NSC BRIEFING ARGENTINE CHURCH-STATE CONFLICT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000400050002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 15, 1955
• Content Type: BRIEF

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'Mitt 447
14(june 1955
NSC BRIEFING
ARGENTINE CHURCH-STATE CONFLICT
I. New incidents -- growing out of the seven-month Peronista
campaign to reduce the Catholic church's political power --
have raised political tension in Argentina to its highest
peak in over two years. There were large-scale Catholic
demonstrations on 11 June and minor clashes on 12 and 13
June.
A. Catholic groups became increasingly active in resisting
Peron's campaign following December '54 passage of new
laws which legalized both divorce and prostitution
(latter known as "Law of Social Prophylaxis"), also
granted inheritance and other rights to illegitimate
children.
B. Catholic resistance has included pamphlet campaigns,
demonstrations, even inflamatory sermons urging Catholics
to "defend their faith", at the cost of their lives if
necessary.
C. Anti-Peronists, regardless of complexion, have joined
the fray, and pro-church pamphlets have been circulated
both by Communists and by the major opposition Radical
Party (which traditionally advocates separation of
church and state).
II. Strongest Catholic agitation was triggered by legislation
passed last month, which -- among other provisions -- calls
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2 L.
up specially elected assembly within 180 days to consider
constitutional revision formally separating church and state.
A. Article 2 of present Argentine constitution declares
that the federal government shall support the Roman
Catholic Church,AoworocaeiciwrAorAcue(orsvippolergora6Awel,
Other May laws abolished compulsorary Catholic education,
financial subsidies, and tax exemption for the church.
Although revenue is involved, political (rather than
financial) motives appear dominant in latter actions.
Although representatives of all Argentine political
groups are reported to favor the new legislation, many
have objected to the turbulent atmosphere in which it
has been promoted.
Principal impetus for Peron's campaign against his former
ally apparently stems from his conviction that opposition
elements in Argentina were working with some of the Catholic
clergy to organize a "Christian Democratic" political move-
ment aimed at the overthrow of his regime.
A. Peron also resents Church competition and agitation
against his youth program for training of future Peron-
istas.
B. Peron steadfastly maintains he is not attacking the
Church itself, but only its political action.
C. Charges Church is supporting attempts to create a new
"democratic-clerical-oligarchical union" which would
continue opposition efforts of past 12 years to oust
his regime.
- 2 -
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. Although plans an Argentine "Christian Democratic"
movement have UFUfepOrted, there are indications that
?Ltier irr" Inerfea4 RA/ .2317r06,Z14;Vi'vrete)
several of PerontsUal.t.lee:-V advisersfimay have exaggerated
the movement's importance in order to make Peron veer from
ward
his more moderate right/trend of past two years.
A. "Strange bedfellow support for the Church by various
opposition groups would also tend to inflame Peron's
suspicions.
VI. Church-state conflict is not expected to threaten stability
of Peron regime for the present, but the issue remains
susceptible to serious incidents of violence until after
the constituent assembly meets (possibly in early November).
A. Issue has given opposition elements--especially Radicals
and Communists--their best vehicle to date for fomenting
anti-Peron sentiment.
serves
B. Conflict also/to create friction among Peronistas them-
selves.
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AM041firisara thure 1955
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ARGENTINE CHURCH-STATE CONFLICT
I. New incidents--growing out of the seven-
month Peronista campaign to reduce the
Catholic church's political power--have
raised political tension in Argentina to
its highest peak in over two years. Large-
scale Catholic demonstrations marked
11 June and minor clashes followed on
12 and 13 June. Anti-Church rally of
General Confederation of Labor members
(on time off provided by token general
V015,
strike)'-+s' scheduled for
ortl 7A1/5, Bar 5-et- PArs's Fore ?olfeer ieweitoop oF reet4rES .
A. Catholic groups increasingly active
against Peron after new (Dec '54) laws
okaying divorce, prostitution ("Law
of Social Prophylaxis"), granting in-
heritance, other rights to illegitimate.
B. Resistance has included pamphlets,
,ebl:bers- 70)
demonstrations, inflamatory sermons
urging Catholics to "defend faith,"
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have joined fray: pro-Church pamphlets
circulated by Communists and by the
major opposition Radical Party (which
traditionally advocates separation of
church and state).
