SOVIET DESTRUCTION OF STALIN MYTH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000400310002-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 22, 1956
• Content Type: BRIEF

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act- 1 '58
22 March 1956
SOVIET DESTRUCTION OF STALIN MYTH
i. Clearest view of recent events in USSR comes from hard
look at known facts, and recent history.
A. Fact that, during three years since his death
(5 Mar'53) Stalin's position has been undergoing
gradual and calculated alterations.
1. Pattern consisted of playing Lenin up, Stalin
down: campaign was rolling by Jan '54 (Lenin's
30th anniversary), when Stalin was described as
"continuator of Lenins cause", rather than
independent genius of equal stature.
2. By time of second anniversary Stalin's death
(5 Mar '55), day went by almost unmarked.
B. Thus, Stalin myth already well-whittled even before
Feb '56 Party Congress. Nonetheless, this occasion--
first meeting of Party rank-and-file since Stalin's
death--was first when really major, although oblique,
blows were publicly struck at remnant of myth.
1_
'restoration
of the norms of Party life elaborated by Lenin,
which have previously been often violated."
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ga n~F 1 t ;UJ2
2. Mika an 1Q~
y , k'' as . o ..v . Z
...we must emphasize this old truth because
in the course of about 20 years, we in fact
had no collective leadership."
C. Not until 10 March, however, (French Embassy recep-
tion) did Amb. Bohlen first catch wind of then two-
week old event which underlies present excitement.
1. At reception, two different sources (one the
London Daily Worker correspondent, the other
unidentified by Bohlen) told him of secret
closed session of 20th Party Congress, (other
sources state night of 24 Feb. until 4 A.M.)
where Khrushchev had spoken for two to three
hours," giving "chapter and verse" on Stalin's
"crimes." According these sources:
2. Khrushchev, who burst into tears three times
during speech, charged that Stalin decimated
party, executed many of outstanding leaders
without cause, and (following purge of
Tukhachevsky) "murdered" the 5,003 best offi-
cers in armed forces.
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3. Said that, at one time, when any important
Communist summoned to Stalin's presence, he
first took farewell of his family. Said tor-
ture was used to extract confessions: those
who confessed were promised "dachas," but in
fact received "dachas underground."
4. Said Stalin had disregarded repeated warnings,
including some from Churchill, of imminent
Nazi attack and, as result, USSR had barely
escaped catastrophic defeat.
5. Said all these "facts" justified attitude of
present leadership toward Stalin and that
statues and other signs glorification Stalin
to be progressively eliminated.
D. Bohlen commented that, while tale obviously losing
nothing in its telling, highly probable some such
;secret" speech actually made.
E. Bohlen also stated Party officials throughout USSR
rumored to be in receipt substance of "secret," speech,
but that nothing had appeared in Soviet press by
12 Mar., and Soviet censors not passing foreign
journalists' stories on subject.
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Ii. Within few days of Bohlen report, world press was having
heyday with "secret speech" story--and now we leave realm
of established fact.
A. Typical press treatment was 15 March Reuters version
which had Khrushchev accusing Stalin, of:
1. '36 removal (followed by execution) of NKVD
head Yagoda, his replacement by Yezhov, and
after '37 "purges," liquidation of Yezhov him-
self.
2. Liquidation, a deca
Politburo econ
of N. Voznesensky,
se disappeara
prised Mown Politburo agues.
3. Insults and threats to Mme. Lenin (Krupskaya)
including declaration that if widow kept up
public criticism of him, he would issue declara-
tion she had never been Lenin's wife, put
"someone else" in her place.
4. At start of June '40lGerman attacks Stalin
attributed them to "indiscipline" on part of
certain Hitler units, ordered Soviet troops
not to return fire. Later, when Germans reached
outskirts of Moscow, Stalin--who had been di-
recting operations "from a school globe, with-
out really knowing what a proper map was"--
cravenly fled the city, lamenting "we have
lost everything that Lenin created."
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5. In postwar atmosphere of "fear and terror"
under Stalin, Bulganin feared prison, Voroshilov
was suspected as UK agent, Molotov was put un-
der house-arrest.
