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December 23, 2016
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January 15, 2014
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August 20, 1965
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?"--`? ? -11. Declassified and Aooroved For Release 2014/01/15 : Cl -RDP8OR01580R001603420034-1 .IP 1 27 Aug 65 TO: DDCl/Helms ROOM NO. BUILDING 1 REMARKS: FROM: ER ROOM NO. BUILDING 1 EXTENSION FORM NO. _ 9/11 REPLACES FORM 36-3 * GPO:1957-0-439445 D classified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA RDP8OR01580R001603420034-1 (0) Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 Why Vietnam THE ROOTS OF COMMITMENT TOWARD PEACE WITH HONOR THE TASKS OF DIPLOMACY THE -TASKS OF DEFENSE THE CHALLENGE OF HUMAN NEED Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 \ Why Vietnam THE ROOTS OF COMMITMENT TOWARD PEACE WITH HONOR THE TASKS OF DIPLOMACY THE TASKS OF DEFENSE THE CHALLENGE OF HUMAN NEED Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 Foreword My fellow Americans: Once again in man's age-old struggle for a better life and a world of peace, the wisdom, courage, and compassion of the American people are being put to the test. This is the meaning of the tragic conflict in Vietnam. In meeting the present challenge, it is essential that our people seek understanding, and that our leaders speak with candor. I have therefore directed that this report to the American people be compiled and widely dis- tributed. In its pages you will find statements on Vietnam by three leaders of your Government?by your President, your Secretary of State, and your Secretary of Defense. These statements were prepared for different audiences, and they reflect the differing responsi- bilities of each speaker. The congressional testi- mony has been edited to avoid undue repetition and to incorporate the sense of the discussions that ensued. Together, they construct a clear definition of America's role in the Vietnam conflict: ? the dangers and hopes that Vietnam holds for all free men ? the fullness and limits of our national ob- jectives in a war we did not seek ? the constant effort on our part to bring this war we do not desire to a quick and honor- able end. AUGUST 20, 1965. Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 Why Vietnam Page Foreword jjj The Roots of Commitment vii Toward Peace With Honor: President Lyndon B. Johnson 5 The Tasks of Diplomacy: Dean Rusk 9 The Tasks of Defense: Robert S. McNamara 19 The Challenge of Human Need: President Lyndon B. Johnson 25 (v) Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 The ROots of Commitment In the historic documents that follow, two American Presidents define and affirm the commitment of the United States to the people of South Vietnam. In letters to Prime Minister Churchill in 1954 and to President Diem in 1954 and 1960, President Eisenhower describes the issues at stake and pledg es United States assistance in South Vietnam's resistance to subversion and aggression. And in December 1961 President Kennedy reaffirms that pledge. Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 Extracts From Letter From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Churchill, April 4, 1954 (From Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953- 1956, New York, 1963) Dear Winston: I am sure . . . you are following with the deepest interest and anxiety the daily reports of the gallant fight being put up by the French at Dien Bien Phu. Today, the situation there does not seem hopeless. But regardless of the outcome of this particular battle, I fear that the French cannot alone see the thing through, this despite the very substantial as- sistance in money and materiel that we are giving them. It is no solution simply to urge the French to intensify their efforts. And if they do not see it through and Indochina passes into the hands of the Communists the ultimate effect on our and your global strategic position with the consequent shift in the power ratios throughout Asia and the Pacific could be disastrous and, I know, unacceptable to you and me. . . . This has led us to the hard conclusion that the situation in Southeast Asia re- quires us urgently to take serious and far-reaching decisions. Geneva is less than four weeks away. There the possibility of the Communists driving a wedge be- tween us will, given the state of mind in France, be infinitely greater than at Berlin. I can understand the very natural desire of the French to seek an end to this war which has been bleeding them for eight years. But our painstaking search for a way out of the impasse has reluctantly forced us to the con- clusion that there is no negotiated solution of the Indochina problem which in its essence would not be either a face-saving device to cover a French sur- render or a face-saving device to cover a Commu- nist retirement. The first alternative is too serious in its broad strategic implications for us and for you to be acceptable. . . . Somehow we must contrive to bring about the second alternative. The preliminary lines of our thinking were sketched out by Foster [Dulles] in his speech last Monday night when he said that under the conditions of today the imposition on Southeast Asia of the political system of Commu- nist Russia and its Chinese Communist ally, by whatever means, would be a grave threat to the whole free community, and that in our view this possibility should now be met by united action and not passively accepted. . . . I believe that the best way to put teeth in this concept and to bring greater moral and material resources to the support of the French effort is through the establishment of a new, ad hoc group- ing or coalition composed of nations which have a vital concern in the checking of Communist expan- sion in the area. I have in mind, in addition to our two countries, France, the Associated States, Aus- tralia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines The United States government would expect to play its full part in such a coalition. . . . The important thing is that the coalition must be strong and it must be willing to join the fight if necessary. I do not envisage the need of any appre- ciable ground forces on your or our part. . . . If I may refer again to history; we failed to halt Hirohito, Mussolini and Hitler by not acting in unity and in time. That marked the beginning of many years of stark tragedy and desperate peril. May it not be that our nations have learned some- thing from that lesson? . . . With warm regard, Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 IKE. Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 Letter From President Eisenhower to President Diem, October i, 1954 Dear Mr. President: I have been following with great interest the course of developments in Vietnam, particularly since the conclusion of the conference at Geneva. The implications of the agreement concerning Vietnam have caused grave concern regarding the future of a country temporarily divided by an arti- ficial military grouping, weakened by a long and exhausting war and faced with enemies without and by their subversive collaborators within. Your recent requests for aid to assist in the formidable project of the movement of several hundred thousand loyal Vietnamese citizens away from areas which are passing under a de facto rule and political ideology which they abhor, are being fulfilled. I am glad that the United States is able to assist in this humanitarian effort. We have been exploring ways and means to permit our aid to Vietnam to be more effective and to make a greater contribution to the welfare and stability of the Government of Vietnam. I am, accordingly, instructing the American Ambas- sador to Vietnam to examine with you in your capacity as Chief of Government, how an intelli- gent program of American aid given directly to your Government can serve to assist Vietnam in its present hour of trial, provided that your Gov- ernment is prepared to give assurances as to the standards of performance it would be able to main- tain in the event such aid were supplied. The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and main- taining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through mili- tary means. The Government of the United States expects that this aid will be met by perform- ance on the part of the Government of Vietnam in undertaking needed reforms. It hopes that such aid, combined with your own continuing efforts, will contribute effectively toward an independent Vietnam endowed with a strong government. Such a government would, I hope, be so responsive to the nationalist aspirations of its people, so en- lightened in purpose and effective in performance, that it will be respected both at home and abroad and discourage any who might wish to impose a foreign ideology on your free people. Sincerely, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER. Letter From President Eisenhower to President Diem, October 26, 1960 Dear Mr. President: My countrymen and I are proud to convey our good wishes to you and to the citizens of Vietnam on the fifth anniversary of the birth of the Republic of Vietnam. We have watched the courage and daring with which you and the Vietnamese people attained in- dependence in a situation so perilous that many thought it hopeless. We have admired the ra- pidity with which chaos yielded to order and prog- ress replaced despair. During the years of your independence it has been refreshing for us to observe how clearly the Govern- ment and the citizens of Vietnam have faced the fact that the greatest danger to their independence 2 was Communism. You and your countrymen have used your strength well in accepting the double challenge of building your country and resisting Communist imperialism. In five short years since the founding of the Republic, the Vietnamese peo- ple have developed their country in almost every sector. I was particularly impressed by one ex- ample. I am informed that last year over 1,200,- 000 Vietnamese children were able to go to elemen- tary school; three times as many as were enrolled five years earlier. This is certainly a heartening development for Vietnam's future. At the same time Vietnam's ability to defend itself from the Communists has grown immeasurably since its suc- cessful struggle to become an independent Republic. Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 Vietnam's very success as well as its potential wealth and its strategic location have led the Com- munists of Hanoi, goaded by the bitterness of their failure to enslave all Vietnam, to use increasing vio- lence in their attempts to destroy your country's freedom. This grave threat, added to the strains and fa- tigues of the long struggle to achieve and strengthen independence, must be a burden that would cause moments of tension and concern in almost any hu- man heart. Yet from long observation I sense how deeply the Vietnamese value their country's inde- pendence and strength and I know how well you used your boldness when you led your countrymen in winning it. I also know that your determination has been a vital factor in guarding that independ- ence while steadily advancing the economic devel- opment of your country. I am confident that these same qualities of determination and boldness will meet the renewed threat as well as the needs and desires of your countrymen for further progress on all fronts. Although the main responsibility for guarding that independence will always, as it has in the past, belong to the Vietnamese people and their govern- ment, I want to assure you that for so long as our strength can be useful, the United States will con- tinue to assist Vietnam in the difficult yet hopeful struggle ahead. Sincerely, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER. Letter From President Kennedy to President Diem, December 14,i 96 Dear M. President: I have received your recent letter in which you described so cogently the dangerous condition caused by North Vietnam's efforts to take over your country. The situation in your embattled country is well known to me and to the American people. We have been deeply disturbed by the assault on your country. Our indignation has mounted as the deliberate savagery of the Communist program of assassination, kidnapping and wanton violence became clear. Your letter underlines what our own information has convincingly shown?that the campaign of force and terror now being waged against your peo- ple and your Government is supported and directed from the outside by the authorities at Hanoi. They have thus violated the provisions of the Geneva Ac- cords designed to ensure peace in Vietnam and to which they bound themselves in 1954. At that time, the United States, although not a party to the Accords, declared that it "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security." We continue to maintain that view. In accordance with that declaration, and in re- sponse to your request, we are prepared to help the Republic of Vietnam to protect its people and to preserve its independence. We shall promptly in- crease our assistance to your defense effort as well as help relieve the destruction of the floods which you describe. I have already given the orders to get these programs underway. The United States, like the Republic of Vietnam, remains devoted to the cause of peace and our pri- mary purpose is to help your people maintain their independence. If the Communist authorities in North Vietnam will stop their campaign to destroy the Republic of Vietnam, the measures we are tak- ing to assist your defense efforts will no longer be necessary. We shall seek to persuade the Commu- nists to give up their attempts of force and subver- sion. In any case, we are confident that the Viet- namese people will preserve their independence and gain the peace and prosperity for which they have sought so hard and so long. JOHN F. KENNEDY. 3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 Toward Peace With Honor Press Conference Statement by the President, The White House, July 28, 1965 Not long ago I received a letter from a woman in the Midwest. She wrote: DEAR Mn. PRESIDENT: In my humble way I am writing to you about the crisis in Vietnam. I have a son who is now in Vietnam. My husband served in World War II. Our country was at war, but now, this time, it is just some- thing that I don't understand. Why? I have tried to answer that question a dozen times and more in practically every State in this Union. I discussed it fully in Baltimore in April; in Washington in May; in San Francisco in June. Let me again, now, discuss it here in the East Room of the White House. Why must young Americans?born into a land exultant with hope and golden with promise?toil and suffer and sometimes die in such a remote and distant place? The answer, like the war itself, is not an easy one. But it echoes clearly from the painful les- sons of half a century. Three times in my life- time, in two world wars and in Korea, Americans have gone to far lands to fight for freedom. We have learned at a terrible and brutal cost that re- treat does not bring safety and weakness does not bring peace. THE NATURE OF THE WAR It is this lesson that has brought us to Vietnam. This is a different kind of war. There are no marching armies or solemn declarations. Some citizens of South Vietnam, at times with under- standable grievances, have joined in the attack on their own government. But we must not let this mask the central fact that this is really war. It is guided by North Vietnam and spurred by Commu- nist China. Its goal is to conquer the South, to de- feat American power, and to extend the Asiatic dominion of communism. THE STAKES IN VIETNAM And there are great stakes in the balance. Most of the non-Communist nations of Asia can- not, by themselves and alone, resist the growing might and grasping ambition of Asian communism. Our power, therefore, is a vital shield. If we are driven from the field in Vietnam, then no nation can ever again have the same confidence in Amer- ican promise, or in American protection. In each land the forces of independence would be consid- erably weakened. And an Asia so threatened by Communist domination would imperil the security of the United States itself. We did not choose to be the guardians at the gate, but there is no one else. Nor would surrender in Vietnam bring peace. We learned from Hitler at Munich that success only feeds the appetite of aggression. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another, bringing with it perhaps even larger and crueler conflict. Moreover, we are in Vietnam to fulfill one of the most solemn pledges of the American Nation. Three Presidents?President Eisenhower, Presi- dent Kennedy, and your present President?over 11 years, have committed themselves and have promised to help defend this small and valiant nation. Strengthened by that promise, the people of South Vietnam have fought for many long years. Thousands of them have died. Thousands more have been crippled and scarred by war. We can- not now dishonor our word or abandon our com- mitment or leave those who believed us and who trusted us to the terror and repression and murder that would follow. This, then, my fellow Americans, is why we are in Vietnam. 5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 INCREASED EFFORT TO HALT AGGRESSION What are our goals in that war-stained land? First: We intend to convince the Communists that we cannot be defeated by force of arms or by superior power. They are not easily convinced. In recent months they have greatly increased their fighting forces, their attacks, and the number of incidents. I have asked the commanding general, General Westmoreland, what more he needs to meet this mounting aggression. He has told me. We will meet his needs. I have today ordered to Vietnam the Air Mobile Division and certain other forces which will raise our fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men almost immediately. Additional forces will be needed later, and they will be sent as requested. This will make it necessary to increase our active fighting forces by raising the monthly draft call from 17,000 over a period of time, to 35,000 per month, and stepping up our campaign for vol- untary enlistments. After this past week of deliberations, I have con- cluded that it is not essential to order Reserve units into service now. If that necessity should later be indicated, I will give the matter most careful con- sideration. And I will give the country adequate notice before taking such action, but only after full preparations. We have also discussed with the Government of South Vietnam lately the steps that they will take to substantially increase their own effort?both on the battlefield and toward reform and progress in the villages. Ambassador Lodge is now formulat- ing a new program to be tested upon his return to that area. I have directed Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara to be available immediately to the Congress to review with the appropriate congres- sional committees our plan in these areas I have asked them to be available to answer the questions of any Member of Congress. Secretary McNamara, in addition, will ask the Senate Appropriations Committee to add a limited amount to present legislation to help meet part of this new cost until a supplemental measure is ready and hearings can be held when the Congress as- sembles in January. 6 In the meantime, we will use the authority con- tained in the present Defense appropriations bill now to transfer funds, in addition to the additional money that we will request. These steps, like our actions in the past, are care- fully measured to do what must be done to bring an end to aggression and a peaceful settlement. We do not want an expanding struggle with con- sequences that no one can foresee. Nor will we bluster or bully or flaunt our power. But we will not surrender. And we will not retreat. For behind our American pledge lies the deter- mination and resources of all of the American Nation. TOWARD A PEACEFUL SOLUTION Second, once the Communists know, as we know, that a violent solution is impossible, then a peace- ful solution is inevitable. We are ready now, as we have always been, to move from the battlefield to the conference table. I have stated publicly, and many times, America's willingness to begin uncon- ditional discussions with any government at any place at any time. Fifteen efforts have been made to start these discussions, with the help of 40 na- tions throughout the world. But there has been no answer. But we are going to continue to persist, if per- sist we must, until death and desolation have led to the same conference table where others could now join us at a much smaller cost. I have spoken many times of our objectives in Vietnam. So has the Government of South Viet- nam. Hanoi has set forth its own proposal. We are ready to discuss their proposals and our pro- posals and any proposals of any government whose people may be affected. For we fear the meeting room no more than we fear the battlefield. THE UNITED NATIONS In this pursuit we welcome, and we ask for, the concern and the assistance of any nation and all nations. If the United Nations and its officials? or any one of its 114 members?can, by deed or word, private initiative or public action, bring us Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 nearer an honorable peace, then they will have the support and the gratitude of the United States of America. I have directed Ambassador Goldberg to go to New York today and to present immediately to Sec- retary-General U Thant a letter from me requesting that all of the resources, energy, and immense pres- tige of the United Nations be employed to find ways to halt aggression and to bring peace in Vietnam. I made a similar request at San Francisco a few weeks ago. FREE CHOICE FOR VIETNAM We do not seek the destruction of any gov9rn- ment, nor do we covet a foot of any territory. But we insist, and we will always insist, that the people of South Vietnam shall have the right of choice, the right to shape their own destiny in free elections in the South, or throughout all Vietnam under inter- national supervision. And they shall not have any government imposed upon them by force and terror so long as we can prevent it. This was the purpose of the 1954 agreements which the Communists have now cruelly shattered. If the machinery of those agreements was tragically weak, its purposes still guide our action. As battle rages, we will continue as best we can to help the good people of South Vietnam enrich the condition of their life?to feed the hungry, to tend the sick?teach the young, shelter the home- less, and help the farmer to increase his crops, and the worker to find a job. PROGRESS IN HUMAN WELFARE It is an ancient, but still terrible, irony that while many leaders of men create division in pursuit of grand ambitions, the children of man are united in the simple elusive desire for a life of fruitful and re- warding toil. As I said at Johns Hopkins in Baltimore, I hope that one day we can help all the people of Asia toward that desire. Eugene Black has made great progress since my appearance in Baltimore in that direction, not as the price of peace?for we are ready always to bear a more painful cost?but rather as a part of our obligations of justice toward our fellow man. THE DIFFICULTY OF DECISION Let me also add a personal note. I do not find it easy to send the flower of our youth, our finest young men, into battle. I have spoken to you today of the divisions and the forces and the battalions and the units. But I know them all, every one. I have seen them in a thousand streets, in a hundred towns, in every State in this Union?working and laughing, building, and filled with hope and life. I think that I know, too, how their mothers weep and how their families sorrow. This is the most agonizing and the most painful duty of your Presi? dent. A NATION WHICH BUILDS There is something else, too. When I was young, poverty was so common that we didn't know it had a name. Education was something you had to fight for. And water was life itself. I have now been in public life 35 years, more than three decades, and in each of those 35 years I have seen good men, and wise leaders, struggle to bring the blessings of this land to all of our people. Now I am the President. It is now my opportunity to help every child get an education, to help every Negro and every American citizen have an equal opportunity, to help every family get a decent home and to help bring healing to the sick and dignity to the old. As I have said before, that is what I have lived for. That is what I have wanted all my life. And I do not want to see all those hopes and all those dreams of so many people for so many years now drowned in the wasteful ravages of war. I am going to do all I can to see that that never happens. But I also know, as a realistic public servant, that as long as there are men who hate and destroy we must have the courage to resist, or we will see it all, all that we have built, all that we hope to build, all of our dreams for freedom?all swept away on the flood of conquest. So this too shall not happen; we will stand in Vietnam. 