THE CULT OF MISINTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000400050033-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 33
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

Approved For Release 2004/12/22: CIA-RDP80R0172OR0004000
LETTERS
The cult of misintelligence
Either Sam Adams's article ["Viet-
nam Cover-Up: Playing War With
Numbers," May] was heavily edited
or Sam's memory isn't so good these
days. There was no cover-up in the
CIA.
Most of the knowledgeable people
in the CIA, including the director
and myself, thought Sam's analysis.
of the strength of the VC had merit.
The question was, How much merit?
Most agreed that, where the evidence
existed, Sam's figures could be sup-
ported. But where there was little or
no evidence, considerable doubt ex-
isted as to how reliable Sam's extrap-
olations were. Sam thought his ex-
trapolations to be sound. Other equal-
ly competent and knowledgeable
analysts and their supervisors were
not so sure.
As I remember the consensus, it
was that VC strength was indeed a
good deal greater than had been es-
timated but probably not as much
greater as Sam thought. Even the
CIA was inclined to agree, but Mil-
itary Assistance Command headquar-
ters remained skeptical. Sam wanted
to take the matter directly to the
President. Our director-quite cor-
rectly, I thought-didn't feel he
could do that without stronger evi-
dence and a consensus in support
of it.
The director asked me to look into
the matter. I did so and spent con-
siderai,!e time on the question, in-
cluding a long interview with Sam
which he neglects to mention, or per-
haps he confused it with the one he
memo of our conversation, and I
agreed to its substance.
As a result of all this, I discussed
the matter with the chairman of the
President's Foreign Intelligence Ad-
visory Board. He then arranged to
have Patrick Coyne, executive sec-
retary of that board, interview Sam
Adams. This was done.
The net result was that we could
perceive no merit in presenting Sam
and his conclusions to the President,
and that close scrutiny and revision
of VC strength figures should be con-
tinued as evidence became available
and along the lines he had pursued.
Sam was not satisfied with that de-
cision and kept insisting that ar-,
rangements be made for him to pre-
sent his case personally to at least the
PFIAB and Rostow.
At that point Helms and the rest
of us had had enough of what I con-
sidered intellectual arrogance on
Sam's part, so I told him in writing
to get back to work with the rest of
the team or resign and pursue his
campaign on his own time. At no
time do I recall Sam Adams being
suppressed, ignored, or restrained or
his ideas pigeonholed, nor was any
question of security restraint raised.
I think Harper's owes an apology
to Messrs. Graham, Procter, and Hy-
land for the gratuitous and insulting
comments it printed about them.
RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Whispering Pines, N.C.
The writer was Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence from 1966
to 1969.
says he had with our then executive Sam Adams's article presents
director. Anyway, Sam made a long distorted picture of the CIA's ana-
lytical effort on Vietnam. Harper's
has become an accomplice in an un-
justified attack on precisely those ele-
ments of the CIA-the Directorate
of Intelligence and the Office of Na-
tional Estimates-that worked con-
sistently to put forth an honest and
objective picture of Communist ca-
pabilities and determination to ;pro
long the war against the imposing
military might assembled by the U.S.
government.
This work comprised a vast out-
pouring of studies on Communist
logistics, Communist manpower re-
sources in both South and North Viet-
nam, and the effects of U.S. air
bombing (a subject which involved
the Agency in long and sometimes
bitter arguments with the U.S. Sev-
enth Air Force). The product of this
work went to the President and the
principal members of the National
Secerity Council (Secretaries of State
and Defense).
By mid-1967, if not by mid-1966,
the Agency had clearly passed the
word that the Communists' manpow-
er resources were adequate to sustain
the war, that their logistics system
was bearing up under bombardment,
and that the Hanoi leadership was
determined to protract the struggle.
Unfortunately, Adams fails to take
any of this work into account and he
conveys a misleading impression of
a single-handed and lonely struggle
to get the truth about the war to the
White House against the massive op-
position of countless knaves and cow-
ards. His charge that his research
findings were suppressed does not
stand up against a careful reading
of his article. And his assumption
that these findings were generally ac-
cepted within the CIA is a distortion
Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR000400050033-3
 LETTERS
of the facts. q!'l ,asV Q41! 1224 (dA D QA OR9Wtl00@0Q8b64adquarters to an
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order-of-battle analysis, was arcane
and complex. This was particularly
the case when dealing with paramil-
itary or irregular forces that do not
appear on the battlefield in regular
units. Adams's methodology for es-
timating the strength of these irreg-
ular and paramilitary forces often
raised more questions than it an-
swered. He was dependent on cap-
tured Communist documents, which
meant that there were valid questions
as to the timeliness and accuracy of
the data as well as to the statistical
significance of the available sample.
Beyond the question of the numbers
of Communist irregulars was the
larger question of their military ca-
pabilities and staying power. There
was always room for debate on these
points, but it is clear that there was
no neglect of the subject.
