DRV MANPOWER, ARMED FORCES AND REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY

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• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
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TA.170
DRV MANPOWER, ARMED FORCES AND REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY
Manpower and Mobilization Potential
Since mid-1965 the North Vietnamese Armed Forces have expanded
from an estimated 250,000 men to at least 470,000. This expansion includes
those troops in Laos and South Vietnam. The bulk of the physically fit draft
age class of 17-year-olds (about 100,000 each year) is being taken into
military service. The war in general and the bombing in particular have
forced Hanoi to divert from 500, 000 to 600, 000 civilians (men and women,
young and old) to full-time and part-time war-related activities.
Nevertheless, it does not appear that North Vietnam is encountering
insurmountable problems in obtaining sufficient able-bodied men to support
the war in South Vietnam. Of North Vietnamts total population of over 18
million, about 4 million or so are males between 15 and 49, and about half
of these are probably physically fit for military service. At present, the
North Vietnamese Armed Forces have taken less than one-quarter of the fit
males aged 15 to 49 and less than two-fifths of the approximately 1.2 million
fit males in the prime military ages of 17 to 35. Though there is some
evidence of lowering of draft standards and extending of age limits, it appears
that, with a few local exceptions, Hanoi is still drafting only those between the
ages of 17 and 35.
The number of physically fit males above and beyond the annual
increment of those reaching age 17 and who are not yet in the armed forces
is substantial. The most obvious source of manpower is agriculture, where
there are almost 3 million men of all ages, and where per capita production
is low. There are also about half a million men in the service sector of the
economy, including 170, 000 in consumer services; almost half a million men
in industry, over half of whom are in handicrafts; and some 60, 000 male
students of military age.
There is of course no fixed percentage of these men who can be spared
for military duty. Hanoi has already drawn men from the civilian economy for
military and war-related tasks, replacing them where possible with women.
Taking large additional numbers of men would obviously involve some additional
Approved For Release 2004/1N. Q11;raj
AtKuv80R017207:)0W1 10g9-1? ? 7 ?
Approved For, Release 2004/12/222mel
th
01720R000100090009-9
costs to the civilian economy, but this would be a question of priorities in
Hanoi. Losses in agricultural and industrial production can be made up by
imports to the extent necessary to maintain essential subsistence levels of
consumption; consumer services are to some degree expendable and
education can be postponed. Thus we believe that the manpower problem,
while growing more serious, is still manageable in North Vietnam. At a
conservative estimate we believe there are some 100, 000 to 200, 000 men
who could be called into military service, in addition to the annual draft class.
The Armed Forces
The North Vietnamese Armed Forces expanded last year and are now
estimated to total about 470, 000. Despite better evidence on their strength,
there are still some uncertainties concerning the actual strength of units, the
number of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops in Laos, and the size of the
Armed Public Security Forces. The following table should be regarded as a
conservative estimate.
ESTIMATED NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES
1 October 1967
SUMMARY
Army
Air Force
Navy
Armed Public Security Forces
TOTAL Armed Forces
North Vietnamese Army Breakdown
Out-of-Country
South Vietnam
Laos
TOTAL
447, 500
4, 500
2, 500
16, 500
471, 000
54,000 (+20,000 --
304th/320th
Division)
18, 000
72, 000 (92, 000)
In-Country
Infantry 171,500
Air Defensea 93, 000
Other b 111,000
TOTAL 375, 500
grtiE
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Approved For Release 2004/12/22f
1720R000100090009-9
a .
This includes only regular army personnel in AAA units, radar,
and SAM battalions. ft does not include part-time air defense
personnel such as militia, or logistical troops supporting air defense.
bThis includes artillery, armor, high command, logistics,
engineers, and transportation.