7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 I Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 The Tasks of Diplomacy Statement by Secretary of State Dean Rusk August As the President has said, "there are great stakes in the balance" in Vietnam today. Let us be clear about those stakes. With its archipelagos, Southeast Asia contains rich natural resources and some 200 million people. Geo- graphically, it has great strategic importance?it dominates the gateway between the Pacific and Indian Oceans and flanks the Indian subcontinent on one side, and Australia and New Zealand on the other. The loss of Southeast Asia to the Com- munists would constitute a serious shift in the bal- ance of power against the interests of the free world. And the loss of South Vietnam would make the defense of the rest of Southeast Asia much more costly and difficult. That is why the SEATO Council has said that the defeat of the aggression against South Vietnam is "essential" to the security of Southeast Asia. But much more is at stake than preserving the independence of the peoples of Southeast Asia and preventing the vast resources of that area from be- ing swallowed by those hostile to freedom. THE TEST The war in Vietnam is a test of a technique of ag- gression: what the Communists, in their upside- down language, call "wars of national liberation." They use the term to describe any effort by Commu- nists, short of large-scale war, to destroy by force any non-Communist government. Thus the leaders of the Communist terrorists in such an independent democracy as Venezuela are described as leaders of a fight for "national liberation." And a recent edi- torial in Pravda said that "the upsurge of the na- tional liberation movement in Latin American countries has been to a great extent a result of the activities of Communist parties." Communist leaders know, as the rest of the world knows, that thermonuclear war would be ruinous. before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 3, 1965 They know that large-scale invasions, such as that launched in Korea 15 years ago, would bring great risks and heavy penalties. So, they have resorted to semi-concealed aggression through the infiltration of arms and trained military personnel across na- tional frontiers. And the Asian Communists them- selves regard the war in Vietnam as a critical test of that technique. Recently General Giap, leader of North Vietnam's army, said: If the special warfare that the U.S. imperialists are test- ing in South Vietnam is overcome, then it can be defeated everywhere in the world. In Southeast Asia, the Communists already have publicly designated Thailand as the next target. And if the aggression against South Vietnam were permitted to succeed, the forces of militant com- munism everywhere would be vastly heartened and we could expect to see a series of so-called "wars of liberation" in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. International law does not restrict internal revolution. But it does restrict what third powers may lawfully do in sending arms and men to bring about insurrection. What North Vietnam is doing in South Vietnam flouts not only the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 but general interna- tional law. The assault on the Republic of Vietnam is, beyond question, an aggression. It was organized and has been directed by North Vietnam, with the backing of Communist China. The cadres of guerrilla fighters, saboteurs, and assassins who form the backbone of the Viet Cong were specially trained in the North. Initially, many of them were men of South Vietnamese birth who had fought with the Viet Minh against the French and gone North in their military units after Vietnam was divided in 1951. But that reservoir was gradually exhausted. During 1964 and since, most of the military men infiltrated from the North have been 9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 natives of North Vietnam. And near the end of last year they began to include complete units of the regular North Vietnamese army. In addition to trained men and political and military direction, the North has supplied arms and ammunition in increasing quantities?in considerable part of Chinese manufacture. Between 1959 and the end of 1964, 40,000 trained military personnel came down from the North into South Vietnam, by conservative esti- mate. More have come this year. Had all these crossed the line at once?as the North Koreans did in invading South Korea 15 years ago?nobody in the free world could have doubted that the as- sault on Vietnam was an aggression. That the di- viding line between North and South Vietnam was intended to be temporary does not make the attack any less of an aggression. The dividing line in Korea also was intended to be temporary. If there is ever to be peace in this world, aggres- sion must cease. We as a nation are committed to peace and the rule of law. We recognize also the harsh reality that our security is involved. We are committed to oppose aggression not only through the United Nations Charter but through many defensive alliances. We have 42 allies, not counting the Republic of Vietnam. And many other nations know that their security depends up- on us. Our power and our readiness to use it to assist others to resist aggression, the integrity of our commitment, these are the bulwarks of peace in the world. If we were to fail in Vietnam, serious conse- quences would ensue. Our adversaries would be encouraged to take greater risks elsewhere. At the same time, the confidence which our allies and other free nations now have in our commitments would be seriously impaired. THE COMMITMENT Let us be clear about our commitment in Viet- nam. It began with the Southeast Asia Treaty, which was negotiated and signed after the Geneva agree- ments and the cease-fire in Indo-China in 1954 and was approved by the United States Senate by a vote of 82 to 1 in February 1955. That Treaty protects against Communist aggression not only its members but any of the three non-Communist states growing 10 out of former French Indo-China which asks for protection. Late in 1954 President Eisenhower, with biparti- san support, decided to extend aid to South Viet- nam, both economic aid and aid in training its armed forces. His purpose, as he said, was to "assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resist- ing attempted subversion or aggression through military means." Vietnam became a Republic in 1955, was recog- nized as an independent nation by 36 nations ini- tially and is so recognized by more than 50 today. Beginning in 1955, the Congress has each year approved overall economic and military assistance programs in which the continuation of major aid to South Vietnam has been specifically considered. During the next five years, South Vietnam made remarkable economic and social progress?what some observers described as a "miracle." Nearly a million refugees from the North were settled. These were the stout-hearted people of whom the late Dr. Tom Dooley wrote so eloquently in his first book, Deliver Us From Evil, and who led him to devote the rest of his all too brief life to helping the people of Vietnam and Laos. A land reform program was launched. A com- prehensive system of agricultural credit was set up. Thousands of new schools and more than 3,500 vil- lage health stations were built. Rail transportation was restored and roads were repaired and im- proved. South Vietnam not only fed itself but re- sumed rice exports. Production of rubber and sugar rose sharply. New industries were started. Per capita income rose by twenty percent. By contrast, North Vietnam suffered a drop of ten percent in food production and disappointments in industrial production. In 1954, Hanoi almost certainly had expected to take over South Vietnam within a few years. But by 1959 its hopes had withered and the South was far outstripping the heralded "Communist para- dise." These almost certainly were the factors which led Hanoi to organize and launch the assault on the South. I beg leave to quote from a statement I made at a press conference on May 4, 1961: Since late in 1959 organized Communist activity in the form of guerrilla raids against army and security units Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 of the Government of Vietnam, terrorist acts against local officials and civilians, and other subversive activities in the Republic of Vietnam have increased to levels unprece- dented since the Geneva Agreements of 1954. During this period the organized armed strength of the Viet Cong, the Communist apparatus operating in the Republic of Vietnam, has grown from about 3,000 to over 12,000 per- sonnel. This armed strength has been supplemented by an increase in the numbers of political and propaganda agents in the area. During 1960 alone, Communist armed units and terror- ists assassinated or kidnapped over 3,000 local officials, mili- tary personnel, and civilians. Their activities took the form of armed attacks against isolated garrisons, attacks on newly established townships, ambushes on roads and canals, de- struction of bridges, and well-planned sabotage against pub- lic works and communication lines. Because of Communist guerrilla activity 200 elementary schools had to be closed at various times, affecting over 25,000 students and 800 teachers. This upsurge of Communist guerrilla activity apparently stemmed from a decision made in May 1959 by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of North Vietnam which called for the reunification of Vietnam by all "appropriate means." In July of the same year the Central Committee was reorganized and charged with intelligence duties and the "liberation" of South Vietnam. In retrospect this de- cision to step up guerrilla activity was made to reverse the remarkable success which the Government of the Republic of Vietnam under President Ngo Dinh Diem had achieved in consolidating its political position and in attaining signif- icant economic recovery in the five years between 1954 and 1959. Remarkably coincidental with the renewed Communist activity in Laos, the Communist Party of North Vietnam at its Third Congress on September 10, 1960, adopted a res- olution which declared that the Vietnamese revolution has as a major strategic task the liberation of the South from the "rule of U.S. imperialists and their henchmen." This resolution called for the direct overthrow of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. Next door to South Vietnam, Laos was threat- ened by a similar Communist assault. The active agent of attack on both was Communist North Vietnam, with the backing of Peiping and Moscow. In the case of Laos, we were able to negotiate an agreement in 1962 that it should be neutral and that all foreign military personnel should be