ORGANIZATION ON THE INDOCHINA PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000400060008-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: July 15, 1970
• Content Type: MF

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m y 1970
MMRAHi}U F0Rc Dr. Henry A. Kies
S TBJECTs Organisation on the Indochina Problem
1. 1 am the first to recognise that I have already discussed
with and with Alexis Johnson the problem of how the Ooven nt
should organize to fight the political and military war in Indo-
china. Therefore, this memorandum may strike you as redundant or un-
realistic in light of the complexities inherent in the "bureaucracy".
Nevertheless, I risk your ire, because I genuinely believe that the
issue involved is one of great importance. I an much persuaded that
Hanoi regards the battle for Vietnam as a single struggle involving
Laos and Cambodia as well. If one accepts this belief" valid,
a corollary is that to combat the North Vietnamese effectively and
efficiently, the United States should also view Laos, Cambodia, and
Vietnam as component elements of a single struggle and conduct its
affairs accordingly.
2. When one looks today at how this Government conducts its
affairs in the Indochina area, one comes across the followings A
plethora of working level and policy level groups and corittees?
with much overlapping membership, are grappling with various com-
ponent parts of the total Indochina problem but in a way that almost
precludes effective, efficient address to the total problem. We
have, for example, an DISC Vietnam ad hoc subcommittee which specifically
avoids considering Laos or Cambodia, a Laos ad hoc committee which
does not look at Vietnam (and whose activities have waned as those
of YSAC have waxed) s a Vietnam Special Studies Group which is dif-
ferent from both, and various subgroups of all three -?- some of which
work on overlapping problems (e.g., cease fire, where there has long
been a subgroup working on cease fire under Tyr. Sullivan's NSC
Vietnam subcommittee and there is also a VSSG Working Group cease-
fire panel, under a different chairman,, with overlapping but dif-
ferent membership). One special ad hoc group drafts the response to
R 5M-9L , another drafts the response to NSSM 95, while the VSSG
Working Group, in an organizationally separate exercise (but using
some of the same people), drafts a different paper that materially
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bears on the conclusions of both. Meanwhile, the VI4a0, or its
working group, ploughs the same, or adjacent, terrain in separate
fashion though, again, with some overlapping membership. This
whole arrangement virtually guarantees duplicate efforts, con-
fusion, wasted energy, missed opporttunities, and poor staff work
to support decision-making echelons of the government, including
the President and yourself.
3. It would seem to me that a drastic rationalization and
consolidation of this staff support and coordination effort would
be of great benefit to the United States Goverment and those who
determine its policies,, particularly since the latter have every
right to expect that the government's full resources will be ef-
ficiently marshalled to support and implement their decisions.
I. I am certainly no organization expert,, but I recognise
that when one is critical of a condition, one should not stop at
carping. One should at least have a suggestion. I would, there-
fore, recommend that there be appointed within the NSC staff a
single senior officer who would serve full-time as, in effect, your
Indochina manager. This officer should relieve you of detailed
concern on Indochina matters, and should have a small staff asatting
him on a full-time basis. He should chair an interagency committee
whose members from appropriate agencies should be of at least two-
or three-star rank or at a civilian equivalent. This group would
replace the present VSS3 Working Group,. the Vietnam ad hoc group,
the Laos ad hoc group, and all similar bodies. Its members would
have direct access to their respective principals and be empowered
to vote their agency's stock on routine matters. it is not en-
visaged that this Indochina Conrsittee would attempt on its own to
do substantive analysis or detailed operational planning. Instead
it should levy such tasks on the component of goverment most
directly responsible, asking that component to prepare a draft with
the participation and in consultation with other government com-
ponents. The Chairman of the Indochina Committee would confine
himself to setting terms of reference for commissioned projects,
reviewing the drafts, directing revisions, assembling completed
packages for policy review, and insuring that policy decisions are
in fact carried out. The Committee would, of course, report to you
and to whatever higher authorities you deemed appropriate or
desirable .
Richard Helms
Director
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