THE CHINESE OFFSHORE ISLANDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000300040003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 1998
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 8, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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COPY NO22
DATE 8 Sept 54
CIA No. 50318
THE CHINESE
OFFSHORE ISLANDS
III
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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THE CHINESE OFFSHORE ISLANDS
I. CHINESE NATIONALIST SITUATION IN THE QUEMOYS
A. Nationalist Strength . . . . . . . . . . 3
B. Nationalist Reinforcement Capabilities. . 4
C. Nationalist Troop Dispositions. . . . . . 5
D. Nationalist Air, Naval and Logistic Support 6
E. Nationalist Morale on the Quemoys . . . . 7
F. Possible Landing Areas . . . . . . . . . 8
G. Hydrographic Details of Quemoy-Amoy Waters 9
H. Lines of Communication . . . . . . . . . 10
I. American Personnel on the Quemoys . . . . 11
II. CHINESE COMMUNIST SITUATION IN THE QUEMOYS
A. Communist Strength in the Area . . . . . 12
1. Ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2. Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3. Naval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
B. Communist Capabilities for Reinforcement. 14
C. Disposition of Communist Troops and
Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
D. Communist Amphibious Lift Capability. . . 15
III. CURRENT CLASHES IN QUEMOY AREA . . . . . . . . 17
A. July and August . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
B. The 3 September Bombardment . . . . . . . 17
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C. American and Nationalist Reaction . . . 18
D. Results of Nationalist Raids . . . . . . 18
E. Current Communist Activity . . . . . . . 19
F. Background Information on Amoy . . . . . 19
IV. OTHER OFFSHORE ISLANDS . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A. Tachen Islands . . . . . . . . . . . 20
B. Matsu Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
V. INDICATIONS OF COMMUNIST INTENTIONS . . . . . . 25
VI. APPENDIX: FORMOSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
A. Chinese Nationalist Capabilities. . . . . 27
B. Chinese Communist Capabilities . . . . . 29
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I. CHINESE NATIONALIST SITUATION IN THE QUEMOYS
A. Nationalist Strength
Chinese Nationalist strength on the Quemoys is
spread over four islands--Quemoy, Little Quemoy, Ta-tan
and Erh-tan. Total Nationalist troop strength is
approximately 42,100, including service troops and head-
quarters personnel. In addition, there are about 6,000
lightly-armed guerrillas. The civilian populace numbers
perhaps 6,000.
1. On Quemoy itself, there are an estimated 34,000
regular troops, plus guerrillas, all subordinate to the
VIII Corps, which includes the 33rd, 34th, 68th and 69th
infantry divisions. The 69th division is minus the 205th
regimental combat team which has been detached for garrison
duty on the Matsus, another island group about 200 miles
farther north. These divisions are all American-trained
and MDAP-equipped and are rated as good divisions by
the MAAG, although all are about 15 percent understrength.
These units have three battalions of 75mm pack howitzers
as organic artillery. In addition to the MAAG-trained
units there is one division remaining from the old Quemoy
garrison; this is the 45th division of the 19th Army
and contains only about 6,600 men. It has not been trained
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by MAAG, does not have MDAP equipment, and is not highly
regarded.
Additional units on Quemoy under Corps control include
the following:
Artillery
5 155mm guns (GPF)
3 Bns 105mm howitzers (36 pieces)
4 companies of 4,2 mortars (6 mortars per
company)
Armor
There are reported to be approximately 50 light
tanks on Quemoy of which 22 are being held in
reserve near the final defense perimeter, which
is being established around the high ground
at the eastern end of the island.
2. Little Quemoy is held by the 34th division
(less one regiment) which has a total of 4,500 men. The
division has its organic artillery (one battalion of
75mm pack howitzers) and 20 light tanks.
3. Ta-tan and Erh-tan are held by a battalion of
regular troops totalling about 700 men.
B. Nationalist Reinforcement Capabilities
The Nationalists have alerted 11,000 men for possible
reinforcement of the Quemoy garrison. These reinforcements
include 4,000 men from a marine brigade which can be
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lifted from Tsoying on Formosa by Nationalist naval land-
ing ships and 7,000 men from the 1st infantry division
which has been ordered to prepare for lift from Kaohsiung
by commercial type vessels. There is a 9 September report
that the 19th infantry division and a battalion of artillery
are now aboard ship for transport to Quemoy.