II. Strongest Catholic agitation triggered by
latest legislation (May '55) which--among
other provisions--calls for special con-
vention (to meet in next six months) to
consider constitutional revision formally
separating church and state.
A. Article 2 of present constitution
provides federalusupport&for Church.
Other May laws abolish compulsorary
Catholic education, financial sub-
sidies, tax exemption for the church.
Although revenue is involved, political
(rather than financial) motives appear
dominant in latter actions.
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political groups reportedly favor
new legislation, but many have objected
to turbulent atmosphere in which it
promoted.
Principal impetus for Peron's campaign
against his former ally is his apparent
conviction that opposition elements in
Argentina are working with some of
Catholic clergy to organize "Christian
Democratic" movement, overthrow him.
A. Peron also resents Church competition,
agitation against his own youth program.
B. Peron steadfastly maintains he not
attacking Church itself, but only its
political action.
C. Charges Church supporting attempts
create new "democratic-clerical-
oligarchical union" which would con-
tinue opposition 12-year efforts
oust his regime.
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"Christian Democratic" movement have been
reported by reliable sources.
A. However, are indications that several
of Peron's extremist advisers (particu-
larly Minister of Interior Borlenghi,
who reports on internal police and
political matters) may have exaggerated
movement's importance in order switch
Peron from moderate rightward trend
of past two years.
B. "Strange bedfellow" support for Church
by opposition groups would also tend
inflame Peron's suspicions.
VI. Church-state conflict not expected to
threaten stability Peron regime for present,
but issue remains susceptible to serious
incidents of violence until after con-
stituent convention meets (possibly early
Nov).
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especially Radicals and Communists--
their best vehicle to date for foment-
ing anti-Peron sentiment.
B. Conflict also serves to create friction
among Peronistas themselves.
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In the following Latin American countries, separation of church
and state has been effected:
Brazil
1890
Chile
1925
Cuba
1901
El Salvador
1871
Guatemola
1871
Haiti (i)
1830
Honduras
1880
Mexico
1853
Nicaragua
1894-1908
Panama
1903
Uruguay
1919
(1) Despite the separation, some governments continue to give
financial aid to the church. Furthermore, in Haitijchurch-state
relations are at present very close.
11. Separation of church and state has not been effected in the
following:
nrcleNni in a
Bolivia
Co1ombiaL2)
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Paraguay
Peru
Venezuela (3)
(2) Although church and state were separated in Colombia on
June 15, 1853, the present official position of the church is so
closely intertwined with the government that separation cannot be
considered in effect in any way,
(3) While church and sta e ave ?een separated defacto at
various times, the state continues to exercise control over church
administration and to supply financial support.
,11.1.A priest's estimate of religious affiliation in Argentina, as
reported by the American embassy there on 25 March 55, is as follows:
20% - Active, practising Catholics
50% - Have had some contact with the Church, but have
little sense of responsibility toward it.
20% - Have had no ties
10% - Anti-Catholic
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BACKGROUND - CHURCH AND STATE IN L.A.
I. In the following Latin American countries,
separation of church and state has been
effected:
Brazil
1890
Chile
1925
Cuba
1
901
El Salvador
1871
Guatemala
1871
Haiti*
1830
Honduras
1880
Mexico
1853
Nicaragua
1894-1908
Panama
1903
Uruguay
1919
Despite the separation, some governments
continue to give .financial aid to the
church. Furthermore, in Haiti, church-
state relations are at present very close.
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been effected in the following:
Argentina
Bolivia
Colombia*
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Paraguay
Peru
Venezuela**
* Although church and state were separated
in Colombia on June 15, 1853, the present
official position of the church is so
closely intertwined with the government
that separation cannot be considered in
effect in any way.
* *
While church and state in Venezuela
have been separated defacto at various
times, the state continues to exercise
control over church administration and to
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III. A priest's estimate of religious affilia-
tion in Argentina, as reported by the
American embassy there on 25 March 55,
is as follows:
20% - Active, practising Catholics
50% - Have had some contact with the
Church, but have little sense
of responsibility toward it.
20% - Have had no ties.
10% - Anti-Catholic.
