1. I MET ALONE WITH MCMILLAN ON TUESDAY, 3 MARCH, AT THREE O'CLOCK FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR TO DISCUSS A NUMBER OF CURRENT ITEMS WHICH NEED CLARIFICATION BETWEEN CIA AND NRO.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01580R002004130024-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2013
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: March 4, 1964
• Content Type: MEMO

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4 March 1964
MEMORANDUM or 'CONVERSATION WITH BROCKWAY McMILLAN,
D/NRO ?
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? 1. 1 metalone with McMillan on Tueeday, 3 March, at three
? o'clock for approximately one hour to discuss a number of current
items which need clarification between CIA and NRO..
2. LIGHTENING BUG. I-raised the question on the desirability of
running the LIGHTENING BUG drone operation over Pyongyang, North
Korea. Hie response was not immediate, and he inquired how Vance
and others had reacted. McMillan is concerned over the reliability
of the system and says that if it is a one-shot operation, as it
probably will be,. he wants to review the anticipated reliability very
carefully. Ile stated quite candidly that SAC war plan "penetration
Was based on low-altitude intrusion and bombing out defenses as they
went. He said that although General Power would make a strong case
for the role jammers would play, you could not seriously justify
running the Pyongyang operation on the basis of its immediate benefit
to the SAC manned bombers. We then agreed that the issue should
stand or fall on its benefit to the OXCART program for the imraediate
3. I suggested that if this was the case, his decision on Pyongyang
might be intimately tied to his attitude toward the OXCART "super-
market", representing the D1D/8&T proposal for a combination of
passive, active and jarrnner electronic equipments for OXCART .
protection. I said it was our impression that he and rubini had taken
a vary negative view in which case there might be no point in running
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? 4. Advanced Aircraft. I then turned to the advanced aircraft
program in OSA, indicating that approximately one-quarter of a million
dollar .s had already been spent at General Dynamics on a Mach 4 -
design, which seemed to be proceeding well. I indicated that I had
within the last week directed a joint study between the OSI air defense
people and OSA aircraft development group to establish the dependence
of aircraft vulnerability on the three basic independent variables:
speed altitude and radar cross section. He thought this was an
excellent approach and had also wondered where the specifications for
the General Dynamics study had come from. I opined that any follow-
on aircraft would be the result of an active technical competition
between aircraft vulnerability - in all of its dimensions - and aircraft
performance, whereas OXCART had been a simple competition between
radar cross section and performance. I suggested.that the solution
might very well be a vehicle with very high altitude, low radar cross
section and siert) speed, I. e., a balloon. McM.illan agreed that we
ought to explore this "vuinerability space" in all its dimensions and
ramifications before proceeding further. I indicated that this study
would take about a month, at the end of which we should be in a position
to suggest further contracts which would be complementary to the
General Dynamics effort and which would explore other portions of the
speed-altitude regime which may emerge as vulnerable windows in the
Soviet defenses. He seemed well pleased with all this and will be
interested in the results.
5. He did opine that he thought it would be very difficult to begin
another program like OXCART, involving a whole power plant develop-
ment and aircraft technology. He felt that OXCART had benefited
from previous development of the 3-58 and that any next generation
aircraft would require a distinctly new engine. He thought that it would
be difficult for the Agency to conceal this sort of development under
confidential funds. He went on to opine that the Agency would find it
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difficult to work with anybody except Kelly Johnson at the Skunk Works,
and that Kelly had probably built his last airplane. He did suggest
that McDonald might have promise in this area, but completely threw
up his hands-at the rest of the aircraft industry. We agreed that it
was premature to debate how development programs might proceed
until we knew what sort of development was called for.
