Summary of Indications of Possible Changes in Yugoslavia's International Position

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000100200008-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 1998
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: May 29, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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29 May 1953
Summary of Indications of
Possible Changes in
Yugoslavia's International Position
Events in the last several months
suggest that an improvement in diplomatic
relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia
may be expected during the remainder of 1953.
It is not likely, however, that such improve-
ment will produce a detente between the two
governments or will basically alter Yugoslav
relations with the West.
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29 May 1953
Yugoslavia's Position in Relation to the Orbit
Several recent incidents have aroused speculation as to the nature
of present and future relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia. In
appointing Kirsanov as charge, the Soviet Union has selected a diplomat
experienced in satellite affairs. A Yugoslav basketball team has been
sent to a tournament in Moscow. The recently successful negotiation of
an agreement on the Iron Gates dispute, though vital to the economic
interests of both Yugoslavia and Rumania, two weeks after Yugoslavia
withdrew several of its delegates dune to lack of progress and also after
Molotov's talk with Yugoslav charge Djuric in Moscow, suggested the
possibility that the accord may have been stimulated by the Soviet Union.
However, as indications, these events have.been somewhat cancelled out
by . other factors. The Yugoslav basketball team, which was admitted
along with the Israeli team, was accorded an organized hostile reception.
The United States Embassy in Moscow reported on 29 May that there was no
reason to believe that Djuricts calls at the Foreign office were other
than brief and as reported, and that he seems to have over-emphasized his
polite reception by Molotov and the relaxation of surveillance by the
police. On 30 April US Ambassador Bohlen reported that Djuric had told
him that although he had been received by Molotov (the first time a
Yugoslav representative had been received since the break), the Yugoslav
Government was under no illusions as to the basic Soviet attitude toward
Yugoslavia. Border incidents have continued with the satellites and the
vituperative Soviet publication For a New Yugoslavia continues to be
published. However, it does seem probable that the Soviet Union may make
additional overtures of friendship leading to an improvement of diplomatic
relations between the two countries, possibily including the exchange of
representatives of higher diplomatic rank.
F'om Tito's point of view, reaffiliation with the Orbit would hold
little appeal. His objections in 1948 centered on excessive Soviet
control and the suppression of Yugoslav national interests. The change
of top-level personalities in the Kremlin does not appear to have allevi-
ated the basic causes of the disagreement. It is improbable that the new
Soviet regime will be willing to make the concessions which Tito would
demand for actual reaffiliation with the Orbit. To grant to Yugoslavia
the political autononr and economic independence within the Orbit, which
she would undoubtedly demand, would produce consequences jeopardizing
Soviet control of her European Satellites. An important factor about
which little information is available is the extent of Cominform influence
in Yugoslavia. The US Embassy in Belgrade estimates that it is negli-
gible on the policy-making level.
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Yugoslavia's Position in Relation to the West
The YugoslavGovernment has steadily strengthened its ties with the
West since 191.9. This rapprochement with the West culminated in 1953
with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Greece and Turkey,
and with Tito's visit to Great Britain. The Treaty was signed on February
28 and unanimously ratified in Yugoslavia on March 23. This solidification
of relations with the West undoubtedly has been motivated in large measure
by the insecurity of,Yugoslaviats isolated position. The differences aid
tensions still existing between Yugoslavia and the West complicate its
relations to the degree that its dependability and availability as an ally
might be brought into question. It does not appear, however, that the
Soviet Union can exploit any of these issues in such a way as to attract
Yugoslavia back into the Orbit.
Tito and Yugoslav leaders have reiterated on various occasions their
loyalty to the West. On May 21, Tito, apparently disturbed by suggestions
to the contrary, reaffirmed his loyalty to the West, and said that Yugoslavia
would not return to the Soviet bloc, though he would welcome "tolerable"
relations with the USSR. In January 1953, in a somewhat similar vein,
Tito denied to Ambassador Allen that his speech of December 16, 1952, claiming
that Yugoslavia had another "outcome" if not accepted as an ally, implied
a return to neutralism or was directed against the policies of the United
States. Under no circumstances, he said, would Yugoslavia return to the
Cominform. On March 6 Kardelj, an Executive Council vice president, told
Ambassador Allen that Yugoslavia would rebuff any overture the Soviet Union
might now make. He said that the Yugoslav quarrel was not with Stalin
personally, but with the "bureaucratic, dictatorial system" and as long
as the system continued, there was no possibility of a change in Yugoslav
attitude. During the talks in March 1953, Churchill agreed with Tito's
insistence that the assumption of an attack only against Yugoslavia was
unrealistic, and that there was no point in attempting joint planning on
this basis. Upon his return, Tito declared on 31 March that "In case of
an aggression, we will be on the side against aggression." This implication
of unity with the West was more clearly reaffirmed by Djilas in March
1953 when he told a group of US newspapermen that Yugoslavia would immedi-
ately enter the fight if the USSR should attack the West. In April 1953,
Djerdja, Foreign Office Counselor, emphasized to US Dubassy officials the
close proximity of Yugoslavia to Rumania, and stressed his government's
determination to resist Soviet imperialism. There is no indication in
these expressions of Yugoslav leaders that its solidarity with the West
has been weakened.
Relations between Yugoslavia and Italy have continued on a strained
basis. This has been focused in the problem of Trieste, in the Italian
fear of Yugoslav activity against Albania, and in the Italian objections
to Yugoslav affiliation with NATO and concern over the Balkans' Treaty.
