THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000200210002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 10, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 1, 1954
• Content Type: BRIEF

BOU "ni rir iivci 1954
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The current flare-up in the Arab-Israeli. cold war centers on two
main trouble spots--Jordan and Syria.
Smoldering antagonism on the chronically tense Israeli-Jordanian
border has steadily deepened since the Qibya massacre last October.
It has now broken into the open with two serious incidents. The
ambushing on 17 March of an Israeli bus in the Negev desert--responsi-
bility for which has not been determined--was followed on 29 March by
an attack on the Jordan village of Nahhalin. Israel's Premier Sharett
admitted participation of Israeli citizens, but implied no official
Israeli responsibility by describing the raid as a "local affair."
25X1X who visited Nahhalin,
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censured Israel for the attack.
In western Jordan, near the Israeli border, there are 11,700 Arab
Legion troops. Israel has secretly redeployed troops and called up
some reserves. Approximately 12,000 Israeli troops are located in this
central sector.
The continuing dispute over the Jordan River waters helped to
promote the flare-up on 11 March over fishing rights on Lake Tiberias.
Heavy fire was exchanged between Israeli gunboats and Syrian outposts
on the shore. The armistice commission condemned both sides, but the
local UN chairman prohibited even traditional Syrian civilian access
to the lake. This decision threatens imminent break-down of the
Syrian-Israeli armistice machinery and will create an infiltration
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of its troops, located in southern Syria. Israel has about 10,000
troops in its northern sector.
The following developments may be anticipated. Syria, though
involved with its own internal problems, will probably walk out on the
local armistice commission if Syrian fishing rights in Lake Tiberias
are not restored. Syria might create trouble if Israel resumes work
on its diversion canal there. In Jordan, bitter hatred mixed with
fear will continue the present border tenseness. The Arab states,
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aware of Israeli military superiority, are not likely to attack Israel.
In Israel, Sharett is under pressure from military groups who are
insisting on tough treatment of the Arabs. For reasons of international
reaction, Israel can hardl f t ck now,
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which might embarrass Israel internationally.
Long-range prospects for any relaxation of the cold war between
Israel and the Arab states are likewise dim. Israel is becoming
increasingly annoyed with the West and with the United Nations. It is
greatly disturbed over Western defense plans in the area which might
strengthen the Arabs. At the same time, Israel is irritated with the
Orbit because of anti-Semitism and restrictive emmigration policies.
The 28 March Soviet veto of a UN resolution condemning Egyptian
interference with Israeli-bound shipping through the Suez Canal will
deepen Israel's dissatisfaction with diplomacy and the UN as instruments
for achieving peace in the area.
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pressure, particularly in the United States, to gain its ends. It
may be expected to develop a tougher and more. provocative policy in
dealing with the Arabs.
The Arabs, unable to engage in all-out war, will be tempted to
push senseless terrorism on a private level and, on an official level,
to sharpen boycotts and political pressure. They will cautiously avail
themselves of whatever Soviet support is forthcoming. They will be
encouraged by the recent Soviet veto, which follows an earlier one
favoring Syria in its dispute with Israel over Jordan waters.
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