C. Nationalist Troop Dispositions
The Quemoy commander has divided the island into six
defense areas and an observer on the island reports the
troops soundly deployed within the limits imposed by the
terrain. The 68th division holds the northwest area; the
69th division has the central plain; the northeast area
is the responsibility of the 33rd division; the south-
west sector is held by the 134th regiment plus remnants
of the old garrison still remaining on the island; the
45th division garrisons the southeast sector. The 34th
division provides the garrison on Little Quemoy and the
two smaller islands.
The bulk of Nationalist artillery and three of the
four mortar companies are emplaced on the western end
of Quemoy where Nationalist guns can lay down supporting
fires for the defense of Little Quemoy and where their
155mm guns can reach the Amoy area.
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The Nationalists are reported to be setting up a final
defense perimeter around the base of T'ai Wu mountain on
the eastern end of Quemoy. Guerrilla troops are reported
moving into this area and digging new fortifications.
A reserve battalion of light tanks is being held near the
defense perimeter.
I
D. Nationalist Air, Naval, and Logistical Support
The Nationalists are capable of supporting the Quemoy
garrison by approximately 175 air sorties per day. This
figure includes 117 sorties by F-47 fighters, 45 sorties
by F-84 fighters, and 13 bomber sorties. The Nationalists
reportedly flew F-84 sorties on 8 September. The maximum
Nationalist air effort to date has been a raid on
Communist shore installations in which about 75 sorties
were flown against heavy Communist antiaircraft fire.
Naval support for Quemoy garrison can be given by
2 destroyers, 3 destroyer-escorts, 2 patrol gunboats,
2 smaller patrol vessels, and about 10 armored junks.
The DD's carry five-inch guns and the smaller patrol
vessels are armed with three-inch guns. They could be
used for neutralization of Communist shore batteries on
the southeast coast of Amoy, and the Nationalists are
counting on naval forces to prevent successful Communist
landings on the southern beaches of Quemoy.
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Approximately 15 days' supply are estimated to be
on Quemoy at the present time, assuming a limited
offensive or defensive combat situation. About 45 days'
additional supply are estimated to be available on
Formosa for transport to Quemoy. Resupply of the Quemoy
garrison would probably be carried out over the southern
beaches by LST.
E. Nationalist Morale on the Quemoys
An American naval officer who was on Quemoy just be-
fore the Communist bombardment began on 3 September re-
ported that both civilians and troops on the island
were "jittery." Later reports, however, indicate that
the troops steadied subsequent to the Communist artillery
attack and morale is now said to be "not low," although
it could be improved. Nationalist counter-battery fire
on Communist gun positions and Nationalist air strikes
against Communist targets lifted the spirits of the
garrison. As of 7 September the troops were reported
by their commander to be "ready to fight, and hoping
the Communists would attack." Life in Quemoy town was
said to be rapidly returning to normal with civilians
moving about freely and children playing outside. In
Taipei, Chiang Kai-shek told Ambassador Rankin that he
believed an announcement of US intent to defend the
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offshore islands would have an "instantaneous effect
for good all through the Far East" and urged that, if
the US decided not to intervene, the decision not be
released.
F. Possible Landing Areas
1. Quemoy
It is believed in Formosa that the east coast
is the most likely area for landing. The south beach
is under the protection of Chinese Nationalist naval units.
Ground defense of the south beach is light, as reliance is
placed on the navy. The Chinese Nationalist navy could
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prevent amphibious landings on the east coast if it stayed
and fought, sources on Formosa believe. US ships could
be used to best advantage in this area.
2. Little Quemoy
3. Other islands (Ta-tan)
Only one minor beach, a rocky isthmus connecting
25X6A two rocky islets.
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25X6A
H. Lines of Communication
The Liaolo airstrip on the southeast corner of Quemoy
is out of effective range of Chinese Communist artillery.
It is clay, in good condition, 3,280 feet long, 100 feet
wide. The field is capable of taking C-46, C-47, PBY,
AT-6 operationally in dry weather. F-47 or even B-26
bombers could use the strip only for emergency landing.
