MILITARY ASSISTANCE ALTERNATIVES FOR CAMBODIA - - A PAPER PREPARED BY THE WSAG/CAMBODIA WORKING GROUP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000200030003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 22, 1970
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2RE 1
20R000200?30003-0
? APR is/0
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director for Plans
SUBJECT:
Military Assistance Alternatives for
Cambodia -- A Paper Prepared by
the WSAG/Cambodia Working Group
We attach the WSAG/Cambodia Group paper on military
assistance to Cambodia. The paper was prepared by an
interagency group chaired by
25X1
25X1
25X1
Attachment: As stated
Approved For Release Z 14
William E. Nel on
Chief, Far East D vision
CIA-RDP80 01720 003-0
25X1
 Approved For Release 22004/06/14: CIA-RDP80RO172OR0002000030003-0
TOP SECRET)
MILITARY ASSISTANCE ALTERNATIVES FOR CAMBODIA
I. PURPOSE
This paper develops military assistance alternatives
for Cambodia. It examines:
--The Interests of the US, Cambodia, and Important
Third Countries,
--The Political and Economic Viability of the Present
Cambodian Government,
--Enemy Intentions and Capabilities,
--Current Cambodian Military Capabilities and Alternative
Defense Objectives,
--US Military Assistance Options.
4/21/70
A TOP SECRET
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80RO172OR000200030003-0
 Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80R01720R0002000003-0
TOP SECRET/
II. INTERESTS
2 25X1
A. Closely Concerned Countries
--United States: Principal US interests are to avoid
(1) increased US costs and involvement in a widening war in
Southeast Asia and (2) the installation of a Communist-
dominated or pro-Hanoi Cambodian Government which would in-
crease the threat to Vietnamization and Thai security. Within
these constraints the US has an interest in curtailing North
Vietnamese use of Cambodian territory, or at least making their
presence in Cambodia more costly to the North Vietnamese.
--Cambodia: The major interest of the current govern-
ment is-in preserving itself in power. Their maximum goal is
substantially reducing NVN/VC presence in Cambodia and their
minimum goal is to limit NVN/VC territorial control and prevent
the return of Sihanouk.
--North Vietnam: The major North Vietnamese interest
lies in preserving their sanctuaries and sources of food in
Cambodia. Their maximum goal is the promotion of a Cambodian
government which would serve North Vietnamese interests in
South Vietnam (e.g. use of Sihanoukville) and their long-term
plans for domination of all Indo-China. Their minimum goal is
protection of sanctuaries.
--South Vietnam: The major South Vietnamese interest
lies in seeing the NVA/VC denied base areas and supplies in
Cambodia. SVN also has an interest in seeing fair treatment
for the Vietnamese minority in Cambodia.
Based on a consideration of maximum goals, there is little
hope of a peaceful settlement in Cambodia. The existence of a
Communist or pro-North Vietnamese Government would threaten
Vietnamization and the Government of South Vietnam. Conversely,
without Cambodian sanctuaries, the North Vietnamese effort in
South Vietnam may be seriously impaired. However, there is a
possibility that the US could achieve its overriding interests
within a neutral Cambodia, which would acquiesce to some degree
of NVN/VC presence and thus be acceptable to the enemy. Some
forms of US assistance may encourage Cambodia to adopt a pro-
American orientation rather than neutrality, and may result in
a sharp North Vietnamese military reaction leading to deepen-
ing American involvement and increased costs.
TOP SECRET/ 25X1
Approved For Release 2004/06/14: Cl - 0R000200030003-0
 Approved For Release 200 /0SECRrT/ _RDPF1QRQ17JR000200W003-0
3 25X1
B. Important Friendly Third Countries
--Thailand and Laos have major interests in preserving a
neutral or friendly government in Cambodia for their territorial
security.
--The remaining Asian states have only minimal interests
in Cambodia. Indonesia is the most sympathetic to Cambodia,
but it probably will extend only limited assistance in a non-
aligned context.
25X1
--Of the Western countries, only France has direct in-
terests in Cambodia. France has a major interest in preserving
its economic position in Cambodia and in retaining influence in
the former Indo-Chinese states, in particular in Hanoi. If US
actions in Cambodia appear aimed at supplanting French influence,
France will react unfavorably and, since the French are unwill-
ing to commit?themselves in Cambodia, this could be an inhibi-
tion to strong US action.
