WOULD THE LOSS OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND LAOS PRECIPITATE A "DOMINO EFFECT" IN THE FAR EAST?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01580R001603440028-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 17, 2013
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: June 9, 1964
• Content Type: MEMO

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9 June 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Would the Loss of South Vietnam and Laos
Precipitate a "Domino Effect" in the Far Ent?
? 1. The "domino effect" appears to mean that when one
nation falls to communism the impact is such as to weaken the
resistance of other countries and facilitate, if not cause, their
fall to communism. Most literally taken, it would imply
the successive and speedy coils-pie of neighboring countries, as
a row of dominoes falls when the first is toppled - we presume
that this degree of literalness le not essential to the concept.
Most specifically it means that the loss of South Vietnam and
Laos would lead almost inevitably to the Communisation of other
states in the area, and perhaps beyond the area.
2. We do not believe that the logs of South Vietnam and
Laos would be followed by the rapid, successive communization
of the other states of the Far East. Instead of a shock wave
passing from one nation to the next, there would be a simultaneous,
direct effect on all Far Eastern countries. With the possible
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exception of Cambodia, it is likely that no nation in the area would
quickly succumb to communism as a result of the fall of Late and
South Vietnams Furthermore, a continuation of the spread of
communism in the area would not be inexorable, and any spread
which did occur would take time a time in which the total situation
might change in any of a number of way* unfavorable to the
Communist cause.
3. The loss of South Vietnam and Laos to the Communist**
would be profoundly damaging to the US position in the Far East,
most especially because the US has committed itself persistently,
emphatically, and publicly to preventing Communist takeover of
the two countries. Failure here would be damaging to US prestige,
and would seriously debase the credibility of US will and capability
to contain the spread of communism elsewhere in the areas. Our
enemies would be encouraged and there would be an increased
tendency among other states to move toward a greater degree of
accommodation with the Communists. However, the extent to
This memorandum assumes a clear-cut Communist victory in
these countries, e., a withdrawal of US forces and virtual
elimination of US presence in Indochina, either proceeded or
soon followed by the establishment of Communist regimes in
Laos and South Vietnam. The results of a fussier, piecemeal
victory, such as one staged through a "neutralist" phase,
would probably be similar, though somewhat lees sharp
and severe.
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OLUIILI
which individual countries would move away from the US towards
the Communists would be significantly affected by the substance
and manner of US policy in the period following the loss of Laos
and South Vietnam.
4. Southeaut Asia. In the remaining piece of Indochina,
Sihanouk would probably accelerate his movement toward
accommodation with the Communists, in anticipation of a
Communist victory be considers inevitable. Thailand would
almost certainly shift toward a neutralist position, hoping thus
to forestall any vigorous Communist move against the regime for
as long as possible. Cooperation with the US would be reduced.
Already, Thai leaden have made clear their worries about the
firmness of US commitments in the area and their doubts about
the wisdom of ready responsiveness to Washington's immediate
policy desires. Burma would be less affected, having already
virtually severed its tin with the US. Ne Win would see the
ouster of the US from Indochina as confirming the wisdom of
the isolationist, somewhat pro-Peiping course he has already
embarked upon.
5. London, Canberra, and Kuala Lumpur have been
counting ultimately upon US support for Malaysia against
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CLUtiLt
Indonesian aggression. They would be badly disconcerted by a
US failure in Indochina, and would almost certainly seek some
clear US commitment to help them defend Malaysia. Indonesia,
for its part, would be emboldened in its efforts to crush Malaysia.
6. US Western Pacific Eases. US military strength in
the Far East is based on the chain of islands from the Philippines
to Japan, not on the Asian mainland. As long as the US can
effectively operate from these bases, it will probably still be able
to deter Peiping and Hanoi from overt military aggression.
Furthermore, the protection of these island countries from
Communist eubirersive efforts is a different problem from that
of protecting countries on the mainland. In the Philippines,
there would be some Impetus to the tendency of ultranationalists,
such as former Foreign Minister Loper, to press (Sc reduced
cooperation with the US and a Softening of the Philippines'
anti-Pefping staid. They would also seek restrictions on US
bases similar to those presently enforced in Japan. We do not
think this would affect Philippine government policy, at least
at long tie the present administration is in power in Manila.
7. On Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek and his foil en would
be greatly disheartened, but they would not be likely to leek an
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accommodationwwith the Communists. As the nee of the
Philippine*, the Nationalist Chinese leaders appreciate the
efficacy of US sea and air power, and their nation has proved
among the least vulnerable in the Far East to Communist
infiltration and subversion.
S. In Japans the loss of South Vietnam and Laos would
almost certainly produce some Friersan of neutralist sentiment.
There would be more questioning of the desirability of remaining
committed to the US side and continuing to be made a prime
Communist target by the presence of US bases. The mutual
defense treaty and the US bares in Japan and Okinawa would
come under even pester attack than at present. At a minimums
Political pressures for further restrictions on the use oi these
bans would be greatly intensified, and the governrneht would
probably make a few cencenione to these pressiires. We do not
believe that there would be major changes in Japanese policy.
9. Communist Asia. Aside from the immediate joy in
the DRY over achievement of its national goals, the chief effect
would be upon Communist China, both it boosting its already
remarkable self-confidence Ind in raising its prestige as a leader
6
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of World Communism. Peiping hats *lima& begun to advertise
Pa
ns 2 t-,' f I nik
South Vietnam as proof of its thesis that the underdeveloped
world is ripe for revolution, that the US id 0 paper tiger, and
that local insurgency can be carried through to victory without
undue risk of precipitating a major international war. The
outcome in South Vietnam and Laos would conspicuously support
the aggressive tactical contentions of Peiping as 'contrasted with
the more cautious position of the USSR. To some degree this
will tend to encourage and Strengthen the more activist
revolutionary movements in various parts of the underdeveloped
world.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL EST/MATE&
SECRET
SI/ERMAN KENT
Chairman
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Partm
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