NSC BRIEFING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000400030003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 19, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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1. Dutch cabinet resignation solely on
domestic issue:
A. Catholic-Labor coalition resigned
following defeat of controversial
rent increase bill.
B. Bill (sponsored by Catholics, approved
by cabinet but opposed by Labor Party
members of Parliament) provides for
average 10% increase in rents on part
of Dutch rental housing built pre-war.
1. Labor opposed on grounds possible
opening wedge to general hike of
government-controlled rents.
II. Some attempt may be made to reshuffle
cabinet posts or form new coalition.
A. However, friction among coalition
partners has been on increase during
past year.
B. Thus, new elections may be called.
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C. Queen has power to dissolve either
or both chambers, with elections
following in 40 days.
D. Cabinet (which includes Catholic
People's and Labor Parties, Christian
Historical Union and Anti-Revolutionary
Party) would continue as a caretaker
until elections.
III. New elections would be unlikely to affect
present Dutch political alignment:
A. Catholic and Labor parties (chief
coalition members), nearly equal in
parliamentary strength.
B. Voting is by proportional representa-
tion and preferences of Dutch elector-
ate basically constant.
IV. If elections held, formation of new
government might be long-drawn-out
procedure (as was case following '52
general elections):
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A. Premier Drees, a good compromiser
and respected by all parties, may
wish to retire from active political
life.
B. Election campaign likely to raise
sore issue of religion in politics,
thus make post-election cooperation
between two major parties more
difficult.
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BACKGROUND--DUTCH POLITICAL PARTIES
Party
Seats in
Seats in
% Popular
Second
First
Vote**
am er
am er
Catholic
People's*
30
17
28.67
La.bor*
30
14
28.97
:Anti-
Revolutionary*
12
7
11.31
Christian His-
torical Union*
9
6
8.92
Freedom and
Democracy
9
4
8.83
Communist
6
2
6.16
Catholic
National
2
-
2.71
Political
Reformed
2
-
2.42
* Parties in Cabinet
** Based on June 1952 elections for Second Chamber
NOTE: Remaining 2.01 of popular Vote is split
between five splinter parties, none of
hi h won enough votes to elect a deputy.
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SATELLITE REACTION TO
SIGNATURE OF AUSTRIAN TREATY
I. Western observers report--speculation rife
in Hungary and Rumania about possibility
of Soviet troop withdrawal from these
Satellites as a result of Austrian treaty.
A. There have been some rumors that
Soviet troops would be withdrawn;
others that additional troops would
be brought in from Austria.
B. Even before treaty signed, Tito had
conjectured that Soviet troops would
be withdrawn from line of communica-
tions with Austria. (i.e., Hungary,
Rumania).
C. In both countries fears have been
expressed that Warsaw Conference
agreement will require the retention
of Soviet troops under a new pretext.
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II. Satellite propaganda has interpreted
signature of treaty as a. victory for
Soviet diplomacy.
A. A Hungarian editorial claimed, for
example, that during the past ten
years USSR made consistent efforts
to restore Austria's independence,
but the Western powers rejected every
proposition.
B. Budapest editorial (16 May): "Western
powers ...will soon have to evacuate
their carefully established Alpine
fortress."
C. All Satellite media (particularly
East German) have emphasized the
line that the Austrian treaty is a
model for Germany in achieving unity
and independence.
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"FIRST ITEAM" TO VISIT BELGRADE
I. Moscow has made a remarkable gesture--to
show the world how far it is willing to
go in "normalizing" relations and permitting
independence and neutrality on the part of
small nations in Europe--by announcing
(13 May) that a top-level Soviet delega-
tion (including Khrushchev, Gulganin and
Mikoyan) will make a pilgrimage late this
month to the formerly much-vilified Com-
munist apostate, Tito.
A. Leaders of this team of travelling
Soviet good-will salesmen are the
same as those who paid the state
visit to Peiping last October.
B Tacit Soviet willingness to make public
apology to the Yugos by coming to Bel-
grade will have strong impact on world
opinion as evidence of a basic change
of heart in the USSR. Tito has hailed
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C, Molotov's conspicuous absence from
pilgrims' ranks is added measure of
intensity USSR's desire insure suc-
cess of the visit.