The island's roads and trails are adequate for internal
movement. The port area of Quemoy town is suitable for
only light craft. The principal anchorage for ships
supplying Quemoy is west of the town on the west side
of the island. The island can be safely supplied by
ships standing off the southern beach.
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1. American Personnel on the Quemoys
2. Americans from MAAG on Quemoy now number five--
three officers and two enlisted men. Three additional
officers and two enlisted men will be sent to Quemoy on
10 September. Plans for their evaucation are not known.
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II. CHINESE COMMUNIST SITUATION IN THE QUEMOYS
A. Communist Strength in the Area
1. Ground: It is estimated that 150,000 Commu-
nist troops would be required to capture the Quemoys
from the Nationalists. In the immediate vicinity, at
Amoy, the Chinese Communists have at least one army
and elements of a water transport division. Chinese
Nationalist sources have reported the presence in this
area of an additional army. Within 150 miles of Amoy
there are: a) another army at Swatow; b) an army at
Foochow to the north; and c) the remainder of the
water transport division. Thus the number of troops
within 150 miles of the Quemoys and available almost
immediately for an attack is at least 160,000, and
possibly as many as 200,000. The combat capability
of all these troops is considered good, and one of the
armies reported in the area had considerable combat
experience in Korea.
2. Air: Two Communist jet figher divisions are
presently known to be within combat radius of Quemoy,
but these units, located at Canton and Nanchang, are
not close enough to provide effective fighter cover
for operations in the Quemoy area. Light piston
bombers, now based at Shanghai, Changsha, and Canton,
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are in range to launch air strikes against Quemoy or
other Nationalist bases. There are at least four air-
fields--Chuhsien, Chienou, Nantai and Kaochi--between
Shanghai and Amoy which lie closer to Quemoy and which
might be used by jet fighters or bombers. The absence
of effective communications leading to Chienou, Nantai
and Kaochi would make logistical support of these fields
extremely difficult, however.
3. Naval: Chinese Communist naval strength in the
Amoy area is negligible, consisting of about six minor
patrol boats, 15-20 motor junks, and 400-500 junks of
all types normally used for fishing and light coastal
transport. This represents normal naval strength in
the area. As yet, no naval strength has been brought
in from other areas, but frigates, gunboats, and LST's
could be deployed from the Shanghai area within 48-72
hours. There are questionable current reports of the
sighting of 11 Communist "landing craft" (about the
size of LSM's) east of Haitantou Island about 120 miles
northeast of Quemoy, and of the sighting of a Communist
"light cruiser" steaming southeast about 60 miles
northeast of Quemoy.
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B. Communist Capabilities for Reinforcement
1. Chinese Communist capabilities for reinforcing
the Amoy area are poor; it is assumed that, if an attack
is planned, they have most of their needed shells and
supplies already on hand. The area is not served by
Chinese Communist merchant shipping, except for limited
movement of launches and small junks. It is 500 miles
from the Hangchow-Nanchang railway and 500 miles from
Canton, the two nearest supply sources, over poor and
low-capacity roads. Taking all road conditions into
account (mountainous terrain, recent heavy rains, 10-
to-20-foot width, fair weather condition, ferries,
length, etc,), it is believed that capacity for truck-
lift into Amoy is under 1,000 tons a day, and probably
considerably under. This means that armies and important
munitions can be moved in, but that it would be difficult
or impossible to activate at the same time a jet fighter
division with its high daily fuel consumption (100 tons
or more).
Chinese Communist capabilities for supplying
forces on Amoy island have just been considerably im-
proved by the temporary completion (with pontoons) of
a bridge running north from the northern tip of Amoy
Island to the mainland, a bridge which has been under
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construction since December 1953. Heretofore all traffic
with the mainland has been ferried? This bridge, how-
ever, would be vulnerable to Nationalist air interdiction.