C. Important Communist Nations
--The Peoples Republic of China has an interest in ensuring
that North Vietnamese capability in South Vietnam is not weakened
significantly, in promoting a neutralist or Communist Cambodia
friendly to China rather than the USSR, and in keeping US in-
fluence in Cambodia to a minimum.
--The Soviet Union has an interest in promoting without
substantial Soviet involvement;,a Cambodian government friendly
to them rather than China and which allows basic North
Vietnamese capability in South Vietnam to be preserved.
D. International Considerations
--Cambodia publicly renounced its status as a protocol
state to SEATO in 1962.
--The ICC will not be an effective tool given Communist
opposition and the unwillingness of India and Canada to become
involved.
--The UN role is limited by the unwillingness of the
Secretary General to become involved and the opposition of
Approved For Release Y /d J 1 RDP80R0172 R000200030003-0 25X1
 Approved For Releas 04/06/14: CI - OR0002qQP30003-0
710P SECRET/ 4 25X1
the Communist and some neutralist members. Major actors in
this conflict: China, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam, are
not members.
III. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC VIABILITY OF PRESENT GOVERNMENT
A. Introduction
This section examines the political and economic viability
of the present Cambodian Government.
The government has been in power for just over one month,
having deposed Prince Sihanouk, the founder of modern Cambodia
and the nation's most prominent political figure since Cambodian
independence in 1953. This government is trying to establish
itself in the face of a major Vietnamese Communist military
threat. The government is receiving no significant outside
assistance, although it has made specific requests for aid to
Australia, Indonesia; Japan, and the US. The French have also
been approached. 1!
B. Strengths
Popular support
--Over 85/ of Cambodia's six million people are Khmer and
harbor a centuries old hatred of the Vietnamese. They consider
themselves engaged in a war of national salvation against the
Vietnamese Communists. The present government in Phnom Penh
launched and leads this popular cause and thus enjoys the sup-
port of the great majority of the Cambodian people.
--The atmosphere in the capital has been generally calm
and controlled since Sihanouk's ouster with the citizenry ap-
parently backing the Lon Nol regime.
--In the countryside, apart from a series of brief but
violent anti-government demonstrations in a number of Eastern
border provinces in late March, there has been almost no overt
reaction to Sihanouk's dismissal. The demonstrations which
occurred in areas of heavy Vietnamese Communist infiltration
and influence, were crushed quickly and brutally by the army.
Elsewhere in the country there have been no significant anti-
government disorders.
TOP SECRET/
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80RO172OR000200030003-0
 Approved For Release 2004/06 14 : CI R0002000003-0
'MP S , CRFT 5 25X1
--The government is trying to win the support of the con-'
servative peasantry. A number of propaganda teams composed of
students, Buddhist monks and local officials are circulating
throughout the countryside carrying the government's message to
the peasants. Although government leaders haveestimated that
they can consolidate their hold over the peasants in two or
three months, if the Communists do not cause major military
disruptions in the more populated rural areas, there is little
information available on which to evaluate this judgment.
--At the moment there are no signs that any serious in-
digenous challenges to the government's authority are develop-
ing in rural areas and there are no indications that there has
been any significant peasant response to Sihanouk's call to
the Cambodian people to form an armed resistance movement in
the bush.
Political Leadership
--Two men, Lon Nol and Sirik Matak, now share political
power in Phnom Penh. Prime Minister Lon Nol, the nation's
senior military figure, has had considerable experience in
government and the armed forces. Lon Nol previously served as
Prime Minister in 1967 and has held the position of Commander
of FARK for several years. He reportedly enjoys considerable
support from the armed forces and is widely known and respected
throughout Cambodia. Lon Nol has apparently delegated all non-
military policy making to Deputy Prime Minister, Prince Sirik
Matak, a tough and capable conservative who has held many posi-
tions of responsibility in previous governments. Supporting
Lon Nol and Sirik Matak is a small but capable and experienced
group of second level leaders.
--The government's main power base is the armed forces
which has so far steadfastly backed Lon Not. The Civil
Administration in Phnom Penh and the Provinces has pledged its
loyalty to the government. The National Assembly, the country's
only popularly elected body, is also behind the regime. The
Buddhist clergy which wields considerable influence among the
people has also given its support to the government. The
heads of the most important Buddhist order have spoken out in
public for the government and monks in the countryside are
being used as propagandists. Youth and students have en-
thusiastically backed the new regime. University students
TOP SECRET 25X1
Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80R01720R000200030003-0
 Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA- R000200030003-0
MP SECRET/I 6
have been at the forefront of anti-Vietnamese and pro-government
demonstrations and parades. Many have volunteered for the army.
