MEETING WITH SECRETARY LAIRD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000400060013-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2004
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: April 7, 1970
• Content Type: MFR

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7 April 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Meeting With Secretary Laird
TIME AND PLACE: Secretary Laird's Office, Tuesday, 7 April
1445-1530
PERSONS PRESENT: Secretary Laird, General Pursley, Mr. Carver
1. South Vietnam. 1 opened by commenting on the current
flurry of Communist military -activity in South Vietnam initiated on the
night of 31 March. This flurry was still going on and there was some
evidence that the Communists planned to re-cycle with additional
attacks on or about 7 April. The rnagnitu.de of the current rise depended
on the time period one used for the purposes of comparison. The
present level of Communist activity was considerably higher than
anything yet.- seen in 1970, but still did not exceed the level of various
high points launched by Communist forces during 1969.
2. Communist objectives were somewhat obscure, particularly
since the current activity cycle appeared to have been initially planned
for February. The launch mateseems to have been slipped for various
reasons, almost certainly including the effectiveness of pre-emptive
allied spoiling operations. Among other things, Hanoi was clearly trying
to remind. the South Vietnamese, and the world, that Communist military
forces were still very much present in South Vietnam. and still had
considerable capabilities. Thus at least part of the current activity
round's `,objectives lay in the psychological and propaganda field. Hanoi
also probably wanted to get US casualties back up into- three digits for
at least a couple of weeks and to probe for possible ARVN weaknesses,
questing for a tactical success with political overtones. Furthermore,
Hanoi almost certainly wanted to keep the ARVN, and the US, fairly
busy in South Vietnam in order to dampen enthusiasm for incursions
into Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia.
3. The current round of activity was probably not stage-setting
for moves in the political or diplomatic field. If the noise level remained
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high for more than another week or so, however, this judgment would
have to be reviewed.
4. On the domestic front, there is a considerable amount of
stirring in the South Vietnamese political pot. We briefly discussed
the lingering echoes of the Chau case in Saigon, the GVN's problems with
the students, and the current demonstrations of the disabled veterans
who are seeking greater financial benefits from the government. I
made the point that although Thieu does not at the moment have a
political crisis on his hands, he will have to play his cards with somewhat
greater finesse than he has shown in the past week if he is to avoid
generating some rather sharp outcries and considerable static from
both the Saigon politicians and the international, particularly American,
press.
5. Laos. We discussed the current pattern of enemy activity in
northern Laos, particularly in the area around Sarn Thong and Long Tieng
and the Plaine des Jarres. I noted that the North Vietnamese juggernaut
which had rolled across the Plaine in late February and early March
seemed td be stalled, at least momentarily. The evidence available
strongly suggested that Hanoi's forces had outrun their supplies and,
hence, had been compelled to pause and regroup. Because of the Meo
forces capture of enemy caches last summer and -fall, in this spring's
campaign the North Vietnamese Army was unable to move into pre-
positioned -stockpiles and, hence, was compelled to live :off its own
logistic tail. This made it much more vulnerable to being stalled or
inhibited by aerial interdiction.
6. The brief breathing space of the past few weeks had been put
to good use by Vang Pao's MR II forces to reinforce Long Tieng, retake
Sam Thong, and generally improve their defensive positions and prospects.
Thus things have been looking up slightly over the last week or two.
Nonetheless, we could-not guarantee that the picture would remain bright
when the North Vietnamese troops once again started to move, axticularly
when or if they committed the 312th Division.
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7. I made the general point that while we could not guarantee
that Long Tieng would be held, the longer we were able to delay the
North Vietnamese advance and keep Communist forces working in the
general vicinity of MR II Headquarters, the better chance we stood of
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stalling Hanoi's offensive at least through this year's campaign season.
Thus every day, and particularly every week, gained was a net political
plus. Laird noted that the Air Force was a1s
stallin o eration.
9. Cambodia. I explained the current situation in Cambodia
and also tried to explain why post-18 March events there constituted
a potential change in the total Indochina situation of very great magnitude.
Hanoi's whole style of fighting the war depended heavily on the relatively
undistrubed use of Cambodian sanctuaries. The loss of these sanctuaries
could affect North Vietnam's campaign as adversely as the. Greek
Communist insurgency immediately following World War II was affected
by the closing of the Albanian and Yugoslav frontiers.
10. I also pointed out that the Cambodian situation could not
remain static and that Hanoi was already moving briskly in a very hard-
nosed fashion to coerce the Lon Nol government into resuming apre-
18 March posture or, failing that, to unseat it. Meanwhile, the US still
seemed unable to make up its mind what it wanted to do. This was very
much a situation in which inaction was clearly a course of action-with its
own attendant risks. If the President, after review of all available
information and a careful weighing of pro's and con'r~ should opt to do
nothing, that was clearly his constitutional prerogative. I hoped, however,
that if the US Government did not respond to the situation, its non-response
was the result of a deliberate Presidential decision and not'siinple
bureaucratic inertia or inadvertence.
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11. I also explained to Secretary Laird that this was a situation
in which President Thieu would be certain to follow his concept of South
Vietnam's national interests regardless of what the US decided to do.
Thieu had long been concerned that even under the most optimum
internal circumstances, Vietnamization vould never, succeed so long
as North Vietnamese forces enjoyed sanctuary in Cambodia from which
they could sally forth whenever they wished to. Thieu had expressed
these views very bluntly to a number of people and, for that matter,
had spelled them out in considerable detail to me last November. Thus
Thieu was bound to see the current situation in Cambodia as a windfall
he could not ignore. I was certain that regardless of what Thieu might
or might not say to Ambassador Bunker, ARVN forces would respond'
to Cambodian requests for assistance and would probably mount
operations against Communist sanctuaries whenever an opportunity
afforded itself. Laird agreed with my assessment of Thieu's views and
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12. Laird asked what we should do to assist Lon Nol. I replied
that we did not need to do very much at this stage. We did need to
convey quietly and privately to him the fact that the US Government
strongly supported genuine Cambodian neutrality, did not want to
complicate his position, but was prepared to provide some discreet
assistance if he needed it and if the provision of it was not politically
counter-productive. I also pointed out that we needed to be able to talk
with Lon Nol and his colleagues and perhaps give them some discreet
advice. For example, the Cambodian Government was now making public
noises about -eliminating the institution of monarchy and setting up a
republic. In my view, this would be a tactical blunder of the first order.
The Cambodian peasantry had an almost mystical reverence for the throne
as an institution and an attack on this institution would give Sihanouk
and his Communist supporters a great deal of political leverage. On the
other hand, properly played, the monarchy issue could be turned against
Sihanouk, probably with considerable effect.. Sihanouk, strictly speaking,
was not the legitimate heir to the throne - - a fact of which he is well
aware and about which he has always been sensitive. When King Monivong
died in 1941, Admiral Decoux (then French_Gavernor General) arranged
for Prince Monireth, the King's eldest son, to be passed over and for
the throne to be given to his nephew, Norodom Sihanouk, then a student
in a French lycee in Saigon. In lieu of establishing a republic, the Lon
Nol government would do well to consider putting Monireth on the throne
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and taking the tack that after a 30-year period of usurpation by Sihanouk,
it was restoring rightful legitimacy.
13. In any event, it seemed to me that this was the sort of thin
the US Government should be thinking about
14. With a rather owlish smile, Laird said he agreed with my
views on Cambodia and had in fact been urging substantially the same
general line on Kissinger that morning (though he had not taken up the
monarchy issue, not having known the details involved). He said he was
also prepared to raise this again with the President and hoped there
would be some further action in this area in-the vexy near future. On
that note our meeting ended.
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