THE VIET MINH THREAT TO THE TONKIN DELTA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000200270001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 7, 1954
• Content Type: BRIEF

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NSC BRIEFING 0 7 May 1954
THE VIET MINH THREAT TO THE TONKIN DELTA
I. Although world attention has concen-
trated on Dien Bien Phu, it is actually
the rice rich Tonkin delta, and its
7,000,000 people,)that has always been
the strategic prize of the Indochina
war.
A. The Viet Minh will do all they can
to capitalize on the confusion and
shock of the French and anti-
Communist Vietnamese over the fall
of Dien Bien Phu.
B. Might try to maintain present momen-
tum by making an early all-out
effort to take the delta.
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II. The French are usually pictured as
holding most of the delta, while the
Viet Minh infiltrate and stage guerrilla
attacks.
A. But
Viet Minh's so-called "infiltration"
is so widespread. that it might be
more accurate to say that the French
are the infiltrators.
B. Major part of French strength of
192,500 is tied down in numerous
little posts dotting the countryside
and in protection of major towns
and lines of communications.
1. French now have firm hold only
on some 700 of the more than
5,000 Tonkin delta villages.
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C. Viet Minh forces of 76,000 in
and around the delta move freely
about the countryside in large bands
attacking French installations at
will.
III. Much of Viet Minh strength lies in
,elusiveness.
A. When approached by superior numbers,
they trade rifle for hoe and vanish
among the farmers. If surprised,
they may become human submarines,
hiding under water in flooded fields
and breathing through bamboo tubes.
IV. If started on its way soon, most of the
battle-tested Viet Minh force of about
30,000 now at Dien Bien Phu could reach
9~
the Tonkin delta two or three weeks well
n
before the heavy rains begin in
early July.
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A. But victors at Dien Bien Phu may
not be needed, since Viet Minh
forces in and around the delta
have not yet made all-out effort
and degree of demoralization of
delta defenders is unknown factor
at present.
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V. U.S. Consul Sturm, just returned from
Hanoi, feels the signal for a big
Viet Minh offensive may well be an
attempt to capture Nam Dinh, third
most important city in the Tonkin
delta. (PoP: 2S`,00S)
A. Example of ability to surprise and
seize it iative is fact that over
a month ago, a small Viet Minh
group, disguised as women, seized
the marketplace of Nam Dinh and
held it for several hours. Group
melted away in crowd when French
troops approached.
B. Tonkin capital, Hanoi, is an equally
likely target. By permanently
cutting the city's communications
with the port of Haiphong, the Viet
Minh might stifle the French into
submission. Hanoi needs 2,000 tons
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of supplies daily from Haiphong.
C. Hanoi is also believed vulnerable
to attack from within.
1the enemy
is bringing in quantities of
explosives and guns for sabotage
or an internal uprising. Past
estimates of Viet Minh underground
strength in Hanoi range from hundreds
to thousands.
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