--There has been no significant internal opposition to
the regime. There are no political parties in Cambodia, ex-
cept the remains of Sihanouk's personal political movement,
the Sangkum. This body has been taken over by the government.
The small Cambodian Communist Party was never an effective
political force and has not surfaced politically since 1962.
Economy
--The recent harvest produced a near record rice crop
and there should be sufficient rice to feed the expanded armed
forces.
C. Vulnerabilities
Political
--Aside from the overt military threat from the Vietnamese
Communists (see Section III), the major threat to the present
government is the possibility that Sihanouk will return and,
with Vietnamese Communist assistance, lead a jungle-based re-
sistance movement. Sihanouk could probably attract a sub-
stantial following, but it is not presently possible to deter-
mine just how large or effective this would be. Much would
depend on the degree of support the Communists would commit to
Sihanouk. The taint of this support would have some negative
effect on Sihanouk's recruiting efforts, in view of the
Cambodian's deep-seated hatred and fear of the Vietnamese.
Moreover, Sihanouk's return could have a debilitating effect
on many of the governments more cautious or lukewarm supporters,
particularly in the face of strong NVA/VC pressure and economic
difficulties.
--The indigenous insurgents, or "Khmer Rouge," represent
the main indigenous opposition force. Although hard evidence
is lacking, the total numerical strength of the Cambodian
insurgents probably does not exceed 5,000. There is no proof
that this three-year-old insurgency is a coordinated movement
but there is evidence that the insurgents along the Eastern
border receive arms and direction from the Viet Cong. The
TOP SECRET
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80R01720R000200030003-0
 Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80RO172OR00020003 0003-0
P SECRET/ 7
movement has had little popular appeal and its terrorist tactics
have alienated many peasants. If it could identify itself with
Sihanouk, it might attract a wider following in the rural areas.
A recently acquired COSVN document indicates that the Viet-
namese Communists are now placing greater emphasis on helping
to build a viable Cambodian Communist movement. In sum, it
is probable that the Cambodian Communists will emerge in the
next several months as a greater problem for Phnom Penh.
Economic'
--The ousting of Sihanouk and the resulting confrontation
with thq Communists considerably dampen short-term economic
prospects. Exports of rice--Cambodia's major source of foreign
exchange--may be significantly disrupted by an extensive mo-
bilization of civilian trucks for military movements. Shipping
to Cambodian ports has dropped off about 40% since the March 18
deposition of Sihanouk. A shortage of domestic transport may
also produce a disruption in imports, taxes on which are the
main source of domestic revenue. Domestic commerce undoubtedly
has been hampered by the harassment of the Vietnamese (and
perhaps Chinese) who make up a substantial segment of the local
business communities.
25X1
--The government budget will be under considerable strain
produced by the costs of the military mobilization now under
way. Foreign exchange reserves are low, and the Cambodians
have already asked the US for $50 million in financial assistance.
--Cambodia has no domestic sources of oil supply. There
is a refinery in Sihanoukville that can meet all the country's
major petroleum needs, except aviation gasoline, if supplied
with crude oil from abroad.
D. Conclusions
The present government appears to have consolidated its
position during the month since Sihanouk's ouster and in the
near term (the next 90 days) its prospects for remaining in
power are good, providing the Vietnamese Communists do not
launch a major offensive that overruns Phnom Penh. The primary
reasons for the short-term viability of the current government
are the surge of nationalistic support opposing the Vietnamese
enemy, and the present lack of any significant indigenous op-
position. In the longer term, the continued Vietnamese Com-
munist military threat and the lack of significant external
support for the Cambodian Government are elements of uncertainty.
Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80RO172OR000200030003-0
TOP SECRET
25X1
 Approved For Release ZQ,Q4/06/14: CIA-RDP80RO172OR00020Q 0003-0
TOP SECRET
IV. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS
General Capabilities
The VC/NVA forces in Cambodia at this time consist of z0, 000-
40, 000 personnel organized into 14 Combat Ready Regiments.
These regil ents have the capability of operating approximately
30 to 60 days with current supplies. Adequate food is available
locally to sustain these operations. No unusual VC/NVA morale
problems have been detected.
