THE SITUATION IN IRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000200080001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 30, 1953
• Content Type: BRIEF

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30 December 1953
THE SITUATION IN IRAN
25X6A
Resumption of diplomatic relations between
Iran and Britain.
A. First break in three-year impasse
between two countries paves way for a
new attempt to settle oil problem.
B. Formal resumption of relations on
23 December was followed by arrival in
Tehran on 21 December of British charge
Dennis Wright and his staff of 15.
III. Anticipated developments in oil negotiations,-
A. After oil talks actually begin, a
minimum of several months of negotiating
are expected.
ebb
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D. Iranian foreign minister Entezam told
Ambassador Henderson that Iran would
not agree to any one company holding
more than 35 percent, and no single
country 50 percent or more, of the
shares in any consortium.
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E. Other points of difference will appear
as both sides prepare for actual talks.
Differences will include compensation
due AIOC, use and control of foreign
technicians, and refined versus crude
oil production..
F. It will probably be months before any
agreement can be reached. Still no
assurance of ultimate agreement.
III. Internal problems facing Zahedi.
A. In trying to establish confidence in his-
regime, Prime Minister Zahedi must win
public support for his oil negotiations.--
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B. He must convince public that he will
protect Iran's rights in coming oil
talks. Since his government has just
sentenced to prison former prime
minister Mossadeq, father of oil
nationalization, Zahedi will find it
difficult to prove that he is not a
British tool.
C. Old Majlis and Senate have been dis-
solved and elections for new Majlis
are scheduled to take place before end
of January. Elections for Majlis and
Senate will take place on separate
days, but each must be completed
within 24 hours. Previously elections
lasted many months and often were
never completed.
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D. Shah and prime minister reportedly
have agreed on list of candidates whom
they will support covertly. Organiza-
tions allegedly have already been set
up to manipulate elections in govern-
ment's favor.
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E. If a parliament amenable to government
can be elected and be available to
approve prime minister's actions,
stigma of military dictatorship will
be removed from Zahedi regime.
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F. In elections Zahedi will face both
Communist and non-Communist opposition.
It is likely that electoral cooperation
will be established between Tudeh and
some non-Communist groups in an attempt
to elect anti-Zahedi deputies.
G. Communists will not run as Communists
since Tudeh continues to be banned.
H. Main disruptive influence in new
Majlis, as in previous ones, will be
opportunistic character of many
deputies and pressure of special
interests.
IV. Friction between shah and Zahedi.
A. Continued possibility of serious
friction arising between shah and
Zahedi remains a threat to govern-
mental stability.
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B. Although earlier disagreements
between two apparently were resolved,
shah's intervention on Mossadeq's
behalf raises possibility of new
friction.
C. Shah, by announcing his forgiveness of
Mossadeq's offenses against throne,
apparently hoped to win public favor
and disassociate himself from court's
sentence. An unfavorable reaction
would accordingly be directed against
Zahedi rather than shah.
D. Zahedi reportedly strongly opposed
shah's intervention before sentence
was passed.
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E. Mossadeq's continued presence within
country will constantly remind his
adherents of his potential availability
and invite action to free him. His
presence will be a continuing concern
of government.
F. Mossadeq's appeal for review of his
sentence was granted.. Proceedings
will start 2 January and may take
several weeks. Although appeal court
is competent to change lower courts'
sentence in any direction, it is likely
that decision will be sustained unless
shah again intervenes. A further
appeal is possible if the shah should
authorize an extraordinary court to
pass on the case.
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Next few months will be crucial for Iran's
future. Success or failure of pro-Western
Zahedi government hangs on its ability to
make substantial economic and social
progress even. after present $45 million
emergency financial aid furnished by the
US runs out in March or April.
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NSC BRIEFING 30 December 1953
BACKGROUND
Iranian Oil Production
1. Annual production prior to-nationalization
(21 March 51) - about 33,000,000 tons of
crude/year,(242 million barrels in'1950
last year full production)--about 80
percent was refined, mostly exported;
about 20 percent was crude, mostly exported
II. Total production since nationalization:
Probably about 2,500,000 tons -- exported
about 135,000 tons, mostly crude; domestic
sales about 2,000,000 tons.