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NBC BRIEFING
AM
14rJune 1955
SOVIET AVIATION "SHOW-OFF" PLANS
I. In past three weeks, USSR has apparently
adopted surprising new policy of actively seeking
international publicity for its achievements in
aircraft design.
A. Soviet spectators at Toronto Inter-
national Trade Fair publicly characterized
US air display as "obsolete" (which in fact
much of it was) and suggested that world
watch for "something new" at Moscow
Aviation Day fly-by this weekend.
B. Soviet Legation in Switzerland has
indicated USSR's interest in exhibiting
military planes at Geneva International
Air Show (24 June-17 July).
C, USSR may also participate in Canada's
International Air Show next year.
D. Finally, USSR has - for second con-
secutive year - pushed schedule of Moscow's
Aviation Day show-off (normally July) up
to late June (19th).
II. Comments at Toronto Trade Fair are attri-
buted by press to team of Soviet engineers, who
showed particular interest in Martin Matador (pilot-
less bomber) and in engine exhibits,
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A. Engineers stated that Aviation Day
display will include "models more advanced
than those seen before" and will "make
US airpower look obsolete".
B. Suggested Canadian hosts visit Moscow
to "compare what you see here with what
we will show."
III. In Switzerland, following up earlier state-
ments by Soviet officials that USSR might send MIG
jet fighters to Geneva show (where UK, France and
others will display late military types), Legation
spokesmen said USSR "seriously considering" partici-
pation.
A. Asked details of plans tif other nations,
particularly US.
B. Questioned suitability of Geneva air-
port for operating Soviet bomber types and
stated that, if unable to land, bombers
might in any case over-fly Show.
IV. Possibility of USSR exhibition at Canadian
Show (June, '56) first broached in late May, when
Soviet Ambassador made bid for such participation.
A. Press states that engineers at Toronto
Fair confirmed this Soviet intent.
V. Meanwhile, rehearsals for unusually early
Aviation Day fly-by in Moscow have displayed lesser
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numbers of same jet bombers (four-jet BISONS and
twin-jet BADGERS) which overflew city in rehearsals
for abortive May Day parade.
ALSo cee"i1/4/ tgEff-CrAgs /Nay
A.
F.Lij err )
turbo-prop bora-
bers(BEAR), of which at least nine were
seen during May Day rehearsals.
B. Also
5e.rela Ar 6%1-ZS
for "official"
Aviation Day display are the new day fighters
(FARMER) and all-weather interceptors
(FLASHLIGHT) likewise seen during May Day
rehearsals.
C. Only "new" craft seen rehearsing to
date is a large helicopter.
1. Seems unlikely that blow-hard
engineers at Toronto would have had
something this "tame" in mind.
2. Has been Soviet practice in past
to include prototypes in this show,
so may be surprise in store.
VI. Following considerations could underlie
apparent Kremlin switch to active hunt for publicity
on air developments.
A. Present Soviet progress places USSR
on at least equal footing with US in develop-
eeefieW4 eAtc-Gogte5
mentA modern fighters, bombers.
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B. "Show-off" in Moscow, properly touted
abroad, serves to underscore this progress.
C. "Show-off" abroad (if either Geneva or
Canada participation actually materializes)
permits muscle-flexing before audience
particularly sensitive to threat of nuclear
war.
D. At same time, such "show-off" can be
propagandized by USSR as exact opposite - -
a sort of "curtain-lifting" gesture towards
international amity, cooperation.
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secutive year--pushed schedule for
annual Aviation Day display (normally
July) up up to lewt-e- June (19th).
II. Technical press has reported comments made
at Toronto Trade Fair by team of Soviet
engineers, who showed particular interest
in Martin Matador (pilotless bomber) and
US jet engine exhibits.
A. Engineers stated that coming Aviation
Day display will include "models more
advanced than those seen before" and
will "make US airpower look obsolete."
B. Suggested Canadian hosts visit Moscow
to "compare what you see here with
what we will show."
III. In Switzerland, Soviet Legation spokesman--
following up earlier statements by local
Soviet officials that USSR might send MIG
jet fighters to next week's Geneva show
(where UK, France and others will display
late military types)--said USSR "seriously
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particularly US.
B. Questioned suitability of Geneva air-
port for Soviet bombers: stated that,
if unable to land, bombers might in
any case over-fly show.
