PROBABLE POST-GENEVA COMMUNIST POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000300010009-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 12, 2003
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: August 5, 1954
• Content Type: BRIEF

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NSC BRIEFING 5 August 1954
PROBABLE POST-GENEVA COMMUNIST POLICY
I. BACKGROUND - The Outcome at Geneva.:
A. first-,1, Communists at Geneva settled for less
than they could. got, in view Viet Minh military successes.
N
1. By delay at conference, they might have seized all
Indochina.
2. By not meeting Mendes-France's dramatic bid for
peace, they might have caused critical internal
crisis in France.
B. Several very good reasons for Communist settlement.
1. Desirable to end "hot" war in order continue under-
mining Western alliance.
2. Continuation of "hot" war greatly increased risk
US intervention,,(.fq l,.~
3. Overwhelming Communist victory in Indochina might
have frightened non-Communist Asians into closer
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collaboration with West and denied to Communists
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their assistance in blocking Western plans for
II. POST-GENEVA EXPECTATIONS - Short-Term Probabilities:
A. Communists unlikely to make military moves
in near future.
B. In Europe, Moscow will capitalize on Geneva atmosphere
by pressing for further negotiations. /Already state
it
lesson of Geneva is success of negotiations for peace
?t
with U.S. on sidelines.?
C. In Asia, the Chinese Communists will try to make
Formosa a major issue, also intensify efforts to under-
k
mine "reactionary" regimes in Thailand, Japan.
III. Soviet negotiations will aim at: forestalling EDC and German
rearmament; blocking creation of US-backed Middle East defense
grouping or Southeast Asian alliance; major aim - splitting
chief Western allies and wrecking NATO.
A. USSR moving swiftly.. 24 July note, asking all-European
conference on " prospective settlement
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in Germany and Austria as bait, also plugged for
atomic ban. On 4 August follow-up note asked pre-
liminary 4-Power meeting in August or September (press).
B. At end Geneva conference, leading Pravda correspondent
predicted; "We will all grow old covering conferences."
IV. Another weapon in Communist campaign to splinter Western
alliance will be East-West trade.
A. Although such trade will fall short of Soviet promises,
Western countries apparently welcome Kremlin's policy
of "trade for trade's sake" as proof Soviet reasonable-
ness.
B. Soviet's present attempt to use its. trade position to
secure Finnish political commitments is a, tactic they
will apply elsewhere.
V. In Far East, immediate Communist aims: increase Asian
neutralist sentiment; block Western-sponsored collective
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defense, particularly establishment additional US bases.
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A. At Geneva, Chinese Communist journalist said: "We
have won first campaign for neutralization all South-
east Asia." Communist propaganda stepping up "Asia
for Asians" theme.
B. Peiping may propose.. own Asian security pact; threaten
prospective Asian members of SEATO with "consequences"
of joining.
VI. Nonetheless, Communists will increase pressures in Far
East. Three areas for immediate exploitation are Indo-
china, Thailand and Formosa.
A. In Indochina, Communists will not violate armistice
line, but will use political, psychological and para-
military means to gain domination of whole area.
1. Ho (22 July) stated people of north, central,
south Vietnam "will be liberated:" French believe
south Vietnam flooded with Viet Minh political
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agents, preparing way for "early" elections.
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B. In Thailand, stepped-up psychological pressure,
perhaps subversion.
1. Ex-premier Pridi, whose whereabouts obscure since
1947, attended Peiping banquet China Peace Com-
mittee his honor 22 July.
2. Pridi warned Thai people they "duty-bound" over-
throw American-controlled "reactionary puppet"
government, restore nation's good name.
3. Thai leaders have
fear of Pridi: 25X6
Thai Government spokesman termed his attack
"first step" in campaign Communist conquest
Thailand.
C. In particular, Peiping will emphasize issue of Formosa;
promote friction between US and others of Free World
over support of Nationalists.
1. Senior Communist General Chu Te made bellicose
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declaration (1 Aug) Taiwan will be liberated and
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"other countries" not allowed to interfere.
Premier Chou, back from Geneva, echoes view.
C/k ,Lk
2. Peiping smarting from TUAPSE, other ship seizures
by Nationalists, destruction of planes at Hainan.
3. May attack Nationalist-held islands off China.
coast with diversionary air attacks on Formosa.
4. Major Nationalist islands (north to south) are
Tachen group (15,000 troops), Nanchi (4,500),
Matsu group (9,000) and Chinmen (47,000).
5. In East China, Communists have 350,000 troops,
Have ten Air
Division, (total at least 300 fighters, 100
bombers). Navy in area totals 35 landing-ships,
40 torpedo boats, dozen small warships.
6. Communists can take any of islands (but Chinmen
would be costly).
VII. Elsewhere in Far East, immediate prospects for Communist
action are less dramatic-
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INSERT SUGGESTED FOR NSC BRIEFING
-Probable Post-Geneva Communist Policy
(To follow Item IIIA - which covers 24 July note)
I. Soviet note of 4 August proposes four power foreign ministers'
conference in August or September to prepare for future all-
European security conference and to discuss Germany.
A. Kremlin is obviously disappointed by the cold Western
reaction to its previous call for a European conference,
and is very concerned about pending EDC debate in France.
B. The note proposes no immediate talks on a German peace
treaty and unification, where the Soviet Union has very
little maneuverability.
C. Instead it proposes talks on unspecified German questions
1. It will probably renew the plans for a, variety of
all-German committees, suggested at the Berlin con-
ference.
2. The current visit of East German deputy premier
U:Lbricht may lead to more extensive proposals.
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