FOR:(Sanitized) DEPUTY LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL FROM PAUL V. WALSH ADDI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000400050002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 13, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR:
Paul V. Walsh
ADDI
c: D/DCI/NIO
L-c
Ed Proctor and most of the still surviving
warriors of the campaign. Other than the two
copies that I gather you will ask the DCI if you
can send to the Hill, I don't think we should
send it anywhere until we have requests that
can ha satisfied by this paper.
vetted with George Carver,
ground paper on Sam Adams. It has been
Deputy Legislative Counsel
Attached are three copies of the hack-
FORM NO. IV I REPLACES FORM 1D-'1O1
1 AUG 5A WHICH MAY BE USED;.
13 June 1975
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1:3ack 'round Statement on Samuel A. darns
2. As an analyst on Indochina affairs, Mr. Adams under-
took in mid-1966 a number of research tasks which were a major
factor leading to substantial differences within the Intelligence
Community regarding estimates of enemy strength in South Vietnam.
These differences became the jubject of extended discussion in
1967 during the preparation of a special national intelligence
estimate, SNIE 14. 3/67, "Capabilities of the Vietnamese C0171,-
munists for Fighting in South Vietnam. rr (The nature of these
differences is presented in Annex A).
His concern
b
a
out this matter led to his filing in
May 1918 of a formal complaint t
o the Inspector General,
questioning the overall conduct of intelligence research on
the Vietnam war, and, ultimately, to a charge of deliberate
fabrication of intelligence estimates.
The Order of :Battle Issue
4. As a result of research conducted by Mr. Adams in
1966, it became clear to observers in Washington that the of-
ficial MACV, J-2, order of battle numbers understated by a
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considerable margin the actual size of the enemy forces in
South Vietnam. The fact of this understatement was accepted
in the Agency although there were substantial differences of
view on the magnitude of the differences and the accuracy and
confidence which could be ascribed to either Mr. Adams'
estimates or to MACV's numbers.
5. The disparities between Washington and MACV were
also broadened because of varying methodologies used to
estimate enemy strength and differing views on what categories
should be included in such estimates. The lack of agreement
between CIA and MACV was reinforced by two factors:
a. The difference between an order of battle
and an estimate of enemy forces; and
b. Different concepts of what constituted the
enemy threat in SouthVietnam.
-- An order of battle is a meticulous accounting
of enemy units which are accepted only after they
have met very rigid criteria such as the capture of
prisoners or a certain number of official documents
from the unit headquarters. This methodology ensures
that the order of battle figures will always be conserva-
tive and tend to lag behind events.
--- An estimate of enemy forces, on the other
hand, uses less rigid acceptance criteria and attempts
to quantify known gaps in the order of battle by making
reasoned judgments about the size of forces, in the
absence of hard data. Thus, an estimate will usually
produce much higher figures than an order of battle.
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6. In addition, MACV's view of the enemy threat was
to see it strictly in terms of combat forces, their support
forces and armed guerrillas. CI.A has always accepted this
MACV view as a reasonable definition of the combat threat.
In terms of coping effectively with the situation in South Vietnam,
however, CIA thought that the total insurgency threat should be
considered. This would include, in addition to the forces counted
in the order of battle, other organized groups such as self-
defense forces (armed militia) and the political infrastructure.
7. The historical differences between MACV and Wash-
ington are usually recounted as a debate about numbers. To a
great extent this was true. But there were also significant
differences of view as to how the various enemy organizations
should be characterized, even if there were agreement on their
numerical strength. A numerical estimate of the size of enemy
forces, for example, would have been deficient if there were no
textual qualifications marking the substantial disparities between
the combat capabilities of a Main Force combat unit and a Self-
:Defense or Assault Youth organization. Many of the difficulties
Mr. Adams experienced were due to his inability to obtain
agreement among his colleagues on the qualitative clarifications
necessary to such estimates.
8. In any event Mr. Adams was provided opportunities
for his views to be heard, not only by his peers, but by most of
the senior line officers in the Agency charged with the production
of intelligence on the Vietnam war. In addition to the normal
day-to-day exchanges of views, Mr. Adams was able to present
his views during a number of major attempts to resolve Community
differences on the strength of enemy forces. These included:
a. His attendance, in February 1967, at a
conference in Honolulu on the order of battle
question.