with- drawn. We complied with that agreement. But North Vietnam never did. In gross violation of its pledge, it left armed units in Laos and continued to use Laos as a corridor to infiltrate arms and trained men into South -Vietnam. There was no new agreement, even on paper, on Vietnam. Late in 1961, President Kennedy there- fore increased our assistance to the Republic of Vietnam. During that year, the infiltration of arms and military personnel from the North continued to increase. To cope with that escalation, President Kennedy decided to send more American military personnel?to assist with logistics and transporta- tion and communications as well as with training and as advisers to South Vietnamese forces in the field. Likewise we expanded our economic assist- ance and technical advice, particularly with a view to improving living conditions in the villages. During 1962 and 1963 Hanoi continued to in- crease its assistance to the Viet Cong. In response, President Kennedy and later President Johnson in- creased our aid. Hanoi kept on escalating the war throughout 1964. And the Viet Cong intensified its drafting and training of men in the areas it controls. Last August, you will recall, North Vietnamese forces attacked American destroyers in interna- tional waters. That attack was met by appropriate air response against North Vietnamese naval in- stallations. And Congress, by a combined vote of 504 to 2, passed a resolution expressing its support for actions by the Executive "including the use of armed force" to meet aggression in Southeast Asia, including specifically aggression against South Vietnam. The resolution and the Congressional debate specifically envisaged that, subject to con- tinuing Congressional consultation, the armed forces of the United States might be committed in the defense of South Vietnam in any way that seemed necessary, including employment in com- bat. In summary, our commitment in Vietnam has been set forth in: ? The Southeast Asia Treaty, which was al- most unanimously approved by the United States Senate; ? The pledges made with bipartisan support by three successive Presidents of the United States; ? The assistance programs approved annual- ly, beginning in 1955, by bipartisan ma- jorities in both Houses of Congress; ? The declarations which we joined our SEATO and ANZUS allies in making at their Ministerial Council Meetings in 1964 and 1965; 11 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 ? The joint Congressional resolution of Au- gust 1964, which was approved by a com- bined vote of 504 to 2. Our commitment is to assist the government and people of South Vietnam to repel this aggression, thus preserving their freedom. This commitment is to the South Vietnamese as a nation and people. It has continued through various changes of gov- ernment, just as our commitments to our NATO allies and, in various forms, to many other nations remain unaltered by changes in government. Continued escalation of the aggression by the other side has required continued strengthening of the military defenses of South Vietnam. Whether still more American military personnel will be needed will depend on events, especially on whether the other side continues to escalate the aggression. As the President has made plain, we will provide the South Vietnamese with whatever assistance may be necessary to ensure that the aggression against them is effectively repelled?that is, to make good on our commitment. THE PURSUIT OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT As President Johnson and his predecessors have repeatedly' emphasized, our objective in Southeast Asia is peace?a peace in which the various peoples of the area can manage their own affairs in their own ways and address themselves to economic and social progress. We seek no bases or special position for the United States. We do not seek to destroy or over- turn the Communist regimes in Hanoi and Peiping. We ask only that they cease their aggressions, that they leave their neighbors alone. Repeatedly, we and others have sought to achieve a peaceful settlement of the war in Vietnam. We have had many talks with the Soviet au- thorities over a period of more than four years. But their influence in Hanoi appears to be limited. Recently, when approached, their response has been, in substance: You have come to the wrong address?nobody has authorized us to negotiate. Talk to Hanoi. We have had a long series of talks with the Chi- nese Communists in Warsaw. Although Peiping is more cautious in action than in word, it is un- 12 bending in its hostility to us and plainly opposed to any negotiated settlement in Vietnam. There have been repeated contacts with Hanoi. Many channels are open. And many have volun- teered to use them. But so far there has been no indication that Hanoi is seriously interested in peace on any terms except those which would as- sure a Communist take-over of South Vietnam. We and others have sought to open the way for conferences on the neighboring states of Laos and Cambodia, where progress toward peace might be reflected in Vietnam. These approaches have been blocked by Hanoi and Peiping. The United Kingdom, as Co-chairman of the Geneva conferences, has repeatedly sought a path to a settlement?first by working toward a new Geneva conference, then by a visit by a senior British statesman. Both efforts were blocked by the Communists?and neither Hanoi nor Peiping would even receive the senior British statesman. In April, President Johnson offered uncondi- tional discussions with the governments concerned. Hanoi and Peiping called this offer a "hoax." Seventeen nonaligned nations appealed for a peaceful solution, by negotiations without precon- ditions. We accepted the proposal. Hanoi and Red China rejected it with scorn, calling some of its authors "monsters and freaks." The President of India made a constructive proposal for an end to hostilities and an Afro-Asian patrol force. We welcomed this proposal with interest and hope. Hanoi and Peiping rejected it as a betrayal. In May, the United States and South Vietnam suspended air attacks on North Vietnam. This action was made known to the other side to see if there would be a response in kind. But Hanoi denounced the pause as "a worn-out trick" and Peiping dcnounced it as a "swindle." Some say the pause was not long enough. But we knew the negative reaction from the other side before we resumed. And we had paused previously for more than four years while thousands of armed men in- vaded the South and killed thousands of South Vietnamese, including women and children, and deliberately destroyed school houses and play- grounds and hospitals and health centers and other facilities that the South Vietnamese had built to Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 improve their lives and give their children a chance for a better education and better health.. In late June, the Commonwealth Prime Min- isters established a mission of four of their members to explore with all parties concerned the possibil- ities for a conference leading to a just and lasting peace. Hanoi and Peiping made it plain that they would not receive the mission. Mr. Harold Davies, a member of the British Parliament, went to Hanoi with the approval of Prime Minister Wilson. But the high officials there would not even talk with him. And the lower-ranking officials who did talk with him made it clear that Hanoi was not yet interested in nego- tiations, that it was intent on a total victory in South Vietnam. As Prime Minister Wilson re- ported to the House of Commons, Mr. Davies met with a conviction among the North Vietnamese that their prospects of victory were too imminent for them to forsake the battlefield for the confer- ence table. We and others have made repeated efforts at discussions through the United Nations. In the Security Council, after the August attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin, we supported a Soviet proposal that the Government of North Vietnam be invited to come to the Security Council. But Hanoi refused. In April, Secretary General U Thant considered visits to Hanoi and Peiping to explore the possi- bilities of peace. But both those Communist regimes made it plain that they did not regard the United Nations as competent to deal with that matter. The President's San Francisco speech in June requested help from the United Nations' member- ship at large in getting peace talks started. In late July the President sent our new Ambas- sador to the United Nations, Arthur J. Goldberg, to New York with a letter to Secretary General U Thant requesting that all the resources, energy and immense prestige of the United Nations be em- ployed to find ways to halt aggression and to bring peace in Vietnam. The Secretary General has al- ready accepted this assignment. We sent a letter to the Security Council calling attention to the special responsibility in this regard of the Security Council and of the nations which happen to be members of the Council. We have considered from time to time placing the matter formally before the Security Council. But we have been advised by many nations?and by many individuals?who are trying to help to achieve a peaceful settlement that to force debate and a vote in the Security Council might tend to harden posi- tions and make useful explorations and discussions even more difficult. President Johnson has publicly invited any and all members of the United Nations to do all they can to bring about a peaceful settlement. By these moves the United States has intended to engage the serious attention and efforts of the United Nations as an institution, and its members as signatories of its Charter, in getting the Com- munists to talk rather than fight?while continuing with determination an increasing effort to demon- strate that Hanoi and the Viet Cong cannot settle the issue on the battlefield. We have not only placed the Vietnam issue before the United Nations, but believe that we have done so in the most constructive ways. THE CONDITIONS FOR PEACE What are the essential conditions for peace in South Vietnam? In late June, the Foreign Minister of South Viet- nam set forth the fundamental principles of a "just and enduring peace." In summary, those principles are: ? An end to aggression and subversion. ? Freedom for South Vietnam to choose and shape for itself its own destiny "in conform- ity with democratic principles and without any foreign interference from whatever sources." ? As soon as aggression has ceased, the ending of the military measures now necessary by the Government of South Vietnam and the nations that have come to its aid to defend South Vietnam; and the removal of foreign military forces from South Vietnam. ? And effective guarantees for the freedom of the people of South Vietnam. We endorse those principles. In essence, they would constitute a return to the basic purpose of the Geneva Accords of 1951. Whether they require re- affirmation of those Accords or new agreements em- 13 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 bodying these essential points, but with provision in either case for more effective international ma- chinery and guarantees, could be determined in dis- cussions and negotiations. Once the basic points set forth by South Viet- nam's Foreign Minister were achieved, future re- lations between North Vietnam and South Vietnam could be worked out by peaceful means. And this would include the question of a free decision by the people of North and South Vietnam on the matter of reunification. When the aggression has ceased and the freedom of South Vietnam is assured by other means, we will withdraw our forces. Three Presidents of the United States have said many times that we want no permanent bases and no special position there. Our military forces are there because of the North Vietnamese aggression against South Vietnam and for no other reason. When the men and arms infiltrated by the North are withdrawn and Hanoi ceases its support and guidance of the war in the South, whatever remains in the form of indigenous dissent is a matter for the South Vietnamese them- selves. As for South Vietnamese fighting in the Viet Cong or under its control or influence, they must in time be integrated into their national so- ciety. But that is a process which must be brought about by the people of South Vietnam, not by for- eign diplomats. Apart from the search for a solution in Vietnam itself, the United States Government has hoped that discussions could be held on the problems concern- ing Cambodia and Laos. We supported the pro- posal of Prince Sihanouk for a conference on Cam- bodia, to be attended by the governments that par- ticipated in the 1954 conference, and noted the joint statement of the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, in April, to the effect that both favored the convening of conferences on Cam- bodia and Laos. Subsequently, however, Hanoi ap- peared to draw back and to impose conditions at variance with the Cambodian proposal. We look beyond. a just and enduring peace for Vietnam and Laos and Cambodia, to the day when Peiping will be ready to join in a general settle- ment in the Far East?a general settlement that would remove the threat of aggression and make it possible for all the peoples of the area to devote themselves to economic and social progress. 