General Limitations
0
Increased VC/NVA actions in Cambodia might result in increased
political visibility, loss of personnel, supplies and equipment that
could be used in Vietnam, and restrictions on troop and equipment
movements due to the imminent rainy season.
Intentions
VC/NVA forces could:
-- a expand and remain in base areas in Eastern Cambodia:
-- The VC/NVA have conducted overt actions to expand
their base areas and have the military capability to defend these areas.
The additional size of the base area provides protection against GVN
and Cambodian incursions and insures an adequate supply of rice to
feed VC/NVA forces.
-- On the other hand, if VC/NVA forces remain in their
base areas, it is unlikely that the Cambodian government would permit
them to be supplied through Sihanoukville.
-- b apply pressure on the Lon Nol Government to accommodate
and permit Communist forces to freely use Cambodian territory,
-- The VC/NVA can conduct military operations from
the base areas against Cambodian LOCs with the demonstrated
capability to interdict at will. They can isolate or defeat Cambodian
units as has been recently demonstrated in Kandal and Svay Rieng
TOP SEC"
Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80RO172OR000200030003-0
 Approved For Release 2 P4/06/14: CIA-RDP80RO172OR000200030003-0
Pi{I AN VIlI1::1lt
3 GP
tY~1 M k`I
_4
'~iCr u~i.J?:II
1'~I 47
'~vILE DE PHU t0000
COMMUNIST STRENGTH 2 9
INSURGENT,S,SITIRENGTI-1 4,5001
SECRET SPOKE
104
.'y 30
\,%II3ANG
41 \1Pi1
f ~b I 1 F, f
h. t AtI ;YI 704
2,4
sot iii
CUTA:1 31'41
CAMB',A
12 APRIL 1970 DISPOSITION
OF FORCES
0U - DE'MIEJRIGADE
I?P - P!INCJM PENN-I
GP _... C;FIOUP
POLICE GROUP
CAMBODIAN ARMY STRENGTH
Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80RO172OR000200030003-0
 Approved For Release 2a,04/06/14: CIA-RDP80RO172OR000200030003-0
TOP SECRET
Provinces. The VC/NVA can also inspire insurgent/guerrilla
actions and conduct psychological operations among ethnic groups
against the RKG. Thus far VC/ NVA forces have been able to
pursue this startegy without significantly degrading their capability
in South Vietnam.
10
Not withstanding, to apply continuous pressure on the
Lon Nol government takes time and cannot guarantee Cambodian
cooperation. Lengthy operations may require additional forces,
degrading the VC/NVA capability in South Vietnam.
-- c mount an overt attack to topple the Lon Not Government.
6
-- Approximately 10 regiments are immediately
available to mount an attack on Phnom Penh; an attack with this sized
force would be successful. Such an action would topple the Cambodian
Government and give VC/NVA forces full use of Cambodia.
0
-- The commitment of forces to seize Phnom Penh
would reduce significantly (by`33%) VC /NVA main force capabilities
in the II, III and IV Corps areas in South Vietnam. Overruning the
Lon Nol Government by overt military force would require some
North Vietnamese administration of Cambodian affairs. The North
Vietnamese may be concerned that such an action may trigger a U. S.
military response.
In conclusion, the North Vietnamese are most likely at this time to
pursue course b -- applying pressure on the Lon Nol Government.
TOP SECRET/SENSTIVE
0
Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80RO172OR000200030003-0
 Approved For Release 2.404/06/14: CIA-RDP80RO172OR000200030003-0
CURRENT CAMBODIAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES
AND ALTERNATIVE DEFENSE OBJECTIVES
Introduction
This section examines Cambodian military capabilities to
include their ability to absorb and effectively utilize various
levels of military assistance. It develops three alternative
Cambodian defense objectives:
--defend minimum territority to defend viable Cambodian
state,
TOP SECRET)
25X1
11
--contain VC/NVA in base areas,
--force VC/NVA to leave Cambodian soil.
Finally, the 'section examines military assistance required for
the Cambodians to accomplish each objective.
TOP SECRE
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80RO172OR000200030003-0
 Approved For Release
"NOW 220D4/BI #Etr -RDP8OR0120R00020Q30003-0 1 25X1
A. Friendly military situation and capabilities
Cambodian Armed Forces. The Royal Cambodian Armed
Forces (FARK) have a strength of about 40,000 men
consisting of: 37,000 Army personnel organized. in 55
infantry and commando battalions and 9 specialized. half
brigades; 1,750 Air Force personnel organized into three
wings; 1,400 man Navy organized in Coastal and River Groups.
