COMMENTS ON THE CURRENT DRAFTS OF THE INTRODUCTORY NOTE AND TEXT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES 14.3-67

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000100090005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2005
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 9, 1967
• Content Type: MFR

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9 November 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Comments on the Current Drafts of the Introductory Note
and 'text of National Intelligence Estimate 14.3-67
1. Having studied the Viet. Cong mani over problem since early
1966, and discussed various drafts of NIE 14.3-67 for what seems almost
as long, I wish to make the following comments as a matter of permanent
record. They are my views and not necessarily those of my office.
The Introductory Note
2. The first paragraph of the current draft of the introductory
note to NIE 14.3-67 states that "our initial understanding of Communist
capabilities in Vietnam had, of necessity, to rely" on GVN data, and that
'bur information has improved substantially in the past year." Both
statements, although factually correct, are misleading because of facts
omitted.
3. While it is true that our first under standing of Communist
capabilities was derived from GVN data, we continued to rely on it well
past the initial phases of our military involvement in South Vietnam. By
mid-1962, the number of U.S. military advisors in South Vietnam
exceeded 10, 000.. The massive commitment of American infantry began
in March 1965. Yet:
a. The U. S. intelligence community conducted no
research on the. size of the Viet Cong irregular structure
between early 1962 -- when MACV J-2 estimated there were
100, 000 guerrillas and militiamen -- and September 1966.
b. The U. S. intelligence community conducted no
research on the size of the Viet Cong political apparatus until
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late 1966.
4. It is also factually accurate to say that "our information has
substantially improved in the past year. " It is a misleading statement
in that it tends to obscure the fact that the. quantum improvement in
intelligence occurred not in 1967 but in the latter half of 1965 and during
1966, as U. S. forces began to capture large numbers of enemy documents.
Strength studies compiled in 1966 based on materials captured in 1965
and 1966 came to essentially the same conclusions as current strength
studies. In fact, since the earlier studies usually listed numbers higher.
than those in the present NIE, they were probably closer to the truth. I
cite the following examples:
c. The U. S. intelligence community conducted only
rudimentary and incomplete research on the strength of the
Vict Cong military support mtruGtur bafore this yoa,xr.
a. A "Draft Working Paper" (which I wrote) dated
8 September 1966, suggesting that the number of Viet Cong
irregulars carried in the MACV Order of Battle should be at.
least doubled. The paper was based on captured documents,
the latest of which was released on 29 July 1966.
b. An unpublished MACV study, the existence of which
was surfaced in Hawaii in February 1967, based almost entirely
on data of earlier years, which indicated there were 198, 000.
'Viet Cong irregulars 13, 000 more than carried in a draft
MACV study on irregulars dated 1 September 1967. The earlier
study is probably that more accurate,
c. An unpublished DDI study (which I wrote) suggesting
the number of Viet Con g irregulars in 1966 was between
250 - 300, 000. The study was completed in late 1966, and
contained 83 footnotes, most citing one or more captured documents,
the.latest of which was published on 10 December 1966. The study
was never published, for the stated reason that MACV was itself
about to publish a study on irregulars. **-
This memorandum prompted MACV to review its irregular holdings.
As of this writing, MACV has not done so.
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d. An informal CIA study of January 1967 -- based on
1966 documents and population statistics -- estimating the Viet
Cong had 304, 000 irregulars as of August 1966. Shortly after
the completion of the study, a captured Viet Cong document
was published which indicated that the enemy had 330,'.000
irregulars in early 1966.
e. A MACV study, the existence' of which was surfaced
at Honolulu in February 1967, based on 1966 data, which
indicated the Viet Cong political infrastructure had some 90, 000
members.
Specific Comments on the Text
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no direct evidence indicating that Viet Con; hamlet and village officials
falsify returns -- on the contrary, a long association with VC documents
convinces me that their personnel records are essentially honest -- it is
probable that certain VC functionaries, for self-aggrandizement, inflate
strength figures. While it is possible, therefore, that the 170 - 180, 000
figure is inflated, the extent of the exaggeration, if any, is far from clear.
Since I tend to accept VC personnel accounting procedures and their
definition of "guerrillas, " I feel that the exaggeration is probably not great.
OB expert, for example, speculated in August 1967 that the table of
organization for the "Viet Cong administrative service structure --
as currently defined -- could allow for as many as 100, 000 persons.
