INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000100110006-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 26, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION r_7
.CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
26 March 1953
The conflict in Indochina, now in its seventh year, is
still a stalemate. There is no prospect of an early military
decision for the French Union forces -- or for the Communist-
led Viet Minh, barring large scale intervention by Communist
China.
25X1C8b There are strong indications that a new Viet Minh offensive
will begin shortly. the attack
will be directed against northern Laos; however, it is likely
that at least a secondary effort will be made against the
Tonkin Delta.
The deepest roots of the Indochina problem are political --
the people remain largely apathetic -- and substantial progress
towards a solution of the political, as well as the military,
problem seems to be necessary for an advance toward any signifi-
cant or lasting victory over Communism in that country. It is
difficult to overestimate the magnitude of the problem of recon-
ciling the nationalist aspirations of the native people with
present French policies.
The question is often argued as to which should (or must)
come first, new military victories or an improvement in the
political situation. It is the view of this Agency that each?
is indispensible and that the two are inseparable -- they must
both be furthered simultaneously.
Tonkin, the northern province of Vietnam, is the area of
major military activity, but there is sporadic guerrilla fight-
ing throughout the rest of Vietnam and in the other Indochinese
states of Laos and Cambodia. Even within the so called French
defense perimeter around the Tonkin Delta there is continual
fighting. Viet Minh forces, both regular and guerrilla, within
this area currently number about 40,000 and pin down a significant
portion of the French Union troops in northern Vietnam. Ad-
ditional Viet Minh forces infiltrate the area quite freely.
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25X1 C8
The war in Indochina imposes a very heavy burden on France.
It has suffered 90,000 casualties from 1945 to October 1952,
and losses since then may have brought the figure over 100,000.
Moreover, 26 percent of its officer corps and 37 percent of its
noncommissioned officer corps is in Indochina. The French
claim that officer casualties annually exceeds the number of
St. Cyr graduates. From the financial standpoint Indochina
accounts for a billion and a quarter dollars of the total French
military budget of four billion dollars. American aid for the
1953 military effort in Indochina is expected to reach 777
million dollars. The French claim that the Indochina war has
cost them over four billion dollars since 1945. For comparison,
the total post-war American aid to France is about seven billion
dollars.
The Viet Minh has been receiving aid from Communist China
since early 1951. This assistance has included the training of
whole units in China and Tonkin, the assignment of several
thousand technical and military advisers and the supp l in of 25X1C8b^
a wide variety of military materiel. It is estimated
that during the last few months the Chinese have
been shipping to the Viet Minh between 500 and 700 tons of
supplies per month. Indicative of a possible increase in
supplies from China are recent reports of a marked acceleration
of truck traffic on the Red River valley route into northwest
Tonkin.
The French have long asserted that there is the need for a
strong native army to offset their lack of manpower. Plans for
the creation of a native army were first discussed almost five
years ago. Since then, however, the French have moved haltingly.
They have been particularly slow in training native officers.
At present, the Vietnam National Army consists of 60 battalions
(58,000 men), large numbers of which were transferred from the
regular French forces.
Recently, French and Vietnamese officials agreed to in-
crease the army by 54 light battalions (40,000 men) by the end
of this year. Lack of fighting spirit among the rank and file
and a strong aversion among many educated Vietnamese to serve
as officers in what they consider to be a puppet army suggest
that the army's capabilities will not necessarily increase in
proportion to its numerical growth. The French may view this
army apprehensively because it might eventually oppose French
authority.
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'MW SECURITY INFORMATION
French failure to speed development of the army may also
stem from the fear that it might provoke larger Chinese Commu-
nist participation in the war.
In the political field, the Vietnamese feel that their
present status falls far short of real independence, and there
is no further step planned by the French to satisfy such Vietna-
mese criticism. The Vietnam Government's international status
is that of "independence within the French Union," but the
French have final authority in military matters, a veto power
over decisions affecting their economic interests and certain
special commercial and individual privileges. No Asian state
except Thailand has established diplomatic relations with
Vietnam.
The Vietnamese are strongly resentful of French authority
and influence, and suspicious of their own government, which
they consider composed largely of pro-French puppets.
The French, on their side, argue that if further politi-
cal concessions were granted the Vietnamese, their National
Assembly would then refuse to continue support of the war.
They feel that France's sacrifices must be compensated for by
certain long-term special privileges in Indochina.
In this stalemated political and military situation, the
current French course appears to prolong the status quo until
the threat from the Viet Minh and from Communist China has been
dispelled by some over-all settlement in the Far East.
Indochina has a vital strategic position in the Far East.
It is generally assumed that the fall of Indochina to Communism
would shortly be followed by the collapse of the rest of South-
east Asia. This consideration underlines the critical import-
ance of the outcome of the conflict to food deficit countries
like India and Japan. For example, in 1952, almost one-half
of Japan's import of rice (996,000 metric tons) was from
Thailand and Burma.
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