III. Oil revenues produced 12 percent of Iran's
budget and 30 percent of country's total
income.
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IV. After a settlement is reached, Iranian
production will resume slowly and will
probably not reach full capacity for three
years. Oil experts believe that slowly
rising Iranian production can be accommo-
dated on world markets with only small
cutbacks elsewhere.
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 CONFIDENTIAL
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BACKGROUND
New Iranian elections
I. Elections for a new Majlis and Senate
will be held before end of January.
A. Government intends elections will be
held simultaneously in all districts
and be completed within a 24-hour
period, with Majlis and Senate
elections on separate days.
B. This would contrast with customary
procedure where elections have
dragged on for months.
1. Elections to last Majlis were
never completed.
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2. After 81 out of 136 deputies had
been chosen, Mossadeq government
suspended elections in 30 districts
where vote was going against its
supporters.
II. Of 136 Majlis deputies to be elected,
12 are from Tehran and 124 from provincial
-districts.
A. Deputies need not reside in districts
which elect them.
B. Each deputy is elected for two years;
term dates from day three-fourths of
deputies are in Tehran.
C. Simple majority (69 deputies)
constitutes a quorum.
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III. Senate has 60 members; regular term is
six years.
A. Half of Senate is elected; other half
appointed by shah..
B. Half of the Senators elected and half
of those appointed must be from
Tehran; remainder must come from
provinces.
C. Senators must be residents of
districts from which they are
appointed or elected.
IV. Population of Iran is estimated at
18 million. Tehran's population is
estimated at 850,000.
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Sidelights
I. Iranian electoral law on Majlis candidates:
II. More than 3,000 candidates are anticipated
to file for the 136 seats.
IIII. New Tudeh slogan at time of arrival of
British charge: "Charge d'affaires go
home!"
IV. Between the time of Zahedi's assumption o
power and 13 November, reports show that
3,000 Tudeh and pro-Mossadeq sympathizers
had been arrested. Of these about half
appear to have been released.
"Candidates must be completely honest by
reputation."
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V. Many of those arrested have been exiled
without trial to prisons in Luristan in
west-central Iran and to the Persian Gulf
island of Khark. Facilities at these two
places were strained by the sudden influx
of prisoners and strenuous efforts are
being made to build the necessary quarters
and requisition supplies.
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30 December 1953
BACKGROUND
THE SITUATION IN IRAN
Status of Communist penetration of Iranian
military establishments
I. In April 1953 a commission of high-
ranking Iranian officers estimated
1,600 Tudeh members in armed forces,
900 in the Army, 300 in the Air Force
and 200 each in the Military College
and Military High School.
II. Iranian army intelligence has long
shown awareness of Tudeh activity in
army and is familiar with Tudeh army
officers organization and has identified
various individuals involved.
III. Iranian G-2, Colonel Pakravan, has been
in charge of ferreting out Tudeh in the
Army. Several hundred army officers,
non-corns and soldiers have been arrested.
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In G-2's office four officers out of
a total of sixty, and 20 non-corns out
of a total of 25 to 30 have been
removed for suspected Tudeh sympathies.
Of those arrested around 250 non-
commissioned officers have reportedly
been summarily dismissed from the
service after their arrest, others have
been exiled. At least sixty officers
who were under arrest presented a
problem because the documentary proof
of.their complicity in the Tudeh party
was "mysteriously missing" from G-2
files.
IV. Attention was drawn particularly to
Tudeh infiltration of the Air Force
on 22 September when Communist sympa-
thizers succeeded in temporarily
sabotaging 13 planes.
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?
10 V. The Iranian Chief of Staff, in October,
asked the Chief of Staff of the US
Army Mission for a list of Communists
known by ARMISH to be in the Iranian
army. He said that he could not locate
his own list.
VI. In early November 1953 Iranian G-2
remarked that only a small proportion
of Party members or sympathizers in
the army have been known or apprehended.
In later statements he has been more
optimistic, although there is no con-
vincing evidence that the situation
has changed markedly.
VII. It probably is true that current
Iranian army efforts to remove Communist
sympathizers are more widespread and
more successful than during Mossadeq's
regime.
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However, the army has neither the
knowledge, the experience, nor the
organization to do an effective job.
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