C. Disposition of Communist Troops and Weapons
Chinese Nationalist sources report that fourteen
120 and 155mm Communist guns have been active from Tateng
and Amoy Islands, and claim to have destroyed five of
these in air attacks since 6 September. Of the Communist
troops in the area, one army, the 31st, is believed to
be located at Amoy, 15 miles west of Quemoy; the Chinese
Nationalists report two Communist divisions north of
Quemoy; the Nationalists also state that the 41st Army
has moved from Swatow, over 100 miles southwest of
Quemoy, to Changpu., 30 miles southwest of Quemoy; one
regiment of the water transport division is believed
located at Lienho? on the coast ten miles north of Quemoy,
D. Amphibious Lift Capability
The Chinese Communists could provide immediate water
lift in an attack against Quemoy for at least 30,000
troops and could reinforce these quickly with greater
numbers, drawing upon the 400-500 junks and small craft
in the area. ((Typical junk sightings by Nationalist
sources in the Amoy area since 3 September have been
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as follows: 30 wooden boats anchored in vicinity of
Hsiangchichiao (Navy CTF 74); 110 wooden boats anchored
in the vicinity of Yungning, 30 wooden boats near Wuyu,
over 100 wooden boats in the vicinity of Shinhu (Navy
CTF 72); about 300 junks of all types concentrated in
area from Chenhai to Shuitou ONI reports
that there are normally about 500 junks in the area,
and that most of these belong to the civilian populace.))
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III. CURRENT CLASHES IN THE QUEMOY AREA
A. July and August
Following Communist propaganda threats in July and
early August, in mid-August there were unconfirmed re-
ports of troop movements into the Amoy area opposite
the Quemoys. At least one army, with a strength of
50,000, was said to be involved. At the same time, the
Communists stepped up reconnaissance raids at night,
apparently to test the Quemoy garrison and collect in-
telligence by taking prisoners.
B. The 3 September Bombardment
On 3 September Communist artillery, located near
Amoy and on the Tateng Islands, shelled the northern and
western sides of Big Quemoy, saturated Little Quemoy, and
hit at Nationalist naval vessels at anchor along the west
coast of Big Quemoy and between the Quemoys and Tatan
Island. Six thousand rounds of 120mm and 155mm artillery
were poured in during a five-hour barrage. The shelling
was unexpectedly accurate and later reports say that the
Communists pinpointing was due to Communist agents on
Quemoy who directed the Communist shelling. Two Amer-
icans of the US Military Assistance Advisory Group
were killed in the shelling;. Nationalist personnel losses
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have not been revealed. Several small Nationalist naval
vessels were damaged; at least one was sunk.
C. American and Nationalist Reaction
Reaction was quick. By the morning of 5 September,
three carriers, a cruiser and three destroyer divisions
of the Seventh Fleet were standing by, patrolling the
waters in the Formosa Straits at a distance of several
miles from Quemoy; and Nationalist naval and air forces
began to strike at targets on the mainland coast in an
effort to knock out enemy artillery and disrupt any
Communist attempt to assemble an invasion force.
D. Results of Nationalist Raids
The Nationalists report that a 76-plane air strike
on 7 September destroyed 5 of 14 Communist artillery
positions, and that only three Nationalist planes were
damaged. The Taipei press has made large claims, prob-
ably exaggerated, of great fires at storage points,
hundreds of junks sunk, and blows at Communist troop
concentrations. Peiping Radio admits that at least 60
persons in the vicinity of Amoy have been killed by
Nationalist bombing. Mainland artillery is said to have
shot down at least six Nationalist planes and damaged
about 25 others. Peiping on 8 September declared that
"anger is aroused" among the Fukien populace.
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E. Current Communist Activity
The Communists have continued to fire at Nation-
alist positions on the Quemoys, but only sporadically
since 3 September. There have been no confirmed reports
of Communist air activity in the area, and Communist
naval and ground force activity in the area is not un-
usual. Chinese Communist radars along the East China
coast continue to be active on a 24-hour basis tracking
American and Nationalist air patrols.
F. Background Information on Amoy
Amoy is a city of 200,000 located on an island off
the Fukien coast. It has no important industries, but
it has long been an important trading center for agricul-
ture, fish and handicraft products.
Amoy is 500 miles from the nearest railroad, and
road connections with inland points are poor. The city's
airfield is not in use. If it were not for British
shipping, Amoy would be isolated by sea as well; the
Chinese Communist merchant marine has not ventured to
serve any Fukien port due to fear of Nationalist naval
forces. The Inner and Outer Harbors of Amoy--deep, large
and well-sheltered--would make it an excellent naval base.
