GEORGE CARVER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000200160006-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2004
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: BH

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I. Background
B. College Education - degrees, honors, fellowships,
scholarships
II.
Qualifications
A. Present Employment
1.
Title or Position.
(SAVA) How long? (since 1966).
2.
Responsibilities:
Indochina).
(All Agency activities on
3.
Duties: (To furnish "intelligence support" to
President and Senior Advisor).
4.
What does such "intelligence support" consist
of? (Explain) Are these functions substantially
the same for intelligence organizations in all
major countries?
B. Have you been in Vietnam?
1. When, and for what period of time? (1958-60,
and regular visits since 1969).
C. For how long has your work involved Vietnamese
Affairs? (1957)
D. In your present position have you worked with
Senior U.S. Officials on Vietnamese Affairs? Who,
and under what circumstances?
Secretary of Defense -- weekly meetings; trips
to Vietnam.
JCS, State, White -- Rostow, Kissinger.
President --
Clifford Study Group and Wise Men
E. Have you received commendations and awards for your
work?
Humphrey -
Nixon -
Awards -
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F. Have you published articles on Vietnam?
Foreign Affairs?
Asked to write by editor?
Identify Ex. K-81.
A. Have you read and studied it?
Did you work with the Wheeler Report in the
course of your duties in 1968? When? What
were the circumstances?
B. Could possession of Ex. 19 in 1969 by a foreign
nation have been prejudicial to the defense
interests of the U.S.?
C. In what ways could Ex. 19 have been advantageous
to a foreign nation or prejudicial to U.S. in
1969? (List ways)
D. Could Ext. 19 have been of advantage to a
foreign nation in 1969 even if not translated
into action in combat or on battlefield?
E. Would the value of Ex.19 to a foreign nation in
1969 have been destroyed if the information in
it were wrong? Falsified?
F. To whom in a foreign nation could this document
have been of advantage in 1969? (If not done
previously, ask for duties and functions of a
nation's "intelligence service.")
G. In 1969, would there have been any difference
in the utility to a foreign nation's intelligence
service between Ex. 19 and public materials
containing similar statements? What difference?
H. In 1969, what weight and value would a foreign
nation have ascribed to Ex. 19?
1.
Would the age of Ex. 19 have rendered it
of no value to foreign nations in "69"?
2.
Was
such
the quality of NVN intelligence in 1969
that NVN could have had no need or use
for
Ex. 19?
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3. Could NVN in 1969 have obtained information
the same as that in Ex. 19 from other sources?
4. Would the "open" nature of U.S. society, or
the large amount of information in public
sources have rendered it of no value to a
foreign nation in 1969? Why?
I. Is the table on page 4 "absolutely unintelligible?
(Interpret Table (PFD)).
IV. Exhibits 1-18
A. Have you examined, and are you familiar with
Exs. 1-18?
B. Could possession of Exs. 1-18 in 1969 have been
advantageous to a foreign nation?
Could possession of Exs. 1-18 by a foreign nation
in 1969 have been prejudicial to defense interests
of the U.S.?
C. In what ways could Exs. 1-18 have been of advantage
to a foreign nation in 1969? (Exploitation)
1. Discloses how U.S. does business; compromise
of sources, methods, technology.
2. Utility for authenticating public documents;
exemplars for deception operations.
3. Psychological warfare; to encourage selves,
demoralize adversaries.
4. Labor saving research, compilation,
authentication, leads.
5. Informative on U.S. views on Vietnam War, and
what U.S. considers sensitive.
6. Aid and comfort to action like NVN.
D. In what ways could possession of Exs. 1-18 by a
foreign nation in 1969 have been prejudicial to
U.S. defense interest) (Impairment)
1. Impairment of trust and confidence of sources.
2. Impairment of frankness of USG officials in
performing functions.
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E. In 1969, would there have been any difference
in value to a foreign nation of the whole of
Exs. 1-18 as compared with any single volume
or extract from a volume? What difference?
F. Would the presence of the footnotes in
Exs. 1-18 have added significantly to the
value of these documents to a foreign nation
in 1969? (Note: "SC" indicates COMINT Channel)
G.
Would the classification of Exs. 1-18 have any
significance to a foreign intelligence service's
assessment of them? What?
H.
In terms of value to a foreign intelligence
would books or memoirs such as Hilman's "To
A Nation" be the equivalent of Ex. 9? Why
service,
Move
Not?
V. Whiting Rebuttal
A. Did changes in U.S. technology make it impossible
for a foreign intelligence service in 1969 to
assess U.S. intelligence capabilities on the basis
of materials dated 1968 and earlier? Why not?
B. Did infrared and electronic sensors substantially
alter U.S. intelligence capabilities in Vietnam
between 1965 and 1969?
C. Is it true that finished U.S. intelligence could
be of no use to a foreign nation in assessing U.S.
intelligence capabilities?
1. Could the finished intelligence in Exs. 1-18
have been advantageous to a foreign nation
in assessing U.S. intelligence capabilities
in 1969?
D. Is it true that without raw data indicating source,
time and place of collection, "it is impossible
for an enemy to design a counter-intelligence
response?
1. Can finished intelligence be used by a foreign
nation in designing counter-intelligence
responses?
2. Can finished intelligence furnish an advantage
to a foreign nation quite apart from whether it
discloses sources or is usable for counter-
intelligence purposes? In what ways?
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E. If a foreign nation was aware that the U.S. was
using intelligence collection methods, such as
communications intelligence, would that knowledge
mean that the foreign nation could gain no further
advantage by learning the results of those collection
methods?
F. Was NVN in 1969 helpless to devise counter-
intelligence systems which would deny the U.S.
the kind of information in Exs. 1-18?
1. Did NVN use land lines for communication
in 1969?
2. Were NVN foreign SVN capable of using only
the most simple communications systems?
3. Were NVN forces in SVN at every level
capable of employing counter-measures
to protect their communications?
G. Would the information in Ex. 6, page 233, indicate
to a competent foreign intelligence analyst, the
collection method used?
1. Would defendants Ex. K-81, page 362, be
equally revealing?
2. What does "SC" in footnote of Ex. 6, page 222
indicate?
H. Could disclosure of the Kosygin phone intercept
and other COMINT in Ex. 17, page 93-94, have been
prejudicial to U.S. defense interests in 1969?
How? Advantage to foreign nation.
1. Is that material "communications intelligence?"
2. What is the significance of the:
a. "President's Cipher" information?
b. NSA 201 and 510 group information?
Is information of that kind useful, even if the
messages are not deciphered and read?
3. Is there any basis in that material to support
a supposition that Kosygin's phone call was
intended by him to be overheard by British or
U.S.? Or that call was placed through switch-
board at Claridges Hotel?
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I. Could the materials in Exs. 1-18 from National
Intelligence Estimates (NIE) have been of
advantage to a foreign nation in 1969? In
what way?
J. Is it true that a foreign intelligence analyst
would attach virtually no significance to the
classification indicated on Exs. 1-18.
K. Is it true that disclosure of the information in
Exs, 1-18 in 1969 could not have led to the
death of a single American or allied life?
L. In your judgement, what monetary value would
Exs. 1-18 have had as intelligence information
to a foreign nation in 1969?
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SENDER WILL CHECK CLASS :ATION TOP AND BOTTOM
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
I
Mr. George Carver
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General Counsel 7 D 01 Hqs
4/17/7
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
FORM No. 237 Use previous editions
167
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