INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000200340009-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 1998
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: June 24, 1954
• Content Type: BRIEF

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NSC BRIEFING 24 June 1954
INDOCHINA
25X1X6r
I paints dismal picture
.French future in Tonkin delta.
A. Failing American intervention or Geneva cease-fire,
he foresees inevitable withdrawal French expeditionary
corps from delta.
1. This coincides recent reported consensus 35
French officers in Indochina, who believe
withdrawal to Haiphong perimeter will be
followed by mass Vietnamese desertions, and
that even beachhead would soon be lost.
25X1X6
2. preparations already well under way,
including bulldozing of beaching points for
landing craft east of Haiphong.
3. He points out that parts of Hanoi-Haiphong
LOC now open only two to three hours daily;
in event evacuation Hanoi, depot stocks amount-
ing to 600 train loads would have to be abandoned
or destroyed; road-bound forces have only one
25X1X6r route to Haiphong.
II. considers Viet Minh could make all-
out attack any time after 1 July.
A. Thinks, however, this more probable after 15
September for following reasons:
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1. Enemy can significantly improve its delta
position during next few months at small cost.
2. Battle corps has many replacements needing
additional training.
3. Minimum of two months` detailed preparations
usually-made by Viet Minh before major attacks.
B. He believes, however, that if enemy sees evidence
25X1X6
improvement civilian morale or probable international-
ization of war it would immediately commit battle
corps for early decisive victory.
= French believe 500 potential Viet Minh truck
drivers sent from delta to Thai Nguyen area,will replace
borrowed Chinese drivers.
25X1X7 A.
following agreements Geneva.
interpretation: Preparation
for possible inspections by neutral nations
25X1X6
IV. General Cogny,
believes
enemy battle corps on delta perimeter ready to move
against French "at any time."
A. He not sure when assault might come but said if he
were Viet Minh commander, he would have attacked
delta two weeks ago.
1. Cogny thinks political considerations might
explain delay.
p
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25X1X7^
large quantities Chinese aid
crossed border past several weeks.
A. Materiel largely ammo and heavy weapons; in mid-June,
36 to 50 105mm howitzers received.
B. French opinion: materiel destined for Thai Nguyen
area, where enemy's nine battalions in training
may eventually constitute new division, possibly
artillery.
VI. Regardless plans for major assault, early intensification
Viet Minh activity in delta forecast by several reports.
A. "indications" that
25X1X7
Division 320 plus some irregular units have been
ordered prepare for action on 1 July in southern
delta. area. One regiment Division 304 also may
be involved.
1. French undecided whether this would be part
of attack on entire delta. or only limited
campaign.
B. French also expect strong additional attacks
against Hanoi-Haiphong LOC by several enemy battalions.
1. These units may first turn against Ke Sat-Hung Yen
route, in attempt isolate Hung Yen whose loss
would cripple southern delta defense, increase
vulnerability Hanoi and Haiphong.
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C. Report of 37mm AA defenses near Haiduong, just east
of Ke Sat, suggests enemy plans for increased action
that area, possibly in conjunction with interdic-
tion Hung Yen route.
1. Bridge across Thai Binh River at Ha,iduong
most vulnerable link in Hanoi-Haiphong LOC.
VII. Altered French defense plans now call for French units
to remain southern delta, area., rather than turn zone
over to Vietnamese army.
A. French apparently wish avoid major reorganization
while enemy has strong attack capability, also
fear Vietnamese troops could not hold area alone.
B. Extent of present insecurity southern delta, area
indicated by recent closing large spinning and
weaving mills in Nam Dinh; this was one of largest
manufacturing enterprises in Indochina..
VIII, Meanwhile, security in five once-safe provinces in South
Vietnam said by prominent Vietnamese army officer to
have deteriorated markedly over last half year.
A. He blames poor pay, inadequate arms of local
militia and corruption, incompetence of local
governments; says Vietnamese army "concerned much
more with tailoring of uniform and unearned
decorations than with primary purpose of combatting
Communist enemy."
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B. His opinion--unless remedial action taken, "all
would be lost" these provinces within two or three
months.
IX. Fie Bao Dal, it becoming less likely he will return
25X1X4A
A. most French and Vietnamese plans
call for his dismissal.
OP gr rr
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