Molotov is last of "148 team" that
kicked Yugos out of Cominform. Says
Yugo foreign minister Popovie: his
omission "perhaps has a certain sig-
nificance."
II. Yugos had kept plans for Soviet visit a
close secret.
A. I initiative
came from USSR during course of trade
talks in Moscow (Dec '54).
B. However, no hint of subsequent negotia-
tions given Western diplomats in
Belgrade.
III. Yugos reported "not too happy" over role
of Khrushchev-(party boss) as leader of
delegation.
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A. His role deemed indication that Soviets
will plug for reestablishment of Party-
to-Party relations.
B. While Yugos glad to raise comradely
glass to Marx, they reluctant to wake
up in bed with Stalin again.
IV. Soviet Belgrade visit represents latest
in series of conflicting pressures being,
applied to Tito:
A. US, UK, and Turks have been trying
unsuccessfully to pin Yugos down on
subject informal NATO. tie, military
planning and better cooperation on
aid problems.
B. But Tito against further Western
military preparations, lest alarmed
Soviet reaction foreclose possibility
of long-term adjustment differences.
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V. Although outsiae DOSS i i v exists that
Tito and USSR have made or are making a
secret deal for eventual Yugo return to
Bloc (or for Yugoslav neutrality in event
of wax), we conclude in new NIE (which
goes before IAC today) that basic elements
of Tito's policy remain unchanged:
A. His dominant concern--stay in power
as head of independent state.
B. His first objective--beneficial rela-
tions with both sides and minimum of
commitments to either.
C. His second--reduction of likelihood
of war since, in all-out conflict be-
tween Bloc and West, Yugos likely to
be losers no matter which side they
chose.
VI. Therefore, we believe that coming meet with
Soviets is unlikely to produce major shift
in Yugoslav policy.
A. Tito may join in renouncing "aggression,"
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join Warsaw Pact or take other steps
flatly inconsistent with present
Balkan commitments or with continued
receipt of Western aid.
C. In this connection, Tito now taking
great pains to reassure West of his
bona fides.
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 AMOVAPOW 1 Ease
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AGENDA FOR "SUMMIT" MEET
I. USSR is continuing drumfire of diplomatic
moves designed to:
A. Cash in on highly dramatized Soviet
"liberality" on Austrian treaty.
B. Take credit for prospect of reduction
international tension at "summit"
meeting this summer.
C. Persuade West Europeans in particular
and non-Communist world generally:
1. That USSR wants major East-West
detente and reciprocal disarmament;
2. Within this context, that rearma-
ment West Germany is menace to
European peace and security,
rather than gain of strength
for NATO coaliti?n.
II. Although these Soviet moves are full of
propaganda, they are not just propaganda
gimmicks:
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A. USSR is taking political o fensive
worked out and coordinated as care-
fully as any of Zhukov's massive
battlefield assaults.
B. Positions being set forth in advance
represent Soviet agenda for "summit"
meeting.
C. Aim--weaken US position in Western
Europe; stop (or minimize) rearmament
West Germany.
III. Main lines of Soviet negotiating position
at "summit" laid down in elaborate pro-
posals on disarmament and ending cold war--
sprung last week at London talks, and,
since then, plugged heavily by Soviet
leaders.
A. Core of position is Soviet willingness
to agree to:
1. Reasonably realistic disarmament
scheme;
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2. System o genera security guaran-
tees of any kind (LOCARNO or UN
regional grouping) that would
satisfy West Europeans as manifest
of Soviet peaceful intent.
IV. USSR can go long way in negotiating from
this position because:
A. General war in Europe not in Soviet
interest in foreseeable future:
B. Pushing US off Eurasian continent
easier by political pressures on
Western Europeans than by military
moves, which Soviet leaders know are
very dangerous in hydrogen age.
C. In process, USSR is trying to capture
good words in popular lexicon, like
"peace"--'"disarmament"--"neutrality"
and "independence" of small nations.
D. By contrast, USSR portrays US as advo-
cating high-levels military expenditure4
keynoting imminence of war, and demand-
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V. Most telling shots in ov a arrage last
week were:
A. Demonstration of "good faith" in
sending Molotov, amid fanfare and
rejoicing, to sign Austrian treaty
on schedule.
