Briefing Notes on Soviet 20th Party Congress

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000400280002-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 28, 1956
• Content Type: BRIEF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
28 Februar 1956
Copy No. l -of 15
Briefing Notes on Soviet 20th Party Congress
I. The flood of rhetoric from Moscow in the past two
weeks (14-25 February) has been most enlightening about
Soviet policy and Soviet policy makers. The 20th Party
Congress gives the clearest definition we have had of
recent trends in Soviet affairs. These trends began to
emerge about the time of Stalin's death, became more
definite with the purge of Beria, but became crystal-
clear only in the past year--since Malenkov's demotion
and Khrushchev's rise to his "first among equals" posi-
tion in the top circle of Soviet leaders.
II. Party First Secretary Khrushchev dominated the Con-
gress: his 8-hour, 50,000-word political report took up
the whole of the Congress' opening day; his revision of
two important Communist doctrines was a solid demon-
stration of authority.
III. All the words poured forth at this Party Congress,
viewed in the light of Soviet actions and the history of
Communism, add up to the simple fact that the present
collective leadership, headed by Khrushchev, Bulganin,
Mikoyan and Kaganovich, has in the past three years
accomplished a peaceful revolution designed to bury
Stalinism and strip the Communist system of the principal
drags on its future growth. These drags, accumulated
during 20 years of domination by Stalin were:
A. An absolute dictatorship based on naked police
power.
B. A primary reliance on force and the threat of
military power to achieve Communist ends.
C. The grim thesis of the inevitability of war.
D. An equally grim thesis on the necessity of
violent revolution in every nation.
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IV. The Soviet leaders, after faltering in the face of
stout Western political, economic and military resist-
ance in the later years of Stalin's life and the
immediate post-Stalin era, appear to have achieved a
new political sophistication and are challenging the US
and Western positions in world affairs with new and
subtler weapons. ?
V. The three years since Stalin's death have been
occupied in political, economic and military readjust-
ments. These readjustments were designed to clean up
the Soviet backyard and to eliminate the principal de-
fects that were making the Soviet system unappealing
politically and ineffective in diplomacy.
Mikoyan: "The leading collective body of the
Party introduced a new, fresh course, pursuing
a high policy of high principles, active and
elastic.... Certain ossified forms of our
diplomacy, of our foreign trade and economic
organs in their relations with foreign countries
and the citizens of these countries, were dis-
carded."
A. Politically, the Soviet leaders have worked out
an internal balance of power based on the con-
cept of "collective leadership",-which in Mos-
cow does not mean "equality" among leaders but
merely a system preventing the accumulation
of absolute power in the hands of one man.
Mikoyan: "The principle of collective leader-
ship is elementary for the proletarian party,
for the Lenin-type party. However, we must
emphasize this old truth because in the course
of about 20 years, we in fact had no collective
leadership. The cult of personality was flourish-
ing--already condemned by Marx and afterward
by Lenin--and this course could not help exert-
ing an extremely negative influence on the
situation within the Party and in its work."
B. Economically, the USSR has maintained priority
of rapid growth of heavy industry, while trying
to improve agriculture and consumer-goods out-
put.
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C. Militarily, the USSR has kept its armed forces
strong but has brought fighting in Korea to
an end, and withdrawn forces from certain
advanced positions--Austria, Port Arthur, and
Porkkala (Finland).
VI. From the point of view of US problems, four main
ideas expressed at the Party Congress stand out from
the welter of words.
A. These veterans of Stalin's cruel tyranny have
at least outwardly committed themselves to
"collective leadership." This is not likely
to work indefinitely, but--while it does--it
gives a flexibility to Soviet policy that may
well make it more dangerous than the "hard-
arteries" period of Stalin's last years.
Khrushchev: "The furthering of the Party's
unity and the raising of the activity of its
organizations demanded the restoration of the
norms of Party life elaborated by Lenin, which
have previously been often violated. Of
primary importance was the restoration and
complete consolidation of Lenin's principle
of collectivity-in leadership."
B. "Peaceful coexistence" and denial of the "fatal
inevitability of war" are policy-propaganda
themes likely to last a good many years, be-
cause the Soviet leaders recognize that Stalin
was making things easier for us by frightening
small nations into cooperation with the US from
a dread of general war or direct Soviet mili-
tary aggression.
1. "Peaceful coexistence"--
Khrushchev: "There are only two ways:
either peaceful coexistence or the most
destructive war in history. There is no
third way."
"It is common knowledge that we have
always, from the very first years of Soviet
power, stood with equal firmness for peace-
ful coexistence. Hence it is not a tactical
move, but a fundamental principal of Soviet
foreign policy."