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IV. OTHER OFFSHORE ISLANDS
A. Tachen islands
1. Chinese Nationalist strength on the Tachens is
believed to be 15,000 troops. Of these, 10,000 represent
one of Taipei's best divisions, the 46th, and the re-
maining 5,000 are guerrillas used in occasional raids
on the Chinese mainland. The Tachen-based forces are
positioned at strategic locations on the islands, and
their combat status is considered excellent; they are,
however, vulnerable to Communist air attack and seaborne
invasion at night.
Nationalist naval forces in the Tachen area
normally include one destroyer escort and about ten
small patrol craft. These are vulnerable to Communist
air attack. Air support for the Tachens is provided by
Formosa-based F-47 conventional fighters, far from a
match for Communist jets.
The Nationalist Ministry of Defense has pledged
all-out efforts to provide land, sea and air forces to
protect the Tachens in the event of invasion. The
Nationalists' ability to reinforce, however, would de-
pend on whether Communist military activities were under
way against other islands under Nationalist control.
Significant numbers of ground forces could not be
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transported without the help of American naval forces
in the area. Air forces would have to continue to
operate from their bases on Formosa; naval support
could be drawn from the two destroyers now at Quemoy
and two destroyer escorts and about 100 patrol craft
now in Formosan waters.
The Tachens are valuable to the Nationalists
as listening posts, for advance warning in the event of
air and sea attacks on Formosa, and as bases for opera-
tions against the mainland.
2. The 450,000 Chinese Communist troops in the
East China area provide sufficient force to take any
of the Nationalist-held offshore islands. At least
three armies are deployed within 150 miles of the Tachens,
any one of which is considered sufficient to take the
Tachens with co-ordinated naval and air support. The
Tachens are particularly vulnerable to air attacks by
the large numbers of aircraft of all types located in
the Shanghai area.
3. In mid-May, the Communists occupied six unde-
fended islands within 20 miles of the Tachens. Beginning
at about that time, clashes between Nationalist and
Communist naval and air forces became frequent, and
reports of concentrations of troop-carrying vessels in
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mainland ports opposite the Tachens suggested that a
Communist invasion was planned. The appearance of the
US Seventh Fleet in the Tachen area in early June and
again in August has served to quiet Communist military
activity there, however, and recent action in the
Tachens has been confined to infrequent air clashes.
Reports in mid-August indicated that a division of
Communist troops may have moved into Sungmen, a coastal
port directly west of the Tachens, so the Communist
threat there continues.
4. The mainland area opposite the Tachens would
seem logistically a good point from which to stage an
attack. It is only about 150 miles from the rail hub
at Hangchow, and is serviced by the Communist merchant
marine. An invasion could be supported by air cover
from the Ningpo airfield, as well as air bases at
Shanghai and Hangchow.
B. Matsu Islands (including White Dog islands)
1. Chinese Nationalist strength in the Matsu
group is believed to be only 9,000 regulars and guer-
rillas. The Nationalists have capabilities for re-
inforcement similar to those noted above for the
Tachens.
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The Matsus, like the Tachens, are of value to
the Nationalists as listening posts, advance warning
points in event of air and sea attacks on Formosa, and
as bases for operations against the mainland.
2. Chinese Communist strength in East China is
easily sufficient to overwhelm the Nationalist garrison
on the Matsus as well as other island bases. While not
so vulnerable to Communist air action as the Tachens, the
Matsus could probably be taken by a Communist division
(17,000 troops). The Communists could muster such a
force for an invasion of the Matsus with virtually no
warning. Communist capture of these islands would be
of far less value than either Quemoy or the Tachens, but
possession of these bases would permit Communist harass-
ment of Nationalist attempts to keep the Tachens supplied.
3. No clashes between Communist and Nationalist
forces in the Matsu area have been reported this year,
but an increase in the number of Communist junks and
patrol vessels near the Matsus led American observers
on Formosa to expect a Communist attack on the islands
last July. Communist activity near the Matsus since then,
however, has suggested no plan for an invasion.
