POSSIBLE US HARASSMENT ACTIONS IN CAMBODIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000200030004-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 22, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2004/06/tl= ' DP80R01720R000200030004-9
22 April 1970
SUBJECT: Possible US Harassment Actions in Cambodia
1. The opportunities for effective harassment of
VC/NVA forces in Cambodia are relatively limited. Their
strong logistical base which undoubtedly includes sub-
stantial stockpiles of supplies -- possibly upwards of
2,000 tons of ordnance ---- is so widely dispersed that
it does not offer sound targets against which operations
can be directed. Meaningful destruction of enemy
supplies would in large measure be a result of chance.
2. The most promising harassments, in terms of
finding a real deterrent to further Communist advances
in Cambodia, would be those designed to locate and
destroy their command and control facilities, particularly
COSVN headquarters, or their human resources. The
following suggestions of possible harassment actions
are made on the premise that they might result in
substantial enemy casualties:
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004x06/14 : CIA-RDP8QR01720R000200030004-9
 Approved For Release 2004/06/1?
Authorize all
ve opert tic+ns and call in air and artillery
ikes.
Con
A relatively low- a. Effects would be
profile way of locat- localized.
ing and attacl(ing
enemy troops.
immediate impact
operations.
'there would-be b. Some risks if teams
need to be withdrawn
2) Ground sweep, in force through Base Area
a. A successful sweep
could eliminate all
or some part of CC '
headquarters.
Significant stock.-
piles and facilities
could be destroyed.
c. Could have signifi-
cant shock-effect
on VC/ NVA high
command.
a. Area is probably
heavily defended and
high US casualties
would undoubtedly
result.
b. COM is somewhat
a floating crap game,
so location of head-
quarters would require
prolonged and exten-
sive sweep.
Approved For Release 2004/06/14; CIA=RDP80R01720R000200030004-9
25X1
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/06/1
P80R01720R0QD200030004-9
25X1
(3) Ground sweep in farce into Base Area 702.
a.
Would
enemy
trol
disrupt a major
logistics con-
center and
a.
b.
sanctuary area.
FARK is dug in
south and west
to
b.
facilitating coor-
dination and hopefully
blocking escape routes
to west.
c. Area believed to be
lightly defended.
d. Located in remote
area with minimum
risk of publicity.
e. Could deny a potential
base of operations for
Sihanouk.
Securing area would
be difficult.
Enemy reinforcements
could be moved in
quickly.
(4) Ground sweep in force into Base Area 704.
a. Could destroy or dis- a. A deep penetration
rupt a major logistics might be needed to
apparatus serving effectively harass
IV Corps. troops near Phnom
Penh.
b. Could cause diversions
of VC/NVA troops in b. Could be in large
areas west towards measure an ARVN
Phnom Penh. ground operation with
US air and artillery
c. Immediate effects support.
which could be long
lasting.
Approved For Release 2004/06/ - 1720R000200030004-9 1 14 - r. 25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/06/14 F4P80R01720R0Q 200030004-9
(5) Target a multi-company_
reaction force, with TAC air, artillery and B-52
aide jae ainstBase Area 353.
Pro Con
a. Lower profile than a.
option (2).
b. Possibility of same
results as option (2)
but with less exposure b.
of ground troops.
c. Operation would be
quicker than ground
operation.
forces
are mighty light and
would be heavily
pressed.
Large enemy defensive
forces.
(6) Send Khmer Serai Units into Cambodia.
a. Being ethnic Cam- a. Their numbers are
bodians, they would small.
present a low
profile.
They could conduct
guerrilla operations
to harass enemy
operations.
c. Low cost (to US)
favorable response
to Cambodian requests
for aid.
Approved For Release 2004/0
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1