In addition, there are an estimated 55,000-65,000 para-
military forces including Provincial Guards (16,000), Home
Guards (30,000 part-time volunteers) Police (15,000) and.
National Youth movement (5,000).
The Armed Forces are the power base of the present
government. The officer corps is conscious of its elite
social position and is politically sensitive. Officers are
generally nationalistic and non-communist.
However, the Armed Forces are plagued with a shortage
of experienced combat officers, especially at the field
grade. Corruption on the part of officers, evidenced by
involvement in smuggling activities (usually through bribes
with the NVA/VC) prevails throughout FARK.
Although French Advisors conduct professional sound
service schools, the lack of combat training at battalion
and higher level limits the value of French instruction.
Enlisted men are generally well-disciplined and loyal.
Their technical proficiency suffers from a low education
level and the lack of realistic training, including weapons
firin . However, most will fight the VC/NVA if properly
organized and led.
FARK pay is low but indications are that personnel
are paid regularly and food and shelter are considered
adequate. Items of uniform are in short supply, especially-
boots.
Army. Army units are manned at one-half of authorized
strength. Some units, particularly the commando battalion,
have a reasonable degree of combat effectiveness. The Army
is capable of small unit tactical operations, but it is
untrained in operations utilizing units larger than a
battalionq
Approved For Release.AqP4/g~ftEf - OR000200030003-0 25X1
 Approved For Release Q04/06/ 4 : CI/ R00020Q,430003-0
The Arn
=is not considered capable of oanizin an
effective defense against an a.11-out attackby t-he VC NVA,
primarily because it lacks combat experience and training
in large scale operations. But in the absence of such an
all-out attack, the FARK has a reasonable chance of
successfully absorbing still higher levels of VC/NVA
pressure.
Navy. The Cambodian Navy is organized to protect
the coastal and inland waterways and to support ground
forces in maintaining inland waterways. Both the Coastal
and River Command have demonstrated fairly quick reaction
to territorial violations by Thai fishing junks, South
Vietnamese forces and insurgents. However, in general,
it is only moderately effective as a river patrol and
could offer ground troops only limited gunfire support.
It would be ineffective in combating a determined sea-
borne incursion. The Navy is hampered by lack of good
officers and non-commissioned officers, obsolete equip-
ment and limited funds.
Air Force. The Air Force is incapable of defending
Cambodia against a determined air attack but has a limited
interdiction and close support capability. However, it has
not trained for these roles. Lack of training and skilled
personnel indicated by the low aircraft serviceability
rate severely restricts Air Force capability.
Paramilitary. Cambodia has a variety of paramilitary
forces. These forces are primarily concerned with internal
security. In an emergency, they could provide a sizeable
input (about 60,000) to the ground forces provided suf.
ficient time, outside logistic and most important, the
organizational apparatus was established to effectively
utilize these personnel. The Provincial Guards, the
mainstay of the Cambodian police, are the largest (15,000)
full time, fully armed and uniformed paramilitary force.
The Guards' 20-brigades deployed in each of Cambodia's
19 provinces are manned at one-half of authorized strength.
The other paramilitary organization include Home Guards or
CHIVAPOL (30,000 part-time volunteers), Police (15,000) and
national youth movement. The equipment and potential combat
effectiveness of paramilitary forces are considered to be
less adequate then that of the regular Army.
25X1
13
TOP SECRET 25X1
Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CI - 000200030003-0
 `""'P SECRE/A
Approved For Release 4/06/14 : 0002000003-0 14
Equipment. The Army is presently equipped pre-
dominently with the Soviet-Chinese Communist family of
small arms but also has considerable mix of other weapons,
including U.S. weapons and equipment provided before 1963.
Artillery is limited and consists of US 105 Howitzers,
Chinese Communist 82mm mortars and 76mm and 122 Howitzers,
and some French 37mm and 75mm field guns. Armor units
have about 150 vehicles including 12 U.S. light tanks
(M-24), armored cars and half tracks.
