UNITED STATES-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS ENTERING CRITICAL PERIOD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000200320009-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2003
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: June 15, 1954
• Content Type: BRIEF

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1954
MTE STA _' SOME Ra
TIONS ENTERING CRIT:
Introduction
A. The United States is now entering into a critical per i
tions with President Rhea.
rrectne
all his delegation
egotia
has often threatened to renew hostilities following f
ating or
There are several pending military and economic issues likely to
bring US-South Korean relations to a new low over next few weeks.
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A. Rhea is likely
pletely and unto,
onally terminates talks
one with CO
Rhee desires a clean break with no left-
d gathering mould in the U'N icebox."
Anything Rhea interprets as temporizing or appeasement increases
Possibili
lateral RCZ walk-ou
problem in M-ROK relations.
OE spokesmen have stated repeatedly there will be no more talks on
Korea following Geneva.
1. Rhea strongly opposes proposals to refer for
or to continue discussions among
NSA, State Dept. reviews completed
1.y exploit failure of Oenei
niets are
ck to t".
p of nation
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June.
likely be
conference, sponsored by
propaganda advantage In retelling delegation at that
get conference aims "off with a
could no
17 June
heduled for 15-17
versary of Rheete prisoner release.
~e to this move even if Allies have agreed to
and notwiths' ndini
er promises to
al discussions to run
days.
uonxerence
as a 'people's conference of Asian na?
I representatives is being sponsored
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.on covering hee's personal sponsor-
o coincide with the
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sentially a R propaganda form seeking. to attribute broad
u Support to R .foreign policy objectives..
is attacking and seeking to reverse US strategy
to, concentrated on a stronng# friendly Japan
economically integrated with SEA countries. .
Rhea may offer an anti- Commmiet front
an alternatire to Japan as basis of US poa tio.
The anticipated criticisms of America's A
suggest a
paganda appeal to US Congressiona
opinion to strengthen the RC in dealing with ? ioutive depart
eyed ire *i a t
for a collective an
a is R determination to achieve leadership in any
orted SEA collective security program.
feel that basis of US support for A derives principally
ese Communist conflicts
consider, therefore
a US-led organization
to block Communist pressure in d is an ultir, te, if indirect, means
of ensuring US support in unifying Korea., a sing that In event
of war with China, US would be forced to reinforce Korean front.
Post-Geneva Per,,
their failure to unify Korea.
xtrsmely difficult to deal with ones the Geneva con-
o convince US popular Asian sup-
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nt public statements, ho
started as soon as possible."
from evioua - held views about his future o3
convinced that time is running out
recent top-level army reorganizatio
commend flexibility in case
ommaanders,, except for UCS Chairman
a cannot hope to unity Korea by uni
It is ass
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7.
officers to
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RheeI a mime tactic at the mo
whicho in an 11 June press interview, he called "es
alternative.
9. He seems to be thi;
matum" to the Communists
previous restrictions on ammo,
dications of possible
daps
ction are that Rhea
seems to be t
.n ter na. of delivering an "ulti_
ck.
out of Korea or we will fight you,"
that the Soviet Union does
d to nor detract
es of action..
it fight we sue
ties him
lateral action, his
use of three
her minions,
ill apparentli not be moved from bluff to action
can contrive to embroil the in renewed hostility
moves to improve relations with Peiping. Period between end
App#6vG
critical.
3MO O @2e7aas be
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ng to the armistice
seek to provoke the Chinese CQz=ua
ry action b~ indirect means. (Ue LII 7-8 above
by
seising Chinese .Fishermen off the Korean coast;
as to be that he can embroil the US in
b. continuing to urge the use of ROK troops in Indochina ;
c., provoking incidents along the truce
or seeking entry into an Asian defense community which
Be may announce that South to
recipient of t military aid.
onger bound by the armistice
psi from the UN Co;
s stated he will eject the Cor: nuniat members of the NNSC from
eaa*
South Korean attempts to secure L4reater US econo
1. Rhee will continue to seek inar
of keeping as many issues "boil
power#
tary co
Bible to strengthen his
lion ROK. army with naval and air supporting units in-
eta;
US-ROK mutual defense pact and the con-
on of a status of forces agreement;
c, a greater ROK voice in the disbursement of Una
retention of the unrealistic 180-1 "per rent" exchange rates
is an inflammatory one with Rhee)
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he recall of Economic Coordinator Tyler Wood;
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e stoppage
pressuring Korean fire from Ong
n Japan, even where !QA contracts are involved).
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He will put forth all his old demands, ignoring the fact that
an aid purchases for or
0
bargained away these dezoanda for concession
already granted by the United States.
He will reverse the ordinary negotiating procedure of putting
forth the i.ium position first, by his umal technique of adding
new demands once he has exploited his original position to the
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