WORLD REACTION TO PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S UN ADDRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000200060003-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 1998
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 14, 1953
• Content Type: BRIEF

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NSC BRIEFING Ww"?`w"A' 14 December 1953
WORLD REACTION TO PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S UN ADDRESS
The restrained handling of the President's proposal by
Soviet media indicates that the Kremlin is avoiding an advance
commitment as to the nature of its official response.
The initial negative attitude of Radio Moscow commentators
is in contrast with the careful Soviet press treatment and the
Soviet Foreign Ministry'-s announcement that the government
would give. the President's proposal serious attention.
Polish and Hungarian government officials also have indi-
cated interest in the speech and have promised to give it thought-
ful and careful study.
Communist:
USSR: Soviet authorities have stated that they could
not comment until the text had been studied.
Vyshinsky, while he did not comment on
the content of the President's speech, critici-
zed what he chose to call an ommission -- the
banning of atomic weapons.
Pravda published an.800-word summary of
the speech. It was essentially fair in that
it included the essence of the American propo-
sals. However, it made no mention of the refer-
ences to the US atomic potential and through
the very process of summarization destroyed
to some extent the effect which the
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reading of the entire speech produces.
Pravda's only comment was contained in the
final sentence which said:
"However, in his speech President Eisenhower
did not express his attitude on the question of
the prohibition of atomic armaments."
TASS transmitted a summary of the speech --
apparently the one published in Pravda.
Moscow's four leading newspapers, with the
exception of Pravda, suspended publication on
17-Te-cembe No reason was given. Western ob-
servers believe that these papers may have con-
tained unfavorable comment and that a last-
minute change in the official Communist line
necessitated their suspension. The next edi-
tions carried Pravda's original remark that the
President did not express his attitude toward
previous Soviet atomic proposals.
In summarizing foreign press comment on
the proposal, the Soviet press gave the majority
of space to negative reactions although citing
some positive comments.
The two initial Radio Moscow commentaries
have been repeated several times. They have
not, however, been beamed to the Soviet home
audience,
Leontyev, considered the leading foreign
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affairs commentator of Radio Moscow, commented
on the speech in the last two paragraphs of his
lengthy attack on the joint Bermuda communique.
He charged that:
1) Like the Bermuda communique, Eisenhowerts
"belligerent speech" evidenced no desire
on the part of the Western powers, parti-
cularly the US, to lessen world tension;
2) "Eisenhower actually came out with a
threat of atomic warfare;
3) He praised the "policy of force";
4) He pursued a "new version of the same old
Baruch plan which repudiates the need to
ban atomic weapons and enforce strict con-
trol over the enforcement of the ban."
Orlov, a Radio Moscow commentator
of lesser importance who usually handles
material to be beamed to North America,
attacked the speech at greater length.
This commentary, however, has been.'beamed.
only to North America.
He asserted that:
1) The address lacked concrete proposals (for
peace among nations);
2) If the President proved to be so familiar
with the terrifying destructiveness of
the atom bomb, he should realize the need
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for outlawing atom and hydrogen. bombs
urgently and unconditionally;
3) Eisenhower carefully evaded any mention.
of Soviet atomic proposals;
He gave no explanation as to why US dele-
gates in the United Nations so stubbornly
oppose the Soviet proposals;
5) He wanted to scare his listeners with
atomic war;
6) His words really could be applauded if
and when actions are made to fit the words.
On. 12. December, the Moscow press and
radio released the following announcement:
"On Decmeber 7 US Ambassador-Bohlen
visited Minister of Foreign Affairs Molotov
and informed him of a statement forth-
coming on December 8 by President Eisenhower
in the UN General Assembly devoted to the
question of atomic weapons. Referring to
instructions of his government the Ambassa-
dor requested that attention be given the
proposals which would be contained in the
speech by the President of the United States.
"Thanking the Ambassador for this in-
formation. Molotov stated that the question.
of atomic weapons was an extremely impor-
tant question and that the Soviet Govern-
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ment would treat the speech of the
President of the United States on
that question with all seriousness as
it had done previously on similar
occasions,
"On December 9 in a letter addressed
to Molotov, Bohlen transmitted excerpts
from the above-mentioned speech of
President Eisenhower."
Poland: Michalowski, Acting Under Secretary of Foreign.
