SITUATION IN SOUTH KOREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000300070011-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: October 4, 1954
• Content Type: BRIEF

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NSC BRIEFING 4 October 1954
SITUATION IN SOUTH KOREA
I. The ,present period in South Korea, which Ambassador
Briggs terms "disquieting and dangerous," is a highly
critical one in US-South Korean relations.
II. Rhee has not yet agreed to sign the draft minute of
understanding which calls for South Korea's co-operation
in return for the proposed American aid program.
A. He apparently intends to bargain hard over the
minute. His tactics were suggested in a recent
statement that action on the minute must await
settlement of South Korea's differences with
Japan--something he has no intention of doing.
III. He has ignored strong US representations to cease his
public attacks on American policies and officials.
A. Since returning from his Washington visit, he
has charged American officials with being "pro-
Japanese."
B. He misrepresents the troop withdrawals as
"abandonment".
C. He describes American economic and military aid
as inadequate and improperly administered. (These
statements being used by Pyongyang radio).
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D. He belittles the Manila Pact.
E. This campaign is a standard Rhee tactic to
pressure the US into accepting his views.
IV. On 1 October, hexreitne
he supply of local currency
to the UN Command, in an effort to force the US to
accept his unrealistic 190-1 exchange rate.
V. He is also threatening action in the international
field which could be embarrassing to the US.
A. He said on 1 October, through his information
office, that the "Communist spies" (Czech, Polish
members of NNSC teams) must be expelled forthwith.
25X1X4
Rhee said to . Korean
official that NNSC members "would be picked up."
B. He is continuing his public vilification of Japan,
HAS put armed troops on disputed Liancourt Rocks,
'S
andAcontinuing to seize Japanese fishing vessels.
Rejected Jap offer to submit Liancourt dispute
MA1
C. He submit a dissent to the UN on
(AoRrmewlArGPJ
eTH,nation report concerning the Korean ,political
A7' cSEK/Et/k ,
conference thus breaking the united front and
giving the Communists a good propaganda issue.
VI. For the past two months the South Korean army general
staff, presumably on Rhee's orders, has been planning, on
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a contingency basis, an attack designed to embroil the
UN in renewed hostilities.
A. One plan envisages a small-scale attack by a
volunteer force and assumes that UN intervention
could be attained by asserting South Korea had been
invaded. 25X1X4
B. No date appears to have been set,
25X1X4 considerable uncertainty among
Rhee's military officials over the feasibility of
the plans.
d
VII. Rhee appears depressed a uncertain about which way to
turn. He told Ambassador Briggs on 27 September that the
time had come for South Korea to "decide its own course,"
but added no decision had yet been made. Later he
said South Korea Was in "great peril" and that unification
under the Communists was, perhaps, better than no unifica-
tion at all.
VIII. It remains possible that these threatening developments
are designed primarily for psychological pressure on the
US government, to gain the objectives Rhee was unable
to attain by direct diplomacy.
A. However, Rhee is resentful and emotionally disturbed
over the failure of his Washington visit to change
American policies, and angry over the troop with-
drawals.
B. His present agitated mood could result in dangerous
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and irrational conduct.
WTVT_