B. Molotov's prompt acceptance of US-UK-
French invitation for "summit" meeting.
C. Bulganin's conclusion of Warsaw Pact.
VI. Establishment of this 8-power Soviet Bloc
treaty group (pledged to friendship, co-
operation and mutual assistance) also
brought into being a long-anticipated
"unified" Eastern European military force.
Twists at Warsaw: language carefully
made clear that:
A. Non-Communist states will be welcomed
into Pact;
B. Pact, together with its military de-
fense system, would lapse when and if
a general European security treaty
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C. This could permit later argument that
both Warsaw defense group and NATO are
made obsolete by future reduction of
world tension, agreement on disarma-
ment, and conclusion of general mutual
security system.
VII. Most special gimmick of all at Warsaw--
announcement that participation of East
German armed forces in "unified" command
would "be examined later."
A. This saving-out of East Germany as
bargaining counter is probably most
serious sign that USSR means business
in negotiations at "summit."
B. Ambassador Bohlen said several weeks
ago tipoff to earnestness of Soviet
wish for a settlement of the German
problem would be failure to incorporate
East Germany in Warsaw defense system
on same basis as other Satellites.
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VII ?.v uoFwever,as ?v a interes in et4ente0a0rid3Ge0r-3
man settlement not in any sense a Soviet
willingness to surrender.
A. USSR may hope to sell scheme of recip-
rocal armament limitations in "two
Germanies," as part of general
security system.
B. Some such scheme foreshadowed by 10 May
Soviet proposal for strict limitation
of local police contingents in both
parts of Germany.
C. Under such an arrangement (and with
considerable reduction of tension),
USSR might in long run be willing
withdraw most of its powerful military
forces from East Germany; count on
political power and security police
to maintain essential Soviet control.
D. In this way USSR could impose safe
limits on West German contribution to
NATO without giving up East Germany.
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AFGHAN CRISIS CONTINUES
I. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran and Turkey
have either volunteered or been asked to
help settle the Afghan-Pakistan dispute.
A. Only firm action to date, however,
taken by Saudi Arabia, which has sent
Mussaid, youthful uncle of King Saud,
to Kabul and Karachi.
B. Saudi delegation arrived Kabul 14 May.
C. Pak ambassador there says Mussaid is
suggesting both sides "forgive and for-
get" in best Islamic tradition, without
any determination of guilt.
D. This certainly acceptable to Afghans.
II. Mussaid peddling of same line in Karachi
(where he arrived 16 May) proved totally
unacceptable to Paks, who announced 19 May
that Saudi mediation efforts had failed.
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A. Most Near East mediators-elect appear
to side with Paks in recognizing Afghan
guilt.
B. Paks expect quid-pro-quo for postponing
15 May ultimatum deadline.
III. Afghan prime minister Daud
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I iscouraged by
failure his actions (particularly army
mobilization) to inspire enthusiasm among
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willing resign if Moslem nations find
against Pushtoonistan policy.
B. Attitude suggests Daud beginning see
folly his course, lays groundwork for
repudiation of Pushtoonistan.
C. Some indications, however, rest of
Afghan government encouraged by Saudi
attitude and attempting in last few days
to put up stronger front.
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D. Believe Paks firmness and weight 01
Near East opinion will eventually
wear down Afghan resistance.
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MACDONALD MOVED TO NEW DELHI
Importance of New Delhi in UK view em-
phasized by appointment of.54-year-old
top diplomat and trouble shooter, Malcolm
MacDonald, to post UK High Commissioner
India. (effective September).
A. He has strong backing of Foreign Office,
appointment as Commissioner-General
in Southeast Asia has been extended
several times since 1945.
B. Has reputation as effective diplomat,
outstanding conciliator and negotiator.
C. Has widespread respect among Asian
peoples.
II. Appointment suggests British consider im-
portance of India as linl1 between West and
Sino-Soviet bloc on rise.
A. MacDonald can strengthen Commonwealth
ties through sympathy for, ability to
make friends with Asians (even at ex-
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is was wfiat end eared ou a ens
to Indians.
B. As a trained economist he can give
boost to Anglo-Indian trade expansion
and keep close eye on Indian economic
development under Second Five Year Plan.
