1968 INFILTRATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000400040005-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: October 15, 1968
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 200410,5/21 Cl
SUBJECT: 1968 Infiltration
15 October 1960
The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam has prepared the
following monthly estimates for the first eight months of 1968:
January
23, 200
February
10,200
March
Z5,800
April
22, 900
May
27,400
June
27,Z00
July
28,400
.August
32, 000
Total
197, 100
Although there are a number of difficulties in making monthly
estimates of NVA infiltration, we believe that M.A.CV's nionthly cstixno_tes
a.re the. correct order of rna nitudc. We believe, however, that the suns
of those 1968 monthly estimates -- about: 197, 000 -- is not re wlly the best
estimate for the eight month period as a whole. Although the cannot apportion
by month, we believe as many as 40, 000 additional infiltrators may have
arrived, This gives us an Agency estimate of 200, 000--240, 000. We believe
DIA..'s estimate for this period is 210, 000.
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 Approved For Relea
se ZUU41U572T-.-ClA-KL)Pt5UH
We believe that the evidence concerning the level of infiltration.
during September and so far in October is inconclusive. We have observed
16, 200 who should arrive in September and 8, 700 who should arrive in.
October. Actual infiltration is certainly higher but we have no way of judging
the exact figures.
In September, four infiltration groups, possibly five, with an
estimated strength of 2, 300 were detected in in ercepted comMunications.
So far in October, two, possibly three infiltration groups have been noted.
No strength figures are available for these groups. These groups will arrive
in November and December.
Our best judgment is that the pace of entry into the infiltration
pipeline has probably dropped below the declining rates seen in June and July --
an average of some 18; 000. We believe, however, that the rate is still
well above the rate indicated by the number of groups detected in September and
October.
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ILLEGI
 Approved For Release 2004/05/29 `"G IA-RDP8.0R01720R000400040005-5
During the first two weeks in October there has been a marked drop
in the number of attacks per week as contrasted with the preceding six weeks'
total. (See chart below. )
The number of ground attacks mounted by the enemy is the principal
indicator of his aggressiveness. It should be noted that the period covered
by the chart begins with the initiation of the third phase of his general offensive
on 18 August.
PERIOD
NO.
OF ATTACKS
18-24 August
91
25-31 August
65
1-7 September
58
8-14 September
40
15-21 September
58
22-28 September
50
29 Sept. - 5 Oct.
32
6-12 October
36
TOTAL
NO. OF INCIDENT
585
486
492
560
653
572
510
538
The current downward trend in attacks is a phenomenon which has been
observed more or less consistently after an extended period of intense offensive
activity by the enemy. Thus between the Tet attacks, the 1st phasof his general
offensive and the beginning of the 2nd phase of the general offensive in early May
we see a period of fewer attacks and general avoidance of combat by the enemy.
A parallel situation is also observed between the end of June, the end of the 2nd
phase, and the beginning of the 3rd phase in mid-August. We once again
apparently have moved into a period in which the enemy avoids combat, withdraw.
this current period of fewer attacks presagesya period of renewed intensive
offensive activity remains to be seen.
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 Approved For Release 2004/05/21.:
22 October 1968
Since mid-September and continuing to date, a major
repositioning of NVA and VC main force units has been noted in
sigint. It now appears that from 18-20 regimental size units may have
moved either into NVN or into base areas along the border or well
into Laos and Cambodia. If the 18-20 regiments were at normal
strength as many as 30, 000 men could be involved in this movement.
I-Iowever, due to having combat losses (22, 000 KIA since mid-August),
sickness and wounded, these units are probably far from being at
their "normal" strengths. It should be noted, though, that there
is no reason for supposing, that those units noted in movement from
SVN were the only ones to sustain casualties, In other words, while
some of the units that moved may have been badly mauled, they were
not all completely decimated. Allied operations, bad weather, supply
problems, and sickness contributed to these withdrawals. The VC,
however, retain the capability of resuming offensive operations on
short notice and sigint and collateral reports indicate that the
enemy continues to plan for offensive operations.