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2. Non-inevitability of war--
Khrushchev: "War is not fatalistically
inev to e . "
3. These were the "sacred" texts before the
20th Party Congress:
Lenin (1919): "...the existence of the
Soviet Republic side by side with imperia-
list states for a long time is unthinkable.
One or the other must triumph in the end,
and before that end supervenes, a series
of frightful collisions between the Soviet
Republic and the bourgeois states will be
inevitable."
Stalin (1952): "In order to eliminate the
inevitability of wars, imperialism must be
destroyed."
C. Most important for the future, the admission
that the "transiion to osicalism" (in Soviet
jargon meaning Communist control) may be achieved
in some countries by peaceful parliamentary means
is a signal for full speed ahead with the "popu-
lar front" in unstable political arenas like
France, Italy, and Indonesia.
Khrushchev, Bulganin, Mikoyan and Kaganovich
are gambling that they can push American influ-
ence off the Eurasian continent and perhaps
right back home without war--by political,
economic and subversive pressures alone.
Khrushchev: "The present situation offers the
working class in a number of capitalist
countries a real opportunity to unite the
overwhelming majority of the people under its
leadership.... In these circumstances, the
working class...is in a position to defeat
the reactionary forces opposed to the popular
interest, to capture a stable majority in
parliament, and transform the latter from an
organ of bourgeois democracy into a genuine
instrument of peoples' will."
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Mikoyan: "By force of the favorable postwar
sit anon in Czechoslovakia the socialist
revolution was carrie out by peaceful means.
Communists came into power after having
allied themselves not only with the parties
of the working people which were close to
them but also with the bourgeois parties
which supported the common national front."
While some local Communists leaders have probably
been shaken by Soviet repudiation of Stalinism,
which they slavishly followed so long, they have
a chance, now, to revitalize their parties and
win back respectable intellectual'and working-
class support, previously dwindling because of
the unfailing subordination of local interests
to Soviet policy.
1. The policy line laid down in Moscow during
these past two weeks will have many reverbera-
tions in Communist circles throughout the
world. Already, there has been gratification
in Yugoslavia and consternation in France.
a. Yugoslavia: The Tito regime finds the
developments at the Congress much to its
liking. The Yugoslavs have already been
citing these developments as evidence of
the correctness of their policies in the
present international situation. The
Yugoslav press has mentioned the extent
to which the USSR has adopted views
similar to Yugoslav doctrine, in particu-
lar, the existence of differing roads to
socialism.
b. The French Communist Party, in contrast,
has largely kept from the readers of its
paper, L'Humanite, Moscow's repudiation
of Stalin sm and rigid ideological con-
formity.
The non-Communist French press is report-
ing proceedings fully and twitting Stalin-
ist French Party leaders for having just
two weeks ago expelled Pierre Herv4 from
the Central Committee for his views on
fallible leaders and non-violent roads
to socialism (remarkably similar to ideas
voiced by Khrushchev.)
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c. The Satellite press has given wide
coverage to the Congress speeches,
but has generally treated with caution
all statements reflecting on Stalin's
methods. These criticisms of Stalin
combined with the Congress' official
endorsement of "differing roads to
socialism" will probably lead to
additional problems in some Satellite
parties, whose relatively undoctrinated
rank and file may press for greater
freedom than either Moscow or the
Satellite leaders are willing to grant.
In particular, Hungarian leader Rakosi's
problem in restoring party discipline
within the Hungarian Communist party
may be intensified.
d. Communist China: Peiping is being polite,
although some Chinese may feel Khrushchev's
pretensions to being an ideologist lessen
the stature of Mao Tse-tung, who is recog-
nized as having "creatively interpreted"
Marxism-Leninism.
D. Finally, and also important for the future, the
whole Soviet regime is de is ing itseTfo main-
taining a rapid pace of development of industrial
strength.
Khrushchev: "Statistics show that in a quarter
of a cenfury ..?.- Lhe Soviet Union increased its
industrial output more than 20 fold despite
the tremendous damage done to its national
economy by the war. Meanwhile, the United
States, which enjoyed exceptionally favorable
conditions, was only able to slightly more than
double its production, while industry in the
capitalist world as a whole failed to register
such growth." . ?
"The countries of socialism are giving
unremitting attention to the development, above
all, of heavy industry, which is the foundation
for the continuous expansion of social pro-
duction as a whole."
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Saburov: "It is true that we have not
yet caught up to the United States in
the volume of the quantity of industrial
production per capita and,,so far, in
the general volume of industrial pro-
duction ...However., the pace of our
development, which by many times exceeds
the pace of growth in the United States
permits us to overcome this lagging within
a very short historic period of time."
1. The economic goals permit the USSR simultane-
ously:
a. To keep the home base solid and secure in
both economic and military contexts, even
though at some cost as regards standards
of living.
b. To export capital to the places where it
will do the most political good--especially
to the ex-colonial countries anxious to
industrialize rapidly and likely to adopt
the Soviet model if treated gently and
liberally for a while.
c. To distribute arms to countries abroad,
wherever such action will cause the most
mischief.