The Cambodian Air Force has 119 aircraft including
only 24 Fighter/Attack types, (13 MIG-17, 11 ALH, and
15 T-28) and 10 helicopters (French). The aircraft are
old and aircraft and airfield maintenance are poor. In
addition the incommission rate is very low, and there is
a shortage of POL and Cambodia has few navigation aids.
Only one airfield (Phom Phen) has a hydraulic fueling
capability. Refueling at other airfields is primarily
done with jerrycans.
Cambodia does not have the capability to manufacture
military equipment or ammunition and depends on outside
sources for POL. Although the quantities of communist
small arms and heavy weapons are adequate for present
force levels and to equip an expanded force of about
70,000 men, spare part shortages and poor maintenance
practices would attrite these weapons rapidly in a
combat environment.
There were 3,000 metric tons of ammunition available
in depots at the end of 1969. It is intimated that these
stocks will provide sufficient small arms ammunition for
about 100 days of sustained combat. Field artillery
mortars ammunition would be depleted more quickly.
Expansion Capacity. Cambodia has sufficient new
manpower to carry out a several fold expansion in its
armed forces. There are presently a maximum of 815,000
males fit for military service. This is about twice
the number required to meet Lon Nol's plan for a total
force of 410,000.
Alternative Defense Objectives. It is assumed that
the RKG general strategy gives first priority to the
preservation of a politically viable Cambodia against
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 94/ ~' 64-RDP80R0172bR000200030003-0
 Approved For Release ,004/08 1'!1 RDP80R01720R0 0200 0003-0 15 25X1
the single threat of VC/NVA military force in the eastern
and southeastern portions of the count.. This would
involve the uninterrupted functioning of the government,
preservation intact of the armed forces, and. physical
control of a certain minimum amount of territory.
Having once assured itself of its minimum require-
ments, the RKG would then attempt to improve its position
at the expense of the VC/NVA, pressuring them, to the
extent of'their capability, to leave the country.
Based on the foregoing, there are three alternative
Cambodian defense objectives:
-- Objective 1: Defend minimum territory to insure
a viable Cambodian state;
-- Objective 2: Contain VC/NVA in base areas which
permit ground communications between the RKG and all of
its provincial capitals,
-- Objective 3: Force the VC/NVA to leave Cambodian
soil.
Approved For Release "/ /~#Sf - 000200030003-0 25X1
 Cheom Ksan' K on'?
Vira
Kompong Troun !.~ Af:ltyr
Pranak ThaIa BarivatO,i
i ~tunf; Lompha
---
iPlfum Rowiahg.
Kam
Phu
KOMPO ( II IOM t 1y,.
KorrTpo~lg
Tharni
sal r
0 a 4Kompon /
CAMBODIA
International boundary
Province boundary
? National capital
O Province capital
KeP Independent municipality
-+ Railroad
Road
Track or trail
Khanh
Hunk
OOUNOARY REPRESENTATION IS
NOT NEC- SSA111LY AU1110RITATIVE.
(: ` ~'~ KrRuru
a
o rn r) on f-, -a M
N: I \1
~
PttN
M~ e Prcy 7~ J Q
akhmau Tay Ninn/
~I~'Ba n l n1 y
 Approved For Release 0 4/06/14: CI R00020gQ 0003-0
TOP SECRET/
17 25X1
Objective 1. Defend Minimum Territory (see ma
Accomplishing this objective requires both action by the
Cambodian Government and external military assistance. First
it requires, as a minimum, an expansion of FARK by 30,000.
Cambodian Actions
The RKG has already called 10,000 reservists back to
active duty; in addition, recruiting is under way to organize
some 30 additional battalions. These actions would increase
the FARK to about 80 battalions plus specialized units and a
total strength of about 65,000. It is estimated that FARK has
the capability to find leadership to organize, and give minimal
training to an increase of approximately 30,000 provided they
are organized into lightly armed infantry units; and that they
can do this without undertaking a special training program.
This is so in view of the 10,000 reservists around whom these
new units could be built. The FARK also has sufficient numbers
of rifles and carbines to give each man some kind of personal
weapon; however, these weapons could not be standard.
In pursuit of Objective 1, the FARK could take the follow-
ing actions at this time without outside help:
--pull forces in northeast back toward Mekong,
--strengthen the critical sector from Kampong Cham south-
west to Takeo with approximately 50% of the units now positioned
along the Thai border and redeploy all artillery to vicinity of
Phnom Penh,
--organize and train a strategic reserve of about 2,000
men,
--construct defensive positions throughout the major threat
area using military supervision and civilian labor,
--increase the size of the armed forces.