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7. 1 then took the 'wind out of our joint Sails by indicating that we
had been, largely unsuccessful in organising and articulating the specific
requirements for photography in the indications intelligence role.
suggested that this was. true partly because indications and watch.
people were not used to having photography as a regular input to their
? analysis, but recognised that there might also be a basic limitation
on the role that photography could play. 1 indicated that Mr. Sheldon
who is Certainly the senior Agency person in the watch business had made
a very deterMined effort to run this down and felt unsatisfied about
? proceeding with the hardware feasibility questions. Brock was very -
surprised to hear this as he holds Sheldon in high regard and was much
interested in the problem. 1 said that since he and Fubini seemed to have
a clear requirement in their minds for a satellite placed somewhere
between the border on short notice to monitor tensions there that we might
discuss this together with . benefit. Molvlillan said that their
enthusiasm might be based on the fact that they were quite unprofeSsional
in the indications intelligence buSiness ad that they had a great deal to
learn from our people in sorting out the standard list of requirements.
proposed that a vary small group - myself, Sheldon and one other '
person - meet with McMillan arid EblIni, and whomever else they elect,
to try to understand the joint military/Agency requirement. He agreed
that this was a first-rate idea and suggested we do it some Saturday.
We left the matter there, but 1 think we can go further in this field by
making McMil n a . o - ? -cision procesii.
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8. I then inquired about the statue of the G.3 program about
which we had heard and the GAMBIT-J configuration in the light of
comments that Land made to the DCI about a resolution system.
McMillan clarified the situation about as follows: Eastman Kodak has
had a well-funde study program from Greer for some time
called VALLEY to etuy advanced spotting systems for the Air Force.
These studies now point to the feasibility of building a 4700 lb.. pay
load which would be carried aloft by the ATLAS AGENA and photograph
ground areas with a resolution or? fThe ground coverage would be
a square 4-1)2 miles on each side and obviously involves a camera
steering program of the type now used by the GAMBIT. McMillan
confirmed that this is the G-3 program and that it is a very strong candidate
for major funding in FY 65 as an active follow-on to the present GAMBIT.
He also confirmed that GAMBIT-J would not be funded as originally indicated
by the 1965 NRO budget. He stated that our reduced requirement for
GAMBIT shots to about 8 per year made the development of the J version
quite unnecessary and uneconomical, with which I agreed. He stated that
the coat of a routine GAMBIT launch schedule was
Virtscreed that we could save somewhere in
the neighborhood of In the GAMBIT-S development. While
the double bucket J development for GAMBIT would cost only about
Ithe confidence firings and R&D costa to prove out such a
system would probably raise the additional
9. 1 mentioned his two memos to me appointing a committee for
NRO for follow-on to Drell in which he had selected an individual within
S&T to represent the Agency. I indicated that his selection had not
necessarily been our strongest man nor most experienced in Agency
affairs and we would prefer to make our own nominations to such activity
in the future. He readily agreed that it was not appropriate for him to
designate such people.
10. He raised the question with me about the three people he had
asked the Agency to assign to NRO and laid particular stress on an
advanced development individual who might go to the West Coast and
replace Captain Gorman on General Greer's staff. I made little
response to this except to agree that the issue had been hanging for
some time. I inquired whether the individual had to be on the West
Coast. He said no, that he had an open mind on this. He then went on to
point out that an AF Colonel. Dave Carter, is coming to Nrto to carry
out an advanced development staff function for him. He did ask for
CIA nominees to serve with Carter after Carter arrives and has
established his requirements.
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13. The meeting was most cordial and therefore quite interesting
in view of the PFIAB/Baker Panel inquiry.
cc: DCI
DDCI
NLPE
ALBERT D. WHEELON
Deputy Director
(Science and Technology)
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I UNCLASSIFIED I
ArioN TOP AND BOTTOM
I CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
1
Exec. Director 4/4d41
2
DCI
3
4
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ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks: 6) ,t() c/ grt...0 cedrei
DDCI and Mr. Bross
14?,4,
bc,,,, 4-
recid copies.
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FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
ER
I UNCLASSIFIED I
I CONFIDENTIAL I
SECRET
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1961 0-587282
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