If the recruitment of men for replacements and for unit infiltration into
the South should become a critical problem for Hanoi, as a last resort it could
draw down its standing military establishment in North Vietnam. The number
of troops which could be released for out-of-country duty would be influenced
greatly by HanoPs concern to retain a sizable force for defense against a
possible invasion. If, for example, Hanoi should want to keep some 225,000
troops for the defense of North Vietnam and another 85,000 as a training base
and for command and administration, then some 65, 000 additional NVA troops
could be made available for use outside of North Vietnam.
Reinforcement Capability
The best precedent available which establishes the speed with which
the DRV can dispatch troops to the south has been furnished by the recently-
completed southward deployment of the 304th Division and the 320th Division
to the Khe Sanh/DMZ area from North Vietnam.
25X1
Should deployments be made to areas farther south, for instance the
B-3 Front area, the time frame would of necessity be increased.
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DRV MANPOWER, ARMED FORCES AND REINFORCEMENT CAPABTLTTY
Manpower and Mobilization Potential
Since mid-1965 the North Vietnamese Armed Forces have expanded
from an estimated 250,000 men to at least 470,000. This expansion includes
those troops in Laos and South Vietnam. The bulk of the physically fit draft
age class of 17-year-olds (about 100,000 each year) is being taken into
military service. The war in general and the bombing in particular have
forced Hanoi to divert from 500, 000 to 600, 000 civilians (men and women,
young and old) to full-time and part-time war-related activities.
Nevertheless, it does not appear that North Vietnam is encountering
insurmountable problems in obtaining sufficient able-bodied men to support
the war in South Vietnam. Of North Vietnams total population of over 18
million, about 4 million or so are males between 15 and 49, and about half
of these are probably physically fit for military service. At present, the
North Vietnamese Armed Forces have taken less than one-quarter of the fit
males aged 15 to 49 and less than two-fifths of the approximately 1.2 million
fit males in the prime military ages of 17 to 35. Though there is some
evidence of lowering of draft standards and extending of age limits, it appears
that, with a few local exceptions, Hanoi is still drafting only those between the
ages of 17:and 35.
The number of physically fit males above and beyond the annual
increment of those reaching age 17 and who are not yet in the armed forces
is substantial. The most obvious source of manpower is agriculture, where
there are almost 3 million men of all ages, and where per capita production
is low. There are also about half a million men in the service sector of the
economy, including 170, 000 in consumer services; almost half a million men
in industry, over half of whom are in handicrafts; and some 60, 000 male
students of military age.
There is of course no fixed percentage of these men who can be spared
for military duty. Hanoi has already drawn men from the civilian economy for
military and war-related tasks, replacing them where possible with women.
Taking large additional numbers of men would obviously involve some additional
T1)7?
? ?
Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP8OR01720
Approved For.-Release 2004/12/9
IA
0i01720R000100090009-9
costs to the civilian economy, but this would be a question of priorities in
Hanoi. Losses in agricultural and industrial production can be made up by
imports to the extent necessary to maintain essential subsistence levels of
consumption; consumer services are to some degree expendable and
education can be postponed. Thus we believe that the manpower problem,
while growing more serious, is still manageable in North Vietnam. At a
conservative estimate we believe there are some 100, 000 to 200,000 men
who could be called into military service, in addition to the annual draft class.
The Armed Forces
The North Vietnamese Armed Forces expanded last year and are now
estimated to total about 470, 000. Despite better evidence on their strength,
there are still some uncertainties concerning the actual strength of units, the
number of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops in Laos, and the size of the
Armed Public Security Forces. The following table should be regarded as a
conservative estimate.
ESTIMATED NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES
1 October 1967
SUMMARY
Army
Air Force
Navy
Armed Public Security Forces
TOTAL Armed Forces
North Vietnamese Army Breakdown
Out-of-Country
South Vietnam
Laos
TOTAL
447, 500
4, 500
2, 500
16, 500
471, 000
54, 000 (+20, 000 --
304th/320th
Division)
18, 000
72, 000 (92, 000)
In-Country
Infantry 171,500
93,000
Other b 111,000
Air Defensea
TOTAL 375, 500
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OR01720R000100090009-9
an fl_i:jan777
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gl-KpemRy1720R000100090009-9-
... ?
aThis includes only regular army personnel in AAA units, radar,
and SAM battalions. It does not include part-time air defense
personnel such as militia, or logistical troops supporting air defense.
bThis includes artillery, armor, high command, logistics,
engineers, and transportation.