Military Assistance
Minimum necessary wit low level VC/NVA pressure. The
extent to which the short run survival of the RKG is dependent
O
TOP SECRET/ I
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80RO172OR000200030003-0
 Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA 00020000003-0
MP SECRET
18 25X1
on the VC/NVA decision as to priorities has already been dis-
cussed. If the Communists don't move to topple the Lon Nol
Government, but rather limit themselves to raids, harass-
ments by fire, and attack on small isolated units, the FARK
can probably take care of itself in near term--three to six
months. However, without some external assistance, any level
of combat--however low-forced on them by the VC/NVA--will, in
the long run, immobilize and incapacitate the FARK. This will
come about as key categories of supplies are exhausted. Primary
among these ar'e: ammunition, POL, and spare parts. In short,
without some outside military aid, the FARK will ultimately
be incapable of functioning. FARK morale may deteriorate
quicker from supplies being exhausted,
Assistance to achieve Objective 1 with continued NVA/VC
pressure. The following equipment and supplies would be neces-
sary to sustain the required 30,000 increase in Cambodian
forces:
--small arms and ammunition,1/
--personal clothing and equipment for 30,000,
--trucks: 200
--radios: 300
--ammunition: 60-day stock plus resupply for 15 months,
--medical supplies.
Additional Needs:
--fortification material and hand tools,
--river patrol craft
--POL tanker at Phnom Penh
--emergency bridging
--military field rations.
Cambodian weapons stock will be adequate for the 30,000
expansion if compatible ammunition is available; if not, US
small arms and ammunition would be required
Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80R01720R000100030003-0
TOP SECRET/I 25X1
 Approved For Release 0 4/06/14: CIA- 00020W003-0 19
P SECRET/I 2T 25X1
Impact of Precedingambodian Actions and Military
Assistance on Cambodian Ability to Achieve Objective I
Current estimates credit the VC/NVA with the capa-
bility to take Phnom Penh, using a force of 11-14 regiments
if they strike at this time. However, there are a number of
reasons why the Communists would hesitate to make a maximum
effort of this sort:
--not necessary to ensure base areas in Cambodia,
--would detract from effort in South Vietnam,
--would reveal. to world the presence of NVA forces in
Cambodia and South Vietnam.
The longer they wait, the greater the losses the VC/NVA
must expect to take assuming FARK is receiving some outside
military assistance. Unless undertaken during the next thirty
days, the rainy season water level will inhibit large scale
movement toward Phnom Penh.
The redeployments and increases proposed for Objective 1
give the FARK the capability for deploying a force of 50 to 60
battalions (about 30,000) plus paramilitary forces into the
area south and east of Phnom Penh.
In summary, the VC/NVA capability must be diminished by
the disadvantages to them associated with electing to expend
it on an attack on Phnom Penh. At the same time the FARK
capability is appreciated by the psychological lift that would
come from receiving outside aid, and the absorption of addi-
tional hardware. Taking these together, it is reasonable to
estimate that if the FARK can achieve the Objective 1 capa-
bility, they will have a fighting chance to survive.
Delivery time required to achieve Objective 1:
--to begin delivery by air: ten days.
--to complete delivery from US military sources: 30-45 days.
--for FARK to absorb, train and deploy approximately 30
bns: 90-120 days.
TOP SECRET/
D
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80RO172OR000200030003-0
 Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80RO1720R00020QDZ0003-0
-??- International boundary
------- Province boundary
*(~ National capital
!}~ Province capital
.-+-s-c- Railroad
Road
Phnom Penh, &,kor, Kep, and
Slhanouk~ille ore autonomous
rrrunidpo/Aiec.
S' rrt>nh
LrDf?R
M E'A NC;I-IE_Y
0 25 5O Miles
0 25 50 Kilumelers
r1.G M
ralanh c: E A fr'_.
JPursat
r - ~- _ Senmonorom
,Sian Reap
, oNirC>^ c. THOM
I t H ' 'rey
Vrni~
aktrinau
lanam
-- Svay
/;rar J" Phu
4
Ila lien
t-Tt)YN
N
Long Xuyen -'~'Y
Vinl
Lo
Tay
Nino
S O T H
('hon Thank
KO KUT 1`''y'Khen7Trak
?,PtYotanlinville.,
llbon :
R