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b. His participation in the Community drafting
of SNIE 14. 3/67. During the preparation of this
estimate, Mr. Adams was provided extensive
opportunities to expound his views on enemy
strengths, including full briefings of the Board
of National Estimates.
c. His participation as a member of the
Agency team that attended an order of battle
conference in Saigon in September 1967 in an
attempt to reach agreed numbers for SNIE 14. 3/67.
d. His participation in the drafting of a
number of papers that were the basis of a CIA-
sponsored conference on enemy order of battle
held in Washington in April 1968.
9. Despite these opportunities Mr. Adams failed to
obtain full and unswerving acceptance of his estimates of the
size of enemy forces. It was generally believed, by both his
peers and his superiors, that considerably more research
and analysis needed to be made before a conclusive and decisive
challenge could be made to the MACV point of view. Even so,
the main thrust of his views was generally accepted and was
presented in a number of official Agency publications or state-
ments.
10. In sum, CIA's official position throughout the period
was that the official MACV order of battle for enemy forces
in South Vietnam needed to be revised upward substantially.
The extent of this upward revision could not be stated precisely
at that time and certainly could not be stated with the confidence
and certainty that Mr. Adams asserted. A number of Agency
publications alerted the most senior levels of the Government
to the differences regarding the enemy threat and presented
Agency estimates which were significantly higher than those of
MACV. These included:
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a. A June 1966 memorandum stating CIA
acknowledgment of the general accuracy of M ACV'S
order of battle figures but suggesting that the use
of less conservative acceptance criteria might
increase the figures by one-third.
b. One of the so-called "1%1cNamara reports, "
issued in August 1966, which pointed out that work
underway suggested that our holdings on the numerical
strength of enemy irregular forces ". . . may require
drastic upward revision. " These special assessments
of the war in Vietnam were prepared at the request
of the Secretary of Defense and were also disseminated
to such senior officials as the Secretary of State, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Walt Rostow,
Assistant to the President.
c. A November 1966 memorandum on Viet Cong
recruitment prepared for Robert W. Komer, Special
Assistant to the President, in which the Agency noted
that reappraisals underway indicated that current
estimates of Viet Cong irregular forces may have
drastically understated their growth.
d. A December 1966 report on North Vietnamese
manpower prepared for the Deputy Secretary of Defense.
In this report the Agency discussed the variances in
estimates of enemy forces depending upon the methodologies
used. This report also presented Agency estimates of
irregular forces which were in large measure the product
of research by Mr. Adams.
e. CIA assessments prepared in May 1967 expressed
the Agency's strong reservations about the accuracy of
official order of battle figures and clearly warned that
the US and its Allies were facing ". . . a total organized
opposition far larger than accepted official figures have
indicated."
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f. A memorandum prepared in June 1967 for
Ambassador Leonhart which used a total enemy strength
estimate, including political cadre, which again reflected
the product of Mr. Adams' research.
g. A CIA assessment prepared in December 1967
which, while using the numbers agreed at the order of
battle conference held in Saigon in September 1967,
expressed our concerns that the numbers were too low
and did not include other sizeable components in the
Communist force structure.
h. A joint CIA/Joint Staff/DIA memorandum of
February 1968 which used the high CIA estimates for an
analysis of enemy manpower infiltration. This memo-
randum was transmitted to the Secretary of Defense by
the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
11. As pointed out above, the CIA's assessments of
enemy strength, which were higher than those,of others, re-
flected much of Mr. Adams' work. The frequency with which
these judgments were presented to the most senior levels of
Government demonstrate quite conclusively that the Agency
did not suppress intelligence which challenged military estimates
as Mr. Adams charges.
The 1968, Complaint to the Inspector General
12. On 27 May 1968 Mr. Adams filed a formal complaint
with the Inspector General in which he called into question the
overall conduct of intelligence research on the Vietnam war.
He cited four basic complaints: a misuse of research manpower;
misdirection of research effort; a want of courage in advancing
well-documented findings concerning Viet Cong manpower; and
a lethargy in correcting past :failures.
13. Mr. Adams' charges received an extremely thorough
and extensive investigation on the part of the staff of the Inspector
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General. Their report, which did not accept the validity of Mr.
Adams' charges, was completed and submitted to the Executive
Director on 1 August 1968. Because of the gravity of the charges,
and particularly because Mr. Adams' complaint put Mr. Helms'
own role in question, Mr. Helms decided to appoint, under the
chairmanship of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, a
review board of some of the most senior officials of CIS. to look
into the charges and to advise him on the course of action that
he should take.
