(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000400310004-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 1998
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 1999/09/08 :CIA-RDP80R01443R000400310004-1
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 :CIA-RDP80R01443R000400310004-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08: CI - 4438000400310004-1
VII. At end this review of fa.ets, ca.n a.sk
what does destruction of Stalin myth
mean for present Soviet regime? As we
~,
see it, campaign brings present regime
I
advantages, but also embarrassment a.nd
dangers.
A. Some of a;dva.ntages--
Abroad: Will reduce bad odor of
Communism; facilitates winning
', cooperation of non-Communist left
intellectuals in popular fronts;
get nationalist leaders behind
neutral or pro-USSR policy.
At Home: Will strengthen regime a,nd
'' broaden its base, by encouraging
honest competence in upper layers of
bureaucracy a,nd reducing fear of
police terror.
Both at Home a,nd Abroad: Will provide
convenient scapegoat for all past
Soviet iniquities d
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ro
B. Advanta.gesAsome extent counter-
. ba,laneed by difficulties inherent
for Soviet leaders in iconocla.stie
course. One problem":
C. Most of these leaders were Sta.lin's
own hatchet-men for many years.
1. Khrushchev held key jobs under
Stalin after 1935 (18 years),
2. Bulga.nin held key jobs under
Stalin after 1931 (21 years).
3. Mikoya.n held key jobs after
1922 (30 years)..
4. Ra.ganovich held key jobs after
1924 (28 years).
5. Ma.lenkov probably member Stalin's
personal Secretariat beginning
1925 (27 years).
6. Molotov close associate of
Stalin a.t least from 1912
~ (40 years),
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-~~ r-.
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D. Another problem: although Soviet
leaders are anxious to dissociate
themselves from Stalin's reputation
for cruelty and violence, they do
not intend to relinquish benefits,
acquired b~ Sta.lin, which they now
j enjoying.
VIII . Finally, although "Opera.tion Rethink'
on Stalin will probably not upset
internal security of USSR, it opens king-
size Fandora's box of embarrassing
questions with which ghrushchev and
Company will have to deal:
A. Since Stalin is a dishonored prophet,
', perhaps all his books (esp. Problems
of Leninism) will have to be burned
(history of his eaa, esp. History of
the CPSU: Short Course, is already
being rewritten).
B. Old associates of Stalin axe surely
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to go--b~olotov? Ma,lenkov?
~~
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C. Stalinist-type Satellite leaders
bound to be uneasy: Beirut (pola.nd)
died conveniently, Rakosi (Hungary)
is feeling shaky.
D. Mao Tse-tong now surely replaces
Stalin as leading modern Communist
theoretician--does this mean that
Ma,o and Lenin are equal greats?
E. Regime will be under some pressure
to indicate which of various Soviet
foreign policies were Stalin's a.nd
henceforth to be repudiated by "good"
collective leadership (Korean wa.r?
Berlin blockade? etc.)
F. Since most of existing interna.tiona.l
agreements with West (Ya.lta, Potsdam)
were personally Sta.lin's, what
commitments does the USSR now stand
by, and what ones does it repudiate?
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G. Communists, a,s well as intellectuals
in the socialist and non-Communist
left., will remember and ought to be
reminded that Stalin also started
out with "collective lea,derships~+;
a.nd a.s ma.tter of fact ran through
several sets of collectives before
emerging as undisputed arbiter about
1929. ,,(Stalin-Zinoviev-Ka.menev vs,
Trotsky 1924-25); (Sta.lin-Bukharin-
Rykov-Tomsky vs. Trotsky-Zinoviev-
Kamenev 1925-Z?); (Stalin-I~olotov-
. Voroshilov-A~ikoyan vs. Bukha.rin-
Rykov-Tomsky 192?-29),
r~x?4`6^
H. Regime may be pressed to admit that
Stalin murdered Trotsky, a.nd even
to restore Trotsky to place of honor
', with Lenin.
I, Lenin's caustic criticisms of Stalin,
warning he wa,s a. menace, if printed,
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stibsequen Ql~,
.. ~.-_
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J. The Soviet people must wonder how
they can tell when they have an "evil
dictatorship*' end when they have
}'collective leadership," both of
which look much the same from any-
where outside the top circles.
K. Ethnic Great Russians must wonder if
a. Ukranian plot to take over Moscow
isn't following hard upon the heels
of Georgian tyranny.
L. Some Stalinist behavior since Stalin's
death (e.g., Beria's ~udicia.l murder)
will have to be explained a,wa,y more
a.dequa.tely than in past.
M. Task of renaming all the cities
(Sta.lingra.d, Stalinaba,d, etc.) , to
say nothing of streets (like Berlin's
Stalin Allee), could keep Soviet
Bureaucracy out of mischief for a
long time.
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~.~~~'
~~~?
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N. More seriously, Soviet leaders must
be a.fra.id some people will think
that situation-calls for Army take-
over, since military is only force
relatively untainted by Stalinism.
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