I CORPS:
The HQ MRTTH and its subordinate 6th and 9th Refits
displaced to Laos in mid-September. The NVA 138th and 270th .Refits
moved north across the eastern DMZ in late September. In late
September - early October, the NVA 320th Div and its three
subordinate regts, the 48th, 52nd, and 64th, plus the NVA 164th Arty
Regt have moved N of the Ben Hai River. In addition, there arc now
tenuous indications that the NVA 803rd Regt may now be located in NVN.
Since mid-September, the I-IQ NVA 1st Div and at least two
subordinates, the NVA 66th and 320th befits have withdrawn to
Cambodia. Collateral sources, not sigint, Indic ate that the 95C and
the l O1D 1~c fits have also withdrawn to Cambodia, Additionally, the
NVA 95th, 18B Refits and the 40th Arty Regt are in Cambodian
sanctuaries to which they had moved just prior to the redeployment
of HC 1st Div.
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In III CTZ the I-Iq NVA 7th Div is now located in the north
central Binh Long Province - Cambodian border area; 5th VC Div
in NE Tay Ninh Province - Cambodian border area; the 9th VC Div
in west central Tay Ninh Province - Cambodia border area. Four NVA
Refits, the 32nd, 141st, and 165th Regts and the NVA 96 Arty R.egt and
two VC Regts the 271st and 272nd have moved to the Cambodian border
area. NOTE: While these moves to safe areas have occurred, the
HQ NVA 1st Div has moved from II Corps and is now located in th
NW Binh Long Province - Cambodian border area of III Corps. This
movement would seem to indicate a strengthening of forces in this
Corps area in preparation for a renewal of hostilities.
reports indicate t.- at VC units have pulled back from population
centers and scorn to pose no immediate threat at this time.
There are no NVA units in IV CTZ.
In view of the difficulties the VC have experienced in recent months a
noted in pares 1, the present lull in fighting can probably be attributed to
the necessity to have units regroup and be resupplied and not to any intent
to cease hostilities.
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 Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000.40QQ40005-5
Co;.)e.rat ivc
1~SIi;I"1~Lti',s of Qr~'"anj '.cdfnteny
Sires Lbs in South Victlia;it, 3 r{fir- 1964
k ..
iACV(30 Junee)
Con 2 t i,o rce s
~rC /1 VA \l a,:c Lo'cal Forces 1 14, 300=12.9, :100
N V ?'~1 ) 41 ' .r f
30,-000- -000
Subtotal
O ::~ _ ? : ; tar emcnts
Assut:'_t Youth
;. T .
- / i ::S 3 J oa?C s
Subtotal
l ;n ast1?1tct rc
'raft s s ona1 Cadre
Supuor In Staffs
Subtotal
Total
Not
CIA(;.1. ~~, )
60 000 180, 0 0{;=,:
(1 1 .,, ()00 &O0)
(4 000-50, 000 )
60, 0()0-80, 000:?:.
80, 000- 1 10, 000
10,0()0-20,000
80, 000-.' = -'? -t 1.
90, 000--1=vr=;t
7 ;--003= 85, 000 75,000-85,000
10,000-30,000
85, 000 85, 000- 1 15, 000
sucks the 308th Division and cxcl.u(-Ies the 30,101. T!, c MAC V
o t -13, 000" 000-NVr7"..so.ldic.rs..-:se vJ.rt~ it1 1 C ti:)
s t ;n_Ytc u t about. pc rcent 15, 000-20, 000) of those are NVA personnel
y -
.
to ! C.: :Vail- 1J11.1t} of MAC~''S strong-th figures for ?.ilu
I}oti-;
OF :L 1~
Ci-1~~ InU:,t }J l: x':1.'1: 1.1I17171cL 1? The,
Y CIA estirnate of VC/NVA l a.ai-i end
1 r..cal r'c~l cs ~; is been iiirrcasc d 10, 00G-
20, 000 l asc cl ate increase in i sic: r 4L c
tai infiltI' LL ion anCI generally lower Casualty rates
(2) G) 'vlAGV c sti:
Hates the total NVA presence in South Vietnani to be from
r
).(ri CIA estimates it t) be from k-
2 5X1
-RDP80RO1720R000400040005-5
Ow-
 Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000400040005-5
Material used in private briefing of Senator John C. Stennis
on 23 October 1968 by Mr. John Maury.
Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000400040005-5