14 Several of the nations of Asia are densely popu- lated. And high rates of population growth make it difficult for them to increase per capita incomes. The solution to these problems cannot be found through external aggression. They must be achieved internally within each nation. As President Johnson has said, the United States stands ready to assist and support cooperative pro- grams for economic development in Asia. Already we are making available additional funds for the development of the Mekong Valley. And we are taking the lead in organizing an Asian Development Bank, which we hope will be supported by all the major industrialized nations, including the Soviet Union. We would welcome membership by North Vietnam, when it has ceased its aggression. Those arc our objectives?peace and a better life for all who are willing to live at peace with their neighbors. THE PRESENT PATH I turn now to the specific actions we are taking to convince Hanoi that it will not succeed and that it must move toward a peaceful solution. Secretary McNamara is appearing before the ap- propriate committees of the Congress to discuss the military situation within South Vietnam in detail. In essence, our present view is that it is crucial to turn the tide in the South, and that for this purpose it is necessary to send substantial numbers of addi- tional American forces. The primary responsibility for defeating the Viet Cong will remain, however, with the South Viet- namese. They have some 545,000 men in military and paramilitary forces. Despite losses, every branch of the armed forces of South Vietnam has more men under arms than it had six months ago. And they are making systematic efforts to increase their forces still further. The primary missions of American ground forces are to secure the air bases used by the South Vietnamese and ourselves and to provide a strategic reserve, thus releasing South Vietnamese troops for offensive actions against the Viet Cong. In securing the air bases and related military installations, American forces are pushing out into the countryside to prevent build-ups for surprise attacks. And they may be used in emer- gencies to help the South Vietnamese in combat. But the main task of rooting out the Viet Cong will Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 continue to be the responsibility of the South Viet- namese. And we have seen no sign that they are about to try to shift that responsibility to us. On the contrary, the presence of increasing numbers of American combat troops seems to have stimulated greater efforts on the part of the fighting men of South Vietnam. At the same time, on the military side, we shall maintain, with the South Vietnamese, our program of limited air attacks on military targets in North Vietnam. This program is a part of the total strategy. We had never expected that air attacks on North Vietnam alone would bring Hanoi to a quick decision to cease its aggression. Hanoi has been committed to its aggression too long and too deeply to turn around overnight. It must be con- vinced that it faces not only continuing, and per- haps increased, pressure on the North itself, but also that it simply cannot win in the South. The air attacks on the North have also had spe- cific military effects in reducing the scale of in- creased infiltration from the North. Finally, they are important as a warning to all concerned that there are no longer sanctuaries for aggression. It has been suggested in some quarters that Hanoi would be more disposed to move to negotia- tions and to cease its aggression if we stopped bomb- ing the North. We do not rule out the possibility of another and longer pause in bombing, but the question remains?and we have repeatedly asked it: What would happen from the North in re- sponse? Would Hanoi withdraw the 325th Divi- sion of the regular army, which is now deployed in South Vietnam and across the line in Laos? Would it take home the other men it has infiltrated into the South? Would it stop sending arms and am- munition into South Vietnam? Would the cam- paign of assassination and sabotage in the South cease? We have been trying to find out what would happen if we were to suspend our bombing of the North. We have not been able to get an answer or even a hint. Those who complain about air attacks on mili- tary targets in North Vietnam would carry more weight if they had manifested, or would manifest now, appropriate concern about the infiltrations from the North, the high rate of military activity in the South and the ruthless campaign of terror and assassination which is being conducted in the South under the direction of Hanoi and with its active support. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM Let me now underline just a few points about the political and economic situation in South Viet- nam. For we know well that, while security is fundamental to turning the tide, it remains vital to do all we can on the political and economic fronts. All of us have been concerned, of course, by the difficulties of the South Vietnamese in developing an effective and stable government. But this fail- ure should not astonish us. South Vietnam is a highly plural society striving to find its political feet under very adverse conditions. Other na- tions?new and old -NN ith fewer difficulties and unmolested by determined aggressors have done no better. South Vietnam emerged from the French Indo-China war with many political factions, most of which were firmly anti-Communist. Despite several significant initial successes in establishing a degree of political harmony, the Government of President Diem could not maintain a lasting unity among the many factions. The recent shifting and reshuffling of Vietnamese governments is largely the continuing search for political unity and a vi- able regime which can overcome these long-evident political divisions. And we should not forget that the destruction of the fabric of government at all levels has been a primary objective of the Viet Cong. The Viet Cong has assassinated thousands of local officials?and health workers and school teachers and others who were helping to improve the life of the people of the countryside. In the last year and a half, it has killed, wounded, or kidnapped 2,291 village officials and 22,146 other civilians?these on top of its thou- sands of earlier victims. Despite the risks to themselves and their families, Vietnamese have continued to come forward to fill these posts. And in the last six years, no political dissenter of any consequence has gone over to the Viet Cong. The Buddhists, the Catholics, the sects, the Cambodians (of whom there are about a million in South Vietnam), the Montagnards?all the prin- cipal elements in South Vietnamese political life except the Viet Cong itself, which is a very small 15 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 minority?remain overwhelmingly anti-Commu- nist. The suggestion that Ho Chi Minh probably could win a free election in South Vietnam is di- rectly contrary to all the evidence we have. And we have a great deal of evidence, for we have Americans?in twos and threes and fours and sixes?in the countryside in all parts of Vietnam. In years past Ho Chi Minh was a hero throughout Vietnam. For he had led the fight against the Japanese and then against the French. But his glamor began to fade when he set up a Communist police state in the North?and the South, by con- trast, made great progress under a non-Communist nationalist government. Today the North Viet- namese regime is badly discredited. We find the South Vietnamese in the countryside ready to co- operate with their own government when they can do so with reasonable hope of not being assassinated by the Viet Cong the next night. At the present time, somewhat more than 50 percent of the people of Vietnam live in areas under control of their government. Another 25 percent live in areas of shifting control. And about 25 percent live in areas under varying degree of Viet Cong control. But even where it succeeds in im- posing taxes, drafting recruits and commandeering labor, the Viet Cong has not usually been able to organize the area. We have a good deal of evi- dence that Viet Cong tax exactions and terrorism have increasingly alienated the villagers. And one of the problems with which the South Viet- namese government and we have to deal is the large scale exodus from the Central Highlands to the coastal areas of refugees from the Viet Cong. It is of the greatest significance that, despite many years of harsh war, despite the political in- stability of the central government, and despite division of their country since 1954, the people of South Vietnam fight on with uncommon deter- mination. There is no evidence among politicians, the bureaucracy, the military, the major religious groups, the youth, or even the peasantry of a desire for peace at any price. They all oppose surrender or accommodation on a basis which would lead to a Communist take-over. The will to resist the aggression from the North has survived through periods of great stress and remains strong. 16 The central objective of our foreign policy is a peaceful community of nations, each free to choose its own institutions but cooperating with one an- other to promote their mutual welfare. It is the kind of world order envisaged in the opening sec- tions of the United Nations Charter. But there have been and still are important forces in the world which seek a different goal?which deny the right of free choice, which seek to expand their influ- ence and empires by every means, including force. THE BULWARK OF PEACE In defense of peace and freedom and the right of free choice: ? We and others insisted that the Soviets withdraw their forces from Iran. ? We went to the aid of Turkey and Greece. ? We joined in organizing the European Recovery Program and in forming the North Atlantic Alliance. ? We and our allies have defended the free- dom of West Berlin. ?We and 15 other nations joined in repel- ling the aggression in Korea. ? We have joined defensive alliances with many other nations and have helped them to strengthen their defensive military forces. ? We supported the United Nations in its efforts to preserve the independence of the Congo. ? We insisted that the Soviet Union with- draw strategic weapons from Cuba. Had we not done these things?and others?the enemies of freedom would now control much of the world and be in a position to destroy us or at least to sap our strength by economic strangulation. For the same basic reasons that we took all those other measures to deter or to repel aggression, we are determined to assist the people of South Viet- nam to defeat this aggression. In his last public utterance, recorded only half an hour before his death, a great and beloved Amer- ican, Adlai Stevenson, said: There has been a great deal of pressure on me in the United States from many sources to take a position?a pub- lic position?inconsistent with that of my Government. Ac- tually, I don't agree with those protestants. My hope in Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 Vietnam is that resistance there may establish the fact that changes in Asia arc not to be precipitated by outside forces. I believe, with the President, that "once the Com- munists know, as we know, that a violent solution is impossible, then a peaceful solution is inevitable." The great bulwark of peace for all free men?and therefore of peace for the millions ruled by the ad- versaries of freedom?has been, and is today, the power of the United States and our readiness to use that power, in cooperation with other free na- tions, to deter or to defeat aggression, and to help other free nations to go forward economically, socially, and politically. We have had to cope with a long series of danger- ous crises caused by the aggressive appetites of others. But we are a great nation and people. I am confident that we will meet this test, as we have met others. 