Affairs, expressed appreciation for the copy of
the address and said that the government would
give thoughtful and careful study to the Presi-
dent's proposal. He added that his government
is deeply interested in efforts to bring about
disarmament and abolition of destructive instru-
ments of war.
The Polish press carried the TASS summary
of the speech, and excerpts of un.favorabl.e
Western press comment,
Hungary: Foreign Office official Berei expressed interest
in. the speech and said he understood the impor-
tance of its implications. He said that Hungary
was vitally concerned over the issue.
The press carried the TASS version of the
address and commented editorially on the long-
standing differences between US and Soviet atomic
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is based on the Baruch plan. intended to establish
a US monopoly on atomic weapons, and has as a
goal the establishment of an. agency for espionage
and diversionist activities against the Soviet
Union.
East Germany: East Berlin. radio and press comments continue
to label the President's proposal a "declaration
of bankruptcy of American atom bomb diplomacy." --
--
roof that `h a US had to
proof to a world-wide
demand for elimination of the atomic menace,
France: Communist Humanite featured this message allegedly
telephoned by its Moscow correspondent: "From a
usually well informed source it is learned here that
Eisenhower's UN speech was received with interest
by Soviet circles and that it is considered here
that the speech requires careful examination."
SECRET
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Western:
Yugoslavia: When Ambassador Riddleberger presented the
text of the President's address to the Yugo-
slav Foreign Minister, Popovic expressed such
interest that he went into a long discussion
of the speech and atomic energy problems.
The first half of the conversation was de-
voted to the theoretical background of atomic
development, including consideration of such
subjects as the development of Riemann's and
Lobashevsky's geometry and Einstein's formula
on the relation of matter to energy.
His initial reaction to the speech was
that the approach was well conceived and that
he understood the necessity for careful
controls. He added that he was glad to hear
that the proposal was not immutable and that
it should serve as a good basis for discussion.
But he wanted to reflect upon all the implica-
tions of the offer.
He felt that the Soviet Union would re-
fuse the offer if it is far behind the United
States in atomic development as the USSR
would be reluctant to expose this fact or to
admit ignorance in the presence of others.
He also believes that the USSR would raise the
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question of their contribution of fissionable
material,
The first Yugoslav press comment high-
lighted the "extraordinary reaction of the
international public," but ascribed the timing
of the offer to requirements of the President's
domestic and foreign policy, The proposal
was described as "essentially human and
feasible."
Western Europe: In Western Europe official reaction to
the President's speech was notable mainly by
its absence, except in specific instances
where inquiries from the American embassy
brought forth belated statements. The re-
sponses elicited were overwhelmingly favorable,
and the reservations expressed concerned
various practical aspects of the plan, mainly
the likelihood of the Soviet Union's co-
operation. Press reaction was generally
favorable with the intensity of enthusiasm
decreasing from right to left. The con-
servative rightist papers were highly favorable,
the Socialist press was more critical and fear-
ful of Soviet reaction, and the communist
press pooh-poohed the whole idea without ex-
pressing actual hostility to it.
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dramatic acceptance appear ridiculous.
Premier Laniel's earlier speech on the
Bermuda Conference made no mention of the
Bomb speech.
In Rome the American embassy marked
certain passages of the speech which it
brought to the attention of the Italian
Foreign Office, whereupon Premier Pella, at
the conclusion-of his foreign policy speech
to the Italian Senate on December 10,
associated the Italian Government fully with
President Eisenhower's views on atomic
energy control.
French Foreign Minister Bidault, also
in response to prodding from the American
embassy in Paris, indicated on 11 December
full agreement with the President's proposal
although midly concerned lest the smallness
of the French atomic contribution make any
Comparatively few West German political
leaders expressed themselves on the President's
address, although what reaction there was
appeared overwhelmingly to support it.
In Spain and Portugal, there was no
official comment, although'the government-
controlled press, which reflects the official
view in both countries, endorsed the speech.
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British officials added no comment be-
yond what was presumably made beforehand at
Bermuda.
Latin America: The one official and the comparatively
few press reactions which have been reported
to date have been favorable, the reserva-
tions expressed being on the likelihood of
the Soviet Union's cooperating. Following
the speech, Peru's UN delegate considered
introducing a resolution thanking President
Eisenhower.
