THE IRANIAN SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000100070006-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 3, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE IRANIAN SITUATION
The crisis brought about by the Shah's decision on 28 February
to resist Prime Minister Mossadeq's efforts to force him to leave
Tehran has resulted in a struggle between the Prime Minister and
an anti-Mossadeq coalition of army, court and religious leaders
headed by the fanatical Majlis president, Mullah Kashani. The
Shah decided to remain after he was approached by secular and re-
ligious leaders and after crowds demonstrated outside his palace.
He has remained inactive, however, and has given no further en-
couragwaent to those elements which supported his.
After four days of turmoil, during which, in addition to his
National Front following, the Tudeh and the small fascist Pan-Iran
and Sumka Parties backed Mossadeq, the Prime Minister appears to
have regained control of the police, the army elements in Tehran,
and the radio. He has arrested some of the demonstrators, notably
some 65 retired army officers as well as a few officers on active
duty.
.
the army and the air force, who apparently continue to oppose
Mossadeq and extend support to the Shah. Army units stationed out-
side the capital have not become involved in the struggle and there
is no evidence available as to where their loyalty would lie it the
present situation were enlarged. At present, they may be expected
to take orders from the newly appointed chief of staff, General
Riahi, who is controlled by the Prime Minister.
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
INFORMATION ONLY
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IRANIAN MILITARY STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION:
A. Strength:
Army 125,000
Navy
2,125
Air Force 5,300
Gendarmerie 209000
Total -- 152,425
B. Disposition:
Tehran and vicinity
Azerbaijan
Central and South Iran
Southeast Iran
Northeast frontier
Iraqi frontier
8 Brigades -- 30,000 -- 40,000
2 Divisions -- 15,000 -- 20,000
2 Divisions -- 15,000 -- 20,000
1 Division -- 5,000 -- 10,000
1 Division -- 5,000 -- 10,000
2 Divisions and 2 Brigades --
25,000 -- 30,000
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Mossadeq's return to full control is currently blocked by
Kashani's order to his followers to boycott parliament. Nine
deputies have reportedly sworn to oppose Mossadeq. By not attend-
ing they can prevent a quorum and block a vote of confidence in
the Prime Minister. Kashani's maneuver may induce the Prime
Minister to carry out his threat of appealing directly to the
people. Although the mullah wishes to become prime minister, at
this point it appears more likely that he is seeking a compromise
rather. than a clear-cut victory over Mossadeq.
Kashani's record of venality suggests that any government he
might head would tend to place self-interest above that of country.
He has consistently followed a policy of extreme nationalism which
is antagonistic toward the United States.
Firm action by the Shah might give him control of the situation.
He is, however, unwilling to move directly against Mossadeq. The
Shah, according to Minister of Court Ala, has considered National
deputy Hossein Makki as a possible compromise candidate for the
premiership, but Makki reportedly does not believe the time is
opportune. He was at one time a close supporter of Mossadeq; at
present, he is hostile to him. Demogogic Makki, without experience
and basically anti-foreign, would make a poor substitute for
Mossadeq.
Social reform is long overdue in Iran. In the absence of a
strong conservative government, Mossadeq appears at present to
represent the chief barrier to Communist control, even though Tudeh
support for the Prime Minister indicates that the Communists consider
that his return to power will best promote their objectives.
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If the Prime Minister wine the current struggle, he will re-
double his efforts to secure complete control of the army. He
will continue his efforts to reduce further the Shah's powers, and
to eliminate the political influence of the monarchy. He may also
be expected to apply himself to limit the powers of Kashani and the
clergy and to continue the government's tribal disarmament program.
His victory would take Iran one step further along its present
revolutionary road. The Prime Minister's growing tendency toward
autocratic government, however, suggests that he is beginning to
realize that many of his contemplated reforms cannot be carried
out unless he resorts to authoritarian measures. Despite his con-
viction that Iranian politicians are sufficiently mature to govern
democratic processes, his victory may also prove to be a step toward
the establishment of a new dictatorship.
Ambassador Henderson in Tehran reports that there appears to
be extensive preparation of charges that the embassy was respons-
ible for the Shah's decision not to leave the country. The develop-
ment of such accusations may foreshadow an anti-American campaign.
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TOP SECRET
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Comment on Tudeh position in current Iranian situation:
Current Tudeh attempts to exploit the confused
situation in Iran suggest that the Communists are not ready for an
all-out assault on the government, but believe that Mossadeq's con-
tinuation in power will best serve their interest in what they
regard as a maturing "revolutionary situation."
On 28 February the Tudeh press came out for a
united front of pro-Mossadeq elements. This was followed by re-
peated attempts during subsequent days to obtain the Prime Minister's
consent to Tudeh collaboration.
Concurrently the Tudeh, in line with its desire
to overthrow the dynasty and to remove American influence from Iran,
unsuccessfully tried to turn the demonstrations in Tehran against
the United States and the Shah.
The diverse nature and conflicting interest
of the forces opposing Mossadeq would undermine any government
brought to power by his defeat and would presumably present the
Tudeh with a new chance to further its aim of obtaining control of
the government.
Hard-core Tudeh strength in Iran is conserva-
tively estimated at about 10,000, of which possibly 4000 are in
Tehran. Its adherents and supporters are many times that number
and vary with the political situation.
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SOVIET MILITARY DISPOSITION NEAR THE IRANIAN BORDERS
West of the Caspian:
Army
220,000
Security
55,000
275,000
East of the Caspian:
Array
about
100,000
Security
n
20,000
120,000
Southern USSR:
Total Aircraft
1,540
Jet Fighters
Jet Bombers.
820
2,3160
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