14. The report of the review board which was submitted
on 1 November 1968 reaffirmed the findings of the Inspector
General I s
The review boarcIl s repor
also recommended forwarding :Mr. Adams' charges and the
Inspector General's report to the Chairman of the President's
Forejcm Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB).
15. The Deputy Director, CIA, discussed the case with
the Chairman of the PFIAB and the Inspector General met with
the Chairman, PFIAB, on 18 November 1968 to discuss the case.
On 25 November 1968 the Deputy Director briefed the members of
PFIAB on the case and on 3 December 1968 Mr. Adams met with
the Executive Secretary of PFIAB.
16. At this point, Agency management regarded hearings
and investigation into Mr. Adams' complaints as concluded. Mr.
Adams was invited, however, by Mr. Helms to submit recommenda.--
tions for reform within the Agency to correct the alleged mishandling
of the Vietnam account. These recommendations were completed
and submitted in Januar 196
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21. In May, Mr. Adams announced his decision to resign
from the Agency, effective as of 1 June 1973.
The 1972 Complaints
22. On 4 December 1972 Mr. Adams called at the Office
of the Inspector General to relate his intention to file two new
charges concerning the management of intelligence research on
the war in Southeast Asia. The first charge involved the alleged
fabrication of order of battle statistics by officers of the Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). The second charge in-
volved the alleged fabrication of statistics on enemy logistics and
order of battle by the Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence
(ADDS), CIA. Mr. Adams was instructed to state his complaints
in writing.
23. Mr. Adams' charges against MACV were filed with
the Inspector General in a memorandum dated 8 December 1972.
This memorandum was forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff
for Intelligence, US Army, for whatever action he considered
appropriate. Mr. Adams was informed in January 1973 by the
Department of the Army that it had no authority to conduct in-
vestigations of Joint Headquarters such as MACV. He was also
informed that the controversy about which he was complaining
had been the subject of previous investigations by appropriate
authorities.
24. During the interval between January 1973 and his
resignation in June 1973, Mr. Adams failed to put his charges
against the ADDI in writing and submit them. At the time of
-9-
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his oral complaint, the Office of the Inspector General was
conducting a routine inspection of the Office of Economic Re-
search, the office with responsibility for the matters on which
statistics allegedly had been fabricated. In the course of that
inspection, representatives of the Inspector General interviewed
officers working on these matters. The results of these inter-
views emphasized the complexity of the subject, in terms of the
hard evidence available and the analytical problems involved,
rather than pointing to fabrication of statistics. In the absence
of information supporting Mr. Adams' oral statement, and
because of his failure to formalize his charges in writing, the
Inspector General did not pursue the matter further.
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TAB
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Annex A
The 1967 Saigon Order of Battle Conference
During the spring and summer of 1967 the Intelligence
Community was tasked to produce a special national intelligence
estimate, SNIE 14. 3/67, Capabilities'of the Vietnamese Conm_-m
munists for Fighting in South Vietnam. During the preparation
of this SNIT, the Intelligence Community was unable to reach
agreement on the order of battle figures and estimates of
communist forces in South Vietnam. Representatives of both
MACV and CINCPAC were invited to the drafting sessions to
present their position, but after extended debate it was apparent
that agreement could not be reached.
Therefore, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General Wheeler, and the Director of Central Intelligence,
Mr. Helms, agreed to send a delegation from the Washington
Intelligence Community to Saigon to discuss the issues with
MACV in the hope that a consensus judgment on these numbers
and strength estimates could be reached. The Washington
delegation was headed by the DCI's Special Assistant for
Vietnamese Affairs. It included the Chief of the Far East
Staff of the Office of National Estimates, two analysts
(including Mr. Adams) from CIA's Directorate of Intelligence,
two analysts from the Defense Intelligence Agency, and one
analyst from the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence
and Research.
VIr. Adams' account of the September 1967 conference
in Saigon has some elements of fact and a considerable amount
of distortion. Mr. .Adams' account of the conference proceedings
is particularly in error on two major points:
a. His allegation that a cable from Director
Helms gave the Washington delegation no choice
but to accept the MACV numbers has no basis in
fact. There was no such cable.
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b: His allegation that the Washington
delegation accepted "the military's numbers"
is also inaccurate. The results of the conference
show clearly that the military numbers were not,
in fact, accepted.