8. Paragraph 30 contains a sentence which says that certain.
VC documents which asserted there were 170 -- 180, 000 guerrillas in
early 1966 were "almost certainly exaggerated. 'f Although I have seen
9. The problems I have with the assertion that the 170, 000 - 180, 000
figures are. "almost certainly exaggerated" bears directly on an estimate,
made later in paragraph 30 that the strength of guerrillas is now 70 - 90, 000.
Having spent several months over the last year studying guerrillas and having
had a part in persuading 1MACV to raise its guerrilla figure from 65, 000 in
September to the present range I do not feel that 90, 000 is realistic as the
range's upper end. The reason for my lack of confidence in 'the 90, 000
maximum is that I believe available evidence does not necessarily support
as sharp a dropoff in guerrilla strength as the NIE seems to indicate. In
viewing the questions, one can make a number of assumptions, of which
two follow:
a. First, that the .strength listed in documents was not'
-exaggerated and that there were 170, 000.. guerrillas in early 1966.
If this was so, and. the current strength is 70 90, 000, then there
has been a decline in the number of guerrillas of from 47% to 59%.
The actual strength of such units would of course be below the TO/E
strength. The question, of course, is how much. Viet Cong infantry
units, for example, are believed to be at about 70% of TO/E.
It can also be argued that some VC bureaucrats, to forestall hierarchical
calls f r the d'n o ~~T11 aF~6?~in e s. A
.Crovg~ r 2ele se ~86~10/ ~' $0` ~'R~~~~Cv~3U9v b
COSV t eve document o early icated that the competition for
manpower between the variotjZp_iq.p~c s was fierce. %
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b. Second, that the strength listed in the document was
exaggerated and that there were, say, 150, 000 guerrillas in
early 1966. If this was so, and the current strength is 70 90, 000,
then there has been a decline in the number of guerrillas of from
40 - 53%a.
10. Although the. decline may have been this precipitous, there
is a body of evidence suggesting it was not. First, according to GVIN
figures, the VC population base decline during approximately the same
period by only 31%;* and there is little evidence to demonstrate that the
Viet Con- are less efficient now than in early 1966 in the extracting
guerrillas from their population base. It can be argued, in fact,. that-they are
more efficient, since -a disproportionately large number of people leaving
VC. areas are children, old men, and old women, who are not normally
recruited as guerrillas. Second, Viet Cong documents suggest that since
late 1966 the Communists have been making major efforts to check the
decline in guerrilla' strength, redress the balance between the regular
and irregular forces. The practical effect of such a decision, if carried
out, would be to lower the rate at which guerrillas are upgraded -- thus
cutting down on one of the major drains on guerrilla strength.
11. Finally, a recently published COSVN-level document, almost
certainly written in early 1967, opens the possibility that as of that date
the Viet Cong had some 150, 000 guerrillas. The relevant passage in the
document is by no means straighforward and is certainly open to questions
of interpretation and of reliability. It states that the U.S.. "pacification
plan failed because they could not annihilate 150, 000 guerrilla soldiers . . .'I
Apparently a lesson plan for instruction to be given by a high-level political
staff officer, the document elsewhere exaggerates Allied losses (in common
with most other VC documents) and VC successes, and obviously contains
a large measure of VC propaganda. In this regard, however, the document
resembles other VC documents which suggest a figure of 170 - 180, 000
From 3, 358, 000 in December 1965 to 2, 312, 000 in August 1967.
Extrapolations from two VC documents, one which showed the VC
thought they controlled 5 million people in early 1966, and another
which suggested that they lost an additional 440, 000 in the second and
third quarters of the year, suggest that the present VC-controlled
population (using their criteria for control) is now in the neighborhood
of 3 1/2 million people: a decline, therefore, of 30% since early 1966.'
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guerrillas in early 1966. These documents are cited in, but not necessarily
accepted by, the NLE. , Whatever its faults, I do not think this latest
document can be disregarded. My own opinion is that 150, 000. is plausible
as an estimate of the number of guerrillas in early 1967.
1Z. I I stated in a cable dated
3 November 1967 that he thought the upper end of the guerrilla range "should
be raised considerably o a the high side..!' On balance, I believe the maximum
number of guerrillas should be raised to at least 120, 000.
13. Paragraph 31 states that the number of members of the political
infrastructure is "large, " but refrains from making even a minimum estimate
of the in:frastructure Is overall size. A numerical estimate was foregone
partly because a MACV range-of 75 - 85, 000 as the number of VC.political
cadre in South Vietnam omitted large numbers of full-time Viet Cong civil
servants serving at district level and above. Although I would hesitate to
estimate the overall strength of the infrastructure, I believe the evidence
warrants a statement that there are at least 100, 000. Most military and
civilian analysts who have worked on the size of the political infrastructure
would probably agree that there are at least this many.