If the recruitment of men for replacements and for unit infiltration into
the South should become a critical problem for I-Tanoi, as a last resort it could
draw down its standing military establishment in North Vietnam. The number
of troops which could be released for out-of-country duty would be influenced
greatly by Hanoi?s concern to retain a sizable force for defense against a
possible invasion. If, for example, Hanoi should want to keep some 225, 000
troops for the defense of North Vietnam and another 85,000 as a training base
and for command and administration, then some 65,000 additional NVA troops
could be made available for use outside of North Vietnam.
Reinforcement Capability
The best precedent available which establishes the speed with which
the DRV can dispatch troops to the south has been furnished by the recently-
completed southward deployment of the 304th Division and the 320th Division 25X1
to the Khe Sanh/DMZ area from North Vietnam.
Should deployments be made to areas farther south, for instance the
B-3 Front area, the time frame would of necessity be increased.
WORKING PAPER: NO DISTRIBUTION
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DRV MANPOWER, ARMED FORCES AND REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY
Manpower and Mobilization Potential
Since mid-1965 the North Vietnamese Armed Forces have expanded
from an estimated 250,000 men to at least 470,000. This expansion includes
those troops in Laos and South Vietnam. The bulk of the physically fit draft
age class of 17-year-olds (about 100,000 each year) is being taken into
military service. The war in general and the bombing in particular have
forced Hanoi to divert from 500, 000 to 600, 000 civilians (men and women,
young and old) to full-time and part-time war-related activities.
Nevertheless, it does not appear that North Vietnam is encountering
insurmountable problems in obtaining sufficient able-bodied men to support
the war in South Vietnam. Of North Vietnamts total population of over 18
million, about 4 million or so are males between 15 and 49, and about half
of these are probably physically fit for military service. At present, the
North Vietnamese Armed Forces have taken less than one-quarter of the fit
males aged 15 to 49 and less than two-fifths of the approximately 1.2 million
fit males in the prime military ages of 17 to 35. Though there is some
evidence of lowering of draft standards and extending of age limits, it appears
that, with a few local exceptions, Hanoi is still drafting only those between the
ages of 17 and 35.
The number of physically fit males above and beyond the annual
increment of those reaching age 17 and who are not yet in the armed forces
is substantial. The most obvious source of manpower is agriculture, where
there are almost 3 million men of all ages, and where per capita production
is low. There are also about half a million men in the service sector of the
economy, including 170, 000 in consumer services; almost half a million men
in industry, over half of whom are in handicrafts; and some 60,000 male
students of military age.
There is of course no fixed percentage of these men who can be spared
for military duty. Hanoi has already drawn men from the civilian economy for
military and war-related tasks, replacing them where possible with women.
Taking large additional numbers of men would obviously involve some additional
rsr'rzr:v.7
t.
A 7-J '#(
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Approved For Release 2004/12/1
01720R000100090009-9
costs to the civilian economy, but this would be a question of priorities in
Hanoi. Losses in agricultural and industrial production can be made up by
imports to the extent necessary to maintain essential subsistence levels of
consumption; consumer services are to some degree expendable and
education can be postponed. Thus we believe that the manpower problem,
while growing more serious, is still manageable in North Vietnam. At a
conservative estimate we believe there are some 100, 000 to 200,000 men
who could be called into military service, in addition to the annual draft class.
The Armed Forces
The North Vietnamese Armed Forces expanded last year and are now
estimated to total about 470, 000. Despite better evidence on their strength,
there are still some uncertainties concerning the actual strength of units, the
number of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops in Laos, and the size of the
Armed Public Security Forces. The following table should be regarded as a
conservative estimate.
