REACTION TO ANGLO-AMERICAN ANNOUNCEMENT ON TRIESTE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000100370001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 13, 1953
• Content Type: BRIEF

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SECURITY INFORMATION
NSC BRIEFING 13 October 1953
REACTION TO ANGLO-AMERICAN ANNOUNCEMENT
USSR protests Anglo-American decision on
Trieste.
The Soviet note of 12 October to Great
Britain and the United States charges that
the Anglo-American decision is a violation
of the Italian peace treaty of 1947.
1. The note points out that the peace
treaty calls for establishing a Free
Territory, neutral and demilitarized,
under a governor appointed by the UN
Security Council.
2. It further charges that failure of
the US and Britain to live up to
their commitment is evidenced by the
fact that "Trieste has been turned
into an unlawful Anglo-American mili-
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SECURITY INFORMATION
tary and naval base."
3. The note does not mention Yugoslavia.
Ambassador Bohlen believes that a
similar Soviet failure to print a
Belgrade Tass despatch giving Yugo-
slav reaction represents an effort
to avoid appearing to support the
Yugoslav position.
Probable Soviet intentions.
1. By capitalizing on the dispute, the
Soviet Union may hope to gain success
in its long-standing policy of thwart-
ing a Trieste settlement.
2. At the same time, this position en-
ables the USSR to maintain the pose
of upholding peace treaties and war-
time agreements -- regardless of how
unworkable they may be in such cases
as Trieste.
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SECURITY INFORMATION
3. The Soviet protest, paralleling in
some respects the note of the Yugoslav
Government, may also be intended to
create suspicions in Allied quarters
regarding Soviet-Yugoslav relations.
Communist reaction.
Satellite propaganda may be expected to
follow the Soviet line, but prior to the USSR's
note there was some confusion.
1. Italian Communist leader Togliatti,
who recently came out in favor of a
plebiscite, denounced US and British
disregard for Italian interests. He
warned that the "tense situation will
be used to tie Italy more closely to
the Atlantic imperialist camp."
2. Some Satellite propaganda pointed out
the "great consternation" in Italy,
while others alleged that the Western
powers complied with Italian demands
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SECURITY INFORMATION
in order to gain Italian acceptance
of EDC.
3. A Cominform broadcast from Prague
noted a positive aspect of the deci-
sion in the promised termination of
Anglo-American occupation which would
test the sincerity of Italy's "so-
called Allies."
Tito attempts to disrupt Anglo-American plan
for Trieste by both diplomatic and military
moves.
His diplomatic moves include a note to
the American and British governments calling
for a four-power conference (US-UK-Italy-
Yugoslavia) and a memorandum to the United
Nations informing it that the Trieste situation
is a threat to the peace.
1. The note to the American and British
governments charges that the Anglo-
American decision on Trieste is
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contrary to the Italian peace treaty
a threat to its integrity and inde-
pendence because it will encourage
Italian aggression.
2. Although Yugoslavia has informed the
United Nations of this situation, it
believes that direct talks with the
United States, Great Britain, and
Italy the most suitable manner for
eliminating this threat to peace.
His military gestures include:
1. Despatch of yet undetermined number
of troops. to Zone B to reinforce ap-
proximately 4,000-man Yugoslav gar-
rison there;
2. Cancellation of all military leaves;
3. Warning that Yugoslav troops will
enter Zone A "the moment" Italian
troops enter.
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SECURITY INFORMATION
It is not believed that Tito will risk
a clash with US-UK forces in Zone A.
His most recent diplomatic moves suggest
that the military measures are intended to halt
implementation of US-UK withdrawal from Zone A
and bolster his internal and international
position:
.1. He probably expects thus to delay im-
plementation of US-UK plan;
2. He has strengthened his position at
home where nationalism is strong.
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25X1 Yugoslav Assistant Forei
25X1X6
sidering whether
Yugoslavs con-
(a) To send Yugoslav troops with Zone A when
Italian troops enter;
(b) To appeal US-UK decision to International
Court of Justice
Re possibility that (a) might lead to war,
Bebler stated Yugoslav Government hoped that the
only result would be"a few skirmishes`.
Some positive action necessary; Yugoslav prestige
at stake.
Turkish Government expected to urge Yugoslavs
to take no military action.
U.S. Forces 4,000
U.K. it 3,000
Zone "A" boundary with Yugoslavia 26rniles
It it tt It Zone "Bit 13 It
It It If Total 400 It
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