IV. Possibility of USSR exhibition at next
year's Canadian Air Show (June '56) first
broached in May this year, when Soviet
Ambassador made bid for such participation.
A. Press states that engineers at Toronto
Fair confirmed this Soviet intent.
V. Meanwhile, preparations for unusually
early Aviation Day fly-by in Moscow have
displayed same jet bombers (four-jet
BISONS and twin-jet BADGERS) which over-
flew city in rehearsals for abortive May
Day parade.
ad640rou.S HAV6AliSoiffeto, . re op
A. turbo-prop lombexs
(BEAR), of which at least nine were
seen before May Day.
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Aviation Day display are the new day
fighters (FARMER) and all-weather
interceptors (FLASHLIGHT) likewise
seen before May Day.
C. Only "new" craft seen rehearsing to
Wilk',
date is a large helicopter.
1. Seems unlikely that blow-hard
engineers at Toronto would have
had something this "tame" in mind.
2. Has been Soviet practice in past
to include prototypes in this show,
so surprise may be in store.
VI. Following considerations could underlie
apparent Kremlin search for limelight on
air developments.
A. Present Soviet progress places USSR
on at least equal footing with US in
development some categories of modern
fighters, bombers.
-4-
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abdipad, serves to underscore this
progress.
C. "Show-off" abroad (if either Geneva
or Canada participation actually
materializes) permits muscle-flexing
before audience particularly sensitive
to threat of nuclear war.
D. At same time, such "show-off" can be
propagandized by USSR as exact oppo-
site--a sort of "curtain-lifting"
gesture towards international amity,
cooperation.
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NSC BRIEFING 1411une 1955
Is
RECENT ASSESSMENTS OF TOP SOVIET LEADERS
Conduct of Soviet pilgrims in Belgrade (particularly
,Khrushchev) made uniformly bad impression both on Yugo-
slays and on Western representatives on the scene. Yugo-
slays openly contdmptuous of Soviet leader following visit.
A. reports Yugoslav assessment of Soviet dele-
gation as composed of "uncouth second-raters," Yugos
felt that Tito stood head and shoulders above them,
and were taken aback by continued inflexibility and
Stalinist cast of Soviet thinking
B. Top-ranking Yugoslays concentrated venom on Khrushchev,
who wasdbscribed as "horrible little man," "completely
tactless and showoff," an "ignoramus." His perform-
ance even caused some Yugoslays to wonder "how long
Khrushchev will last."
press observers reportedly believe
neither Khrushchev nor Bulganin displayed qualities of
leadership.
A. Lowenthal (Soviet expert of the London Observer) re-
ports that Khrushchev "looked like one of these horny-
handed miners who receives gold watch from his pals
and boss following thirty years of toil."
B. Described Bulganin as "chinovnik"-type (i.e., "petty
bureaucrat" in most derogatory sense),
4AirefIL4To
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III. In same connection, Ambassador Bohlen, following
attendance at large Soviet party for Nehru, comments that
the more the top Soviet leaders are seen, the less and less
impressive they become.
A. Bohlen states: "In fact, with exception of Malenkov
(who, even in eclipse, strikes me of superior quality
to others) and Molotov (who, perhaps by experience,
gives impression of greater dignity and capability)
there is not one of present Presidium membership who
appears to have outstanding personal qualities or
abilities."
IV. Reaction in Belgrade to Soviet delegation probably result
of shock caused by Khrushchev's uninhibited, headlong
temperament seen in new role for first time.
A. Contrast is sharp, when compared with reptilian re-
serve of Stalin, who was always shielded from close
scrutiny.
B. Bohlen's appraisal of Soviet. leaders, while unflatter-
ing is less extreme than Yugoslays', probably because
of greater familiarity.
C. Whatever Khrushchev's diplomatic ineptitude, it has
not stood in way of his rise to top and it is equally
?
doubtful that it will cause his decline.
1. His personal position is probably little affected
by Belgrade performance.
2. While individual Soviet leaders may lack polish and
fail to measure up to Western standards of "greatness,
nonetheless unsafe to conclude that Soviet policy is
therefore in incompetent hands.
