THE TACHENS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000200290007-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2000
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: May 20, 1954
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved ,For Release 2000/0 R01443R000200290007-3
NSC BRIEFING 20 May 1954
THE TACHENS
1. 15-16 May, 3,000 Chinese Communist
troops landed on three i01.ands
within 50 miles of Tachens.
A. Similar landings made spring,
summer years past. This year
naval clashes (severe damage
two Nationalist DE's), air
activity. (MIG-15's have
shot down Nat fighters.)
B. Communist force included 20
ships, four MIG-15's giving
air cover.
II. May presage attack on Tachens,
important Nationalist listening
post and defensive outpost.
NAVY DECLASSIFICATIO/RELEASE iNSTRUCTIONS ON FILE
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO1443R000200290007-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08iou -. 3R000200290007-3
25X1X4'
troop
concentrations coastal
Chekiang, army group head-
quarters, increased naval
strength in the area.
B. Most this not yet confirmed;
consensus is recent moves part
Communist war of nerves.
C. Nationalist reaction conflict-
ing. Some officials see no
threat while Geneva conference
continues; others believe
assault imminent.
III. Nationalist defenses on Tachens.
A. One of best divisions Aplus
about 5,000 guerrillas.
B. State of readiness considered
excellent, but vulnerable to
air assault. and amphibious
attacks by night.
Approjved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-FADP80RO1443R000200290007-3
 W.-0000- 1"Op
2000/08/30 : CI 1443R000200290007-3
sent .
bein
f4xcemeats d attack
c . R'einld take concert divisions
U ? V0 a mmnnist
b9 tx'ree co `Current
T ashen
t0 take
G-2 estimate,
Approved For Release 2000/08/30: CIA-RDP80RO1443R000
aW If" 7-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000200290007-3
SECRET WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
No.30-53
Security Information
Special Handling Required
,,y
Z-~ TV L1 1 S-3
Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
SPECIAL REPORT
Islands off the Fukien-Chekiang Coast
Since mid-May, the islands off the southeast coast of China have been the
scene of increasing activity. A number of these islands have been held by the Chinese
Nationalists as outposts in the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores as well as advanced
bases for raids on Communist shipping, as points for observation of Communist activity,
and as potential bases for future action against the mainland. These Nationalist held Islands
have long been a thorn in the side of the Chinese Communist Government, and there are
indications that the recent Communist moves may be the beginning of a determined effort
to remove the threatening irritant.
The Nationalist held islands fall into three general groupings; a northern
group lying between 29-OON and 27-OON, a central group between 27-OON and 25-30N, and
a southern group between 25-SON and 24-OON. The northern group is centered on the
important Ta-Ch'en Aslands, the central on Ma-Tsu Shan and Pai-Ch'uan Tao (White Dog
Island), and the southern on Chin-Men Tao (Quemoy Island) (See graphic pages 10 and 11).
To date, the Communist threat to the islands has consisted of the concentration of troops
and shipping along the adjacent mainland coast, the occupation of and buildup of strength
in formerly unoccupied islands near Nationalist held islands of the northern and central
groups, the capture of one Nationalist garrisoned island (Chikushan) and occupation of
some islands recently evacuated by the Nationalists in the northern group, and some probing
operations in the southern group.
On 29 May, the Communists occupied five islands (Yanghsu, Huoch'Ashan,
Hsiaolushan, Talushan, and Pei Chi Shan) in the northern group. At the time of seizure,
Talushan was occupied by 50 Chinat guerrillas. During June, eight other islands of the
northern group were occupied, one of which (Chikushan) was defended by Nationalist
troops. Three of these were later abandoned and remain unoccupied.
Most, if not all, of these islands, are important only as they are related to
the defensibility of the key Nationalist islands in the area, especially the Ta-Ch'en islands.