ESTIMATED NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES
1 October 1967
SUMMARY
447,500
Army
Air Force
4,
500
Navy
2,
500
Armed Public Security Forces
TOTAL Armed Forces
16,
500
471,
000
North Vietnamese Army Breakdown
Out-of-Country
South Vietnam
54,
000
(+20, 000 --
304th/320th
Division)
Laos
18,
000
TOTAL
72,000
(92, 000)
In-Country
Infantry
171,
500
Air Defensea
Other b
93,
111,
000
000
TOTAL
375,
500
TOP S7CRET
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Approved For Release 2004/12/24'..rgyk ova) 1720R000100090009-9
a .
This includes only regular army personnel in AAA units, radar,
and SAM battalions. It does not include part-time air defense
personnel such as militia, or logistical troops supporting air defense.
bThis includes artillery, armor, high command, logistics,
engineers, and transportation.
If the recruitment of men for replacements and for unit infiltration into
the South should become a critical problem for Hanoi, as a last resort it could
draw down its standing military establishment in North Vietnam. The number
of troops which could be released for out-of-country duty would be influenced
greatly by HanoiIs concern to retain a sizable force for defense against a
possible invasion. If, for example, Hanoi should want to keep some 225, 000
troops for the defense of North Vietnam and another 85,000 as a training base
and for command and administration, then some 65,000 additional NVA troops
could be made available for use outside of North Vietnam.
Reinforcement Capability
The best precedent available which establishes the speed with which
the DRV can dispatch troops to the south has been furnished by the recently-
completed southward deployment of the 304th Division and the 320th Division
to the Khe Sanh/DMZ area from North Vietnam.
25X1
Should deployments be made to areas farther south, for instance the
B-3 Front area, the time frame would of necessity be increased.
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SA.VA
CIA CONTROL NO.
TS #188991
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/Wk2
4 March 1960
.10RANDUM FOR T DIRECTOR
f,LIBIECT : rresert status of avt\TAr
REFERENCE: t,I,TAACV 0315101: oECRET /EYES ONLY
arv of e ere cod me est
Westmoretand expects that a full assessment of the status
as of 29 February will be available on 17 March, Ito has
the following information, however, as an interim report in
use to General Wheeler's request.
ARVN Repellar Forces: A total of I4,42B replacements were
furnished to ARVN regular units.
1-Y.)rsorutel losses (killed, wounded,
and missing) thus far reported total
754. This figure does not include
any personnel losses due to desertion.
eickness or disease. We simply can
not tell whether (or to what extent)
these figures cover personnel AOL.
or aboont on Tet leave.
Of the total 155 maneuver battalions assigned
as of 19 February 1969? 95 were considered
combat effective. As of I March 1968,
110 battalions are considered combat
effective ? an increase of 20 battalions In
10 days. General Westmoreland states
"this indicates a concerted effort on the
rt of the Vietnamese 'feint General Staff
8) to bring units up to effective fighting
ngtls as rapidly as possible."
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FtliN Reglo
c i a of909R conpanies have
ortod in "Present for Duty"
strengths. The average strength
roported was 99. The average
authorized strength for these units
is: 123.
RVN PopularForces:
VN Mr rce:
Performance During
Tet Offensive:
Pere? (
o istkeiEguipment:
Advisors reporte n 4.365 PF
Platoons. These platoons had an
average nr re sent for Duty" strength
of 29. The average authorized
strength for these units is 35.
Not affected by any personnel losses.
Reports are not yet complete, but
*overall reports indicate satisfactory
performance."
Estimates by .TGS indicate that
personnel requirements through the
end of FT 68 can be satisfied.
General Westmoreland states that
"assuming no increase in enemy
activity, the warm. training base
can accomplish the training pro-
grammed by CT 66."