4. Like the Amoy area, the Foochow-Matsu area is
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isolated from Chinese Communist supply centers, of
which the nearest are Canton and Hangchow. It is not
serviced by the regular Chinese Communist merchant
marine and is 400 miles from the nearest railroad over
poor, mountainous roads. Supply capability at this
time, in view of recent rains, is certainly less than
1,000 tons a day and probably less than 500 tons a
day. Due to supply difficulties the Communists could
not count on effective jet operations at or staged through
Nantai Airfield at Foochow.
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O. INDICATIONS OF COMMUNIST INTENTIONS
Peiping Radio began in early July to threaten to
"liberate" the offshore islands as well as Formosa.
Moreover, the Communists were believed to have the
capability of taking any of these islands against
Nationalist opposition alone. It was therefore thought
likely, prior to the Communist bombardment of the Quemoys
on 3 September, that the Communists would soon undertake
probing actions designed to test US intentions as regards
defense of the offshore islands. The Communists' timing
may have been influenced by a desire to affect the Manila
conference, but an early test of US intentions seemed to
be coming in any event.
The Communists certainly observed the movement of
strong American naval and air forces into Formosan waters
on 5 September. Continuing Communist uncertainty as to
US intentions has been suggested by Peiping's failure even
to mention the US action, in contrast to the immediate and
extensive publicity given the US naval visit to the
Tachen islands last month.
The Communists have chosen to proceed cautiously.
They have taken no action against US forces and have not
indicated that they are readying their forces for an
attempted invasion of the Quemoys at this time.
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While the Communists' estimate of their prospects
against strong US forces is uncertain, it is believed
that the Communists would judge that an attempted in-
vasion would be at least as likely to fail as to succeed.
They surely realize that failure of an attempted invasion
would mean such greater loss of face than would postpone-
ment of the Quemoy operation.
Continued Nationalist raids on the Amoy area, how-
ever, increasingly entails a loss of face for the
Communists. Such Nationalist action thus appears likely
to increase the prospect for Communist retaliation against
the Quemoys and for a Communist venture against the
Tachen or the Matsu islands. An additional possibility
is that of Communist air raids against Formosa.
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APPENDIX
FORMOSA
A. Chinese Nationalist Capabilities
1. Total Nationalist ground force strength is
approximately 422,000 men. Of these, about 345,000 are
combat forces, the rest being supply and service troops.
A sizable proportion of the troops assigned to combat
units are considered unfit for combat, and effective
troops are now estimated to number about 285,000.
Nationalist ground force strength on Formosa is
about 354,000 men, currently being reorganized into two
field armies which will divide responsibility for defense
of the island on either side of an east-west line dividing
the island into northern and southern sectors.
The Nationalist navy has 56 major vessels in-
cluding 3 destroyers, 6 destroyer escorts, 38 patrol
craft and 9 minelayers. In addition there are 35
amphibious vessels and 18 auxiliaries plus about 100
minor units. These vessels are manned by approximately
28,000 officers and men. Also included in the naval
forces are two marine brigades totalling about 15,000
men.
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Except for the performance of the DE squadrons
and the new DD's, the Nationalist navy has been disappoint-
ing to American advisers in MAAG. Although the National-
ists have recently shown greater combat aggressiveness
in small unit engagements with the Communists they are
still judged incapable of joint operations with American
fleet units.
The Nationalist air force now has about 850 air-
craft, of which approximately 415 are combat types. In
the combat units are included 81 jets (75 F-84G and 6
RT-33) but most of their planes are obsolete World War
II types. Their communications and early warning
equipment are also inadequate. Although the Nationalist
air force has the capability for daylight air defense of
Formosa and for tactical bombing missions its capacity
for night interception and strategical bombing is nil.
There are 22 operational air fields on Formosa
of which 10 have permanent concrete runways. The re-
mainder have natural surface runways. Fields with
concrete runways are at Chia-yi, Hsin-chu, Ping-tung
north and Ping-tung south, Sung Shan, Taichung, Tainan,
Tao-yuan and Yilien.
2. Although reorganization is expected to improve
the defensive capability of the Nationalist armed forces,
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they are still believed unable to defend Formosa for more
than a week in the absence of active United States support.
The main reason for this weakness is the inadequate
organization for logistical support of combat units.