Their occupation by the Communists was a sufficient threat, however, to bring about an
attempt by the nationalists on 19 and 20 June to retake three of them. In the course of the
fierce fighting that followed, the Nationalist forces temporarily occupied Yanghsu and
Hsiaolushan and gained a foothold on Talushan, but were unable to withstand the Communist
counter-attacks and the islands remained in Communist hands.
Since the first of July the Communists have occupied six islands of the cen-
tral group, posing a threat to Ma'Tsu and Pai-Ch'uan Tao. Four of these islands and at
least two others were evacuated by the Nationalists without action.
Two reports have been received of attempts to land small numbers of troops
on islands of the southern groups, apparently for reconnaissance, Two of these incidents
were on Chin-men and in each case the raiders were successful in taking one Nationalist
prisoner. The other attempt, on nearby Ta-Tan Tao,was unsuccessful.
Chinese Communist activities so far would seem to indicate a determined
effort to remove the threat of the Nationalist held coastal islands. In addition, a POW
interrogation report indicates the existence of a Communist plan for the conquest of all
SECRET
9
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000200290007-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO1443R000200290007-3
I19' 120? 121?
:CIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
F RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
10. NAME OF ISLAND L.AT LONG
YU-SHAN LIEHTA.O 28? 50'
122?15'
VU-P'ENG HSU 28'40'
121054'
PAI-CHIA SHAN 28?38'
121'52'
1-CHIANG SHAN(IKIANG SHAN) 28?36'
1210 48'
0 CH'ING HSU(SHE SHAN) 28?32'
121?56'
1 PANG-TA-CH'EN SHAH 28? 29'
121 ?53'
2 HSIA-TA-CH'EN SHAN 28? 27'
1210 53'
3 HSIA HSU 28? 25'
1210 53'
14 KUEI HSU 28?24'
121042'
15 CHUNG HSU 28? 24'
1210 54'
16 SHANG HSU 28? 24'
1210 54'
24 P'I SHAN (PEN SHAN) 28? 06'
121 ?30'
27 NAN CHI SHAN 27? 28'
1210 04'
35 TUNG-YIN SHAN (YIN SHAN) 26'22'
120?30'
36 LANG TAO (LARNE IS.) 26?20'
120112'
37 KAOTENC-HSU (PEI-SHA-TAO) 26'16'
118?58'
38 PEI-KAN-T'ANG(TANCKI TAO) 26?14'
119' 58'
39 MA-TSU SHAN 26109'
119 ? 56'
40 PAI-CH'UAN LIEH TAO(WHITE DOG)25? 58'
119' 55'
41 TUNG-CHIA
25017'
119 ? 46'
42 WU-CH'IU HSU
25? 00'
119 ? 27'
43 HSIA-WU-CH'IU HSU
24'58'
119?29'
44 CHIN-MEN TAO(OUEMOY,KINMEN)
24? 27'
118 ? 23'
45 LIEN HSU(LITTLE QUEMOY IS.)
24' 26'
118' 15'
46 TA-TAN TAO
24? 23'
118 ? 10'
47 ERH-TAN TAO
24122'
118009,
48 TUNG-TING HSU(CHAPEL IS.)
24?10'
118? 14'
7 TACHAHUA
28?38'
121?'46'
17 CHIKUSHAN
28 ? 24'
1210 44'
18 CHIENSHAMAN SHAN
28? 22'
1210 42'
19 TAT'UNGLING
28? 08'
1210 28'
20 YANGHSU
280 08'
1210 24'
21 HSIAOLUSHAN
28? 06'
1210 24'
22 HUOCHASHAN
280 08'
121? 22'
23 TALUSHAN
28 ? 06'
121? 24'
25 CHIENSHAN
26 PEI CHI SHAN
270 38'
121? 12'
29 PEI SHUANG LIEN TAO
26? 41'
120? 28'
30 SHUANG FENG TAO (FOU YIN SHAN)
260 36'
120? 10'
31 NU GEU SEN
26? 34'
120? 09'
.