17 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 The Tasks of Defense Statement by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, August 4, 1965 The issue in Vietnam is essentially the same as it was in 1954 when President Eisenhower said: I think it is no longer necessary to enter into a long argu- ment or exposition to show the importance to the United States of Indochina and of the struggle going on there. No matter how the struggle may have started, it has long since become one of the testing places between a free form of gov- ernment and dictatorship. Its outcome is going to have the greatest significance for us, and possibly for a long time into the future. We have here a sort of cork in the bottle, the bottle being the great area that includes Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, all of the surrounding areas of Asia with its hundreds of mil- lions of people. . . . THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT What is at stake in Vietnam today is the ability of the free world to block Communist armed aggres- sion and prevent the loss of all of Southeast Asia, a loss which in its ultimate consequences could drasti- cally alter the strategic situation in Asia and the Pacific to the grave detriment of our own security and that of our Allies. While fifteen years ago, in Korea, Communist aggression took the form of an overt armed attack, today in South Vietnam, it has taken the form of a large scale intensive guerrilla operation. The covert nature of this aggression, which characterized the earlier years of the struggle in South Vietnam, has now all but been stripped away. The control of the Viet Cong effort by the regime in Hanoi, supported and incited by Com- munist China, has become increasingly apparent. The struggle there has enormous implications for the security of the United States and the free world, and for that matter, the Soviet Union as well. The North Vietnamese and the Chinese Communists have chosen to make South Vietnam the test case for their particular version of the so- called "wars of national liberation." The extent to which violence should be used in overthrowing non-Communist governments has been one of the most bitterly contested issues between the Chinese and the Soviet Communists. Although the former Chairman, Mr. Khru- shchev, fully endorsed wars of national liberation as the preferred means of extending the sway of com- munism, he cautioned that "this does not necessar- ily mean that the transition to Socialism will every- where and in all cases be linked with armed upris- ing and civil war. . . . Revolution by peaceful means accords with the interests of the working class and the masses." The Chinese Communists, however, insist that: Peaceful co-existence cannot replace the revolutionary struggles of the people. The transition from capitalism to socialism in any country can only be brought about through proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the prole- tariat in that country. . . . The vanguard of the prole- tariat will remain unconquerable in all circumstances only if it masters all forms of struggle?peaceful and armed, open and secret, legal and illegal, parliamentary struggle and mass struggle, and so forth. (Letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, June 14,1963.) Their preference for violence was even more em- phatically expressed in an article in the Peiping People's Daily of March 31, 1964: It is advantageous from the point of view of tactics to refer to the desire for peaceful transition, but it would be inappropriate to emphasize the possibility of peaceful transi- tion. . . . the proletarian party must never substitute par- liamentary struggle for proletarian revolution or entertain the illusion that the transition to socialism can be achieved through the parliamentary road. Violent revolution is a universal law of proletarian revolution. To realize the transition to socialism, the proletariat must wage armed struggle, smash the old state machine and establish the dicta- torship of the proletariat. . . . 19 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 CIA-RDP8OR01580R001603420034-1 "Political power," the article quotes Mao Tse-tung as saying, "grows out of the barrel of a gun." Throughout the world we see the fruits of these policies and in Vietnam, particularly, we see the effects of the Chinese Communists' more militant stance and their hatred of the free world. They make no secret of the fact that Vietnam is the test case, and neither does the regime in Hanoi. Gen- eral Giap, head of the North Vietnamese Army, re- cently said that "South Vietnam is the model of the national liberation movement of our time. . . . If the special warfare that the U.S. imperialists are testing in South Vietnam is overcome, then it can be defeated everywhere in the world." And, Pham Van Dong, Premier of North Vietnam, pointed out that "The experience of our compatriots in South Vietnam attracts the attention of the world, espe- cially the peoples of South America." It is clear that a Communist success in South Viet- nam would be taken as proof that the Chinese Com- munists' position is correct and they will have made a giant step forward in their efforts to seize control of the world Communist movement. Furthermore, such a success would greatly in- crease the prestige of Communist China among the non-aligned nations and strengthen the position of their followers everywhere. In that event we would then have to be prepared to cope with the same kind of aggression in other parts of the world wher- ever the existing governments are weak and the so- cial structures fragmented. If Communist armed aggression is not stopped in Vietnam, as it was in Korea, the confidence of small nations in America's pledge of support will be weakened and many of them, in widely separated areas of the world, will feel unsafe. Thus, the stakes in South Vietnam are far greater than the loss of one small country to communism. Its loss would be a most serious setback to the cause of freedom and would greatly complicate the task of preventing the further spread of militant Asian communism. And, if that spread is not halted, our strategic position in the world vill be weakened and our national security directly endangered. CONDITIONS LEADING TO THE PRESENT SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM Essential to a proper understanding of the present situation in South Vietnam is a recognition of the 20 fact that the so-called insurgency there is planned, directed, controlled and supported from Hanoi. True, there is a small dissident minority in South Vietnam, but the Government could cope with it if it were not directed and supplied from the outside. As early as 1960, at the Third Congress of the North Vietnamese Communist Party, both Ho Chi Minh and General Giap spoke of the need to "step up" the "revolution in the South." In March 1963 the party organ Hoc Tap stated that the authorities in South Vietnam "are well aware that North Viet- nam is the firm base for the southern revolution and the point on which it leans, and that our party is the steady and experienced vanguard unit of the working class and people and is the brain and factor that decides all victories of the revolution." Through most of the past decade the North Viet- namese Government denied and went to great ef- forts to conceal the scale of its personnel and materiel support, in addition to direction and en- couragement, to the Viet Cong. It had strong reasons to do so. The North Vietnamese regime had no wish to force upon the attention of the world its massive and persistent violations of its Geneva pledges of 1954 and 1962 regarding non-interference in South Vietnam and Laos. However, in building up the Viet Cong forces for a decisive challenge, the authorities in North Vietnam have increasingly dropped the disguises that gave their earlier support a clandestine char- acter. Through 1963, the bulk of the arms infiltrated from the North were old French and American models acquired prior to 1954 in Indochina and Korea. Now, the flow of weapons from North Vietnam consists almost entirely of the latest arms acquired from Communist China; and the flow is large enough to have entirely reequipped the Main Force units, despite the capture this year by government forces of thousands of these weapons and millions of rounds of the new ammunition. Likewise, through 1963, nearly all the personnel infiltrating through Laos, trained and equipped in the North and ordered South, were former South- erners. But in the last eighteen months, the great ma- jority of the infiltrators?more than 10,000 of Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 them?have been ethnic Northerners, mostly draftees ordered into the People's Army of Vietnam for duty in the South. And it now appears that, starting their journey through Laos last December, from one to three regiments of a North Vietnamese regular division, the 325th Division of the North Vietnamese Army, have deployed into the Central Highlands of South Vietnam for combat along- side the Viet Cong. Thus, despite all its reasons for secrecy, Hanoi's desire for decisive results this summer has forced it to reveal its hand even more openly. The United States during the last four years has steadily increased its help to the people of South Vietnam in an effort to counter this ever-increasing scale of Communist aggression. These efforts achieved some measure of success during 1962. The South Vietnamese forces in that year made good progress in suppressing the Viet Cong insur- rection. Although combat deaths suffered by these forces in 1962 rose by 11 percent over the 1961 level (from about 4,000 to 4,450), Viet Cong combat deaths increased by 72 percent (from about 12,000 to 21,000).Weapons lost by the South Vietnamese fell from 5,900 in 1961 to 5,200 in 1962, while the number lost by the Viet Cong rose from 2,750 to 4,050. The Government's new strategic hamlet program was just getting underway and was show- ing promise. The economy was growing and the Government seemed firmly in control. Therefore, in early 1963, I was able to say: . . . victory over the Viet Cong will most likely take many years. But now, as a result of the operations of the last year, there is a new feeling of confidence, not only on the part of the Government of South Vietnam but also among the populace, that victory is possible. But at the same time I also cautioned: We are not unmindful of the fact that the pressures on South Vietnam may well continue through infiltration via the Laos corridor. Nor are we unmindful of the possibility that the Communists, sensing defeat in their covert efforts, might resort to overt aggression from North Vietnam. Obviously, this latter contingency could require a greater direct participation