POSSIBLE CHINESE ATTACKS ON OFFSHORE ISLANDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000300010005-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 11, 2000
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 5, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release
NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.
5 August 1954
POSSIBLE CHINESE ATTACKS ON OFFSHORE ISLANDS
1. Strong possibility of Chinese Communist operations against
some Nationalist-held offshore islands during next several
weeks.
A. Since 9 July, Peiping has claimed Uu intention
extend 7th Fleet coverage to "certain" off-
shore islands.
B. Communists may want to move before US com-
mitted to defense as well as before start
monsoon season (late September-October).
C. Most vulnerable Nationalist islands are
Tachen and Matsu groups.
II. Since mid-May, Communists have occupied six small islands
some 20 miles north of Tachens.
A. Nationalists now report arrival six
landing craft, with 10,000 troops, at
point 50 miles north of Tachens, also
sighting of 1,000-ton warship, many
small, vessels at points 15 miles east
and southeast of Tachens.
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IV. Nationalist strength believed to be only 15,000 troops on
Tachens, 9,000 on Matsus, possibly 4,500 on Nanchi.
A. These islands valuable to Nationalists as
listening posts, for advance warning air
and sea attacks on Formosa, and as bases
for operation against mainland.
V. In addition to strong chance attack on Nationalist islands,
also marginal possibility attack on Formosa.
A. Current propaganda most intense, aggressive
since 1950.
B. Principal charges: US scheming use Formosa
as base for aggression; advising, assisting
Chinese Nationalist forces; dispatching
spies and saboteurs to mainland; committing
piracy against merchant vessels.
C. Peiping also asserts US preparing conclude
pact with Taipei which would show "permanent
hostility" to Chinese people, with "protracted
grave consequences."
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D. Since 26 July, Peiping has said Chinese
peoples ''most important task" is "libera-
tion" of Formosa. On 1 August (Army Day)
Commander in Chief Chu Teh said Chinese
must fight with "singleness of purpose"
to take Formosa, that "other countries"
will not be allowed to interfere.
VI. At least four reasons for Peiping propaganda on Formosa
now,
A. With Korean stalemate, armistice in Indo-
China, logical device for keeping Chinese
worked up is Formosa, which Communists
have been vowing to "liberate" since 1949.
B. Nationalist seizures Bloc ships is cause:,
for serious concern.
C. Communists genuinely want no US-Chiang
pact, which would increase US commitment
to defense Formosa.
D. Formosa is ideal issue for widening dif-
ferences between US and rest of West, US
and Asian "neutrals."
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VII. Full-scale assault on Formosa in near future unlikely.
A. Peiping made same assertion in 1950 about
fighting "single-mindedly" for Formosa,
but in fact Communists have not moved
against the island.
B. Peiping's main consideration was and
still is US commitment to island's
defense, as symbolized by mission of
US 7th Fleet.
C. However, Communists have capability
for air attack Formosa. May do this at
any time, to give substance to propaganda.
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