But we have had situation at our door - vitally
affects us
US stock started downward in 19+6 (end OPA)
If trends continue Good Neighbor policy hurt
and vital material supply threatened.
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