VII. Soviet leaders made it clear that the USSR's military
strength will be maintained at a high level, although they
emphasized that Soviet military power would be employed
only defensively, or as a deterrent to Western initiation
of hostilities.
Marshal Zhukov: "/The USSR is7 protected
1y diverse atomic and thermonuclear weapons,
powerful rocket-propelled and jet-propelled
armaments of various types, including long
range missiles."
Mikoyan: "There also exist, however, large
imperialist monopolies such as the United
States, to which war has brought no sacri-
fices, but on the contrary has been the
source of super profits. These monopolies
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are not averse to unleashing a war, al-
though the American people are against
war. They are restrained, apart from
public opinion and apart from the great
military strength of the countries of
socialism, by another new important
circumstance. This circumstance is the
appearance of atomic and hydrogen bombs
not only in America but also in the
Soviet Union, as well as the means to
carry these bombs to any point of the
earth by aircraft or rockets."
"...In the event of American aggres-
sion, hydrogen bombs can in return fall
on American cities too..."
"Hydrogen and atomic warfare can
bring about great devastation, but it
cannot result in the destruction of man-
kind and its civilization. It will des-
troy the outdated and pernicious regime
of capitalism in its imperialist stage.
Communism has no need of war. It is
against war; the ideas of Communist will
triumph without war."
VIII. The policy themes stressed by Soviet leaders at the
Congress are directed at:
A. Reducing fear of Soviet resort to war to expand
the USSR's sphere of dominance.
B. Rendering more palatable Soviet and local Communist
political methods, so as to facilitate the forma-
tion of popular front governments in non-Com-
munist countries.
IX. Soviet policy is also calculated to enhance Soviet
prestige in Asia and Africa. Khrushchev included "peace-
loving" neutral states in both Asia and Europe, along with
the Sino-Soviet bloc, in a vast "zone of peace" which now,
and especially in the future, Soviet leaders expect to play
;w decisive role in world affairs.
Kaganovich: "Lenin, analyzing the prospects
o wor Td development, wrote 83 years ago:
'The issue of the struggle ultimately
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depends upon the fact that Russia, India,
and China comprise the gigantic majority
of the population, and it is just this
majority of the population that has been
coming together at an unprecedented speed
in recent years in the struggle for
their liberation. There cannot be the
slightest doubt of what the final out-
come of the world struggle will be. In
this respect the ultimate victory of
socialism is fully and undoubtedly assured."'
"Now the whole world is watching
this remarkable prophecy of the genius
of mankind, Valdimir Ilyich Lenin, come
true."
X. As to the long-term implications, the tenor of Party
Congress declarations shows that Soviet leaders think of
"competive coexistence" as a policy of considerable dura-
tion.
A. It is highly unlikely that these men would have
undertaken the delicate and potentially dangerous
task of revising Communist dogma if they were
contemplating only some short-term, narrowly
tactical shift in line.
B. Communist policy is designed to slow down the
growth of Western strength, and exploit weaknesses
in the Western coalition.
C. At the same time, it is designed to increase Soviet
influenceon the world's :uncommitted:.-and neutralist
nations, and to manipulate them in ,support of
Communist foreign policy.
XI. All the speeches of the Soviet leaders make it clear
that the capture of power, establishment of "dictatorships
of the proletariat," and the revolutionary transformation
of society will remain the ultimate aims of Communist
parties. Khrushchev's revisions of Communist dogma con-
stitute mainly an admission that long-term Communist objec-
tives can be reached by means hitherto considered unrealistic
and for that reason wrong.
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XII. Finally, all the speakers at the Congress struck a
note of deep confidence in the strength of the Communist
world and in the inevitability of its ultimate triumph
over capitalism. Examples:
Khrushchev: "The Soviet State is grow-
ing and gathering strength. It towers
like a powerful lighthouse showing all
humanity the road to a new world.... Our
cause is invincible.... The future is
ours.... Under the banner of the World-
transforming teachings of Marxism-Lenin-
ism, the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union will lead the Soviet people to the
complete triumph of communism." (stormy
and long applause turning into an ovation;
all rise).
Mikoyan: "Not a single major international
question can now be solved by the will
of the Western Powers alone without re-
gard for the views of the Soviet Union,
China, and all the countries of socialism.
In the minds of humanity, socialism is
now incomparably stronger than capitalism.
That is why it is not for us to fear a
struggle between the ideas of socialism
and capitalism. That is why our Party...
so...openly declared that we are against
war but in favor of competition between
two systems, in favor of a struggle be-
tween the two ideologies under conditions
of peaceful coexistence."
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