by the United States. The survival of an independent government in South Vietnam is so impor- tant to the security of all of Southeast Asia and to the free world that we must be prepared to take all necessary measures within our capability to prevent a Communist victory. Unfortunately, the caution voiced in early 1963 proved to be well founded. Late in 1963, the Com- munists stepped up their efforts, and the military situation began to deteriorate. The Diem Govern- ment came under increasing internal pressure, and in November it was overthrown. As I reported in February 1964: The Viet Cong was quick to take advantage of the grow- ing opposition to the Diem Government and the period of uncertainty following its overthrow. Viet Cong activities were already increasing in September and continued to in- crease at an accelerated rate in October and November, par- ticularly in the Delta area. And I must report that they have made considerable progress since the coup. Following the coup, the lack of stability in the central Government and the rapid turnover of key personnel, particularly senior military commanders, began to be reflected in combat operations and throughout the entire fabric of the political and economic structure. And, in 1964, the Communists greatly increased the scope and tempo of their sub- versive efforts. Larger scale attacks became more frequent and the flow of men and supplies from the North expanded. The incidence of terrorism and sabotage rose rapidly and the pressure on the civilian population was intensified. The deteriorating military situation was clearly reflected in the statistics. South Vietnamese com- bat deaths rose from 5,650 in 1963 to 7,450 in 1964 and the number of weapons lost from 8,250 to 14,100. In contrast, Viet Cong combat deaths dropped from 20,600 to 16,800 and, considering the stepped-up tempo of activity, they experienced only a very modest rise in the rate of weapons lost (from 5,400 to 5,900). At various times in recent months, I have called attention to the continued buildup of Communist forces in South Vietnam. I pointed out that al- though these forces had not been committed to combat in any significant degree, they probably would be after the start of the monsoon season. It is now clear that these forces are being committed in increasing numbers and that the Communists have decided to make an all-out attempt to bring down the Government of South Vietnam. The entire economic and social structure is under attack. Bridges, railroads and highways are being destroyed and interdicted. Agricultural products are being barred from the cities. Electric power 21 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 plants and communication lines are being sabo- taged. Whole villages are being burned and their population driven away, increasing the refugee burden on the South Vietnamese Government. In addition to the continued infiltration of in- creasing numbers of individuals and the accelera- tion of the flow of modem equipment and supplies, organized units of the North Vietnamese Army have been identified in South Vietnam. We now esti- mate the hard core Viet Cong strength at some 70,000 men, including a recently reported increase in the number of combat battalions. In addition, they have some 90,000 to 100,000 irregulars and some 30,000 in their political cadres, i.e., tax col- lectors, propagandists, etc. We have also identified at least three battalions of the regular North Viet- namese Army, and there are probably considerably more. At the same time the Government of South Viet- nam has found it increasingly difficult to make a commensurate increase in the size of its own forces, which now stand at about 545,000 men, including the regional and local defense forces but excluding the national police. Combat deaths on both sides have been mount- ing?for the South Vietnamese from an average of 143 men a week in 1964 to about 270 a week for the four-week period ending July 24 this year. Viet Cong losses have gone from 322 a week last year to about 680 a week for the four-week period ending July 24. Most important, the ratio of South Vietnamese to Viet Cong strength has seriously declined in the last six or seven months from about five to one to about three or three-and-a-half to one; the ratio of combat battalions is substantially less. This is far too low a ratio for a guerrilla war even though the greater mobility and firepower provided to the South Vietnamese forces by the United States help to offset that disadvantage. The South Vietnamese forces have to defend hundreds of cities, towns and hamlets while the Viet Cong are free to choose the time and place of their attack. As a result, the South Vietnamese are stretched thin in defensive positions, leaving only a small central reserve for offensive action against the Viet Cong, while the latter are left free to con- centrate their forces and throw them against select- 22 ed targets. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Viet Cong retains most of the initiative. Even so, we may not as yet have seen the full weight of the Communist attack. Presently, the situation is particularly acute in the northern part of the country where the Communists have mobil- ized large military forces which pose a threat to the entire region and its major cities and towns. Our air attack may have helped to keep these forces off balance but the threat remains and it is very real. Clearly, the time has come when the people of South Vietnam need more help from us and other nations if they are to retain their freedom and in- dependence. We have already responded to that need with some 75,000 U.S. military personnel, including some combat units. This number will be raised to 125,000 almost immediately with the deploy- ment of the Air Mobile Division and certain other forces. But, more help will be needed in the months ahead and additional U.S. combat forces will be required to back up the hard-pressed Army of South Vietnam. Two other nations have pro- vided combat forces?Australia and New Zealand. We hope that by the end of this year others will join them. In this regard, the Koreans have just re- cently approved a combat division for deployment to Vietnam, which is scheduled to arrive this fall. ROLE OF U.S. COMBAT FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM As I noted earlier, the central reserve of the South Vietnamese Army has been seriously de- pleted in recent months. The principal role of U.S. ground combat forces will be to supplement this reserve in support of the front line forces of the South Vietnamese Army. The indigenous paramilitary forces will deal with the pacification of areas cleared of organized Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units, a role more appropriate for them than for our forces. The Government of South Vietnam's strategy, with which we concur, is to achieve the initiative, to expand gradually its area of control by breaking up major concentrations of enemy forces, using to the maximum our preponderance of air power, both land and sea-based. The number of "fixed- Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 wing" attack sorties by U.S. aircraft in South Viet- nam will increase many fold by the end of the year. Armed helicopter sorties will also increase dra- matically over the same period, and extensive usc will be made of heavy artillery, both land-based and sea-based. At the same time our Air and Naval forces will continue to interdict the Viet Cong sup- ply lines from North Vietnam, both land and sea. Although our tactics have changed, our objective remains the same. We have no desire to widen the war. We have no desire to overthrow the North Vietnamese re- gime, seize its territory or achieve the unification of North and South Vietnam by force of arms. We have no need for permanent military bases in South Vietnam or for special privileges of any kind. What we are seeking through the planned mili- tary buildup is to block the Viet Cong offensive, to give the people of South Vietnam and their armed forces some relief from the unrelenting Communist pressures?to give them time to strengthen their government, to re-establish law and order, and to revive their economic life which has been seriously disrupted by Viet Cong harassment and attack in recent months. We have no illusions that success will be achieved quickly, but we are confident that it will be achieved much more surely by the plan I have outlined. INCREASES IN U.S. MILITARY FORCES Fortunately, we have greatly increased the strength and readiness of our military establish- ment since 1961, particularly in the kinds of forces which we now require in Southeast Asia. The active Army has been expanded from 11 to 16 combat-ready divisions. Twenty thousand men have been added to the Marine Corps to allow them to fill out their combat structure and at the same time facilitate the mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve. The tactical fighter squadrons of the Air Force have been increased by 51 percent. Our airlift capability has more than doubled. Special Forces trained to deal with insurgency threats have been multiplied eleven- fold. General ship construction and conversion has been doubled. During this same period, procurement for the expanded force has been increased greatly: Air Force tactical aircraft?from $360 million in 1961 to about $1.1 billion in the original fiscal year 1966 budget; Navy aircraft?from $1.8 billion to $2.2 billion; Army helicopters?from 286 aircraft to over 1,000. Procurement of ordnance, vehicles and related equipment was increased about 150 percent in the fiscal years 1962-1964 period, com- pared with the preceding three years. The ton- nage of modern non-nuclear air-to-ground ordnance in stock tripled between fiscal year 1961 and fiscal year 1965. In brief, the military estab- lishment of the United States, today, is in far better shape than it ever has been in peacetime to face whatever tasks may lie ahead. Nevertheless, some further increases in forces, military personnel, production and construction will be required if we are to deploy additional forces to Southeast Asia and provide for combat consumption while, at the same time, maintaining our capabilities to deal with crises elsewhere in the world. To offset the deployments now planned to Southeast Asia, and provide some additional forces for possible new deployments, we propose to in- crease the presently authorized force levels. These increases will be of three types: (1) Additional units for the active forces, over and above those reflected in the January budget; (2) military per- sonnel augmentations for presently authorized units in the active forces to man new bases, to handle the larger logistics workload, etc.; and (3) additional personnel and extra training for selected reserve component units to increase their readiness for quick deployment. We believe we can achieve this buildup without calling up the reserves or ordering the involuntary extension of tours, except as already authorized by law for the Department of the Navy. Even here the exten- sion of officer tours will be on a selective basis and extensions for enlisted men will be limited, in general, to not more than four months. The program I have outlined here today and the $1.7 billion amendment to the fiscal year 1966 De- fense Appropriation Bill now before the Commit- tee will, in the collective judgment of my principal military and civilian advisers and myself, provide the men, materiel and facilities required to fulfill the President's pledge to meet the mounting aggres- sion in South Vietnam, while at the same time maintaining the forces required to meet commit- ments elsewhere in the world. 