IMPLICATIONS OF FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000200070004-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 1998
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 23, 1953
• Content Type: BRIEF

Apprgved For Release 2000/08/3 - OR01443R000200070004-0
NSC BRIEFING 23 December 1953
IMPLICATIONS OF FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION
1. Sharp division of economic interests
determines political following of most
French parties.
2. Since the war, general political trend
has been to the right, but party plat-
forms still focus on appealing to the
left -- in an unsuccessful attempt to
win the 25% of French electorate
which votes Communist.
3. Center submerged in basic conflict be-
tween right and left.
4. Since last summer Guy Mollet, Secretary
General of Socialists, has been dicker-
ing with leaders of three center parties
-- the Popular Republicans, the Resist-
ance Union and the Radical Socialists
in attempt to form a
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000200070004-0
 Approved For Release 2000/08/30i'CA=RCfP80RO1443R000200070004-0
"Social and Democratic Front."
a. Mollet seems aiming at new elec-
tions which he hopes would permit
a. left-center coalition. No known
results.
B. Election Impasse
1. Division within Radical Socialist
party generally held responsible for
election deadlock. Younger group
desires to avoid rightist label and
.to orient party toward coalition
envisaged by Mollet.
2. Scattering of anti-Laniel votes from
other center and right parties was
probably sufficient to make Radical
Socialist split decisive.
3. Laniel's obstinacy reflected belief
that, as in June cabinet crisis, center
would give way.
4. EDC not a. direct issue.
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO1443R000200070004-0
SECRET
 Approved For Release 20001081,4F P80R01443R000200070004-0
a. entered into early party maneuver-
ing but
b. pro-EDC Socialists voted for
their party colleague Naegelen --
on basis of pre-election agreement
that EDC not involved.
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO1443R000200070004-0
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2000/08/3O"CfAT4D'Ff80R01443R000200070004-0
C. Political Outlook -- Internal
1. Formation of a minority cabinet for
a specific purpose such as EDC
ratification is an outside possibility.
2. Difficulty in forming any coalition
will intensify pressure for new
National Assembly elections, but
a. Most deputies agree that elec-
tions under the present system
would not change the present
composition of the Assembly.
b. Attempt to revise present
electoral system would produce
serious opposition in National
Assembly
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000200070004-0
SECRET
 Approved or Release 2000/08/ 'C1' 180RO1443R000200070004-0
and possibly a complete stale-
mate.
3. Threat of dictatorship. As a result
of public disgust with impotence ex-
hibited by assembly, the possibility
of a coup now gets serious discussion,
where as previously it was dismissed
as idle rumor.
D. Indications for French Foreign Policy
1. European integration may be determining
factor in selection of new government.
2. November foreign policy debate showed;
a. Nationalist sentiment in Assembly
stronger than expected.
b. Laniel dependent on nationalistic
deputies.
c. Clear-cut decision on EDC not then
possible.
3. Dissatisfaction with present foreign
policy growing:
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO1443R000200070004-0
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2000/08/3'Cg=RlV80R01443R000200070004-0
a. Search being intensified for
alternatives to present EDC propos-
als.
b. Third force sentiment reviving.
4. Accordingly, in impending talks with
USSR, France's desire to avoid German
rearmament may weaken solidarity of
three Western powers.
5. On the other hand, no indications yet
that the election crisis is undermin-
ing the broad non-communist support
the National Assembly gives to NATO.
a. Bidault has urged that this policy
be strengthened, and he still
commands support of Popular
Republicans who are essential to
any coalition.
b. Both Socialists and ex-Gaullists
favor a. strong Western defense
plan but want it to include more
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000200070004-0
SECRET
 Ap~rgved For Release 2000/08/30 %IA-qDP80R01443R000200070004-0
than the six EDC powers.
c. The French still view recent
Soviet protestations of friend-
ship with scepticism. Both press
and government have been quick to
recall contrary instances of
Soviet attitude toward France.
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO1443R000200070004-0
SECRET