THE AUSTRIAN STATE TREATY AND THE BERLIN CONFERENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000200100001-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 14, 1954
• Content Type: BRIEF

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NSC BRIEFING 14 January 1954
THE AUSTRIAN STATE TREATY
AND THE BERLIN CONFERENCE
Indications of Soviet Moves on the
Austrian Question at the Berlin Conference:
A. USSR has not formally agreed to discuss-
ing Austria at Berlin conference; but
1. A high Soviet official in Vienna has
told an American official that the
embassy is making considerable
preparations for Austrian treaty
negotiations at Berlin, and attaches'
great importance to them.
2. At least one member of the embassy,
possibly Ambassador Ilichev, will
attend the Berlin conference.
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B. Various Soviet officials in Vienna
have hinted within the last few weeks,
however, that an Austrian treaty is
still dependent on a German settle-
ment and that agreement on an Austrian
treaty at Berlin is improbable.
1. An indication that the Soviet
Union plans no quick withdrawal
from Austria is the anticipated
arrival of the dependents of
Soviet officers, now permitted
to come to Austria.
2. It thus seems likely that the
Soviet Union is merely preparing
to defend its position on the
Austrian issue at Berlin and is
not yet prepared to agree to an
Austrian treaty.
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II. Austrian Pressure for a Treaty or Troop
Withdrawal:
A. During past six months the Austrian
government has seemed willing to pay
almost any price for a treaty.
1. From July to December the govern-
ment made various independent
approaches to the USSR, indicating
a willingness to:
a. Promise that Austria would
enter no military alliances.
b. Accept the economic burdens
imposed by Article 35 of the
long draft treaty which
(1) Allows the USSR to retain
valuable former German
assets including 60 per
cent of all oil production
and also extensive Danube
shipping properties.
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(2) Forces-Austria to pay the
USSR $150 million in com-
pensation for other alleged
ex-German assets.
B. After Western powers indicated to the
USSR on 8 December that they wished the
Austrian treaty question included in
the four-power talks, Austria stated
to the West that:
1. It wished to send a representative
to the conference.
2. Such a representative would make a
strong plea for revision of
Article 35.
3. On the question of neutrality,
Austria's representative would ad-
here to the Western powers' position-
that Austria make no commitments
prejudicing its security or abjuring
international associations permitted
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C. Internal Austrian political pressure for
a treaty has nevertheless continued.
1. Chancellor Raab, in a strong speech
on 8 January about the unprece-
dented "injustice" being inflicted
on Austria, announced that: "if
the Berlin conference should not
bring about a satisfactory result,
we will demand that the Americans
and the Russians also reduce their
armed forces to a symbolically
III. The Current Western Position on the
Austrian Question at Berlin:
A. At the tripartite discussions in Paris
in December, Britain and France agreed
with the US to support the participa-
tion at Berlin of an Austrian represen-
tative who would ask for a relaxation
of the provision of Article 35. In
part, the Austrian representative's
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1. Reduction of the $150 million pay-
ment, agreed upon in 1949, to
release the German assets. Reduc-
tion would be justified by the
amount which the Soviet Union has
taken out of the economy since 1949.
2. Elimination of Soviet control over
oil and Danube shipping properties
in exchange for Austrian compensa-
tion not to exceed $200 million over
25 years.
3. If,however, the USSR retains the
above properties, Soviet extra-
territorial rights in their
administration should be eliminated.'
B. Britain and France indicated, however,
that they are disinclined to support a
determined Western effort to revise
Article 35 if strong Austrian support
for such revision is not forthcoming.
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C. Britain and France agreed with the
United States to resist any Soviet
proposals to:
1. Connect the Austrian problem with
the German problem.
2. Introduce other extraneous issues
such as Trieste, Austrian denazi-
fication or demilitarization.
3. "Neutralize" Austria to the
detriment of Western or Austrian
security or Austria's freedom to
participate in associations
compatible with the UN charter.
D. Britain and France expressed doubts,
however, on the advisability of an
Allied security guarantee to Austria
following a treaty. They gave the
impression that neither power would go
to the aid of Austria should its inde-
pendence then be threatened.
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