The attached table presents the quantitative data reflecting
the positions of MACV and the Washington drafters of the SNIE
regarding the organized groups judged to constitute the enemy
threat in South Vietnam. It also shows the final agreement that
was reached at the conference. It should be noted that for those
categories making up the VC/NVA -Military Force (Main and Local
force, Administrative Service troops, and Guerrillas), the final
agreed figures and those used in the published draft of SNIE 14. 3/67
were within the range of the figures used by the Washington com-
munity in its August draft of the SNIE. The agreed figures also
reflected an acceptance by MACV of a range significantly higher
than the estimate it had submitted at the conference.
The two most contentious categories were Administrative
Services (support) troops and the category of the Irregular Forces.
In each instance neither party to the conference was able to convince
the other of the validity of its case.
Regarding the Administrative Services category, it was
agreed that the quantification---35, 000 to 40, 000--required
textual qualification. Thus, the printed SNIE acknowledged
explicitly that we lacked confidence in the total size of this
category at any given time but that it was 'lat least 35, 000 to
40, 000" (exclusive of any such units located outside South
Vietnam even though they may have been supporting forces in
the DMZ and western highlands). In addition, the estimate
pointed out that almost anyone under VC control could be
impressed into service to perform the administrative service
functions.
The most contentious issue at this conference was whether
or not the category of Irregulars should or could be quantified.
MACV felt quite strongly that these forces did not constitute part
of the military threat and that there was not sufficient knowledge
to quantify them. The Washington view was that while these
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forces did not constitute part of the combat threat they certainly
were an integral element of the entire organized enemy effort
with which the United States Government was trying to cope and,
therefore, should be included in any assessment of enemy
capabilities.
The conference decision not to quantify the Irregular
Forces in the SNIE reflected a.general agreement that our
information on these forces was such that we could not estimate
their size with any high degree of confidence. In order to make
sure, however, that the recipients of the SNIE understood that
these forces were a substantial factor in Vietnam, it was agreed
that they would be described textually, in terms of the types of
people included in the Irregulars category and their functions
and responsibilities. Furthermore, the SNIE stated that in early
1966 the aggregate size of the self-defense force could have been
on the order of 150, 000. Although allowing for some attrition of
these forces, the language of the SNIE made it quite clear that
they still constituted a substantial element in the communist effort.
Finally, the SNIE went to some length to make sure that
its readers did not focus solely on the numbers assigned to the
communist military force, i. e., the "order of battle, " narrowly
defined. The SNIE pointed out that organized military force
constituted but one component of the total communist organization.
It noted, further, that any comprehensive judgment of communist
capabilities in South Vietnam must consider the effectiveness of
all the elements comprising that organization which, in its total size,
would be considerably greater than the numbers ascribed to the military
forces alone.
As one observer pointed out, the debate over these numbers
produced more heat than light. The fundamental problem was the
lack of definitive data which led to disagreements about numbers
based on different methodologies and concepts. The results of the
conference were certainly not fully acceptable to any party. But
the differing views were fully aired. and were made widely known
to all concerned with developments in Indochina. In addition the
need for better data spurred the various components of the Intel-
ligence Community to mount new efforts for collection and the
additional research and analysis necessary to narrow the range of
uncertainty and improve the Community's confidence in its
estimates of comm unist strength in South Vietnam.
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The 1967 Saigon Order of Battle Conference
Estimated Strength of Communist Forces in South Vietnam
Category
August Draft
SNIE 14.3/67
MACV
Conference
Agreement
Final
SNIE 14.3/67
VC/NVA Military Force
Main and Local Forces
121 , 000
119,000
119,000
118,000
Administrative Services
40
- 60,000
29,000
35
- 40,000*
35
- 40,000* `.
(Support)
Guerrillas
60
- 100,000
65,000
70
- 90,000
70
- 90,000
Sub-Total
221
- 281,000
213,000
224
- 249,000
223
- 248,000
Other Organizations
Political Cadre
90,000
85,000
75
- 85,000
75
- 85,000
Irregulars
120,000
No Quantification*
No Quantification*
(Self-Defense Forces )
k,(Secret Self-Defense Forces)
(Assault Youth )
431,000 -
299,000 -
298,000 -
491 , 000
298,000
334,000
333,000
* To be qualified in the text of SNiE 14.3/67
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