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Ml
NSC BRIEFING 15 June 1955
EGYPT-ISRAELI PROBLEMS
I. Situation along Gaza border still quiet -- only two minor
shooting incidents since 30 May; no unusual military activity
reported from either side.
05C-RA oUreootte
Prospects dimmer forAEgypt-Israeli talks, Zis'Prre' B'erree411:fe-i)pedap TetrAr
741465 anat. 4eri.41.1.1 TAK'e 7)4Aee.
A. Egyptian note to UN on 10 June accepts proposal for talks,
but
1. Limits agenda to four points already suggested by UNTSO
Burns;
2. Defines Nasr border proposal as one to establish "neutral"
rather than "demilitarized" zone.
3. Supplementary information indicates Lt. Col. Gohar, rather
than "general officer" requested by Israel, appointed as
Cairo's representative at talks.
B. All these points unlikely to meet Israeli views.
1. Use of word "neutral" especially objectionable as putting
cloud over Israeli sovereignty its gide of demarcation line.
2. Prime minister Sharett told American ambassador on 11 June
that "whole thing had fizzled out."
III. Conclusion--Situation likely to continue inconclusive for
immediate future. Border incidents may resume at higher rate,
as before 30 May.
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RECENT ASSESSMENTS OF TOP SOVIET LEADERS
I. Conduct of Soviet pilgrims in Belgrade
(particularly Khrushchev) made uniformly
bad impression both on Yugoslays and on
Western representatives on the scene.
Yugoslays openly contamptuous of Soviet
leader following visit.
25X1C8b
A.
Yugoslav assess-
ment of Soviet delegation as composed
of "uncouth second-raters." Yugos
felt that Tito stood head and shoulders
above them, and were taken aback by
continued inflexibility and Stalinist
cast of Soviet thinking.
B. Top-ranking Yugoslays concentrated
venom on Khrushchev, who was described
as "horrible little man," "completely
tactless and showoff," an "ignoramus."
His performance even caused some Yugo-
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"how long Khrushchev
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will last."
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II. press observers re-
portedly believe neither Khrushchev nor
25X1C8b
Bulganin displayed qualities of leadership.
A. Lowenthal (Soviet expert of the London
Observer) reports that Khrushchev
"looked like one of these horny-handed
miners who receives gold watch from
his pals and boss following thirty
years of toil."
B. Described Bulganin as "chinovnik"-type
(i.e., "petty bureaucrat" in most
derogatory sense).
III. In same connection, Ambassador Bohlen,
following attendance at large Soviet party
for Nehru, comments that the more the top
Soviet leaders are seen, the less and less
impressive they become.
A. Bohlen states: "In fact, with exception
of Malenkov (who, even in eclipse,
strikes me of superior quality to others)
and Molotov (who, perhaps by experience,
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and capability), there is not one of
present Presidium membership who
appears to have outstanding personal
qualities or abilities."
W. Reaction in Belgrade to Soviet delegation
probably result of sock caused by
Khrushchev's uninhibited, headlong tempera-
ment seen in new role for first time.
A.
B.
Contrast is sharp, when compared with
reptilian reserve of Stalin, who was
always shielded from close scrutiny.
Bohlen's appraisal of Soviet leaders,
while unflattering/pis less extreme
than Yugoslays', probably because of
greater familiarity.
Whatever Khrushchev's diplomatic
eptitude, it has not stood in way
his rise to top and it is equally
doubtful that it will cause his
decline.
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of
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little affected by Belgrade per-
formance.
2. While individual Soviet leaders
may lack polish and fail to measure
up to Western standards of
"greatness," nonetheless unsafe to
conclude that Soviet policy is
therefore in incompetent hands.
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4.41
NSC BRIEFING 10-June 1955
BACKGROUND--SINGAPORE LABOR STRIFE
I. "Sympathy" strikes in Singapore, accompanied by some violence,
got underway 13 June (exactly one month after serious Communist-
directed riots in May).
A. Strikes thus far involve 15-30,000 manual and transportation
workers, although strike leaders had hopes for (and continue
to claim) a general work-stoppaget70,60d eve/Up/00.
B. Immediate trigger was arrest (12 June) of six suspected
Communists, five of whom were union leaders.
C. Actually, strike had been in making for some time, as
one-day demonstration supporting wage negotiations in
progress between 1,300 civil service clerks(employed in
harbor administration)and Singapore government.