Tito's speech of May 17 contained one of his most violent denunciations
of Italy and of De Gasperi. However, Trieste aside, Tito emphasized the
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need fpr close cooperation in economic and mutual defense matters between
the two countries. If Yugoslavia were to become a member of the Soviet
camp, it could expect the West more fully to support the Italian claims
in Trieste. The tripartite declaration of 1948 in support of Italian
claims to all of Trieste should reinforce the logic of this conclusion
in Yugoslav thinking.
Yugoslav leaders and press have indicated some disagreement in
recent months with US foreign policy. On May 17, Tito called the Churchill
speech asking for a big power meeting "one of the most significant made
during the past few years". Tito's statement was made against a background
of Yugoslav press criticism of sane aspects of American foreign policy.
In April 1953, the US Embassy felt it necessary to discuss with Djerda the
Yugoslav press attacks on the US 'concept of the inter-relation of events
in Asia. These newspaper attacks had attempted to distinguish the "aggressive"
character of the Korean from the "colonialist" character of the Indochina
and Malayan conflicts. Such criticism of US policy has not indicated a
substantial divergence from overall Western aims, and has not been of the
character to suggest any agreement rt th Soviet policy.
Changes in Yugoslavia's Ideological Position since the Break
During the first part of 1953 there has been some intensification of
trends evident last year which differentiated Yugoslavia from its more
rigid Communist neighbors and liberalized its government to some extent.
Particularly since the reformulation of goals which occurred at the Yugo-
slav Communist Party Congress in November there have been increased efforts
by Belgrade to prove its claim to represent a different type of Communism.
Internally, compulsory agricultural collectivization has been abandoned;
incentives have been introduced to increase industrial production; wage
and price controls have been weakened; bans on emigration and admission of
tourists have been lifted; and Yugoslavia has made some effort to reduce
ill feeling caused by the break with the Vatican by attempting to initiate
talks on the church problem. These are small changes, but they do testify
to the reorientation of Tito's regime since its break with the Cominform.
Comparable to these changes in internal economic and social policy
have been shifts in Yugoslavia's pattern of dealing with foreign countries.
Yugoslavia has seemed anxious to play a dynamic and important role in
world politics, supporting the international Socialist position, as at
the Rangoon conference, and encouraging "Titoism" within the Soviet Orbit.
Tito and his adherents represent their approach as the genuinely Marxist
one, portraying Stalinism as a deviation. It seems unlikely that he wcu ld
be willing to jeopardize this newly developed ideological and power position
to return to Soviet domination.
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6 March
6 March
Early March
mid-March
17 March
18 March
23 March
26 March
mid-April
23 April
28 April
29 April
30 April
late April
9 May
mid-May
mid-May
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RECENT INDICATIONS OF NO CHANGE
IN STATUS OF YUGOSLAV INT'RNATIONAL POSITION
Borba article on systematic border provocations by Satellites
Kardelj, a vice president of the Executive Council, claims
Yugoslavia's quarrel not with Stalin personally but with the
"bureaucratic, dictatorial system"
Djilas, a vice president of the Executive Council, maintains
that Yugoslavia would immediately enter the fight if the USSR
should attack the West
Tito visits Great Britain
Hungarian protest to Yugoslavia on attempts to smuggle agents
Yugoslavian note to Bulgaria protesting border incidents
Yugoslavia ratifies the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
with Greece and Turkey
Hungarian note to Yugoslavia protesting recent border viola-
tions
Djerdja, Foreign Office Counselor, emphasizes Yugoslavia's de-
termination to resist Soviet imperialism
Yugoslav note to Hungary on 23 border incidents in March--
said the ignoring of prior protests showed true role of
Hungarian Government in these activities
Yugoslav note to Bulgaria protesting frontier violation's
Yugoslavia withdraws part of delegation to Iron Gates confer-
ence with Rumania due to lack of progress
Yugoslav note to Hungary protesting wounding of frontier guard
Djuric tells Bohlen Yugoslavia under no illusions as to basic
Soviet attitude toward Yugoslavia even though he had just
been received by Molotov
Yugoslav Foreign Minister's protest to Hungary on Hungarian
description of 5 May border incident as false
FBIS reports no change in quantity or quality of Orbit radio
propaganda to and about Yugoslavia
No change in number of border incidents since Stalin's death
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16 May Yugoslav note to Bulgaria protesting persecution of Yugoslav
citizens there
21 May Tito reaffirms loyalty to the West
late May Yugoslav press protests Western press interpretation of recent
events as foreshadowing Yugoslav-Soviet detente
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RECENT INDICATIONS
OF POSSIBLE RAPPROCHEMENT
BETWEEN YUGOSLAVIA AND THE ORBIT
15 April Conference of Yugoslavia and Rumania on administration of
Iron Gates opened (meeting proposed by Yugoslavia in February)
29 April Molotov received Yugoslav Charge Djuric for first time since
the break
1 May Absence of usual Soviet May Day slogan excoriating Tito
15 May Yugoslav-Rumanian agreement on questions of arbitration of
Iron Gates disputes in the future
mid-May Yugoslav basketball team sent to tournament in Moscow
18 May Appointment of new Soviet charge to Yugoslavia, S. P. Kirsanov
25 May Further agreement between Yugoslavia and Rumania on adminis-
tration of Iron Gates
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