14. Paragraph 35, which discusses the Viet Cong Assault Youths,
asserts that "little information is available to indicate (their) strength or
distribution. . . . " Having written the first memorandum (unpublished) in
February 1967 calling the attention of the MACV Order of Battle branch to
the existence of the Assault Youths, and having kept watch on the evidence
concerning the Assault Youths since then, I believe it is unwarranted to
assert that there is only "little" evidence on their strength and whereabouts.
The amount of such evidence is substantial -- it includes several documents
from theCOSVN Assault Youth Command, extensive records from Viet Gong
Region V,, and a number of district and province Assault Youth rosters: not,
by any means, a complete picture, but one that is as good as that for other
types of Viet Gong organizations. The problem concerning the size of the
Assault Youth force is not a lack of information, but an absence of research.
15. Paragraph 36 states that "current evidence does not enable us to
estimate the present size of (the self defense and secret self defense forces,
among others) with . . . confidence. " While true, a similar assertion could
be made about any set of numbers concerning the Viet Cong. Estimates of
the size of these forces -- probably as good as other estimates made in the
NLE -- were put forward by MACV S-2 in a draft study dated September 1967.
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!ACV then felt there were about 100, 000 in the self defense forces, and
Z0, 000 in the secret self defense forces. I see no analytical reason why
these estimates cannot be included in the current draft of the NIE, and
have little sympathy with the political reasons which apparently led to
their dismissal from the 1,11E.
16. Paragraph 39, and particularly Table 4 which supports
paragraph 39, are virtually meanirgless, since they compute logistic
requirements for NVA and VC "regular" and "administrative support"
forces only. Neither the table nor the text makes any estimate of the
food consumed by guerrillas, political cadres, Assault Youths, or
civilian laborers serving away from home. Since they probably eat
as much per capita as the regulars and support troops,'* since they may
number .over 100, 000 (say,50, 000 political cadres, 30, 000 village
guerrillas, and 30, 000-odd Assault Youths and civilian laborers), and
since food accounts for 80% of the Communistsa "daily logistical resupply
requirements, " their omission from logistical. computations seems
difficult to understand. I am aware that the overall subject of Viet Cong
logistics is complex. I do not feel, however, that the subject is made
any more comprehensible by a table and text which discuss only those
materials and that food used by half of the Viet Cong organization.
17. Paragraph 55 asserts that the "average monthly recruitment
probably falls within the range of 3, 000 to 5, 000 men per month for the
MI ain Forces, the Local Forces and the guerrillas. " Those who have read
the evidence on which this assertion is based believe the range is
questionable. Work in progress on an in-depth CIA study suggests the
monthly recruitment rate may be in excess of the 3, 000 - 5, 000 range
used in the estimate.
General Comments on the Text
18. I see no reason to dwell at length on why I think the current
draft of the NIE is an inadequate piece of analytical work. I will make
four points, briefly.
Table. 4 conioutes food requirements on the basis of 118, 000 "regulars"
and "35 - 40,.000" administrative service troops. If both categories are
on the low side, as is probable, the amount of food they consume is also
underestimated.
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19. First, the current draft is ill-formed and incoherent. Dis_
edifies, 'using such devices as the phrase "at least" to obscure the possible
existence of tens of thousands of Viet Cong soldiers, Too often, it attempts
to blame evidence as inadequate, when the fault is not in information but in
. 20. Second, the draft is less than candid. It conceals rather than
ul .Lub,.5tiic5, losses, and manpower are largely unrelated.
hide behind disclaimers and refuse to add up numbers, while protesting
,
h
soldiers and politicians, and retreats by intelligence officials. Rather
than admit the extent of past underestimates of enemy strength, its authors
21. Third, the draft is timid. Its history is one of attacks by
"considerable" numbers besides the "at least 223, 000 -. 248, 000" Misted
in paragraph 37), it does not come to grips with the probability that .the
number of Viet Cong, as currently defined, is something over half a
million. Thus,. it makes canyons of gaps, and encourages self delusion.
22. Finally, it is unwise. Although it intimates that there are
t
it is inadvisable: to make sums. ofapples and ora.~ges.
SAMUEL A. ADAMS
Vietnamese Affairs Staff
R.7 TS.. , I a i
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