Khrushchev added that
Stalin had been a vio-
lent nationalist, anti-Semitic (and engineer
of "Doctors' Plot"), and responsible for tor-
ture even of children during 'kpurges", and
that this revelation of the true Stalin could
be "spread to the people either suddenly or
gradually, and I think it would be more correct
to do it gradually." Asked from floor, "how
did you stand it? Why didn't you kill him?",
Khrushchev replied: "What could we do? There
was a reign of terror. You just had to look
at him wrongly, and the next day you lost your
head."
III. Next mixture of fact and press embroidery to arise was
over early March disorders in Georgia.
A. Known facts are these, from 15 March Embassy Moscow
report: A Scandanavian diplomatic dependent, re-
cently returned to Moscow from trip, had eyewit-
nessed "noisy demonstrations" in front Tiflis Gov't.
building 7 Mar. Later, while traveled by train
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from Sochi to Moscow, she was recipient of remarks
by "agitated" Soviet lady fellow-passenger.
1. Passenger related that "extremely brutal"
police had fired "breast-high" on out-of-hand
8 Mar. Tiflis student demonstration, and that
her son, among demonstrators, escaped injury
only by throwing self on ground before machine-
gunning began.
B. We also know as fact that 3rd anniversary of Stalin's
death (5 Mar '56) had gone unremarked throughout
USSR, but that on 9 Mar. the Georgian Party paper,
"Dawn of the East," front-paged big picture of
Stalin and Lenin, plus editorial calling hometown
boy "the outstanding pupil of great Lenin."
C. Also have fact of admission by ex-premier Malenkov,
visiting in London, that, although British press
reports exaggerated, "there had been demonstrations"
in Tiflis.
IV. World press had second heyday on Georgia story.
A. Reuters reported(from Vienna, 17 Mar.) that "hun-
dreds of thousands of angered demonstrators in
Stalin's native Georgia" on 8 Mar. had demanded
dismissal of USSR's present leaders "for making
accusations against late Premier," and that police
refused to intervene, troops ordered not to fire.
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V. No queltion but.that press accounts of Georgia dis-
turbance both exaggerated and demonstrably inaccurate.
However, turning to hard facts, we do know that variety
of people i USSR have reacted strongly to Khrushchev's
"secret' spee h. Among facts are:
A. TASS repo (18 March) of "explanatory" speeches
by Mikoyan d fellow-presidium member Pervukhin
factories.
B. Embassy Moscow re ort (20 Mar) that current "party
line" on Stalin bei g given full treatment at series
meetings party "activ'sts," and general outline
Khrushchev "secret" spe ch widely known among non-
party circles Moscow.
C. Typical reaction one such n n-party source (Moscow
scenario writer) reported as hock, together with
feeling that, while he had been no lover Stalin's
policies, "something great I beli ved in has died."
Scenarist further commented: "it t ok courage for
our leaders to admit they were afrai
D. Embassy also reports that, as late as Mar,
Soviet domestic press still not criticize g Stalin
by name, and domestic reprints of foreign L mmunist
attacks on Stalin (Rakosi, Ulbricht and Togla.tti)
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continue to delet'dire Lmne eferences merely
note that spe ers coed - 1UVrsonality cult."
VI. Interesting evidence Soviet uncertainty over this hot
issue is fact that censors have passed both 19 Mar. AFP
statement that "secret" Khrushchev speech actually was
made, and 17 Mar. NY Times dispatch from Murmansk which
underlined shock,. puzzlement and dismay of arctic man-
in-street over Moscow's "reassessment Stalin."
Declaring flatly "party workers are explaining
things," Times story quotes Murmansk resident as
saying "it is no easy thing to make corrections
in the policy of personal cultism that has pre-
vailed for so long and under which so many of our
youth grow up."
B. Times story also quotes young Komsomol as saying
in response to some of new statements on Stalin:
"ridiculous; Stalin was wonderful. Stalin and
Lenin, they are two of the same. when you say
Lenin, you can also say Stalin."
C. Meanwhile, apparently indifferent to internal re-
action, leadership is continuing debunking cam-
paign. Have these further facts:
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1. Tretyakov Gallery (Soviet ? national
museum")--which once overwhelmed with
Stalin pictures and statues--now con-
tains only one small bust of former
dictator.
2. Stalin statues also disappearing from other
sections Moscow.
3. Rewrite of Party History already in
progress.
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