Significant items destroyed or
severely damaged are as follows:
Armored Personnel Carriers
64
N141 Tanks
24
Cne..Ton Trucks
59
Two and one-half Ton Trucks
l60
10.5mrn Howit zer
3
60r.nra i-Aorttr
63
1134 Ilelicopters
6
Other aircraft
1?
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a. A RVN
ants:
"hen the referenced report is stripped of peripheral data, it is
clear that we still do not have a current evaluation of the status of ARVNAF.
The 14,428 replacements furnished to unite suffering 9.754 personnel losses
still does not get at the crucial question of what the current on duty strength
of MINN regular forces is. The current proportion of the 155 maneuver
battalions considered as combat effective averages 76 percent country-wide,
incorporating proportions ranging from 50 percent in IV Corps to 100 percent
In /I Corps. Given the speed of the increase in combat effectiveness
(20 battalions in 10 ye), it is likely that the term. "combat effective" is
being used to refer solely to strength only. Given the type of personnel input, ?
draft dodgers, military prison inmates. etc. -- it is reasonably clear that
measurement of "combat effectiveness" in this manner does not give us a very
meaningful picture of how MINN will stand up to future Communist assaults or,
for that matter, its current strengths.
The data presented for RF/PF units is no more illuminst ng than that
ivcn for ARVN regular battalions, principally because the strengths reported
compared to "authorised" strengths rather than to actual strengths prior
to Tet. The fact that some 30 days subsequent to the Communist offensive
COIMSMACV is able to obtain reports from only 60 percent of the Regional
Forces and 85 percent of the Popular Forces, however, is a reasonably
dismal picture by itself. The reporting for these forces as of I March 1%8
leaves 83.000 RF/PP personnel unaccounted for. The cable does not address
the current status of civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) personnel. It
is possible that the RF/Pr situation is somewhat more disheartening than
Indicated by General Westmoreland. Agency reporting in IV Corp., for
example, notes that at least ZOO of the 2,000 RP/Pr outposts in that area had
been overrun.
c. General
Although General Westmoreland comments on the effects of personnel
losses on leadership potential only in regard to the RVN Airborne Division, it
would appear likely that similar conditions affect other avivAr units.
41* 3 WV
r 'RE
Lu
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R
Otralifted cadre have al aye been in short euprly for RVNAF regular and
irregular groups and it is unlikely that those lost during the Tot offeneive
can be replaced sa.tisfactorily by the derelicts now entering the personnel
pipeline. Evaluations of the impact of personnel losses in the leadership
category can only be made in the field. We believe, however, that
leadership cadre losses have probably boon more serious than the MACV
cable indicates and that they can take some appreciable time (say several
months) to repair.
It is also worth noting that the 'reformation concerning the on-duty
personnel in the RF/PF comes essentially from low-level GVN sources.
It is not based on a high-level OW, or even 1.7S,, head count. Although we
have no hard information on it. we strongly suspect that the reported
count of RF/PF may have been exaggerated by the GVN sources.
One rather disturbing fact emerging from General 1.Yeetrn eland's
cable is that two of ARVN's best units -- the Marine Brigade and the
Airborne Division euffered extremely heavy losses. While this is
cited Orincipally as an example of the importance of qualitative. as well
as quantitative, effects of the Con-emunist offensive, it is worth noting that
General westmeoreland has refrained from sweet:ming the impact of this loss.
His cable, moreover. does not provide very meaningful statistics on
rt VNAF wounded-in-action, inasmuch as the 'VIA figure eresented fails to
distinguish between trivial and permanently disabling wounds. In abort
the interim assessment provided by General Westmoreland presents
interesting and, in some cases. relevant data on the current state of
RVNAF but fails to come to grips with the problem of assessing the
capability of RVNAF to cope with the Communist offensive.
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
I - Oer
1 - OE
1 - OCI
1 - ON
VAS
George A. Carver,
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
rono
1 - VC Tet Offensive
1 - RF IPF File
SECIT
Approved For Release 2004/12/22: CIA-RDP80R01720R000100090009-9