1. Harbor clerks have been out for 7 weeks, and negotiations
are now deadlocked on question of back-dating agreed
salary schedule.
2. Harbor union involved is a moderate one, affiliated
with moderate Singapore Trades Union Council (TUC).
D. Leaders of "sympathy" strike now say it will continue until
release of six arrested.
1. Communist-directed students, who were "activists" in
May riots, quiet to date.
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Approved For Release 2000/08/13-: -DP8OR01443R000400050002-2
II. "Sympathy" strikes engineered by far-left People's Action
Party (PAP), which active in labor field.
A. Although PAP disavows Communism, it has associated itself
with Communist Party in fight against colonialism, accepts
support from strong Communist elements in Singapore Chinese
student and labor groups.
1. Communist Party, outlawed in 1948, appears to be
successfully manipulating PAP.
III. Trade unionism accounts for only 76,000 of Singapore's
estimated working force of 250,000 (80% Chinese).
A. Approximately half of 76,000 government-employed: 25,000
in moderate Singapore Trades Union Council, 7,000 in unions
controlled by PAP, after this, field is open.
B. PAP has strategic position among public transport, education,
and civil aviation workers.
1. PAP may increase its influence among navy base and
harbor employees as result "sympathy" strike.
IV. British authorities in Singapore believed amply capable cope
with any Communist-directed labor violence.
A. 5,000 police and special constables in Singapore
V. Communist subversion and unrest in Singapore, principally
affecting students and trade unionists, expected to increase.
A. Subversion receives chief emphasis in Malayan Communist
directives.
B. Communists proved in May they can create trouble whenever
they wish.
C. Morale of anti-Communists in Singapore has suffered severely
Ap$1164ad Fliftslkei3?S4.2000/06/13 : CIA-RDP8OR01443R000400050002-2
AO ?of/
ApprovlsdcF8PWeiralge 200071rMDP801414V068i80050002-2
BACKGROUND--SINGAPORE LABOR STRIFE
I. "Sympathy" strikes in Singapore, accom-
panied by some violence, got underway
13 June (exactly one month after serious
Communist-directed riots in May).
Ari
A. Stfikes\aX fr/involveD15-30,000
manual and transportation workers,
although strike leaders had hopes for
(and continue to claim) a general
work-stoppage(70,64,06X Nemec).
gy 7Htkp PAY ('g...71/nir ) O Wm re sow /Z660 -
Immediate trigger was arrest (12 June)
of six suspected Communists, five of
whom were union leaders.
Actually, strike had been in making for
some time, as one-day demonstration
supporting wage negotiations in progress
between 1,300 civil service clerks
(employed in harbor administration)and
Singapore government.
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weermill.M.ftemi
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asea0r99ffltirtiM819M1154ARIN9400050002-2
7 weeks, and negotiations are now
deadlocked on question of back-
dating agreed salary schedule.
Harbor union involved is a moderate
one, affiliated with moderate
Singapore Trades Union Council
(TUC).
D. Leaders of "sympathy" strike now say
it will continue until release of six
arrested.
1. Communist-directed students, who
were "activists" in May riots,
quiet to date.
LH. "Sympathy" strikes engineered by far-left
People's Action Party (PAP), which active
In labor field.
A. Although PAP disavows Communism, it has
associated itself with Communist Party
in fight against colonialsm, accepts
support from strong Communist elements
Approved For RelegigE8M90/43calk-REDIRSOR0444/3EMQ4011050002-2
arabworomMr0 groups.
-2-
Approved For Rel?segladVetitirbelppilpvtigla09g4g9050002-2
appears to be successfully manipu-
lating PAP.
I. Trade unionism accounts for only 76,000 of
Singapore's estimated working force of
250,000 (80% Chinese).
A. Approximately half of 76,000 government-
employed: 25,000 in moderate Singapore
Trades Union Counci4; 7,000 in unions
controlled by PAP; after this, field
is open.
B. PAP has strategic position among
public transport, education, and civil
aviation workers.
1. PAP may increase its influence
among navy base and harbor employees
as result "sympathy" strike.
British authorities in Singapore believed
amply capable cope with any Communist-
directed labor violence.
