INDOCHINA MILITARY SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000200310007-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: June 3, 1954
• Content Type: BRIEF

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IN?3OC~iINA MILITARY SITUATION
3 June 1954
I. Rapid redeployment of `Iiet Minh battle corps .poses imminent
threat to Tonkin delta.
A. Five Divisions from Dien Bien Phu expected to be
in position around delta this weep.
~Yith short period of rest and resupply, could be
ready for action by ]_5 June.
II. Following indications of posaible enemy intent to attack
delta noted:
A. Rapidity of divisions' return from Dien Bien
Phu, although logical from worsening weather
standpoint, could indicate plan for early
offensive.
B. Training of 17 battalions at Thai Nguyen
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~?
III. Cogny
Reeent shipments Chinese aid included six mare
rocket launchers, unspecified number recoilless
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rifles, and 3,3Ua rounds lUSmm artillery ammo..
looks for mayor
attach 15-ZO June, says it's "almost certain."
A. He is pessimistic about holding Hanoi; fears
enemy will concentrate on Hanoi-Haiphong rail-
road lines and he won't be able to prevent
permanent break.
B. If such break occurs, he does not "intend to
have another Dien Bien Phu" and will withdraw
to Haiphong bridgehead.
1. Hanoi dependent on daily coal supplies
all-imp
already
due pre
octant water purification system;
reported law in rice supplies
sent Viet Minh harassment cities'
tain electric light plant and
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General impression
is that delta, except for Haiphong
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bridgehead, can't last 30 days under major"enemy attack.
full attack
on delta would bring no disintegration of French regular
forces, even though their morale is ,poor.
A. However, Vietnamese troops would not be dependable.
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A. I (total delta
infantry strength in near future will be 11? battalions.
B. Most important phase of .plan is increase in mobile
infantry battalions by as many as 15 battalions (to
total 36) in immediate future.
G. Qf these, la to 13 are coming from Laos.
D. Abandonment of some small, static posts will release
additional troops for these mobile forces.
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we may see piecemeal
employment of enemy battle corps in delta, rather than
full-scale attack.
A. Thus, enemy could avoid head-on collision with
heavier armed French forces and exposure to
air attack on their concentrations.
VII. In face of critical situation, French are planning build-
up, reorganization of delta defenses; say will try to
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VIII. Laos, to be stripped of 10 to 13 battalions far reinforcing
delta, faces passible rapid deterioration of security
F. French also plan to concentrate mobile strength
in north of delta, leaving southern areas to
Vietnamese forces.
1. Initially, though, mobile units will
~t,nnnrt.Vietnamese in south,
situation.
A.. Viet PJiinh regular. strength in Laos, although
only 10 battalions, expected to take advantage
of French exodus and increase harassment of
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local forces. There also 8,000 irregulars.
~. Weak Laotian army totals 13 battalions. Also
2,500 auxiliaries.
On the :political side, disintegration in Vietnam being met
ineffectually with old formulas.
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