PROBABLE POST-GENEVA COMMUNIST POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000300010010-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: August 4, 1954
• Content Type: BRIEF

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PROBADU POST-GENEVA CO
FOUND- The C*a tcome at
A t first glance, Coaunlsts at Geneva settled for less
than they could get, in view Viet ;Jinh military
successes,
I, By delay at conference, they might have seized all
Indochina.
By not meeting Mendes-France's dramatic bid for
ce, they might have caused critical internal
crisis in France.
At second glance, several very good reasons for Com-
munist settlement,,
Desirable to end 'hot'" war in order continue
undermining estern alliance.
2. Continuation of hot
US intervention.
NSA review completed
a tly increased risk
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"Humiliating' defeat in Indochina could alienate
non-Communist Asians whose assistance Communists
to block
ern plans .for. SEATO.
II. POST-GENEVA EXPE?T,ATI0*S - Short-Term probabilitie
A. Communists unlikely to make major new military moves
in near future.
In Europe, Moscow will capitalize on Geneva atmosphere
by pressing for further negotiations.
C. In Asia, the Chinese Communists will try to make
'e rmowa a major issue, also intensify e f '!or t s to undep-
mine "reactionary" regimes in Thailand, Japan.
Soviet negotiations will aim at" forestalling EDC and
German rearmament; blocking creation of US-backed Middle
East defense grouping or Southeast Asian alliance; major
aim - splitting chief Western allies.
2 J
l
u
y note, asking all-European
conference on ;...security'`, offered prospective settle-
ment in Germany and Austria as bait, also plugged for-
,
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At end Geneva conference, leading Pravda correspondent
predicted "We will all grow old covering conferences.
IV. Quickness of Moscow's call for European co
,ce brings
to mind Hungarian editorial: "neat task of world peace
camp is to thwart lam.
A. Kremlin vie
can exploit debate on alternatives for German rearma-
ment to sow discord among France, Germany, other
tern powers.
May follow "security" plan with further proposals
on Germany, emphasizing disarmament, neutraliza-
tion, but hinting at continued division under
"security" pact.
2.
not agree to free all-German elections,
or to acceptable formula for German unity.
Fundamental aim 'af Soviet security." plan: wreck NATO,
isolate US. Propaganda already asserts: Lesson of
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Geneva is succ when US on sidelines.
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Another weapon in Communist campaign to splinter Western
alliance will be East-West trade.
A. Although such trade will fall short of Soviet promises,
Western countries have recently relaxed many COCOM
controls, apparently welcome Kremlin's policy o
trade for trade's sake ? as proof Soviet reasonableness.
Soviet attempt use its trade position to secure
Finnish political committments is tactic applicable
elsewhere.
VI. In Far East, immediate Communist aims: increase Asian
neutralist sentiment; block Western-sponsored collective
defense, particularly establishment additional US bases.
A. At Genevva, Chinese Communist journalist said: ,.e have
won first campaign for neutralization all Southeast Asia.
,Communist propaganda stepping up Asia for Asians' theme.
. Peiping may propose own Asian security pact; threaten
prospective Asian members of SEATO with 'consequences
of joining.
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C. Unlikely Communists will make major new military moves
in Southeast Asia: would risk solidifying anti* omunis:
sentiment, weakening present neutralism.
VII. Nonetheless, C- .unists will continue, even increase,
pressures in Far East which are in global context of
splitting the Allies. Three areas for immediate exploita-
tion are Indochina, Thailand and Formosa.
A. In Indochina, Co munists will not violate armistice t E ,
but will use pare-military, political and psychological
means to gain domination of whole area.
1. Ho (22 July) stated people of north, central,
south Vietnam 'Nvill be liberated*." French believe
south Vietnam flooded with Viet Minh political
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agents, preparing way for "early" elections.
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. In Thailand, stepped-up psychological pressure, per-
haps subversion, is likely: aim - cause Thai govern-
ment shift from present pro--Western policy at least
to neutralism.
9a-premier Pridi, whose whereabouts obscure since
1947, attended Peiping banquet China Peace
Committee his honor 22 July.
2. Pridi warned That people they duty-bound" over-
throw American-controlled "reactionary puppet
government, restore nation's good name.
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Government spokesman termed his attack
step'' in campaign Communist conquest 'A"hailand.
C. In particular, Peiping will emphasize issue of rormosa;
promote f
iction betwee,
and others ofree
over support of Nationalists.
1. Senior Communist General Chu Te made bellicose
declaration (1 Aug) Taiwan will be liberated and
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"?other countries" not allowed to interfere.
Premier Chou, back from Geneva, echoes view.
2. Peiping smarting from TU E, other ship seizures
by Nationalists, destruction of planes at Hainan.
feel free to seize Nationalist-held islands
China coast, even bomb Formosa.
4. Major Nationalist islands (north to south) are
Tachen group (15,000 troops), ganchi (4 , S00
Matsu group (9,000) and Chinsen (47,400).
5. In last China, Communists have 350,000 troops
with 150,000 more due from {Kona,. nave
Divisions, (total at least 300 fighters,
100 bombers). Navy in area totals 35 landing-
ships, 40 torpedo boats, dozen small w
can take any of islands
would be costly).
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VIII, Elsewhere in Far last, immediate prospects for Communist
action are less dramatic.
A. Communists regard. Korean situation
for present:
1. Are probably content with indefinite continuation
stalemate.
For propaganda purposes, say urge resumption of talks,
mate "nee," reunification pro
increase their "wooing" of Japan.
try to exploit neutralist sentiment which
they
to increase.
2. Will rely primarily on economic inducements.
May possibly offer a favorable peace treaty,
despite territorial obstacles to this.
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