One unusual reaction may be indicated
by the pro-Communist El Popular of Mexico,
the organ of WFTU leader Lombardo Toledano's
Popular Party, which published the speech
with the banner headline "New and Sensational
Language in Favor of Peace," Whatever the
text of El Popular's article may indicate,
the generally favorable headline would not
necessarily reflect the official Communist
line, since certain disagreements regarding
political strategy currently separate the
Popular Party and the Mexican Communist Party.
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Far Eastern: Throughout the non-Communist Far East,
President Eisenhower's speech was given ex-
tensive press coverage and was uniformly
well-received. The Chinese Communist radio
has been silent, as has the North Korean
radio except for one commentary before the
speech which denounced it in advance as an
effort "to maintain world tension."
Japan: Initial press reaction is described as "uni-
formly favorable, even enthusiastic," and
is believed to have made a strong appeal. to
the imagination of the Japanese.
The speech is said to have greatly over-
shadowed the Bermuda conference whose results
were termed "disappointing." Preliminary
information on the initial press reaction
to the early Soviet reply indicates great
disappointment and support of the American
viewpoint. There has been no official comment.
Communist China: The pro-Communist Chinese press in Hong
Kong, apparently taking its cue from the
first Soviet commentary, discussed the speech
unfavorably, noting that it did not call for
the outright prohibition of atomic weapons.
Nationalist China: Chinese Nationalist President Chiang
Kai-shek, in conversation with American
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officials, described the speech as "exactly
what the President should have said ...; a
good.speech.'' Chiang's comment contrasts
with early Nationalist comment, as reported
by the press, that the speech was evidence
of American "appeasement" of the USSR.
Southeast Asia: In Southeast Asia, the president's
speech was well received. Even in neutralist
Indonesia, spokesmen for the Minister of
Foreign Affairs were quoted as regarding; the
proposals as extremely important. However,
they stressed the essentiality, on the part
of the countries concerned, of a sincere
desire to cooperate if the proposals were to
become meaningful.
In Burma, the speech was given extensive
press coverage, but so far there is very
little editorial comment. Complete confusion
in the leftist press is reported. The embassy
believes that favorable editorial opinion is
likely and that it may create a new climate
for the US in Burma, tinged, however, with
suspicion and a "wait and see" attitude.
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South Asia: Official and press comment from South. Asia
has been uniformly favorable, the speech
being described as of great constructive
value and as clearing the way for better
East-'hest understanding.
There has been no government reaction
from India, Pakistan, or Afghanistan, but
comments of UN representatives from India
and Pakistan were laudatory. The prime
minister of Ceylon expressed a personal
interest.
The press of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon
received the speech with enthusiasm, the
Indian press particularly giving it unusually
favorable treatment and playing down the
pessimism it ordinarily displays about the
implementation of such plans. There has as
yet been no report from Afghanistan.
Arab States: Arab comment to date has varied from laudatory
statements (Lebanon particularly) to limited
reaction or even lack of comment (possibly
deliberate in the case of Egypt). At the
United Nations, delegates from Lebanon,
Syria and Iraq have commented favorably,
There has been no official reaction in the
capitals of the Arab States or Israel, As
suggested by the US Embassy in Beirut, the
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subject is too remote for most Arabs, who
are more interested in grant aid.
Israel has given considerable press
coverage to the speech text and to both East
and West reaction, The few Israeli editor-
ials tend to be skeptical of the chances of
the proposal,
Greece, Turkey, and Iran: In Greece and Turkey, con-
siderable interest and favorable comment on
the speech has been evident. There has been
no official or press reaction from Iran as
yet.
The only official reaction yet noted
is from Greece, where it has been pointed out
that the USSR now has a great chance to
demonstrate its peaceful intentions and
where there are hopes that the plan will be
accepted quickly by all.
The press in both Greece and Turkey ex-
pressed skepticism as to whether the USSR
would adopt President Eisenhower's suggestions
despite their undoubtedly peaceful nature?
Africa: South Africa's UN delegate Jooste was most
enthusiastic. Otherwise there has been no
official or semi-official reaction from
capitals of the continent. A leading newspaper
in Southern Rhodesia, which often reflects
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government opinion, comments that the appeal
was worth making and that it would be dif-
ficult for the Soviet Union to ignore the
new approach but that it was doubtful if it
would accept the proposal. Reporting from
:Africa is slow. No other comments are avail-
able.
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