PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000300020005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 9, 2000
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 11, 1954
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO1443R000300020005-3
PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET
25X1X7
estimate of the new Soviet jet
heavy bomber's probable performance, as it
will be in 1957, now available. Table
shows both joint estimate and earlier
25X1 X71
estimate by USAF alone.
US Estimate
p imum Mission
Optimum Mission
Take off
weight
Bomb load
365,000 lbs.
10,000 lbs.
345,000 lbs.
10,000 lbs.
Combat
radius
3,000 nm.
2,600 nm.
Combat
range
5,900 nm.
5,100 nm.
Target
altitude
43,000 ft.
43,700 ft.
Maximum
targets
speed
rah, August 1954
25X1 D
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25X1 D
25X1 D
25X1 D
T("117 C~Tnr~ rrr
II. This performance estimate (with 10,000 lb.
bomb load, i.e. multi-megaton weapon)*
indicates that, in absence forward staging
(on Chukotsk) and range e*tension (in-
flight refueling or one-way missions.),
striking power is still gener-
ally oriented toward Europe, Asia, and
peripheral areas. Thus, full measure of
threat to US depends upon:
A. Soviet development of in-flight re-
fueling (capability not yet demon-
strated and requiring 18-24 months to
develop).
B. Soviet decision in 1957 to expend all
50 then estimated to be
operational on missions where only
half might be expected to reach targets.
* For other bomb-weight computations, see
"Background - Bomb Load Variations"
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 Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO1443R000300020005-3
III. New performance estimate, therefore, leaves
mid-1957 picture unchanged. Conventional
TU-4 would still figure prominently;
medium jet would be powerful
element of strength against Eurasian and
peripheral targets; would just be
reaching significant quantities.
A. In view Soviet nuclear capabilities,
picture is serious, formidable.
B. But picture not particularly alarming
as regards continental US.
C. With subsequent combination of
series production, forward staging
bases in operational condition, and
development of effective in-flight
refueling, however, Soviet air threat
to US increases sharply - becomes
very grave by 1958-59.
25X1 D
25X1 D
25X1 D
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 Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO1443R000300020005-3
T'/1 T1 C'rr ~r1 r ?r
NSC BRIEFING 11 August 1954
1. By decreasing the bomb load from
10 to 3 thousand lbs. and putting the
7 thousand lb. saving into fuel, the combat
radius/range is slightly extended.
II. However, a 3,000 lb. nuclear weapon would
be only marginally acceptable as a
strategic weapon.
A. If economically constructed, a
3,000 lb. weapon could yield some
20KT--equal to the Nagasaki bomb.
B. If extravagant and inefficient use of
nuclear material permitted, this yield
could be boosted.
III. Uneconomical use of nuclear material in
1957 appears improbable, since the Soviet
stockpile at that date will still be
relatively modest.
25X1 D
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NSC BRIEFING
11 August 1954
COMPARISON:
TYPE 39 AND
US B-52 "BASIC MISSION"*
25X1A9a
25X1 D
Take off
weight
Bomb
load
365,000 lbs.
10,000 lbs.
390,000 lbs.
10,000 lbs.
Combat
radius
2,575 nm.
3,160 nm.
Combat
range
5,050 nm.
6, 560 nm.
Target
altitude 40,000 ft. 46,700 ft.
Maximum
target
speed 490 kts.
480 kts.
* "Basic Mission" contrasts with "Optimum
Mission" in that all conditions assumed for
an "Optimum Mission" are aimed at maximum
possible fuel-load and therefore absolute
maximum radius/range.
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000300020005-3