A. 5,000 police and special constables in
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-3-
00041161106
Approvdcl FoeMiffgt2W?f1s3iiSI*113DRAQAQ14113R000400050002-2
Singapore, principally affecting students
and trade unionists, expected to increase.
A. Subversion receives chief emphasis in
Malayan Communist directives.
B. Communists proved in May they can
create trouble whenever they wish.
C. Morale of anti-Communists in Singapore
has suffered severely during past
month.
-4 -
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1443R000400050002-2
NSC BRIEFING 15 June 1955
FORMOSA STRAITS
I. No significant combat operations in past week.
A. Chicoms continue defer aggressive action while possibility
of Sino-US talks being explored.
II. Airfield construction along coast continues.
25X1X7
A. Chicoms may be about to renovate old
airfield at Swatow. 25X1X7E
B. runway of Nantai (Foochow) airfield
completed.
Chicom planes have not yet appeared at Lungtien (30 miles
S of Foochow) or Chenghai (6 miles NE of Swatow) where runways
believed serviceable.
III. Chicom propaganda of past week has introduced no new line on Formosa
issues.
A. Peiping alleges there is growing campaign in US for nego-
tiations to ease tensions.
B. Peiping on 10 June broadcast 2 June interview in which Chou
En-lai told Indonesian newsman Peiping is willing to nego-
tiate only the US "occupatioh" of Formosa, that there is no
need for cease-fire.
C. Chou explicitly endorsed "good offices" of interested third
25X1C8b
C?
Iv.
parties in setting up Sino-US talks.
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E. Both Chicoms and Chinats have repeatedly denounced compromise
proposals of this type. However, Chicoms might well see in
such proposals a good chance for impairing US relations
with major allies and Asian neutrals, many of whom would favor
some such compromise.
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FORMOSA STRAITS
I. No significant combat operations in past
week.
A. Chicoms continue defer aggressive
action while possibility of Sino-US
talks being explored.
II. Airfield construction along coast
continues. 25X1X7
A. Chicoms may be
about to renovate old airfield at
Swatow. 25x1x7
B. runway of
Nantai (Foochow) airfield completed.
C. Chicom planes have not yet appeared
at Lungtien (30 miles S of Foochow)
or Chenghai (6 miles NE of Swatow)
where runways believed serviceable.
III. Chicom propaganda of past week has intro-
duced no new line on Formosa issues.
A. Peiping alleges there is growing cam-
Approved For Releam1,999/9663 iAINKFMAIN3,4431690949,9050002-2
wjetaftellimmEmmm,
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B. Peiping on 10 June broadcast 2 June
interview in which Chou En-lai told
Indonesian newsman Peiping is willing
to negotiate only the US "occupation"
of Formosa, that there is no need for
cease-fire.
C. Chou explicitly endorsed "good offices"
of interested third parties in setting
up Sino-US talks.
IV.
25X1C8b
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Approved
25X1 C8b
E. Both Chicoms and Chinats have repeat-
edly denounced compromise proposals
of this type. However, Chicoms might
well see in such proposals a good
chance for impairing US relations
with major allies and Asian neutrals,
many of whom would favor some such
compromise.
2-2
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65reAt119"
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NSC BRIEFING 15 June 1955
KWANGTUNG FAMINE
I. Winter and spring drought in South China's Kwangtung
25X1A6a
Province (pop. 35 million) is reported by ChiCom's them-
selves, to be worst in over 90 years. ChiCom's organiz-
ing "spring and summer famine" relief.
A. 8-10,000 KWangtung residents
trying to enter British Colony.
B. Consulate reports "thousands" attempting cross border
into Portuguese Macao.
II. Despite bad. conditions, ChiComs are shipping rice out of
South China.
A. Yangtze Valley--China's traditional "rice bowl"?
suffered badly from summer '54 floods.
B. This year ChiComs have been getting rice for export
to Ceylon from South China, rather than Yangtze Valley..
(300,000 tons planned for '55, about half already
shipped).
C. Peiping even complaining that improperly large amount
of state food stock in KWangtung being issued to local
population, instead of being reserved.
III. Situation in Kwangtung will not improve before this year's
first rice harvest (late summer): even then, government crop
collections are likely to result in continuing "austerity,"
rationing.