I
5
5
3
1
1
1
1
33 CHIN CHU-TAO (TASIYA"ION;o86Cd2'Forlase 2000/08/30 : CIA-RD
SPIDER IS.) "c
34 CHUI SHAN 260 30' 1200 08' JS
`~ n
 KINNEN TAO (TA-O-KUAN T= 280 47' 121050'
T'IEN-AO SHAN 28? 45' 121?51'
TUNGCHI (BELLE VISTA IS.) 28? 44' 121056'
TOU MEN SHAN Apprt*dtl Fd21 f 1e
'8 T'AI SHAN LIEH TAO 260 59' 120? 37'
119?
Approved
:)- 43
gRDPaQ. AO #3R00020029000
30
31
33
STATUS OF ISLANDS
CHEKIANG-FUKIEN COAST
15 JULY 1953
REPORTED HELD BY CHINESE NA-
TIONALISTS
REPORTED SEIZED AND OCCUPIED
BY CHINESE COMMUNISTS SINCE
29 MAY 1953
ISLANDS NOT SHOWN IN ONE OF THE ABOVE CAT-
AGORIES ARE ASSUMED TO BE COMMUNIST OCCUPIED
OR CONTROLLED.
FOR M O S A
BY JOINPAC 172-53 1216 ( SECRET
01 PREPARED
1
r
I
For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000200290007-3
 ABU'GNF~orRelease2-WE /fiK-LYCTELLIdE4NCEO DIGEST-3 No. 30-53
Security Information
Special Handling Required
Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
SPECIAL REPORT
Islands off the Fukien-Chekiang Coast (cont'd)
the islands of the northern group by the end of August. The Communists certainly appear
to have the capability to take any or all of these islands, if they are willing to pay the
price.
Few of the northern islands are heavily defended, but it is reported that
the two Ta-Ch'en islands are being reenforced from Formosa by the 46th Division of the
75th Army. This army, with a strength of about 10,000 men, has recently been reorganized,
and re-equipped, and is believed to be well trained and effective. With this reenforcement
and the advantages of naturally defensible terrain, the Ta-Ch'ens might prove a costly
objective to take by assault.
The other islands of the northern group and those of the central group, with
the exception of Ma'Tsu, where there is a regular army division, are occupied primarily
by guerrillas. Most heavily defended of all the islands is Chin-Men, held by about 50,000
Nationalist regular army troops. It was here that major components of the Communist
28th and 29th Armies were soundly defeated when they attempted an assault on the island
in 1949.
The graphic presentation (pages 10 and 11) of the status of the Southeast
China Coastal islands represents the best information available as of 15 July 1953. The
status of islands not otherwise indicated are assumed to be Communist held. Further
action is to be expected and any of these islands may change hands at any time.
COMMUNIST CHINA
Coastal Operations
The increasing activity along the Chekiang and Fukien coast (see preceding
article) has once again focused interest and concern in the capabilities of the Chinese
Communist Navy.
The strength and disposition of the CCN was described in detail by Pacific
Command WID No. 21-53 of 22 May 1953 and remains essentially the same. The major
operational strength of the CCN remains eight ex-Japanese frigates, a corvette, three gun-
boats, and at least forty motor torpedo boats. In addition, there are three older gunboats,
sixteen river gunboats, four sub-chasers, and about fifty amphibious landing ships of
various categories. The principal areas of "concentration" of CCN vessels, in order of
importance, are the Shanghai-Woosung area, Tsingtao and the Canton-Whampoa area.
Recognition of the fact that the CCN is a third-rate navy by Western standards
and a recitation of the strength and disposition of the their vessels does not afford, however,
a realistic estimate of their offensive capability with regard to operations along
the China coast. The manner in which the units of the CCN are being utilized in such
operations can best be appreciated by realizing that the CCN is subordinate to the Chinese
Army and, as such, apparently is utilized as a supporting weapon of the ground forces,
PW
Approved For Release 2000/08/30: CIA-RDP80R01443R(2((f *8 T_k~~4 On