23 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 The Challenge of Human Need Address by the President to the Association of American Editorial Cartoonists, The White House, May 13, 1965 THE THIRD FACE OF THE WAR The war in Vietnam has many faces. There is the face of armed conflict?of terror and gunfire?of bomb-heavy planes and campaign- weary soldiers. . . . The second face of war in Vietnam is the quest for a political solution?the face of diplomacy and politics?of the ambitions and the interests of other nations. . . . The third face of war in Vietnam is, at once, the most tragic and most hopeful. It is the face of human need. It is the untended sick, the hungry family, and the illiterate child. It is men and women, many without shelter, with rags for cloth- ing, struggling for survival in a very rich and a very fertile land. It is the most important battle of all in which we are engaged. For a nation cannot be built by armed power or by political agreement. It will rest on the expec- tation by individual men and women that their future will be better than their past. It is not enough to just fight against something. People must fight for something, and the people of South Vietnam must know that after the long, brutal journey through the dark tunnel of conflict there breaks thc light of a happier day. And only if this is so can they be expected to sustain the en- during will for continued strife. Only in this way can long-run stability and peace come to their land. And there is another, more profound reason. In Vietnam communism seeks to really impose its will by force of arms. But we would be deeply mistaken to think that this was the only weapon. Here, as other places in the. world, they speak to restless people?people rising to shatter the old ways which have imprisoned hope?people fiercely and justly reaching for the material fruits from the tree of modern knowledge. It is this desire, and not simply lust for conquest, which moves many of the individual fighting men that we must now, sadly, call the enemy. It is, therefore, our task to show that freedom from the control of other nations offers the surest road to progress, that history and experience testify to this truth. But it is not enough to call upon reason or point to examples. We must show it through action and we must show it through ac- complishment, and even were there no war?either hot or cold?we would always be active in human- ity's search for progress. This task is commanded to us by the moral values of our civilization, and it rests on the inescapable nature of the world that we have now entered. For in that world, as long as we can foresee, every threat to man's welfare will be a threat to the wel- fare of our own people. Those who live in the emerging community of nations will ignore the perils of their neighbors at the risk of their own prospects. COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA This is true not only for Vietnam but for every part of the developing world. This is why, on your behalf, I recently proposed a massive, cooperative development effort for all of Southeast Asia. I named the respected leader, Eugene Black, as my personal representative to inaugurate our partici- pation in these programs. Since that time rapid progress has been made, I am glad to report. Mr. Black has met with the top officials of the United Nations on several occasions. He has talked to other interested parties. He has found increasing enthusiasm. The United Na- tions is already setting up new mechanisms to help carry forward the work of development. In addition, the United States is now prepared to participate in, and to support, an Asian Develop- 25 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 ment Bank, to carry out and help finance the eco- nomic progress in that area of the world and the development that we desire to see in that area of the world. So this morning I call on every other industrial- ized nation, including the Soviet Union, to help create a better life for all of the people of Southeast Asia. Surely, surely, the works of peace can bring men together in a common effort to abandon forever the works of war. But, as South Vietnam is the central place of conflict, it is also a principal focus of our work to increase the well-being of people. It is that effort in South Vietnam, of which I think we are too little informed, which I want to relate to you this morning. STRENGTHENING VIETNAM'S ECONOMY We began in 1954, when Vietnam became in- dependent, before the war between the North and the South. Since that time we have spent more than $2 billion in economic help for the 16 million people of South Vietnam. And despite the rav- ages of war, we have made steady, continuing gains. We have concentrated on food, and health, and education, and housing, and industry. Like most developing countries, South Vietnam's economy rests on agriculture. Unlike many, it has large uncrowded areas of very rich and very fertile land. Because of this, it is one of the great rice bowls of the entire world. With our help, since 1954, South Vietnam has already doubled its rice production, providing food for the people as well as providing a vital export for that nation. We have put our American farm know-how to work on other crops. This year, for instance, sev- eral hundred million cuttings of a new variety of sweet potato, that promises a sixfold increase in yield, will be distributed to these Vietnamese farmers. Corn output should rise from 25,000 tons in 1962 to 100,000 tons by 1966. Pig pro- duction has more than doubled since 1955. Many animal diseases have been eliminated entirely. Disease and epidemic brood over every Viet- namese village. In a country of more than 16 mil- 26 lion people with a life expectancy of only 35 years, there are only 200 civilian doctors. If the Viet- namese had doctors in the same ratio as the United States has doctors, they would have not the 200 that they do have but they would have more than 5,000 doctors. We have helped vaccinate, already, over 7 mil- lion people against cholera, and millions more against other diseases. Hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese can now receive treatment in the more than 12,000 hamlet health stations that America has built and has stocked. New clinics and sur- gical suites are scattered throughout that entire country; and the medical school that we are now helping to build will graduate as many doctors in a single year as now serve the entire civilian popu- lation of South Vietnam. Education is the keystone of future development in Vietnam. It takes trained people to man the factories, to conduct the administration, and to form the human foundation for an advancing nation. More than a quarter million young Viet- namese can now learn in more than 4,000 class- rooms that America has helped to build in the last 2 years; and 2,000 more schools are going to be built by us in the next 12 months. The number of students in vocational schools has gone up four times. Enrollment was 300,000 in 1955, when we first entered there and started helping with our program. Today it is more than 1,500,000. The 8 million textbooks that we have supplied to Viet- namese children will rise to more than 15 million by 1967. Agriculture is the foundation. Health, educa- tion, and housing are the urgent human needs. But industrial development is the great pathway to their future. When Vietnam was divided, most of the in- dustry was in the North. The South was barren of manufacturing and the foundations for industry. Today more than 700 new or rehabilitated fac- tories?textiles mills and cement plants, electronics and plastics?are changing the entire face of that nation. New roads and communications, railroad equipment, and electric generators are a spreading base on which this new industry can, and is, growing. Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 PROGRESS IN THE MIDST OF WAR All this progress goes on, and it is going to con- tinue to go on, under circumstances of staggering adversity. Communist terrorists have made aid programs that we administer a very special target of their attack. They fear them, because agricultural sta- tions are being destroyed and medical centers are being burned. More than 100 Vietnamese malaria fighters are dead. Our own AID officials have been wounded and kidnapped. These are not just the accidents of war. They are a part of a delib- erate campaign, in the words of the Communists, "to cut the fingers off the hands of the government." We intend to continue, and we intend to increase our help to Vietnam. Nor can anyone doubt the determination of the South Vietnamese themselves. They have lost more than 12,000 of their men since I became your President a little over a year ago. But progress does not come from investment alone, or plans on a desk, or even the directives and the orders that we approve here in Washing- ton. It takes men. Men must take the seed to the farmer. Men must teach the use of fertilizer. Men must help in harvest. Men must build the schools, and men must instruct the students. Men must carry medicine into the jungle, and treat the sick, and shelter the homeless. And men?brave, tireless, filled with love for their fellows?are doing this today. They are doing it through the long, hot, danger-filled Vietnamese days and the sultry nights. The fullest glory must go, also, to those South Vietnamese that are laboring and dying for their own people and their own nation. In hospitals and schools, along the rice fields and the roads, they continue to labor, never knowing when death or terror may strike. How incredible it is that there are a few who still say that the South Vietnamese do not want to con- tinue the struggle. They are sacrificing and they are dying by the thousands. Their patient valor in the heavy presence of personal physical danger should be a helpful lesson to those of us who, here in America, only have to read about it, or hear about it on the television or radio. We have our own heroes who labor at the works of peace in the midst of war. They toil unarmed and out of uniform. They know the humanity of their concern does not exempt them from the horrors of conflict, yet they go on from day to day. They bring food to the hungry over there. They supply the sick with necessary medicine. They help the farmer with his crops, families to find clean water, villages to receive the healing miracles of electricity. These are Americans who have joined our AID program, and we welcome others to their ranks. A CALL FOR AID For most Americans this is an easy war. Men fight and men suffer and men die, as they always do in war. But the lives of most of us, at least those of us in this room and those listening to me this morning, are untroubled. Prosperity rises, abun- dance increases, the nation flourishes. I will report to the Cabinet when I leave this room that we are in the 51st month of continued prosperity, the longest peacetime prosperity for America since our country was founded. Yet our entire future is at stake. What a difference it would make if we could only call upon a small fraction of our unmatched private resources?businesses and unions, agricul- tural groups and builders?if we could call them to the task of peaceful progress in Vietnam. With such a spirit of patriotic sacrifice we might well strike an irresistible blow for freedom there and for freedom throughout the world. I therefore hope that every person within the sound of my voice in this country this morning will look for ways?and those citizens of other nations who believe in humanity as we do, I hope that they will find ways to help progress in South Vietnam. This, then, is the third face of our struggle in Vietnam. It was there?the illiterate, the hun- gry, the sick?before this war began. It will be there when peace comes to us?and so will we?not with soldiers and planes, not with bombs and bul- lets, but with all the wondrous weapons of peace in the 20th century. And then, perhaps, together, all of the people of the world can share that gracious task with all the people of Vietnam, North and South alike. U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE :1965 0-785-527 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government. Printing Office Washington, D.C.. 20402 - Price 30 cents Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420034-1 27