One paper which dealt with all
these issues at length was the 1967
National Intelligence Estimate on
Vietnam, which Adams describes as
a sellout to the "generals" on the
order-of-battle figures. Apparently
Adams was so obsessed with his own
figures that he never read the entire
paper. It included an extended dis-
cussion of order-of-battle method-
ology, with particular attention to
the problems of estimating strengths
of paramilitary forces. It also pro-
vided a lengthy discussion of the var-
ious categories of Communist irreg-
ulars and the nature of their contri-
bution to the total Communist effort.
The paper -as a whole gave a fair
and objective picture of Communist
strengths and weaknesses. I stand by
it and would welcome action by the
CIA to release it to the public.
In my twenty-five years in the CIA
I never saw an analyst given more in-
dividual attention, more opportuni-
ties to present his evidence and state
his case. Yet the impression created
by the Harper's article is that of a
man whose work was suppressed and
whose views were ignored. Many of
us were sympathetic to Sam because
of his diligence and persistence, but
these traits were not uncommon
among the many outstanding ana-
lysts at the CIA. Adams was only un-
common in his inability to see that
the Board of National Intelligence
SAM ADAMS REPLIES:
-. Vice Adm. Rufus L. Taylor and
Mr. James C. Graham suggest that in
arguing with the military over Viet-
cong strength in_1967 and 1968 I
somehow got carried away. Vice Ad-
miral Taylor ascribes my zeal for
higher numbers to "intellectual arro-
gance," Mr. Graham to an obsession.
The dispute over numbers, they say,
was a reasonable debate between rea-
sonable men over different ways of
counting enemy soldiers.
As they ought to know, however,
the real concern at that time was that
the military was deliberately lower-
ing VC numbers in order to promote
an "image of success." I did not
make this phrase up. It appeared on
August 21, 1967, in a secret cable
composed by General Abrams, ap-
proved by General Westmoreland,
and sent to General Wheeler-head
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-and fi-
nally to Mr. Helms, Director of the
CIA.
The principal reason for dropping
two categories from the order of bat-
tle, the cable said, was that the press
would draw "an erroneous and
gloomy" conclusion if the categories
were left in and that "all those who
have an incorrect view of the war
will be reinforced and [our] task
will become more difficult." I found
this argument outrageous, and I
would be surprised if both Vice Ad-
miral Taylor and Mr. Graham did
not feel the same way.
In my opinion, some of the ac-
tions taken to slash enemy strength
figures may well have constituted a
violation of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, particularly that ar-
y, e su
ortunate
outlying post.
vived the war to tell Senate investi-
gators looking into intelligence mat
Two months later, in April 1968,
the same head of the OB Section, a
Lieutenant Colonel Weiler, appeared
at CIA headquarters with Brig. Gen.
Daniel O. Graham to argue for the
lower numbers. The question arises
whether General Graham-one. of
the persons to whom Admiral Tay-
lor thinks Harper's should apologize
-was aware of the alleged falsifica-
tion. If he was, the question then be-
comes whether Daniel Graham, now
head of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, should keep his job.
Unfortunately, sufficient space has
not been allotted to me to answer
Mr. Graham and Admiral Taylor's
criticisms point by point. I have,
however, spent several days going
over the points raised in the Harper's
article with Senate investigators, and
I have hopes that more will be heard
on this subject through the commit-
tee's continuing work. My concern at
this time is that the controversy not
stray from the central question at
issue here. The question is twofold:
first, whether we now have in our
intelligence establishment the com-
petence to accurately evaluate poten-
tial and existing threats to our na-
tion's security; second, whether we
have the courage and the integrity to
present this information, no matter
how unpopular it might be, to the
men in government who presumably
rely on it to formulate a rational for-
eign policy. -1
Hunting hunters
title which forbids false official state- ago
ments. For example, in February berin
ere was a rock star a few years
o gained notoriety by dismem-
baby doll onstage. That is
charitable analogy I can
a lieutenant in Westmoreland's the mo
1968
,
Order of Battle Section returned to draw to 9
his desk in Saigon to find that his ers Unlimi
superiors had cut one of the cate- ble analogies
gories still remaining in the order of Sen. Joe McC
cer Brown's act ["Hunt-
" May]. Less charita-
battle from some 80,000 to about neurotic fears o
40 000. Incredulous-since the Cate- liberal minority
uld be with the late
, who channelled
gory was his analytical responsibil- Nixon, who similar
inority upon the
and since he had seen no evi- neurotic fears of the
ity
,
he, like the rest of us, was occasion- dente to justify the drop-he went to the political minority;
and in his belief that all the chief and deputy chief of the students.
fallible
all
,
y
reed with his findings had Order of Battle Section to demand Due to the circumstance
di
h
w
o
sag
b nd ulterior motives an explanation. "Lie a little, Mac, lie ern living and the reduced
s
a
hats upon
activist
a
e
" he was told. He refused to habitat, hunters are a minori
JAMES C GRAHAM a little
,
. Potomac, Md. do so, and was transferred from the U.S., and Brown is using the
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annelled the