3. Morale on Formosa is good at the present time,
thanks to faith that American support will be forthcoming
in the event of Communist attacks on any Nationalist base.
The native Formosans, though they are not
enthusiastic about the Nationalist government and would
be pleased to see the mainlanders return to the mainland,
are not disaffected. They are expected to fight in defense
of the island if necessary. In the absence of continued
strong American support, however, Communist efforts to
subvert the native Formosans might be successful.
B. Chinese Communist Capabilities
1. Total Communist ground force strength includes
an estimated 2,250,000 troops in 153 infantry divisions,
47 independent combat regiments and 35 battalions. The
largest concentration of these troops is in Korea, where
there are over 700,000. Next in size are the forces in
East China, from the Shantung Peninsula to Fukien Province,
where there are an estimated 460,000 troops. It is these
troops in the East China area which directly menace all
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Nationalist-held islands as well as Formosa. Forces now
in the area can be augmented quickly by troops from other
areas. Additional ground strength is available from
1,000,000 military and quasimilitary public security
troops, of which there are at least 50,000 in East China.
These security forces can be counted on to preserve in-
ternal security during military operations and to
participate in coastal defense operations in support of
any campaign.
2. Communist air strength in tactical units is
about 1,500 aircraft, including 700 MIG jet fighters
and about 150 IL-28 jet bombers. Primary concentrations
of jet fighters are in the Shanghai area of East China,
where there are about 225, and in Manchuria near the
Yalu River where there are approximately 200. With the
exception of about 20 jet bombers assigned to a naval
air unit at Tsingtao, all other IL-28's are based at
Peiping in North China or in Manchuria. Ten TU-4
long-range bombers are based at Peiping. Conventional
TU-2 light bombers number about 200 and are based in
virtually all areas of China. Almost all MIG-15 units
were combat-trained in Korea; none of the bomber forces
have been similarly experienced.
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3. Communist naval strength is negligible. It con-
sists of one inoperational light cruiser which defected
from the Nationalists in 1949; nine frigates (similar to
the destroyer escort); four large gun boats; three smaller
gun boats; about 50 motor torpedo boats; approximately 50
American-type landing craft; and 300 miscellaneous service
vessels. In the past year, the Soviets have apparently
made available to the Chinese Communists at least three
submarines--a small coastal type and two long-range subs--
which constitute a serious threat to the Nationalist
navy, considered vulnerable to submerged attack. The
capability of the Chinese Communist navy to make use
of these submarines at this time is uncertain, however.
Primary naval bases are at Dairen, Tsingtao, Shanghai
and Canton. Strength at other coastal ports is virtually
non-existent.
4. It is. estimated that eight Chinese Communist
armies (about 400,000 troops) would be used for an
assault on Formosa. The extremely limited Communist
capability to provide sea lift of these troops would per-
mit, according to estimates, only two of these armies
to be transported to Formosa for the initial assault.
An additional three armies could follow within 30 days.
About 2,500 airborne troops could be dropped on the
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island. With their relatively large numbers of jet air-
craft, the Communists could soon establish air superiority
over the Nationalist air force, and bombers would be free
to soften Nationalist defenses in support of ground troops.
Without direct American military support, it is estimated
that Formosa would fall in a very short time.
5. Light bombers based at Shanghai, Canton and
Changsha are within striking distance of Formosa; all
of these are TU-2 types similar to the American B-25.
There are about 75 in the Shanghai area, 60 at Changsha,
and about 15 at Canton. Ten TU-4 medium bombers,
similar to the B-29, are based at Peiping within range
of Formosa. It is doubtful that these bombers would be
used against Formosa unless jet fighters were available
to fly cover against Nationalist aircraft during bombing
missions. At present, the nearest jet fighter units are
at Canton, Ningpo and Nanchang. All are now out of
range of Formosa, and would have to be moved to bases
closer in. At least four fields along the coast between
Shanghai and Canton could be readied in two to four weeks
to be used as bases for these aircraft, although continued
supply of these fields in the absence of effective
communications in this area would be difficult.
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Improvement of radar coverage along the coast opposite
Formosa would be expected prior to initiation of air
attacks on Formosa, and modern ground-control and
navigational equipment would first have to be installed
at the advanced airfields.
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10"Ittmm-?~
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