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r-40.
Approved For Release 2000/0ftWARS)P8OR01443R000400050002-2
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A. However, Communist control of area remains firm and
Peiping does not seem fearful of possible peasant
dissidence.
B.
25X6
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ApprovelffoliNAEM 2000/061FIARDP8Olia1/08WORi80050002-2
25X1A6a
KWANGTUNG FAMINE
I. Winter and spring drought in South China's
Kwangtung Province (pop. 35 million) is
reported by ChiComsothemselves, to be
worst in over 90 years. ChiCom's organiz-
ing "spring and summer famine" relief.
A. 8-10,000
Kwantgung residents trying to enter
British Colony.
B. Consulate reports "thousands" attempt-
ing cross border into Portuguese Macao.
II. Despite bad conditions, ChiComs are shipping
rice out of South China.
A. Yangtze Valley--China's traditional
"rice bowl"--suffered badly from
summer '54 floods.
B. This year ChiComs have been getting
rice for export to Ceylon from South
China, rather than Yangtze Valley.
(300,000 tons planned for '55, about
Approved For ReIWO 2?030011/$13sM1NROP8OR01443R000400050002-2
25X6
Approved FoOelmpi2nOgOCUUMMEVINIA4459p9099c150002-2
ly large amount of state food stock in
Kwangtung being issued to local
population, instead of being reserved.
III. Situation in Kwangtung will not improve
before this year's first rice harvest
(late summer): even then, government crop
collections are likely to result in con-
tinuing "austerity," rationing.
A. However, Communist control of area
remains firm and Peiping does not
seem fearful of possible peasant
dissidence.
B.
-2-
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Am
2000/06t/ re8
ApproMiMillkgRae : - DP8014#141M0b94a050002-2
EGYPT-ISRAELI PROBLEMS
Situation along Gaza border still quiet--
only two minor shooting incidents since
30 May; no unusual military activity re-
ported from either side.
userat-
II. Prospects dimmer forAEgypt-Israeli talks.
A. Egyptian note to UN on 10 June accepts
proposal for talks, but--
1. Limits agenda to four points al-
ready suggested by UNTS0 Burns;
2. Defines Nasr border proposal as
one to establish "neutral" rather
than "demilitarized" zone.
3. Indicates that Lt. Col. Gohar--
rather than "general officer"
requested by Israel--has been
appointed as Cairo's representa-
tive at talks.
B. All these points unlikely to meet
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STeRePumm,
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objectionable as putting cloud
over Israeli sovereignty its side
of demarcation line.
2. Prime minister Sharett told American
ambassador on 11 June that "whole
thing had fizzled out."
III. Situation likely to continue inconclusive
for immediate future.
A. Border incidents may resume at higher
rate, as before 30 May.
B. However, anything more unlikely,
since Israel probably considers that
disadvantages of taking Gaza strip
by force would outweigh gains, while
Egypt is leaning over backwards to
avoid actual war.
-2-
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Approved For Release 2000/06/13 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000400050002-2
1611." - 6)10;1C CrAft.V Ai
71/15' 17-e-44
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NSC BRIEFING
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25X6
SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TO VISIT US
I. Khalid al Azm to arrive in New York 17 June.
A. Azm, leader of leftist clique running
Syria, to attend UN meeting in San
Francisco.
A. Azm is leagued with the powerful, leftist
Communist-infiltrated, Arab Socialist-
Resurrectionist Party, which enjoys
considerable support among the Syrian
military, including Chief of Staff
Shawkat Shuqayr. Numerous independent,
and various deputies also
support Azm. Azm bargained for and got
Communist support in last fall's
parliamentary elections.
B. Azm's aim is to retain sufficient
strength in parliament to effect his
election to the presidency. In August
parliament will elect successor to
octogenarian, pro-Western President
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C. This policy dictates his alignment with
the anti-Iraqi policy of the Arab
Socialists, the army high command, Egypt,
Saudi Arabia and France. He is committed
to signing the Egyptian-Saudi Arabian-
Syrian defense pact.
D. At the same time, however, he must limit
this alignment in order to avoid provoking
a rightist coup. He is therefore
bargaining hard and delaying the pact in
an attempt to make it acceptable at home.
App
law
25X6
25X6
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