C. Will bring to New Delhi personal
knowledge of Communist threat in
Southeast Asia, which may help keep
Nehru from moving closer to Red China.
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BACKGROUND--KASHMIR TALKS CONCLUDED
I. End of Indo-Pak Prime Ministers' talks on
Kashmir announced 18 May. Communiqud
indicates no real progress made toward
solution of problem.
A. Wording of communiqud meaningless,
uninformative--"It was decided to continue
these talks at a later stage, after full
consideration has been given by both
Governments to various points that had
been discussed..."
B. Same sort of language used in past to
announce failure reach agreement on major
points.
II. Subsidiary communique, issued 17 May which
deals with discussion of means avoiding
border clashes (such as 7 May incident, when
12 Indians reported killed), suggests some
progress on preventing future occurrences.
A. This is a minor problem, however, since
such clashes have been occurring for years
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III. India obviously ou wa ing Pakistan, firm in
belief Paks eventually will have to accept
status quo.
A. Paks may eventually agree to partition
Kashmir along present cease-fire line, as
desired by India.
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I. Diem moving cautiously to consolidate mil-
itary and political gains.
A. Personally supervised Army takeover
of Imperial Guard at Dalat on 16 May,
which has eliminated last source of
potential organized support for Bao Dai.
B. Vietnamese Army is now encircling Binh
Xuyen remnant (1,500 in marshes south
of Saigon).
II. Diem "studying with interest" joint US-
French plans for integration of sect
troops (Hoa Hao, Cao Dai).
A. Cao Dai troops already rallied to Diem,
but most Hoa Hao troops remain dissident
B. Actual absorption of latter will prob-
ably involve much haggling and bribery.
C. Diem has complained to Ely of reports
that French military are still in con-
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D. Meanwhile, Cao Dai Pope is reportedly
trying to assert authority over sect's
forces. Diem believes French encourag-
ing him, as potential focus of anti-
government activity.
III. Diem has instructed Information Minister
to curb anti-French tendencies in local
press.
A. He still regards heavy concentration
of French troops in Saigon area as
provocative.
B. Present disposition of French forces
is result of orders by C-in-C (Ely),
who--as commander in chief in South
Vietnam--also has paper command of UNA.
C. Should Diem--as brother Luyen declares
he will--demand that French troops re-
maining in Vietnam be stationed at 17th
Parallel truce line, action would call
into question present command structure..
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IV. Meanwhile, Diem engaged in diplomatic
efforts directed toward:
A. Prodding truce commission to obtain
extension of deadline for refugee move-
ment (which ended 18 May).
B. Holding US-UK-French-Vietnamese confer-
ence in Saigon to demonstrate Vietnam's
international standing.
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I. Jean Sainteny, French delegate to North
Vietnam, last week remarked he was sur-
prised US had not closed its consulate
in Hanoi.
A. Jokingly told American consul Sainteny
mission might leave before consul did.
B. Sainteny, planning trip to France
first part of June, offered to bet
he would have difficulty getting.
transit visa for return travel across
US.
II. Sainteny thought division of Vietnam at
17th Parallel meant that Chinese would take
over France's former position in Tonkin,
but insisted Viet Minh would resist
Chinese domination.
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FORMOSA STRAITS SITUATION
I. Only unusual combat operations were two
clashes between ChiCom and ChiNa.t jet
fighters about 50 mi north of Matsu on
15 and 16 May. No danage to either side.
A. Dogfights probably resulted from daily
patrol flown by ChiCom planes
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B. ChiComs seem intent on making ChiNat
air recon costly, but thus far efforts
largely unsuccessfu
struction..in Fukien.
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B. Other Fukien link projected to Foochow
from Kueichi, on Chekiang-Kiangsi
RR. Link to Amoy will apparently branch
out from Nanping, midway between
Kueichi and Foochow.
C. None of the Fukien rail construction
.expected to be completed before 1956.
III. Of five airfields under construction
opposite Formosa, USAF expects Nantai
(near Foochow) to be completed in June.
A. Three others--Lungtien (S of Foochow),
Chingyang (NE of Amoy), and Swatow
Northeast probably-to be finished
in September.
B. Lungchi (W of Amoy) ready in October.
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